




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LECTURES
ON
ANCIENT HISTORY.

VOL. III.

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11 LECTURES
ON
ANCIENT HISTORY,

FROM
THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TAKING OF
ALEXANDRIA BY OCTAVIANUS.

COMPRISING
THE HISTORY OF THE ASIATIC NATIONS, THE EGYPTIANS,
GREEKS, MACEDONIANS AND CARTHAGINIANS.

BY
B. G. NIEBUHR.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN EDITION OF DR. MARCUS NIEBUHR,
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RECTOR OF THE HIGH SCHOOL OF EDINBURGH,
WITH ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS FROM HIS OWN MS. NOTES.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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ANCIENT HISTORY.

IT might be asked,¹ whether the Greeks who, after the battle of Chaeronea, were so degenerate and dissolute, and had long ceased to be animated by that lofty spirit of freedom which had distinguished their fathers, are at all worthy of being made the subject of serious historical inquiries. I answer in the affirmative; for notwithstanding all their political insignificance, their national history still presents much that is attractive, and deserves to be known, and Greece still continued to manifest herself in the characters of individual men. They still remained a people that was great even in its fallen state, and radiant, as it were, with the reflex of the lofty genius of the extraordinary men who adorn its earlier history.

Whatever may have been the ancient freedom of the Macedonian people, the history of the Macedonian state differs in no respect from that of an eastern despotism; it records only military occurrences, and the personal adventures, and sometimes the crimes, of the ruler and his family. Although the brilliant flowers are withered, yet the history of the Greeks, even during their less illustrious period, remains that of a nation which, though it is sunk low, though it is demoralised and unhappy, yet is still powerful in intellect, and is raised far above every other nation, through its glorious history of the past. Having found the history of that nation during the period of its greatness, delightful and elevating, is it right that we should refuse our attention to its decline? It

The whole of what here follows down to the end of the Lecture (with the exception of a few sentences from the course of 1826), is taken from the Lectures delivered in 1825.—ED.

is indeed true, that the misfortunes of the Greeks during this period are not of a grand or really tragic nature, and that our interest is often diminished by treachery and other detestable and hateful actions; but there is nevertheless no lack of illustrious men and memorable exploits, such as we rarely meet with in history. In spite of all their great misdeeds, it still is very doubtful whether the Greeks of this period, deplorable as it is, were in reality much worse than their ancestors during the time of the political glory of Greece. Even Herodotus and Thucydides had to mention instances of treachery and acts of faithlessness. It is very evident that crimes could not but be multiplied at a time, when there were absolutely no prospects, and when none but bad means enabled a man to effect anything; but it may be doubted as to whether those crimes prove the corruption of the whole nation.

The decay of the Greeks does not entitle us to pronounce a sentence of condemnation upon them, as if they had deserved such a hard fate. Even if the later Greeks had been really a worse race, we ought, with a feeling of sorrow, to excuse many a weakness and even many a wicked action, considering the oppressed state of the nation. All its ancient institutions, nay, its faith itself, had vanished, and there was nothing to compensate for the loss. The imagination thus could no longer soar to any high aspirations; and wherever this is the case, everything high and noble perishes, and instead of the dominion of mind, we have that of the mere animal, seeking gain and pleasure. Man, in order to become great, must be able to aim at something which is above his animal nature. The nation possessed no less intelligence, nay, perhaps, even more than before; at least there was infinitely more knowledge, insight and philosophy, than before, but what was wanting was the lofty genius of their ancestors, and all that proceeds from, and is dependent upon it. Whatever can be made, they did make; but what cannot be made by every one, who has diligence and ambition enough to exert his powers, such as epic and lyric poetry, these things were wanting. Instead of the venerable tragedy of old, they had comedies. But on the other hand, they were farther advanced in the arts and the mechanical skill which belong to practical life. Their speculations were more subtle and logical, but there was no more grand philosophy of nature; they still possessed political sagacity, but we find no political orators.

Nor was there any lack of historians who, in practical wisdom and extent of knowledge, certainly surpassed their predecessors: Polybius is not inferior to Thucydides in point of political wisdom, but he wants the lofty genius and fiery imagination which pervade the work of the latter. The same relation which we find between Polybius and Thucydides, also subsisted between the later and the earlier Greeks generally, from the plain citizen to the statesman and warrior.

This sunken condition of the Greeks is, perhaps, one of the chief causes why their later history has been so much neglected. Another cause, however, is no doubt the want of authorities. If we except some portions of Diodorus, some fragments of Polybius, and a number of notices in Pausanias, we have but little from which we can obtain a knowledge of those times. It is possible, however, that the Vatican fragments may furnish fresh treasures, and it is scarcely credible that some fact or another should not be brought forward.

The works of several valuable historians referring to this period are lost.

Diodorus (xvi. 76) says, that Diyllus of Athens continued the history of Ephorus. He probably commenced his work with the siege of Perinthus, premising, as an introduction, the history of the Phocian war, which may have filled one book, while his general history was contained in twenty-six books. In this manner, several passages of Diodorus may be reconciled with one another. His history, which Diodorus mentions among his authorities, probably closed with the death of Agathocles.

Psaon of Plataeae—"he is sometimes also called Saon"—continued the work of Diyllus in thirty books. "To what point he extended it, cannot be ascertained." It is probable that his work contained the whole history of Antigonus Gonatas. "Even with Diyllus the Greeks were of secondary importance. Of Psaon very little is known:" he is mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, as a writer who, in regard to style, was extremely careless and negligent.

Duris of Samos, another author of this period, belonged to those who imagined that they could produce something great. He treated other writers with contempt, though he himself was not much better. He is frequently quoted by Plutarch, Cicero, and others, and was much read down to the time of

Augustus, though otherwise little is known about him. All we can say, is that he wrote a work under the title of *Μακεδονικά*, but what this, his most celebrated work, really contained, is unknown. It began with Amyntas, and related the exploits of Philip; the last subject he treated of was the life of Agathocles, so that at the time of Agathocles he was still alive, and probably survived him; for his age cannot be accurately determined. His work may have extended down to Pyrrhus' expedition to Italy and Peloponnesus, with the latter of which events the work of Phylarchus, which was a continuation either of that of Duris, or of Hieronymus of Cardia, commenced.

Phylarchus, according to Suidas, was an Athenian, and according to others, an Egyptian: the latter is impossible, but he may have been a Greek of Naucratis. It must, however, be observed, that several authors are called Naucratices from a mere learned pedantry. Naucratis was the emporium of Greek commerce in Egypt; but when Alexandria had become the great commercial city, Naucratis necessarily disappeared from history and geography. Hence many authors were called Naucratices, probably from mere pedantry, instead of Egyptian Greeks (*Αἰγυπτιώτης* and *Σικελιώτης*). The statement of Suidas seems to be more correct, and he might be called an Egyptian only in so far as he availed himself at Alexandria of the literary treasures of the Egyptian kings. It is also possible that he may have left his country only as a Greek enthusiast for freedom. His history embraced, in twenty-eight books, the expedition of Pyrrhus into Peloponnesus (Olymp. 127) down to the death of Antiochus Euergetes (Olymp. 139), "a portion of history which was also treated of by Psaon. His main subject was the history of Greece from a Greek point of view; and he may be regarded as the last national historian who treated Greece as the centre of his narrative. It was at that time very difficult to maintain this point of view, because Greece was extremely insignificant, and the patriotism and republicanism of Phylarchus are qualities, which were then quite unbecoming to a historian. Republican institutions were no more possible in Greece than they are possible in our own age; and if they were possible, they could not be considered salutary. Athens had lost her soul, and was a mere corpse, and the rest of Greece was beyond all cure. A few brilliant

feats threw Phylarchus into a state of enthusiasm, and excited his just admiration, considering his age and circumstances, Cleomenes was highly distinguished in his own way, although he was practically that which Machiavelli's Prince is only theoretically. But Phylarchus was altogether an enthusiast and a fantastic person; and his enthusiasm for Athens went so far as to become ridiculous." He was a much esteemed and much read author. Polybius, however, calls him an enemy of the Arcadians and Achaeans, charges him with base falsehood, and in general judges of him very severely. And he does indeed appear to have been thoughtless and superstitious, for he often relates the most ridiculous and improbable things.

Timæus also was an authority for the history of Greece, during the period from the battle of Chaeronea to the death of Agathocles. In Greece, he was not very popular, but he fared better in Sicily and Italy, where he was more extensively read, and almost threw Ephorus into the shade.

Hieronymus of Cardia, the companion and private secretary of Alexander, who afterwards lived with the excellent Eumenes, likewise wrote a history of his own time, and of the successors and descendants of Alexander; the campaigns of Pyrrhus also were contained in it, not in a separate work, and it perhaps extended down to the time when Phylarchus commenced. He was a talented historian, whence we have the more reason to lament the loss of his work. He always lived at the court, but was unbiassed and impartial towards the Macedonians, and a man of stern character. He did not spare any of the bad Macedonian princes, nor their vices, which were certainly not few; Eumenes alone was treated with favour, and he deserved it.

To these works we must add the Memoirs of Demochares of Athens. This most talented rhetorician lived in the time of Cassander and Demetrius Phalereus, and imitated the style of his great uncle Demosthenes. He likewise wrote a work on the history of Alexander, which, in point of form, perhaps the most important, was written, according to Polybius and Athenæus, with patriotism and dignity, and in the opinion of Cicero (*Brut.* 83, *de Orat.* ii. 23), contained contemporary history written in a good style.

Seventy years after him, a history was written by Aratus the Achæan, who, in point of statesmanship was still more

important than Demochares, and acted himself a conspicuous part in history. He wrote memoirs on the history of his own time in at least thirty books, which were very minute and valuable, and the loss of which is greatly to be deplored.

Between Aratus and Polybius, there occurs an interval, during which little or nothing was done for the history of the Greek nation. There was then more learning than before; the Greeks could not but regard themselves as insignificant and of no weight; and this feeling deterred historians. The two Rhodians, Zeno and Antisthenes, alone, who flourished at the time when Rhodes was at the height of its prosperity and power, composed some historical works.

Polybius wrote his excellent history towards the end of the Achaean league. He who so much loved his country, was yet obliged fully to admit its littleness, to acknowledge the greatness of Rome as the centre of the world, and to confess to himself, that Greece could not be compared with Rome. "He took the right point of view, and wrote a universal history, in which he assigned to Greece the place due to it. The time in which he lived was like that in which Leonardo da Vinci produced his excellent poems, and his leading maxim was that of Leonardo: he who cannot do what he wishes, must wish what he can do. Men wished more than they could accomplish, and neglected what they ought to have done. In this condition, Polybius advised his countrymen not to intoxicate themselves, but to set about that which they were able to perform. If his contemporaries had understood him, they might have saved themselves much misery; they ought to have listened to him rather than to worthless talkers, and not to have embroiled themselves with the Romans from a childish feeling of nationality." He first carried his history down to the fall of Perseus, and published it; he then added the period down to the destruction of Corinth. The first part was indeed revised, but still contains traces of its original condition. He is the only contemporary historian throughout the period from the battle of Chæronea to the destruction of Corinth, whose work has come down to us. It throws much light also on the times of Philip and Alexander. Posidonius continued it down to the fall of Corinth.

With the exception of Polybius, no contemporary historical authority is extant, and hence we are, in regard to the begin-

ning of this period, obliged to have recourse to other writers, who furnish occasional information, especially the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines on the crown, and those of Dinarchus which refer to the later years of the reign of Alexander. Indirect notices of isolated occurrences of this period occur in Arrian, Plutarch, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and lastly in the work of the silly and ignorant Diodorus from book xvii. to xx. (down to Olymp. 119, 2).

In reference to later times, we find in many instances information in Plutarch; and for the period from the second Punic war to the destruction of the Macedonian empire, we possess a complete history in the works of Polybius and Livy. Much solid information is found also in Pausanias, and very valuable chronological statements are contained in Eusebius' extracts from Porphyrius. Many extracts, moreover, occur in Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus, as well as in the moral treatises of Plutarch and in Stobaeus, though the latter furnish for the most part only anecdotes. Much, lastly, may be gathered from the "Characters" of Theophrastus, and from Polyænus and Frontinus, though they seldom present that which they furnish in an uncorrupted form.

The general accounts are very scanty, and the more definite ones are so scattered, that it is extremely difficult to arrange them together. If we possessed the work of Trogus, we should be able to form a clear conception of most things, and we should have accounts of the treaties, etc., which were concluded during that period. Justin does not by any means compensate for its loss.

But the less we know of those times, the more interesting is it to put together the little we do know.



LECTURE LXXXI.

IF it were possible, it would be highly interesting, to describe the sentiments of Demosthenes during the brilliant period of Alexander's career; but we only know, that during that time he was more than once brought to trial for his former adminis-

tration. His speech on the crown, a defence against Aeschines, when Ctesiphon had caused the people to vote a golden crown as a reward for Demosthenes, will live as long as Greek literature exists. The glorious manner in which Demosthenes was acquitted of the charge of the *δίκη παρανόμων*, shows with what a feeling of internal freedom the Athenian people judged of its own circumstances, and how it preserved at least the internal freedom of its judgment.¹ It is surprising to find that, throughout that period, Demosthenes was silent. With the exception of that on the crown, there exists no oration which can be assigned to this period: some of the *λόγοι ἰδιωτικοὶ* may belong to it, but those of which the time can be ascertained, belong to an earlier period. "He kept quiet, not interfering in what was going on; and he was right; for he could not have checked the course of events." But we should like to know, how his great mind was occupied during that time.

During that period, Alexander kept up no other connection at Athens except that with Phocion. He had, indeed, on several occasions shown the Athenians his favour; he had sent them presents, given them arms as trophies, and restored to them from Susa, the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton; but it was only with Phocion that he affected to keep up a personal connection: he sent to him ambassadors with presents, and when Phocion refused to accept them, the ambassadors replied that the king had sent them to him, because he was

¹ "It was in the year after the battle of Chaeronea, that the *causa pro corona* was decided. In the year of the battle, a psephisma had been passed, on the proposal of Ctesiphon, that Demosthenes, on account of his merits, should be presented with a golden crown, and be publicly praised at the performance of new tragedies, as the friend of his country. Against this psephisma, Aeschines rose, reviling Demosthenes in every possible way; but, although all the traitors rose against Demosthenes, the people clung to him, and rejected all charges. It was on this occasion that the two orations were delivered. That of Aeschines can be regarded only as a supplement to that of Demosthenes: it is inconceivable how people can in any way compare the former with that of Demosthenes. There is no more possibility for a second *oratio pro corona*, than there is for a second Iliad: it is the highest to which oratory of this kind can rise. The speech of Aeschines is as bad in a rhetorical point of view as it is in a moral one. The effect of the speech of Demosthenes was, that notwithstanding the recollection of their sorrows, and notwithstanding their misfortunes, the people declared in his favour, and that Aeschines was obliged to flee from his country as a traitor. Demosthenes is said on that occasion to have given him money, that he might be able to live in his exile; he subsisted at Rhodes and in Ionia on what he earned as a sophist."—1825.

the only noble-minded man at Athens—a remark which was afterwards universally repeated. The Athenians actually built a temple to Alexander; but not long after, and even before he set out for India, something occurred to which an allusion is made in a play.² He changed his mind; and certain it is, that on the Hydaspes he spoke of the Athenians with great contempt, though he had shortly before made them a present of a large cargo of corn. It was believed that this was owing to the fact, that they had refused to give him twenty triremes, which he had demanded at the time when he set out, and which he now asked for again: the Athenians had refused them merely because they did not exist. According to Plutarch, Phocion, on being called upon to express his opinion when Alexander's demand was discussed in the senate, said, that they must either have power themselves, or submit to him who had it. Alexander probably demanded something exorbitant or unjust, which the Athenians felt constrained to refuse.

It was about the same time that the affair of Harpalus began to excite attention. Towards the latter period of his life, Alexander showed his displeasure towards Harpalus, one of the companions of his youth, who had formerly been dear to him, whose society he had enjoyed when a prince, like a *compagnon de la jeunesse de Henry V.*,—a man like Falstaff, though not so ridiculous, but thoroughly bad—and who was treasurer in Cilicia. Harpalus was a native of Macedonia, the boon companion of Alexander in his debaucheries and crimes, and was involved in the quarrels of Alexander and his mother with Philip. This complicity was the cause why, after the battle of Chaeronea, when the enmity had reached its height, Philip sent him into exile. But after Philip's death, Alexander recalled him, with all his more intimate friends, and before he entered on his Asiatic expedition, they were treated by him with particular distinction, and honoured with profitable posts. Harpalus was a man of a weakly and unhealthy constitution, whence Alexander entrusted to him his treasures, with a view to give him a suitable employment, and left him behind in the provinces which were completely pacified. In that situation he must have been guilty of fraud,

² See below, note 5.

for even before the battle of Issus, he, being conscience-stricken, fled with an innocent friend to Greece. Alexander at that time felt his absence very painfully: he invited him to come back, offered the hand of reconciliation, and forgave him everything. When Harpalus returned, Alexander again intrusted his treasures to him, leaving him behind at Babylon to collect all that was carried thither from Persia, while he himself advanced eastward. Harpalus lived at Babylon in the greatest tranquillity and luxury, and appears to have received several commissions from Alexander.³ He there gave himself up to every lust, and ordered Pythionice, a notorious courtesan at Athens, to come to him, where she was treated by the barbarians as a queen, and overwhelmed with presents and marks of honor; and he seems in general to have regarded himself as a perfectly independent prince. Pythionice died; and after this event, Harpalus seems to me to have quitted Babylon. According to Diodorus, it would appear that he set out for Athens with his treasures and his mercenaries, as early as that time; but it is evident from a letter of Theopompus to Alexander (in Athenaeus, xiii. p. 586, C,⁴ and p. 596, B, etc.), that he remained for a time at Tarsus, where an ancient and magnificent royal palace had existed from the time of the Assyrian kings at Nineveh, in company with Glycera, an Athenian courtesan, to whom he erected a statue at Rossus in Syria, and that there he extorted money for her far and wide.

He knew that he could do much with impunity; but he became gradually estranged from Alexander; and while the latter was in India, Harpalus, after having committed immense irregularities and embezzlements, was denounced to him on account of unpardonable neglect of duty. In a satiric drama, which Alexander caused to be performed in India, and of

³ "Alexander intended to exchange the vegetation of the continents of Europe and Asia, and we know that Harpalus tried at Babylon to make European plants indigenous there."—1825.

⁴ "Schweighaeuser takes the words τῆς Χίας to mean the country or island of Chios. I would propose to emend the passage thus: ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς Χίας ἐλευθερίας ἐπιστολῇ, because in those times the Chians accused Alexander on account of the Macedonian garrison. If there is nothing to be emended, we must regard the letter of Theopompus as a petition addressed to Alexander on behalf of a Chian woman whose name was Chia, and cannot refer the name to the country or island of Chios."—1825.

which we have a curious fragment in Athenaeus, Harpalus was strongly assailed:⁵ this was a declaration of war; Harpalus now knew that he would have to render an account of the immense sums; and when he learned that Alexander was on his return, there remained for him nothing but to take to flight. He formed his resolution, embarked with his domestic troops, which he had hired like every other satrap,⁶ and with his innumerable treasures, and went to Greece. From the speech of Dinarchus against Philocles, we see, that at Athens a special commander was sent to Piraeus, to close the harbour and refuse admission to the ships of Harpalus. It was no doubt Demosthenes on whose proposal this resolution was come to. Harpalus then took his soldiers to Taenarus, the general recruiting place, and then proceeded himself to Athens, where he landed his unfortunate treasures. His appearance there created an immense sensation. It was a misfortune for Athens, and a permanent one; especially because it led the city to the most glaring injustice against her own best citizens, and gave rise to the disgraceful hunting after anecdotes, and the fearful calumnies against Demosthenes.

The true history is, that on the arrival of Harpalus, Demosthenes immediately acted in the manner which might have been expected of a man so thoroughly in earnest as he was. It was quite natural that, when Harpalus offered to the

⁵ "Athenaeus mentions this satiric drama under the name of 'Αγῆν in three passages (xiii. p. 586, C.; p. 595, E. F.) Alexander caused this play to be performed on the Hydaspes, when he was halting there with the Macedonians, probably on his return. Regarding this 'Αγῆν, it was uncertain whether it was written by one Python of Byzantium, or by another of Catana, or by Alexander himself. The fragment is corrupt and difficult to restore. It is a dialogue between persons whose characters are not clear, and its meaning is not quite intelligible. In it the monument of Pythionice is mentioned. Harpalus had erected to her one extremely magnificent monument at Babylon, and another near Athens, on the road to Eleusis. The one mentioned in the fragment is probably that at Babylon, because the Magi are spoken of, so that the scene is not at Athens. The fragment is remarkable for the insolent hatred expressed in it against Athens. One person says, 'What are the Cecropidae doing?' to which another answers, 'So long as they lived in slavery, they made up for it by eating plentifully, but now they eat herbs and vegetables.' This shows that the Athenians must have offended Alexander. Another person says, 'Corn has been sent to the Athenians, not by Harpalus, but by Glycera, but it will be the ruin.'"—1825.

⁶ "According to Diodorus, the number of these soldiers was 5,000, and according to others 1,000. The number of his ships is said by Curtius to have amounted to thirty."—1825.

Athenian people his ships and his treasures, many were inclined to accept both as advantages. This might be proposed by men of pure minds without any partiality for Harpalus or pity for his misfortune; they might, in their exasperation against Alexander, even go so far as to afford Harpalus protection. For it is a natural feeling to regard the enemy of our enemy as our friend, though he may otherwise not be an honest man. Now Demosthenes opposed this plan, and thereby showed his wisdom, and how far he was above his fellow-citizens. He assuredly never intended for one moment to abandon his scheme of breaking the Macedonian chains, if circumstances were favourable; but he cannot have thought the time during which Alexander was just making preparations for an expedition to the West, a favourable season for beginning his operations against him; he could not but prevent the Athenians from engaging in a war with him, and advise them not to listen to Harpalus. In fact, we learn from Curtius, that Alexander was thrown into a fit of great rage, and determined on making extensive preparations against Athens; and it is obvious to every one that it could not be otherwise. Demosthenes, therefore, immediately called upon the Athenians to seize all the treasures which Harpalus had brought with him, and to keep them safe in the Acropolis.⁷ By this measure no one would have been compromised. Demosthenes did not personally persecute Harpalus, who was in every respect too far below him, and unworthy even of his hatred; nor would Demosthenes gratify Alexander by delivering up to him an enemy. It would have been unworthy of Demosthenes to seize and deliver up a man, and thus to act the part of a policeman towards the Macedonians.⁸ Among both the ancient and the modern anecdote-mongers, there are people who consider it quite natural, that the Athenians should at once have arrested and delivered up Harpalus, but no man of honour would do such a thing in such circumstances. Harpalus was, it is true, a bad man, but there were hundreds of Macedonians like him. With the feelings he possessed,

⁷ "As to the fact, that the proposal originated with Demosthenes, see the Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vit. x. Orat.* p. 846, B. emended from Photius, ed. Hoerschel, p. 805; Plut. *Demosth.* p. 857, C."—1825.

⁸ "According to Diodorus, Antipater demanded of the Athenians to surrender Harpalus, but Pausanias (ii. 33, § 4) says, that the Macedonians commissioned Philoxenus, Alexander's governor in Rhodes, to demand the surrender."—1825.

Demosthenes could no more vote for receiving, than for delivering up Harpalus. His proposal was the only correct one. To receive Harpalus would have been dangerous, and to accept his treasures would have been base; but to deliver him up to the enemy would have been disgraceful, especially as they might regard Harpalus in the light of a suppliant. Think what it would have been to deliver up a man to the Macedonians! it would have been the same, as if we were to deliver up a person to the Turks. The question here was not about imprisonment or death, but all the tortures in which the Turks have indulged in our days, such as tearing off the fingers and toes one by one (*αἰκλῖσθαι*), were inflicted by the Macedonians upon those against whom their passions were roused. It was, therefore, no trifling matter to give up a man to such a death. A decree accordingly was passed, that Harpalus should deliver up his money, and that it should be deposited in the Acropolis to be restored to Alexander. He himself was arrested, that is, he was kept in custody in his own house.

Harpalus had, from the first, applied to men who combined the unprincipled character of the age with great talent and eloquence. Hyperides was one of the most eminent among them. He had from his youth taken Demosthenes for his model; but he is a remarkable instance of what may become of a man of great and eminent talent without moral dignity and firmness. When such a man lives in circumstances where a good cause is to be served, he may utter the noblest sentiments, and speak like virtue itself, but he does so only so long as those circumstances exist; he has in himself nothing that can sustain him, and, on another occasion, he may display the basest dishonesty. There are men, whose life is of this kind, and in whom we can point out beautiful and noble sentiments and great thoughts, together with decidedly eminent talents, but along with them at the same time, perfect dishonesty. What I am going to mention is not exactly a parallel, but still a similar case. About two years ago, a distinguished poet wrote the life of a great orator, with whom he had lived on terms of intimacy; and we there see the same thing: the man throughout his life showed the same unworthy conduct. I will not compare Sheridan with Hyperides, but that immorality cannot be denied. It is quite certain that the

ancients justly ranked the talent of Hyperides extremely high; nay, there were people who preferred him to Demosthenes, though this was incorrect; but he was deficient in that which sanctifies talent—in moral dignity and greatness, which are so gloriously displayed in Demosthenes and Thucydides. The same defect is manifest in the otherwise surpassing talent of Voltaire. Hyperides had in himself nothing that, on such an occasion, prevented him from seeking his own advantage and accepting the presents of Harpalus. He was highly immoral, voluptuous, immensely prodigal, and always in want of money. Hence he was ready to accept the gifts of Harpalus. To soothe his own conscience, he might, if he felt it necessary, say that it was his enemy's money, stolen from Alexander. The almost incredible recklessness of Hyperides is clearly perceptible in the traits which are recorded of him. He had hitherto been, as it were, the planet of Demosthenes, from whom he derived his lustre; but he was now opposed to him. There now rose up a whole host of cowardly souls who sided with Harpalus; and strange to say, among them we find Charicles, the son-in-law of that pattern of virtue, Phocion, and of him it is well attested, that he accepted thirty talents. Phocion himself had declined having anything to do with the matter, but he allowed his son-in-law to take Harpalus under his protection. The latter caused a monument to be erected to Pythonice, near Athens, on the road to Eleusis; and commissioned Charicles to superintend its execution, giving him thirty talents for the purpose. He was to erect for this money a monument according to his own taste, and he set up a very small one: this was, according to his own taste, the best! The truth of this account is beyond all doubt.⁹

The guilty persons now, with a truly diabolical dexterity, contrived to give a different turn to the matter. Demosthenes had caused a resolution to be passed, that the council of the

⁹ "There existed under the name of Hyperides a speech *ὑπὲρ Ἁρπάλου*, which is mentioned by Pollux. Whenever that speech may have been delivered—the extant fragment of it throws no light upon this point—it must have been at the period when Harpalus wanted to be admitted into Athens. Pausanias (i. 37. § 5) expressly states, that Harpalus distributed large sums, especially among the friends and partizans of Alexander. In Dinarchus' speech against Demosthenes, we read that Demades received 6,000 staters (one stater is equivalent to about £1 1s. 8d.) from Harpalus, and that he himself did not deny it. Nay, he said he would accept still more if he could get it."—1825.

Areopagus should institute an inquiry into the bribery which had been carried on. His object was not that the money should be restored to Alexander; he only wanted to keep it together, because the system of bribery was offensive to him; he was, moreover, unwilling, under the circumstances, to compromise the Athenian state. The money, however, would be gained for Athens, if Alexander should die, and if a change occurred, as actually did occur. By this psephisma death was fixed as the punishment for those who were convicted of having accepted money from Harpalus. The fact that Demosthenes was the author of this decree, is expressly mentioned by Dinarchus in several passages.¹⁰ The ancient partizans of Philip and Alexander, and those who had sold themselves to the Macedonians, now formed a coalition, and contrived to obtain the condemnation of Demosthenes, as if he had accepted bribes,—one of the most disgraceful proceedings that have ever occurred. We still possess the speech of Dinarchus against him, which is truly miserable, and which sufficiently displays the badness of the cause.¹¹

¹⁰ "P. 90, 98, 99, ed. Steph."—1825.

¹¹ "In regard to the charges, we must distinguish two periods; first, the one when the question still was as to whether Athens should accept the treasures. The charge then was, as we know from a fragment of Timocles in Athenaeus (viii. 341, F.), where Demosthenes is mentioned together with Callisthenes, Moerocles, and Demon, that he had received fifty talents: this is evidently a falsehood, for Demosthenes had insisted upon not admitting Harpalus. The second charge which the Areopagus raised against Demosthenes, which was supported by Stratoles and Dinarchus, and which mentioned twenty talents of gold (200 talents of silver), referred to a later time. It is stated, that Demosthenes had questioned Harpalus as to the sums he had brought with him, and that the latter had mentioned 700 talents. Demosthenes is then said to have connived at Harpalus when he drew up a false inventory of his treasures, and this was founded upon the evidence, that the sums which were deposited and found in the Acropolis amounted to only 380 talents. The sum, however, which Demosthenes is said to have received, is differently stated; according to Plutarch, it consisted of twenty talents and a golden goblet, according to others, of thirty talents, and according to Philochorus, of 30,000 darics.

"Now, from Dinarchus it is indeed clear, that the Areopagus brought the charge against Demosthenes, demanding that he should make good the money; but we do not find one word in Dinarchus to show what evidence the Areopagus had. Dinarchus himself says in his speech, which he probably wrote for Menesaechmus, that he had no other object in composing it but to excite the people and judges against Demosthenes. It is impossible to discover from that speech what was the real charge brought against Demosthenes, or what it was founded upon. It is the most confused and senseless trash that can be imagined, and we cannot sufficiently wonder how such things could be spoken before the assembled people.

Pausanias¹² mentions a proof of Demosthenes' innocence which is quite satisfactory. When Harpalus had fled to Crete and was murdered there, his secretary went to Rhodes, where he was tried and tortured by Philoxenus, the Macedonian governor, that he might denounce the accomplices whom his master had bribed. Philoxenus sent the list to Athens: it contained all, but the name of Demosthenes was not in it. This list was still extant in the days of Pausanias. Philoxenus, it must be observed, was a personal enemy of Demosthenes, and he did not mention him, whom above all others the Macedonians wished to incriminate, and against whom Alexander raised every possible accusation. Any jury would in this case fully acquit Demosthenes. But even if there were no such evidence, we have the no less weighty moral evidence, in the absolute impossibility that Demosthenes should commit a base and disgraceful action. He was himself a very wealthy man, and had plenty of opportunities of making money by pleading in civil cases, for it was not forbidden at Athens to take professional fees in the courts of justice. His whole life was a succession of acts of liberality and beneficence, of presents and sacrifices made to the state. It is almost incredible how much he did for his country: at sacrifices, and in public situations which he held, he defrayed the expenses from his own means, and never asked to be indemnified. He lived very frugally, had very few wants, and was the most contented man in the world. There was no cause for temptation.

We also know the character of his accusers: Hyperides was a bottomless vessel, and a spendthrift who have might squandered all the treasures of the king of Persia.¹³ Stratocles, the

"When Harpalus soon afterwards made his escape, Demosthenes was again blamed for having allowed him to escape. How can he be blamed for that? It should, however, be observed, that this point is not once touched upon even in the speech of Dinarchus."—1825.

¹² ii. 33, § 5.

¹³ "There can be no doubt that Hyperides wrote a speech against Demosthenes; it is mentioned by too many authors. This speech may have afforded him an opportunity to save himself from his bad reputation, and thus to secure himself against the Macedonians without incurring the suspicion of the patriots. He may have said, 'I seek to secure those treasures, since we need them for purposes of war; whoever has them, must give them up.' Through his support of Harpalus, moreover, he had fallen out with Demosthenes, and he thus had an opportunity of gratifying that animosity also."—1825.

principal speaker, who accused Demosthenes, is the same who afterwards, in the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes, appears as the most abject criminal and as the most cringing dog which that period, degenerate as it was, ever produced. If Demosthenes was guilty, then the others were innocent! but the purity of Demosthenes' character is well known, while his opponents are sufficiently notorious. Moreover, if I survey the whole historical connexion of events, I am altogether unable to see for what purpose Demosthenes should have been bribed. Wretched hunters after anecdotes which originate with Hermippus and men like him, and which are not only suited to Demades, but are actually related of him, referred them to Demosthenes, and invented others that are still more contemptible. Thus when the property of Harpalus was registered, he is said to have given to Demosthenes a splendid golden goblet which particularly pleased Demosthenes, and in addition to it twenty talents; and when on the following day Demosthenes was to come forward against Harpalus, he appeared with his throat wrapped up in woollen bandages, saying that he was unable to speak on account of a sore throat. But one person in the assembly called out, that he was suffering from ἀργυράγχη and not from συνάγχη. This story is of a very strange nature. Critolaus, the Carthaginian, who lived two hundred years after Demosthenes, somewhere related the same story, except that he represented not Harpalus, but some Milesian ambassadors, against whose proposals Demosthenes was to speak, as giving him presents; they came to him, it is said, at night, bringing him the presents, and on the following day he pretended to be suffering from sore throat, whereupon some one from among the people made the above remark about him, and according to Pollux (vii. 104) it was made by Demades. Gellius (xi. 9) also relates, that Demosthenes once said to the actor Aristodemus, when boasting that he had received much for his declamations:—"I have received much for my silence." C. Gracchus related the same anecdote of Demades, and it looks, indeed, very much like him (Gellius, xi. 10). And on the ground of this tale Demosthenes has been condemned by the judgment of subsequent generations! I have with my own ears heard persons quoting Plutarch as an authority against Demosthenes! What a worthless and confused witness Plutarch is, may be seen from his life of

Phocion (p. 751), where he jumbles together the history of Harpalus in so desperate a manner, that the reader almost loses his senses. Shall we on account of such a witness, and of orators such as they then were, doubt the honesty of a Demosthenes?

We cannot be surprised at the fact that the Areopagus condemned Demosthenes, who himself in his psephisma had proposed death as the punishment for those who were bribed, and had called upon the Areopagus to institute an inquiry; for we know what kind of people the archons of that period were; even the infamous Stephanus was archon. The *δοκιμασία*¹⁴ had at that time become a mere matter of form, and had as little meaning, as the oath by which a member of the British Parliament has to establish his possessing property to the amount of three hundred pounds. Most members of the Areopagus may have become archons through Macedonian influence. Demosthenes, moreover, had enemies of various kinds, who were bent upon taking revenge upon him: he had offended many by his virtuous pride in refusing to court any one's favour. We may, therefore, rather wonder at the fact that the decree of Demosthenes was not directed against himself, and that he was not condemned to death. From the speech of Dinarchus against Philocles it is clear, that it was incumbent upon the 1,500 judges afterwards to fix upon the punishment, although it was fixed in the decree itself. Hence we may well imagine that among the 1,500 judges there were many who were unwilling to allow Demosthenes to be put to death on the ground of such charges, and for whom such a verdict was after all too terrible.¹⁵ According to Plutarch, Demosthenes was

¹⁴ "Whoever was elected archon, had to prove that he had behaved kindly to his parents, that he had fought in the campaigns of his country, and that he was a native of Athens, and possessed landed property."—1825.

¹⁵ "Demades too must have been condemned; he had not defended himself, but readily owned his guilt, saying, that he would take money wherever he could get it. He seems, moreover, to have remained at Athens. In the apocryphal letters of Demosthenes, there occurs a passage according to which Philocles also was condemned, and the author seems to have had satisfactory evidence for his statement. Aristogiton, the basest and most odious sycophant of the age, was acquitted. Only one of the two orations against him belongs to Demosthenes. He was a usurer in the worst sense of the term, a miscreant such as is to be found only among robbers and murderers. Once when he was in prison, the other criminals formed a resolution not to have anything in common with him, and not to sit at the same table with him, in order not to dishonour themselves. It was owing only to vile intrigues, that in the accusation Demosthenes

sentenced to pay a fine of fifty talents; and according to the same writer, it was uncertain whether he was thrown into prison, whether he escaped from it, or whether he quitted Athens beforehand.

Demosthenes took to flight not having the means to pay the fine. What then had become of the money which he was accused of having received? When he was condemned, all his property together was discovered not to amount to the fine which he was sentenced to pay, and which, it was said, he had received from Harpalus.

Demosthenes went into exile, first, perhaps, to Megara and afterwards to Aegina.¹⁶ Here we have again an anecdote, for on quitting the city he is reported to have said:—"O Athens, what three monsters dost thou love! the owl, the snake, and the people!" and "If I had to begin my life afresh, and stood at a point where one road leads to the government of the state, and the other to misery, I would choose the latter." Scaliger, in his old age, expressed a similar sentiment. This story is made use of against Athens; but all such anecdotes are worthless. However, even if he had uttered such a word in the bitterness of his grief, it would neither be an evidence against him nor against his country. The Athenians had no privilege of being free from faults any more than other mortals. The same public which at one time raises a man up to the skies, is at another time inclined to condemn him, if fortune turns from him. This fickleness occurs everywhere in the mass of a people; there is, unfortunately, in them an inclination to ingratitude. Very noble minds alone are free from it.¹⁷

was put in the same category with such an outcast, who was acquitted, while Demosthenes was condemned."—1825.

¹⁶ "Plutarch blames Demosthenes for having borne his exile in an unworthy manner. He relates such anecdotes as this. On his flight, he was followed by men, who overtook him and gave him money that he might be able to live, although they were his enemies. Demosthenes wept, and when they consoled him, he said that it grieved him to quit his native city, in which his enemies were doing what his friends ought to do. This is too romantic, and probably a fabrication made in reference to the conduct of Demosthenes himself towards Aeschines."—1825.

¹⁷ "As the heroes whose praise was not sung by Homer acquired no posthumous fame, so praise and blame with posterity depends, in historical times, upon the historians. Demosthenes unfortunately lived at a time the history of which was written by men who hated Athens. Theopompus being a Chian, born at the time of the Social war, was a sworn enemy of the Athenians, and hated Demosthenes. His style also was quite incompatible with that of

Dionysius of Halicarnassus places the trial of Demosthenes in the archonship of Anticles; but from the speech of Dinarchus, it is evident, that this is a mistake, and that it must rather be placed in the archonship of Hegesias (Olymp. 114, 1), during the interval between the Olympian games and the news of the death of Alexander. For among the charges brought by Dinarchus against Demosthenes there is one which cannot but excite our astonishment, namely, that he had conspired with the Macedonian party, that he had been in a regular understanding with them, and therefore caused himself to be sent to Olympia as *architheoros*, in order to have an interview with Nicanor, who was staying there. According to Diodorus,¹⁸ who relates this event between the second and third year of Olymp. 113, Nicanor had been sent by Alexander to Macedonia, and was commissioned to announce to all the Greek cities the demand of his master, that all the exiles should be allowed to return to their country. Accordingly, at the time of the Olympian games, Demosthenes was not yet accused; and as he was already condemned at the time when the report of Alexander's death reached Greece, his trial must have occurred during the interval.

In the mean time, Alexander had died, and that event was followed by the greatest commotions. The Macedonian troops regarded themselves as the nation; they were, in fact, an emigrated people, and among their rude military hordes, there arose an antagonism between nobles and democrats. Strange as this sounds, it is no paradox. The opposition between an aristocratic and democratic tendency has at different times a different colouring, and everywhere and under all circumstances contrives to assume a definite form. Even in the East, as, for example, among the Arabs at Medina and Kufa, under the first Khalifs, I might point out democratic tendencies,

Demosthenes: he was more of a rhetorician of the school of Isocrates, which to some extent sided with Philip, and was consequently opposed to Demosthenes. He, moreover, in his history, aimed at unfolding the hidden recesses and motives of the human heart; and he wrote his history with the intention of showing, by means of such inquiries after the springs of human actions, that all the brilliancy of virtue was a mere delusion. Duris of Samos was no doubt an equally avowed national enemy of Athens, and therefore of Demosthenes also. When a young man, he had been obliged to live in exile away from Samos, until Perdicas expelled the Athenians from the island."—1825.

¹⁸ xviii. 8, 3.

and afterwards aristocratic ones. But these democratic and aristocratic tendencies were, of course, forced to give way to despotism. Among the Macedonians, we meet with an open antagonism between the phalanx and the cavalry, which is evidently an opposition between optimates and people. Neither party showed much dignity or wisdom.

The problem to be solved was very difficult. Alexander had not expressed his wishes in regard to the succession. He had a son, Heracles, by Barsine, a Persian captive; but the child was only six or seven years old, and as his mother did not belong to a princely family, the Macedonians regarded him as a *νόθος*. Roxana, Alexander's lawful wife, a daughter of Oxyartes,¹⁹ the Bactrian, was in the eighth month of her pregnancy. It was not till this child was murdered, that the son of Barsine was brought forward, in order to make him play a conspicuous part, just as in Persia the princesses were brought forward after the death of Nadir Shah. The fact that Roxana was an Eastern queen, was proved immediately after Alexander's death, for she caused a mistress of her husband to be murdered.

Alexander had given his sealing ring to Perdiccas, and thereby assigned to him an undefined, abstract kind of supreme power; but the other Macedonian generals were by no means inclined to acknowledge this unlimited power.

Under these circumstances, Perdiccas and the optimates wished to continue the government of the empire in the name of Alexander, and in the manner in which he had conducted it. The crown was to be reserved for the son of Roxana, in case she should give birth to a son (he was afterwards, together with his mother, murdered by Cassander, as Heracles was murdered by Polysperchon). Until the child became of age, the regency was to be in the hands of Perdiccas, Antipater, Leonnatus, and Craterus, and the satrapies were to remain as Alexander had arranged them, and to be distributed among all the generals. The body of Alexander was to be conveyed to Alexandria: so long as his son was under age, the throne of Alexander was to remain vacant at all the council meetings, but the decrees were to be drawn up in his name. This idea was romantic enough, but not feasible.

¹⁹ Niebuhr, here and elsewhere, erroneously called Roxana a daughter of Darius, king of Persia.—ED.

The phalanx was not pleased either with the regent or the unborn infant; they demanded Arrhidaeus, the idiotic half-brother of Alexander, for their king. He was a bastard of Philip, and was married to Eurydice, a grand-daughter of Philip. It is not impossible that this plan may have been got up by Antipater and his sons; for as Arrhidaeus was in Macedonia (?), and was quite an imbecile, the government during his reign would have been in the hands of Antipater. Arrhidaeus must have been extremely weak in mind. The most appropriate plan would have been to give the crown to Cleopatra, a sister of Alexander, and a woman of talent and energy, but the Macedonians were not yet so far orientalised. The phalanx now rebelled, refusing to obey the decrees of the *ἐταῖροι*, or guard of nobles. Matters would have come to a massacre, had not a reconciliation been brought about, on the understanding that Arrhidaeus should be king under the name of Philip, but that he should come to Asia, and that the claims of Alexander's son by Roxana should be maintained; the regents were to secure the throne to the latter. As Roxana gave birth to a son named Alexander, the two, Philip Arrhidaeus and the infant Alexander, are called *οἱ βασιλεῖς* in the authentic documents of the time. I have supplied a defect in an inscription published by Dodwell; it is upon a stone, the upper part of which is obliquely broken off, but the number of lines and even of the letters can be calculated. I have supplied a large portion of the lower part, and shown that it is a decree of the Mityleneans, in which the *βασιλεῖς* are mentioned. My supplement will appear in the great work on Greek inscriptions.²⁰ This inscription refers to a decree of which I will now speak.

Alexander was in the unfortunate situation of being obliged to be active, and to extend his power in the West also. He accordingly sent a decree to Greece, in which he announced, that all the exiles were to return to their country. This decree was to be proclaimed at the Olympic games (Olymp. 114). Many thousands then flocked to Olympia, as under Quintus Flaminius many thousands flocked to the Isthmus. "Twenty thousand exiles are said to have met on that occasion." They were persons of two different kinds: some were men that had been sent into exile for rebellious conduct, and for

²⁰ Comp. Boeckh, *Corp. Inscript. Graec.*, No. 2166, vol. li. p. 185, foll.

political, civil, or criminal offences; but among them there were also the inhabitants of whole towns, ἀνέσται, ²¹ who had been expelled by the cleruchiae, as, for example, the inhabitants of Oeniadae and the Samians. For, as I mentioned before, during the Social war, the Samians, together with the inhabitants of Cos, Chios, Rhodes, and Lesbos, had revolted against Athens, and the Athenians had availed themselves of that opportunity to make themselves masters of Samos, and to send thither a cleruchia, which was subsequently recognised in the peace by Philip and Alexander.²² Oeniadae, a town at the mouth of the Achelous, had formerly belonged to the Acarnanians, and had then fallen into the hands of the Achaeans, until Epaminondas expelled them and restored it to

²¹ "The ἐναγείς alone were exempted from the right to return; in this exemption, we see a mixture of the religious hypocrisy and the policy of Alexander. For the name of ἐναγείς comprised not only sacrilegious persons, but also those who had offended him, since he had caused himself to be declared a god, and accordingly any offence against him was an offence against a god. As it was just to restore the Samians and the inhabitants of Oeniadae to their country, it would have been equally just to restore the Thebans, Olynthians, and all the citizens of the thirty-two towns which had been destroyed by Philip on the coast of Thrace; but they were excepted. From Plutarch (*Apophthegm. Lac.* p. 221, A.) it is quite clear that Thebes was excepted; and, in regard to Olynthus, it is evident from the pseudo-Plutarch (*Vit. X. Orat.* p. 845, C. ed. Xyland). It is there related, that, when Lamachus recited, at Olympia, a panegyric on Philip and Alexander, in which the Thebans and Olynthians were treated with contumely, Demosthenes rose up and recited passages from the poets in their praise. This seems to have occurred during this period; because Diarchus states, that, after the battle of Chaeronea, Demosthenes was only twice absent from Athens, once when he purchased corn for Athens, and a second time when he caused himself to be appointed *architheoros*. It is, however, surprising, that, at a time when Greece had already been in the hands of the Macedonians for fourteen years, there should have still been exiles of so many towns about whom Alexander could be concerned."—1825.

²² "It is an excellent observation of Wesseling (on Diod. xviii. 18), that this cleruchia belongs to Olymp. 107. He has proved his point, and it does not belong to Olymp. 104, to which the ancients assign it. He saw the truth, but did not follow up the connexion of events, the discovery of which I owe to his remarks. Wesseling has, in general, done much that is excellent. Herodotus is the latest, but not the best of his works; but his commentaries on the Itineraries of ancient geography and on Diodorus contain much that is admirable. He is not a master in philology, and is not to be compared with Scaliger and Perizonius, who thoroughly lived in antiquity; but he is a very well read and learned scholar, and often makes the very best use of his reading, although often we cannot help being vexed at his affectation and mannerism, especially in his notes on Herodotus. Among second-rate scholars he is a very useful writer. Formerly he was by no means valued according to his desert."

the Acarnanians. The Aetolians had probably taken possession of the place during Alexander's expedition in Asia, and had expelled those of its inhabitants who refused to join them. Crying injustice had been done to thousands of Samians and Oeniadians; and before this time he had taken no steps in their behalf: he himself had ratified the peace with Philip, and had guaranteed to the Athenians the possession of Samos, so that, properly speaking, he had now no right to interfere in the matter. The above-mentioned decree, therefore, was a great provocation to the Athenians and Aetolians, and many of them had to sustain serious losses of property. Hence they opposed it; but this was not the only cause of complaint. The sending of persons into exile was then a very common occurrence in Greece, and considering the lawless and unprincipled conduct of men, it was so good and salutary to be able to remove pernicious persons, that such a general measure, recalling the exiles in large numbers, might upset everything. Those exiles, on their return, not only demanded back their property, but their ancient rights: they were *revenans* in the proper sense of the term, entering into circumstances to which they had become quite estranged, and wishing to play the part of masters in them. Among these exiles, there were some detestable characters, as, for example, the Athenian orator Callimedon, who betrayed his country to Antipater.

Throughout Greece, therefore, there arose a great commotion, an indescribable uneasiness and opposition to the execution of Alexander's command. The Greek cities despatched embassies to him to induce him to withdraw it; and they arrived at Babylon towards the end of his life. According to Arrian, they were very ungraciously received, and effected nothing. What was to be done? Alexander's extraordinary preparations were known, and it was perhaps also known that they were directed against the West: before proceeding to Carthage he would have paid a visit to Greece, if it had offered any resistance. In these circumstances, it was a great misfortune that the Lacedaemonians had risen too early, and had ended so unsuccessfully near Megalopolis. The *προεξιστάναι* is always unfortunate, as in the war of the revolution in 1805, Austria rose too early, because at the time Prussia could not yet join it: this was the cause of the disasters at Ulm and Austerlitz. If the war had been delayed for a year,

which might have been done very easily, and if Austria had then risen simultaneously with Prussia, history would neither know of the defeat of Ulm, nor of that of Jena. But it is natural that, where there is an inclination for war, and a desire to try fortune, some should rise rashly, while others who are equally determined, prevail upon themselves to wait, because they see that the time has not yet come.

Such were the circumstances when (Olymp. 114, 1) the news of Alexander's death reached Athens. During the period which had elapsed since the Olympian games, great disturbances and commotions had taken place there. The Athenian exiles had assembled at Megara, and several citizens of Athens had become suspected for having kept up communications with Megara. Then there had been the trial of Demosthenes and all those who had received money from Harpalus. When the news of the death of Alexander was conveyed to Athens, Demosthenes was already living in exile at Aegina; but great influence was exercised at Athens by Leosthenes, a young man belonging to the patriots, who went wherever they saw an opportunity of fighting against the Macedonians.²³ Even at a previous period, he had with uncommon skill saved and embarked a portion of the Greek mercenaries serving in the Persian army, who had remained in Asia after the battle of Issus: just as the Marquis de la Romana embarked in Denmark and went to Spain, so Leosthenes led them back from Asia to Taenarus. For when Alexander gave to his generals satrapies, he left them no troops, but allowed them to enlist small armies for themselves from the Greek mercenaries. When, however, he had returned to Babylon, and was preparing for his expedition against the West, he commanded his satraps to disband their corps of mercenaries, because they appeared to him dangerous, and his intention was to assign to them settlements in the provinces of Upper Asia. Now it was Leosthenes who contrived to prevent this, and to lead them down to the sea. How he effected this, I am unable to understand; but this much is certain, that at this time there were 8000 mercenaries at Taenarus. They were indeed a nice rabble, and ready to serve any one; but he could not hope that

²³ In contradiction with this remark, apparently arising from some confusion, Niebuhr in 1825 mentioned (from Strabo), that he was called an *ἐταῖρος* of Alexander, and was probably the commander of the Athenian cavalry.—Ed.

angels would come down from heaven to help him to fight against the Macedonians, and he therefore reserved those mercenaries as a valuable instrument for the time that was to come. He assembled these bands in those days even before Alexander was dead; and increased their number with the view of undertaking with them something against Macedonia. When the decree of Alexander to restore the exiles was producing the greatest excitement, Leosthenes was at Athens, and, with the knowledge of the government, he was sent to Taenarus, to keep the mercenaries there assembled, ready to enlist in the service of Athens. It was probably while he was at Taenarus that the report of Alexander's death reached Greece.

At Athens, the joyous exultation was at first so great, that Hyperides, with a kind of presumptuous rashness, caused honours to be decreed to Iollas, who was said to have murdered Alexander.

LECTURE LXXXII.

LEOSTHENES was at that time unquestionably the greatest general, and in every respect a man who does not deserve to be forgotten, and who ought to have a place in a work like that of Cornelius Nepos. His private history, and the touching history of his family, are known to us by a mere accident, through St. Jerome.¹ This account shows him in a beautiful light in his domestic relations also, in the exalted love and fidelity of his wife.²

The name of the Lamian war is ill suited to its importance. Leosthenes was the soul of it. He experienced the injustice of fortune not only during his life, but also in his reputation; for after his death he did not acquire that renown which is due to him. In Nepos no place is assigned to him, and few know his name. In the later period of Greek history, there are several men, whose names would be better known if they had

¹ *Ad Jovinianum*, p. 35, ed. Francof. 1684.

² It should be "his betrothed," as Niebuhr himself said in 1825: "he was a young man, and was betrothed when he died. His betrothed, unwilling to survive him, made away with herself."

lived in happier times; as, for example, Olympiodorus, who delivered Athens under Demetrius Poliorcetes, and Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes.

When Alexander's death was known, the Athenians broke out, and prepared all the forces they had quietly assembled. The troops collected by Leosthenes, enraged veterans as they were, combined with the money obtained from Harpalus, afforded the means of waging war. If we compare all the accounts, we must conclude, that on the news of Alexander's death Leosthenes returned to Athens, and in the assembly endeavoured to rouse the spirit of freedom among the people. The times were highly unfavourable to effect the liberation from foreign dominion. All the nobler feelings were extinct, and the patriots were in the greatest despair; the external circumstances were of such a nature, that the undertaking seemed to promise nothing but destruction. The men saw that if they submitted to their fate, and obeyed Antipater, Athens would not be destroyed, and they might hope for better times; but that hope was, perhaps, gone for ever; if they undertook anything, the power of Athens was so disproportionate to that of Macedonia, that no good results could be looked for, especially as it was well known that the other Greeks could not be trusted. Under these circumstances, Demosthenes would never have advised his countrymen to take up arms, although he had no misfortunes to fear, for his own family was dead, and the children of his sister could not make him very much cling to life. The circumstances were such, that, if the contest was begun with prudence and energy, the first success might inspire the people with hope, but their strength was not sufficient for any length of time.

It was the expectation of lucky chances that inspired Leosthenes with some hope of the war. The Rhodians had already expelled the Macedonian garrison, others had perhaps done the same, and although the news of the insurrection in the upper satrapies may not yet have reached Greece, yet a commotion existed there. The Athenians, however, were labouring under the delusion, that such a vast empire must necessarily fall with the man who had amassed it. They calculated on the revolt of the Asiatic nations, the Thracians, Illyrians, etc., and counted all the resources of which the Macedonians would

be deprived, if the distant nations should take up arms, a fact which with prophetic confidence they ventured to predict as an advantage to themselves, and an irreparable loss to the enemy. This was preached by some persons with a certain impassioned enthusiasm; while those of calmer dispositions, as well as the friends of Macedonia, contradicted them. Among the opponents, Phocion was particularly conspicuous: he said of Leosthenes, that his speeches were like cypresses, tall and beautiful, but that they bore no fruit. But at Athens the enthusiasm was so general, and the people were so ready to do anything, that we can well understand why many declared, that whatever was undertaken in such a spirit, could not fail of success.

Simultaneously with the Athenians rose the Aetolians, who now appear in history for the first time, for during the long interval from the earliest period, they are not mentioned at all in history. In the most remote ages they are spoken of as a small people by the side of the Curetes. The name of the Aetolians of Oeneus, who were pure Greeks, was afterwards used in a more comprehensive sense. That small nation of genuine Greek origin formed relations of isopolity with other unhellenic tribes, and these connections gradually extended so much, that even in the time of the Peloponnesian war the Aetolians occupied the extent of country which in our maps bears the name of Aetolia. That country was principally inhabited by Epirot, Pelasgian and Siculian tribes, and these Pelasgians were thus drawn by the Aetolians into the complex of Greek nations, and were regarded as Greeks. But there was as yet no concentration among them, and for this reason they were weak. Great changes, however, must by this time have taken place among those tribes, though we know nothing of them; they must partly have become more and more hellenised, and partly have changed their constitution, for otherwise the strength which they then displayed cannot be explained. From the condition of a mere isopolitic confederation, they must have risen to that of one state with a real constitution. Such a change must certainly have taken place; for otherwise it cannot be explained, how the Aetolians, formerly so weak, could now come forward with such strength and vigour. They were exasperated against the Macedonians on account of the restoration of the inhabitants of Oeniadae.

They were an unprincipled and barbarous race of robbers, but courageous, and as inspired with a love of independence as the most civilised inhabitants of cities. They declared the more boldly against the Macedonians, because Leosthenes, who had embarked at Taenarus, appeared on the coast of Aetolia.

Under these circumstances, the Aetolians were on the side of the Athenians. They did not, indeed, as yet venture to deny to the Athenians the command in the war; but the Athenians had after all but a precarious authority, though they were the soul of the war. Everything was done on that occasion, which in such circumstances ought to be done: the decrees were of an extraordinary character and worthy of Demosthenes, although they did not proceed from him. The Athenians equipped upwards of two hundred ships; and a general rising of the people was decreed. All the citizens up to the age of fifty-four or fifty-five (?) were to take up arms; all the men of the ten phylae capable of bearing arms were enlisted, three phylae remained behind as a reserve, and seven marched against the Macedonians, under the command of Leosthenes. The intention, no doubt, was to form a strong militia. We may take it for granted that the metoeci were likewise armed; and we may easily complete the measure by supposing that the metoeci and slaves were allowed to take up arms, and obtained the franchise and freedom as a reward.

But the Athenians at the same time issued a proclamation declaring that they regarded Greece as their fatherland and all the Greeks as their brothers, and that they looked upon the freedom of Greece as their own cause, and envoys were sent to all parts of Greece.

Many Greek cities were of their own accord ready to join them. The Phocians and Locrians, the victims of Macedonian love of dominion, were the first to declare for the Athenians and Aetolians. As regards Peloponnesus, the Spartans were completely exhausted, and Antipater had fifty hostages in his hands: they were powerless and remained behind, and the Athenians seem to have made no attempt to stir up Sparta.³

³ "There was, however, at Sparta, another peculiar circumstance. Eudamidas, the brother of Agis, who was then king, is the first instance of a Spartan assuming foreign manners, and that even with affectation (we have some of his speeches). From Plutarch, it is highly probable, that, while his brother was leading the Lacedaemonians against Antipater, he himself resided and amused himself at Athens, in listening to the rhetoricians and philosophers,

The Messenians, on the other hand, the Eleans, Argives, Troezenians, and Phliasians, were in arms. The Achaeans appear to have remained quiet, having suffered much at Megalopolis; only one, Chion, sided with the Athenians. As to Corinth, we do not know with whom it sided, but it is more probable that it declared against the Greeks, than that it took their part. It is remarkable that the Eleans, who were then allied with Sparta, came forward again, and that the Messenians and Argives, who, as sworn enemies of Sparta, had taken no part in the war under Agis, now took up arms. This is a proof of the tyranny of the Macedonians. It is also worthy of note, that the Thessalians, who formerly, owing to their oligarchy, and partly, also, because they were alien to the Hellenic character, and more akin to that of the Macedonians, had made no movement under Philip and Alexander, shewed in this war the opposite tendency. Yet, unfortunately, the harmony among the Greeks was not perfect. A conqueror contrives to bribe individuals; such was the case then, and such also was the case with Napoleon, who enriched some countries at the expense of others, giving, for example, a part of Austria to Bavaria. Thus the Boeotians were now bound to Macedonia in the most disgraceful manner. After the destruction of Thebes, Alexander had given to the other Boeotians the territory of Thebes as *ager publicus*, and the Boeotians imagined that this was the happiest condition that the world had ever seen; they had excellent land and sent out cleruchiae. They were, however, certain that, if the Athenians should be successful in this war, Thebes would be restored, and that they themselves would lose these territories. Hence the Boeotians were resolved to maintain the present lawful state of things, as it is commonly called, as long as possible. They were in arms, and determined even to refuse to the allied Greeks a passage through their country to Thermopylae. Were it not that Pindar was a Boeotian, we might be inclined to curse them: they had always been a curse to Greece, and so they were now.

especially Xenocrates. We can easily understand why such a man now kept back the Spartans, even if they did wish to succour the Athenians. When reminded of the deeds of his ancestors against the Persians, he is reported to have said, that it was easier to expel a thousand sheep than fifty wolves."—1825.

Among the cities of Peloponnesus, the unfortunate Megalopolis also refused to join the allies. That city is in truth a proof of the fact, that there are acts of injustice, which we could wish never to have been committed, but which, if amends are made, produce much greater misery than that which existed before. Such was the case here, in the relation subsisting between Messenia and Arcadia. Had the power of Megalopolis not been founded by the Macedonians, had not Philip taken from the Spartans the districts of which he had previously robbed the Arcadians, and had he not restored those districts to Megalopolis, of which they subsequently constituted the territory, the Megalopolitans would have joined the Greeks; but as it was, they were fettered, and dreaded lest the arrangements of Philip should be upset. The Arcadians were thus opposed to the Greeks, and the forces of the latter were distracted: they were obliged every where to keep reserves at home to defend themselves against hostile neighbours.

The Athenians sent an embassy from town to town to induce the states of Greece to join the confederates. Demosthenes was then still living as an exile at Aegina, and this embassy consisted of persons who had voted against him: Hyperides and Polyeuctus were members of it. They addressed the people in every town, but with little success, for they were everywhere opposed by two emissaries of Antipater: Pythias, a foreigner (?), but a talented man, and Callimedon, an Athenian exile, and a traitor.⁴ The latter succeeded in convincing the Greeks of the hopelessness of their undertaking, which they did not find very difficult; they probably also urged, that Athens was only keeping her own dominion in view; and it was against this assertion, that the Athenian ambassadors had to speak. It is, moreover, probable that Philip and Alexander had established in most cities oligarchies which exerted themselves against Athens. Demosthenes now, as an exile, joined the ambassadors, the men who had disowned and betrayed him, and to whom he did not personally become reconciled. He did this without any commission: I know of no act that shows a nobler soul; but considering his natural magnanimity, it cannot have been difficult for him. Thus he

⁴ In 1825, Niebuhr correctly called Pythias likewise an Athenian, and remarked, that both men were exiled after Demosthenes, probably during the first period of this war.—ED.

appeared before the nations of Greece in his own name, and addressed them with vigour on behalf of Athens. His eloquence was crowned with better success, it produced the most brilliant effects: where the others made no impression, the people followed him, and he induced them to declare themselves for Athens. Many no doubt thought, what kind of state must that be, for which even an exiled and injured man acts in this way! and that thought had undoubtedly a powerful effect. Many towns, carried away by his patriotism, declared for Athens.

At Athens, the conduct of Demosthenes excited a perfect enthusiasm, and he was gloriously recalled by a solemn psephisma. A trireme was sent to Aegina to fetch him, and on his arrival all the people, in their best attire, went to Piræus to meet him, and accompanied him in a procession from the port into the city. This was his happiest day, and his return was compared with that of Alcibiades: but what a different return was his! The fine could not, according to the law, be done away with, but in order to relieve him, the people decreed that he should adorn a festive altar, and that he should receive fifty talents for it, though it cost but little to adorn the altar.

Owing to the presence of Demosthenes, the activity at Athens was doubled. It is greatly to be deplored that we have no Athenian history of this period: it would be a fit subject for a Thucydides, and if we had a history of it, we should see unfolded before our eyes phenomena worthy of the best ages of Greece. If the history of Demochares began as early as that time, he took up a subject worthy of his talents. We know the history of the period only from the most miserable extracts; but we who have passed through similar situations may easily conceive what it was. It would deserve no censure, nor be a forgery, if an historian was to describe that period such as it must have been, and not in every point such as it has been transmitted to us.

Meantime, Leosthenes had rapidly advanced with a large army towards Thermopylae, in order to separate the Macedonians from the Boeotians. The Athenians followed him with 5000 of their armed citizens, 500 horsemen, and 2000 mercenaries, with the view of supporting him at Thermopylae. There was no communication at all between Athens and

Thermopylae: the Boeotians, as well as the Chalcidians, Eretrians, and Megarians, had concentrated their forces to cut off the Athenians from Thermopylae. The Athenians, therefore, sent this reinforcement by the nearest road, for the purpose of thus dispersing the Boeotians. Leosthenes now, leaving behind him a portion of his troops, quitted his position at Thermopylae, united his forces with the approaching Athenians, attacked the Boeotians attempting to obstruct his way, and defeated them. The communication was thus restored, and Leosthenes with his reinforcements returned to Thermopylae.

Antipater had, in the meantime, applied for assistance to the Asiatic satraps, and first of all to Leonnatus in Phrygia. But he could not wait for its arrival, for unless he commenced operations immediately, he was unable to prevent the Thessalians and other discontented nations from revolting and declaring in favor of the Greeks. He accordingly proceeded with 13,000 foot and 600 horse—Macedonia was then rather drained of men, so that Antipater had had some difficulty in bringing together even this small number of troops—into Thessaly, where as yet all was tranquil. Strengthened by the contingent of the Thessalians he advanced as far as Thermopylae. There he was met by Leosthenes, who offered battle in the neighbourhood of Lamia, and the Greeks gained a decisive victory. The history of that period is so uncertain, that we do not even know where the first battle was fought. Antipater lost it completely. The Thessalians, commanded by Menon of Pharsalus, a Thessalian noble, abandoned the Macedonians—it is not certain whether before or after the battle—and the cavalry of the Macedonians was thereby so much weakened, and the Greeks obtained so important an addition, that the Macedonians were cut off from their retreat to Macedonia. Antipater, with his remaining troops, now threw himself into Lamia, not far from Thermopylae.

After this, nearly all the Thessalians, the Phthiotans, Dolopians, Aenianians, Oetaeans, and Melians, immediately declared for the Greeks. The Magnesians are not mentioned, because Magnesia was incorporated with the Macedonian empire. During the enthusiasm of success, other nations far and wide also were carried away, such as the Molottians (though only for a time), the Illyrians, and Thracians. It

seemed, as if all those nations were determined to recover their freedom, and the first success was very promising to the Greeks.⁵

Had the Macedonians been an ordinary enemy, had Antipater not been able to fall back upon the power of the Asiatic empire of Macedonia, the Greeks might easily have obtained any terms they pleased. But the situation of the Greeks now was of such a kind, that they could not find any security for peace except in the total destruction of the enemy. "They well knew that, if the Macedonians were spared, they would not observe the peace; and in the mean time to keep the Greeks in arms was a matter of impossibility." When, therefore, Antipater proposed to conclude a peace, the Athenians rejected the offer, demanding that the Macedonians should surrender at discretion; but this was impossible.

Leosthenes and the allies now wished to take Lamia by a *coup de main*; but in this they failed, and were obliged to blockade the place, hoping to force it to surrender by famine. It has always been an inexplicable historical mystery, how Lamia, which had been known before only as a very insignificant and small place, was able to receive and maintain Antipater with an army of any importance. It is possible that Antipater had fortified camps in the neighbourhood, in which his soldiers bivouacked. He was as frightful, hard and unfeeling a man as Tilly, but as a general he also had the same greatness; and in this respect we must rank him unusually high. Such circumstances alone make it intelligible, how he could defend himself at Lamia.

This was a great misfortune. Had the Athenians succeeded in taking Lamia, and in keeping up the war for one year, they would in all probability soon have had an opportunity of finding allies among the Macedonian satraps who had divided among themselves the empire of Alexander. But now, at the first moment, the discord among those satraps had not yet assumed the character which it afterwards had: all were ready to assist in the oppression of Greek liberty; and the Macedonian army was drawn together and strengthened by mercenaries.

⁵ "In the enumeration of the nations which joined the allies, we read in Diodorus, Μηλιεῖς πλὴν Μηλιέων; but we must read, Μηλιεῖς (a small tribe at the mouth of the Sperchius) πλὴν Λαμιέων. Diodorus abounds in blunders of the copyists."

While Antipater was blockaded at Lamia, many engagements took place, and to complete the measure of misfortunes, Leosthenes was fatally wounded during a sally. The catapulta, the artillery of the ancients, had been invented at that period, and Agis once said on seeing such an engine: "alas, there is now no more scope for bravery." Antipater was amply provided with them, and it was with such an engine that Leosthenes was wounded, in consequence of which he died three days after.⁶

The Athenians were, indeed, fortunate in the appointment of his successor,⁷ for Antiphilus was an excellent man, as we see from the whole course of events, though we otherwise know nothing of him; but in a passage of great weight it is said, that the generals of that time were too good, that is, too weak. Their situation was difficult: they had an army of allies which could be kept together only by its own good will. As the blockade of Lamia was protracted, it began to be manifest, how loose and defective the management and union of the Greek affairs were. The Aetolians demanded to be led home on account of some political business—*διὰ τινὰς ἐθνικὰς χρείας*, as Diodorus says.⁸ This business was probably the fact, that Clitus, the Macedonian admiral, had appeared off the Echinades, and that the Acarnanians, as enemies of the Aetolians, perhaps supported by the Molottians, had invaded Aetolia. This must have been the reason why the Aetolians returned home. At all events, their departure was a great misfortune. It is doubtful, whether they returned before the battle with Leonnatus or afterwards.

For Leonnatus (a curious name, only half Greek; the whole character of the Macedonian language was of this kind) had in

⁶ "Some portion of the funeral oration of Hyperides on him and the others who fell on that occasion, have fortunately been preserved from destruction. The only fragment of it occurs in Stobaeus (*Sermon. cxxiii.*), but it is very beautiful and splendid."—1825.

⁷ "The Macedonian party proposed Phocion, who had been elected strategus year after year, but it was justly suspected, that he would then conclude a peace with the Macedonians (he frustrated an expedition against the Boeotians, which the Athenians had demanded of him as their strategus), and Antiphilus was elected."—1825.

⁸ In 1830, Niebuhr said, "the Aetolians, a poor people, demanded to be led home on account of the harvest, as they were near their own country; they could not be kept away." So also in 1825. What authority there is for this difference is unknown to the Editor.—ED.

the meantime arrived with a large army of 20,000 foot and 2,500 horse, in order to relieve Antipater; but he was completely beaten by the Greeks and was himself among the slain. He had come through Thessaly, and was advancing without resistance towards Lamia. But the Greeks, on hearing of his arrival, had raised the blockade of Lamia, carried their stores into the fortified town of Melitaea, and then set out to meet Leonnatus. Their main strength lay in the cavalry, especially the Thessalian; and as that of the Macedonians was weak, they tried to overpower it. And they succeeded in deciding the battle with their cavalry; Leonnatus and his cavalry were driven into a swamp and cut to pieces. The victory of the Greeks was complete, and their cavalry now threw itself upon the phalanx of the Macedonians, which they defeated so completely that it was obliged straightway to retreat into the mountains.⁹ This was one of the most glorious victories that the Greeks ever gained. They erected trophies, but were unable to prevent Antipater, who had left Lamia and followed them, from uniting, on the following day and after very skilful marches, his forces with the phalanx of Leonnatus. During the blockade, as well as during the battle, the Macedonians must have sustained considerable losses, for otherwise their numerical superiority over the Greeks would have been so great, that the war might at once have been brought to a speedy termination. But Antipater was still obliged to maintain himself on the defensive;¹⁰ he had it, however, in his power to retreat through Thessaly to the river Peneus, whereby he restored the communication with Macedonia. He there waited for the reinforcements which Craterus was bringing from Cilicia, and which arrived soon after.

⁹ "It was unfortunate for the Greeks, that they persisted in using their inferior armour and mode of drawing up their forces, refusing to adopt the more modern Macedonian tactics and armour. This circumstance was ruinous to them."—1825.

¹⁰ In 1830, Niebuhr, after the battle with Leonnatus, which was only mentioned by the way, related the following circumstances, which seem to have arisen from some confusion, and have therefore been omitted in the text; "Antipater now wanted to conclude peace, and again offered a capitulation—he had already negotiated with Leosthenes—but the Greeks demanded that he should surrender. They thought that he would keep peace only until some better opportunity showed itself, and renew the war as soon as it was possible for him. We can well understand why the Greeks distrusted him; but it was a misfortune, as in the war with Napoleon, when peace was likewise impossible."—ED.

It was a great misfortune that the Macedonian fleet was superior to that of the Greeks, for shortly before his death Alexander had sent a large fleet with great treasures to Macedonia. Antipater was now in possession of it, and it could always be increased from Asia, while on the other hand, the Athenians alone had a fleet, and had to maintain themselves at sea quite single-handed. The Athenians lost two naval battles against the superior fleet of the Macedonians under Clitus. We neither know the place nor the time of these battles. However, not much importance appears to have been attached to those defeats, nor do they appear to have been felt very keenly. A Macedonian fleet under Micion also appeared in the neighbourhood of Rhamnus; but Phocion, who was then strategus, successfully commanded the Athenians against the Macedonians. Plutarch represents this victory as the work of Phocion; for, according to him, the Athenians were greatly deficient in discipline; but zeal on that occasion supplied the place of discipline, so that notwithstanding the want of discipline, the Macedonians were so thoroughly defeated that their commander, with many others, was taken prisoner.

But now the second army, under Craterus, arrived in Thessaly; it consisted of the veterans whom Alexander had disbanded in upper Asia, because they resisted his scheme of orientalising his whole empire. They had marched very leisurely through lower Asia, but had remained together. They were very ready to march against the Greeks, and went to meet them with the pride of the conquerors of the time of Philip; they considered the Greeks only as a militia unable to resist them, and thought it highly impertinent that they should dare to attempt to deprive them of the fruits of Philip's victories. Craterus, their commander, was the best of Alexander's generals. The Greeks, on the other hand, were suffering from the greatest want of discipline, and the troops, in large numbers, had abandoned their standards. There was evidently discord in the Greek camp, and we may suppose that Antipater made good use of the great Macedonian treasures in endeavouring to create a Macedonian party among the Greeks. But after Craterus had joined Antipater, the Macedonians were superior to the Greeks in numbers also; the cavalry alone were nearly equal, because that of the Thessalians was with the Greeks. Antipater now had 40,000 foot and 5,000 horse, and the

Greeks only 25,000 foot and 3,500 horse. But what a difference of discipline must there have been between the militia of the Athenians and the veterans of Alexander! Most of the Aetolians remained at home; many other Greeks were obliged to watch the smaller tribes in the interior, which had not joined them, and many had no desire to come forward. The Greek army, therefore, was much too weak.

In these circumstances, the Greek generals, Antiphilus and Menon, tried to avoid a battle, but Antipater, anxious to bring about a decision as soon as possible, compelled them to fight. Thus the unfortunate battle of Cranon was commenced. The one party was sure of victory, while the other, by manoeuvring, endeavoured to put off the day of defeat. The Macedonian phalanx threw the Greeks into confusion, so that they were obliged to retreat to the heights. The Athenian cavalry had no time to take part in the battle;¹¹ Antipater and Craterus had managed their arrangements so skilfully, that it could not come to the assistance of the infantry. The battle was by no means completely lost; the number of the dead was incredibly small, amounting only to five hundred, of whom two hundred belonged to the Athenians; but the despondency was exceedingly great, and morally the battle was completely lost. The Athenians found themselves abandoned by all, and all were discouraged. On the following day a council of war was held, in which Antiphilus proposed the question, as to whether they should keep on the defensive, and wait for reinforcements, or whether they should conclude peace. All those who now remembered the pusillanimity with which they had commenced the war, saw no safety except in peace. It was accordingly resolved to sue for it, and to send ambassadors to Antipater. He returned them a proud answer, treating them as rebels, saying that he recognised no confederacy of Greeks; that he would be merciful towards the individual cities, but that he would negotiate only with each separately, not with all collectively; that the ambassadors of each town must come to him separately, and that then he would, according to circumstances, either pardon or punish; but that above all things they must withdraw from the war. All now dispersed one after another. For a time the main forces remained together; but

¹¹ In 1825, Niebuhr more correctly stated, that the cavalry did take part in the engagement, and fought bravely.—Ed.

Antipater led his troops from one Thessalian town to another. Pharsalus, the native place of Menon, was taken, without the Greeks being able to save it, and to strike terror into the rest, it was cruelly destroyed. This act seems to have been decisive, for all the other Thessalian towns now surrendered at discretion, the army dispersed, the Athenians, abandoned by all, returned home, and the Aetolians went back to Aetolia to defend their own country.

Antipater then quickly passed Thermopylae, which was not defended, and began negotiating with the Greek towns separately. They now regularly vied with one another as to which should surrender first. One separate peace was concluded after another, especially as Antipater showed himself tolerably lenient. At least as far as appearances go, the towns did not suffer much; but the recall of the exiles was, of course, the first condition, and afterwards the opponents of Macedonia were sentenced to death; the constitutions were changed everywhere, and oligarchies established.

The war was thus concluded, and Antipater (Olymp. 114, 3) entered Boeotia, was received with great enthusiasm, and pitched his camp near the Cadmea, ready to proceed to besiege Athens. Not one month after the battle, on the 20th of Boedromion¹², Athens was taken, and a Macedonian garrison entered Munychia.

Phocion had from the beginning opposed the war. I should not blame him for this alone, for it was a point on which men might differ in opinion: some might think that it was nothing but an attempt to swim against the current, and that all would be of no avail. This view is intelligible. The discussion of this point will be an excellent subject for a demegoria in the Thucydidean style, if one day there shall arise an historian of that period. He to whom life is a burden, and who has a truly Athenian mind, will feel as I did at an early period of my life; when I conceive an Athenian who survived the Lamian war or the battle of Chaeronea, I feel that life must have been unbearable to him. He who feels thus, will stand by Leosthenes and Demosthenes. Others may think, God has sent us these afflictions

¹² "In former times, the month of Maimacterion was generally placed as the fourth month in the Attic year, before Pyanepsion. Buttmann was the first to observe, that Pyanepsion was the fourth; and his observation is confirmed by the accounts of the battle of Cranon, in Plutarch."—1825.

and we must bear them. But we can never approve of the scorn with which Phocion speaks of this war, and which is an indelible stain on his character. It is a peculiar fact, that that which elevates minds of a higher order, is to those of an opposite tendency not only a subject of indifference, but of hatred and aversion. Thus, in the year 1813, I knew people of rank and honesty, who considered war to be foolish, and were for this reason angry with others, even after the war had turned out to be successful; and who were so vexed at the success of the war they had opposed, that they rejoiced at every piece of bad news, not indeed from hatred of their country, but because it seemed to show that after all they had been right. They were not traitors, but their dinners, carriages, etc., had been in danger. I have known people who rejoiced when fortune turned in the Champagne; but afterwards profited by the circumstances as much as others. In February of that year, I met an Austrian in the Netherlands, a good man and a faithful servant of the emperor, whom Prince Schwarzenberg had sent as courier into the Netherlands, but who considered the war as an absurdity. I asked him how matters stood, and he told me, quite pleased, that we had been beaten: afterwards, however, he rejoiced at the success. Thus Phocion is reported to have said after the first victories: "When shall we cease gaining victories?"—and when he was asked whether he would not rejoice, if he could perform such exploits as had been accomplished by Leosthenes, he is said to have answered, that his own advice was still better. If these anecdotes were related in a spirit hostile to him, I would attach no value to them, but they are told for the purpose of showing his immense wisdom. When the Macedonian fleet appeared off Rhamnus, he called to arms all the men up to the age of seventy-five, saying that he himself was eighty (he was probably seventy-five) years old, and yet still vigorous, and invested with the office of strategus. All this was again scornfully meant: the troops he thus raised, were a mass more injurious than useful. When such things are done by a man who is otherwise described as a pattern of virtue, when such a man treats with scorn and contumely that which is dearest to many, and when he rejoices at seeing those things come to pass which he pretends to have foreseen, his conduct is unpardonable.

When Antipater appeared in Boeotia, the people called upon Phocion and Demades to act as mediators. But Demades had so often been convicted of illegal psephismata, that he had lost the full civic franchise; whence it was necessary first to dispense with his punishment, and then to restore him to the franchise. The first use he made of it was, the proposal that Demosthenes, Hyperides, and their friends should be condemned to death (?). With this decree, and with unlimited power, he proceeded to Antipater to negotiate with him, and to induce him not to advance any farther. Antipater promised to do so out of respect to Phocion, and remained in Boeotia in spite of all the remonstrances of the Macedonians, who urged upon him the necessity of sparing the country of his allies and ravaging that of his enemies. He was probably influenced by his contempt of the Boeotians.

Phocion brought the Athenians a truce, but at the same time the declaration, that they must accept any peace which Antipater might dictate, and submit to the discretion of the conqueror. The Athenians had no choice. But in order to obtain at least some mitigation, they sent a fresh embassy of three men, the chiefs of which were, Phocion and the philosopher Xenocrates, a Chalcedonian, consequently a stranger or a metoecus of Athens. Here again the Athenian people showed their true character: they hoped that the moral respect which the aged and venerable Xenocrates enjoyed, and the favor with which Phocion was looked upon, would procure for them tolerable terms. Xenocrates was a man of such personal sanctity, that they thought it impossible for any one to resist his counsels, and they imagined that the reverence for the sanctity of his character would soften down even the most ferocious. It was just the same, as if St. Vincent de Paula had been sent as ambassador in the reign of Louis XIV. The Athenians revered Xenocrates to such a degree, that one day when he was to take an oath at a trial, the whole assembled people exclaimed, that he should not take it, that his word was sufficient; and they punished the taxgatherer as a criminal for having imprisoned Xenocrates, because he could not pay the head-tax.

LECTURE LXXXIII.

BUT Antipater was so insensible to this moral dignity of the philosopher, that when Xenocrates wanted to speak, he indignantly struck the earth with his stick and commanded him to be silent.¹ He listened, however, to Phocion, who succeeded in inducing him to keep the army in Boeotia, and not to advance into Attica. The other conditions were not modified.

The Athenians lost the town of Oropus (Diod. xviii. 56); the question as to whether they were to retain Samos, was referred by Antipater to the decision of Perdiccas, who declared against Athens. We should say nothing against this, if Macedonia had been entitled to establish justice. They were further obliged to accept their laws from Antipater. He changed the constitution, limiting the franchise to those who possessed more than 2000 drachmae. There were only 9000 possessing this amount of property, and the remaining 12,000 were degraded to the rank of thetes. This was the spirit of the oligarchies which Antipater used to establish. In order to depopulate the city, he offered to these 12,000, habitations and lands in Thrace. Not many, however, appear to have accepted the offer. The exclusion of so large a portion from a share in the government was a great misfortune for the Athenians, for they thereby lost their ἐκκλησιαστικὸν and δικαστικόν. The Athenians had further to pay a war-contribution, "and it is probable that they had also to surrender their fleet." He placed garrisons in Piraeus and Munychia, apparently for the purpose of levying that contribution; the Museum was as yet not occupied by the Macedonians, but under Demetrius Poliorcetes it likewise received a garrison; but Menyllus, who was sent as commandant of Athens, was a good man. The most terrible thing was, that the patriots were outlawed. The most distinguished citizens were sent into exile, according to a list which Antipater himself had drawn up, and the Athenian

¹ "It is not easy to reconcile this account with another in Diogenes Laertius (iv. 2, § 9), where it is stated, that, when Antipater refused the ransom of the prisoners, Xenocrates recited some verses from Homer, whereupon Antipater invited him to his table, and restored the prisoners to freedom. This story seems to be too good for Antipater."—1825.

people themselves were obliged to pronounce sentence against them.

The patriots had fled to Aegina, even before the Macedonian garrison entered Athens. There was no place of refuge for them anywhere but in Italy; there they would have been safe, if they had escaped in time, for at Syracuse and in the other cities of the West, the Macedonians had no influence. But it must have been impossible for the fugitives to reach Sicily or Italy: every ship conveying a fugitive would to a certainty have been sunk. There was no place in Greece in which they could be safe. Such lists of proscribed persons were no doubt made out for all the towns which had been in arms, and from some accidental expressions we may conclude, that there existed a decree of Antipater, by which all the exiles between the Ceraunian mountains and Taenarus were outlawed, and in which their surrender to him was demanded. In Aegina the fugitives separated, and Demosthenes, who being sure of death was certainly not called upon to accelerate it, proceeded to the sanctuary at Calauria, near Troezen. In Aegina he had become reconciled to Hyperides: one of the most fortunate statements that has come down to us, and to my feelings one of the most touching. Demosthenes had joined Hyperides, when he wanted to persuade the Greek cities, but there had been then no reconciliation; now, however, when death was staring them in the face, and when Demosthenes parted from him in Aegina, he pardoned him. Hyperides himself went into the temple of Poseidon, but was dragged from the statue to Antipater, who had entered Peloponnesus and taken his head-quarters at Cleonae, a small town in Argolis. Thither Hyperides was conveyed, and Antipater ordering him to be tortured to death, first commanded his tongue to be torn out, and then had him killed. A similar fate awaited Demosthenes. The celebrated answer of Phocion when Antipater sent him a present, "I can no longer be the friend of Antipater, if I accept a pension from him," was given after Antipater had caused the tongues of the Athenian orators to be torn out of their mouths!

Antipater was in his way a respectable man; he possessed a kind of barbarian honesty, he was a distinguished general, and Macedonia was immensely indebted to him; but he was as rude and cruel a barbarian as a Turk or an Algerian. Every attempt of the Greeks appeared to him as a rebellion of slaves,

just as many an otherwise honest man, cannot understand that his negroes are anything else but brutes. Hence Antipater now sent in all directions a number of Macedonian executioners to hunt up the fugitives, and to cause them to be dragged forth to similar fearful tortures. The worst of these *φνυγαδοθήραι* was Archias of Thurium, a monster, who had acquired a terrible reputation for dogging out fugitives. He was a man of letters, an actor, and orator. He cannot have been a bad artist, for he was the teacher of Polus, the greatest actor in antiquity; he must, therefore, have been a man of talent. He would, perhaps, have acquired great celebrity on this account, but the effect of the detestation in which he was held for his conduct, was, that he was called a wretched actor.

This Archias arrived at Calauria with Thracian soldiers. He endeavoured to persuade Demosthenes to come out of the asylum of the temple, promising that Antipater would grant him a gracious pardon, etc. But Demosthenes answered: "Thou hast never deceived me upon the stage, nor shalt thou deceive me now;" and when Archias replied, that then he should be obliged to employ force, Demosthenes praised his honesty, and only asked permission to write a letter. While writing, he sucked the poison from the reed, which he had put into it; he wanted to die as a free man, and not amid the tortures of a tyrant. When Archias reminded him to make haste, Demosthenes rose, and dying, he begged to be led out of the temple, that he might not pollute the sanctuary: he wished to die in the open air like Goetz of Berlichingen in our poet. He sank down on the threshold of the temple, and Archias took his body to Antipater² (Olymp. 114, 3).

Such was the end of Demosthenes. He had received his reward for his noble life, for he had been successful up to the battle of Chaeronea, and had enjoyed the esteem of 20,000 Athenians even in the days of misfortune. He had nobly attempted to break the chains, and had been rewarded on the day when all Athens, full of hope, came out to meet him; he was also rewarded by his free death, and he will be rewarded to the end of time, for he will be read and loved as the first

² "The *ἐγκώμιον Δημοσθένους* (ascribed to Lucian) contains the most trivial and erroneous account, especially in regard to the description of Antipater; it pretends to be derived from Macedonian memoirs, but it is altogether worthless."—1825.

orator. Let men of letters and sophists revile him: that can make no difference, God himself has been reviled; let them only speak out plainly and show that they love that which is base, and that they have an aversion to what is grand and noble.

The death of Demosthenes was the death of Athens; after him it only breathed. It is true, that afterwards we still meet with a few Athenians, who are deserving of our notice, such as Demochares and Olympiodorus, but Athens was dead. Aristotle, an Athenian in heart, though not by birth, died in the same year as Demosthenes. He had spent many years in that city, and had come to it when a very young man, so that his life and residence had made him an Athenian. One thing is quite certain, that without Athens, gigantic as were the powers of his mind, he would not have become Aristotle.

A short time afterwards, the Athenian people, on the proposal of Demochares, erected a statue to Demosthenes,³ with the celebrated inscription, the meaning of which was strangely misunderstood among the ancients themselves. The true meaning is: if Demosthenes had had as much power as he had intelligence, Greece would not have become subject to Macedonia.⁴ Something similar is said by Demosthenes himself in the oration on the crown.

The fate of the Peloponnesians may easily be imagined. All were now subdued except the Aetolians, who alone persevered with the determination peculiar to uncivilised mountaineers. But there can be no question that they would have fallen after all, had not other occurrences intervened; just as the Spaniards would have been conquered during the winter of 1808-9, if the Austrian war had not broken out. The Aetolians would have been subdued, had it not been, that the commotions in Asia withdrew the attention of Antipater from them.

It was towards the winter of the third year of Olymp. 114,

³ "The statue, which still exists at Rome among the marbles of the Chevalier Camuccini, and which has now been purchased for the pope (in the Braccio Nuovo), may be a copy of that statue. The first authentic head with the name was found among the bronzes of Herculaneum. Even without the name it may very easily be recognised as a genuine copy of the statue of Demosthenes. It is of exquisite beauty; the physiognomy is extremely fine; it has nothing athletic, and the whole body is delicately formed."

⁴ Comp. vol. ii. p. 299, foll.; *Lect. on Rom. Hist.* vol. iii. p. 82, note 13.

when the Macedonians entered Greece. The Aetolians had removed their women, children, and moveable property, into the most inaccessible mountains. The Macedonians attempted to take them by storm, but were repulsed; their numerical superiority, however, was so great, that they began surrounding the mountains to compel the Aetolians by famine to surrender. They accordingly built strong huts around the hills, for the Aetolians had dispersed, and were defending themselves on the separate hills. In this manner, the Aetolians would have been defeated—the Macedonians intended to send them to the most distant parts of Asia—had not, fortunately, the disputes between Perdiccas and Antipater prevented it. As Perdiccas was making preparations to take possession of Egypt, Antipater thought it advisable to march against him and Eumenes into Asia Minor. The war, moreover, was disagreeable to the soldiers, for the Aetolians defended themselves with the courage of despair, and their country did not offer much booty. When the Macedonians, with great loss, succeeded in subduing such poor mountain tribes, they captured indeed a few hundred slaves, women and children; but these same advantages could be gained more easily in wars with wealthy nations. When, therefore, the winter commenced, Antipater was vexed at the time he was spending there, while the disputes in Asia afforded him much more scope and occupation. Accordingly he withdrew his troops, having already made himself master of half the country, and left the Aetolians to themselves (Olymp. 114, 3). He even concluded peace with them, and having once left them, he had no more time to return.

This circumstance saved the Aetolians, and gave a different turn to the affairs of Greece, preventing as it did the Macedonians from afterwards becoming the exclusive masters of Greece. For the Aetolians always opposed them, and it was they that prevented them from completely subduing the country. It was no doubt also owing to the Aetolians that subsequently the Romans gained the victory at Cynoscephalae, a fact which was afterwards ignored by the Romans. It is true, the Aetolians would have effected nothing without the Romans, but their cavalry was of great assistance to the Romans.

The excellent Polybius is always prejudiced against the Aetolians. The alliance between them and the Romans was

indeed like a league between Beelzebub and Satan, but the Aetolians were a thorn in the side of the Macedonian kings; the latter would have liked to conquer the country and change it into a desert, in order to create a peace of unspeakable tranquillity.

When the Aetolians thus obtained breathing time, they concluded a treaty with Perdiccas (Olymp. 114, 4), and availed themselves of the opportunity of making an inroad into Thessaly. Menon of Pharsalus was among them. Having stirred up the Thessalians, they appointed Menon dictator of Thessaly. But the insurrection did not last long, for Polysperchon, whom Antipater during his expedition into Asia had left behind as commander in Macedonia, descended into Thessaly, and Menon, who together with the Aetolians was beaten, lost his life. Soon after this Antipater returned from Asia.

During this period, till after the death of Antipater (from Olymp. 114, 2 to 115, 3), Athens was tranquil. After the men, who were its honour and pride, were gone, it was governed by the newly instituted oligarchy.⁵ But the men who had the real power in their hands, were Phocion, the confidant and tool of Antipater, and Demades. The latter abused Antipater's friendship, by demanding the most exorbitant sums of money. He had previously, notwithstanding the many presents he received, fallen into such poverty, that he was unable to pay his fine; but he now lived in the greatest luxuries, and took a delight in squandering his treasures. Antipater despised him, and used him only as his slave: he said of him, that he was like an animal that had been offered up as a victim, and of which nothing was left but its stomach and its tongue. With this man and the detestable Callimedon the traitor, who had stirred up Antipater against Athens during the embassy to the Cadmea, Phocion shared the confidence and the power at Athens.⁶

Some of the ancient forms, such as the archons, the strategi, etc., were still kept up. It is said that Athens was governed

⁵ "That, on this occasion, the franchise was given to many strangers, is clear also from the fact, that Phocion offered the franchise to Xenocrates, who, however, refused it."—1825.

⁶ "Corn. Nepos goes so far as to say, that Phocion was one of the main causes why Demosthenes was sacrificed, and that he deserved the more censure for this, because Demosthenes had exalted him against Chares, and had, by his eloquence, rescued him from being put to death."—1825.

according to the restored laws of Solon. But on this occasion as well as at the time of Demetrius Phalereus, the term Solonian laws probably means, that an oligarchy was instituted, and that the changes which had been introduced after the time of Solon, were abolished. It is expressly mentioned, that the Areopagus probably recovered the power which it had possessed before the time of Pericles, and of which it had been deprived by Ephialtes. The archons were elected only from the wealthy families.

The Areopagus at that time seems to have possessed a power parallel to the rights of the other magistrates, and which it could exercise whenever it thought fit. The censorial power became afterwards more developed than it had been before. But the character of the Areopagus was not only of a censorial nature, but it could also interfere with the other powers. The right of the Areopagus to ask whence a man obtained his living, must assuredly have arisen during this period. The nature of the original power of the Areopagus will probably remain a mystery. Cicero⁷ remarks that it did not possess the same power at all times, whence we must infer, that in his own time it was peculiar.

The little we know shows that the condition of Athens during this period was highly unfortunate. The state of things was like that under the thirty tyrants, though not so much blood was shed. The tyrants were now supported by the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. The exact position of Munychia close to Piraeus is not sufficiently known. It was not connected with Piraeus by a wall, in the manner in which it is represented in our ordinary maps, but it was situated on an eminence, forming the *ἄκρη* of Piraeus. At the foot of the hill there were buildings containing stores of provisions, etc. It is possible that Munychia was now first fortified by the Macedonians; before this time it does not seem to have been surrounded by a wall.

When Antipater had become old and feeble, the Athenians (Olymp. 115, 2) were anxious that he should withdraw the garrison from Munychia. Phocion refused to go to him as ambassador with this request, probably because he was afraid, lest the Athenians, after the removal of the garrison, should take vengeance on him and the other oligarchs. Demades, on

⁷ *De Re Publ.* i. 27, 43.

the other hand, undertook the journey to Macedonia; but Antipater, who had intercepted some of his letters to Perdiccas, threw him into chains, and after his own son had been murdered before his eyes, he too was put to death.

Antipater died soon after; the Epirot Polysperchon obtained the regency for the two kings, and in Greece those changes were going on of which I shall speak hereafter.

“After the last efforts which the Greeks had made in the Lamian war to recover their freedom, all was lost. Oratory disappeared under the change of circumstances, and all that remained were the *λόγοι δικανικοὶ* and *ἐπιδεικτικοί*. Eloquence could not but perish, as the orators no longer found a will to act upon, for there cannot be anything more painful to an orator than to address an audience which does not enter into his spirit, and which does not reproduce that which it hears. All traces of the power of oratory necessarily vanished, and thus arose the speeches without soul and substance. It was no longer observed, that oratory holds a middle place between poetry and prose. Lyric poetry was entirely gone, but much prose was written. The new comedy, and stories from every-day life, were now very popular, but there was nothing of a higher kind. Philosophy produced the school of the Stoa, also the creature of an age, in which resignation prevails, and in which men seek that which is grand, in individual characters. It is not a purely Greek production, but contains much more of an oriental nature than is commonly supposed. It is not without a meaning that Zeno was a Phoenician. That sad period also produced the sceptic philosophy. Every one strove to console himself in the midst of the miseries of the age: people wanted to persuade themselves, that nothing was real, that the notion of an earlier happier state of things was a delusion, and that formerly things had not been better than they were now. There still existed a few excellent men, especially at Athens; and in the school of Theophrastus true learning was still cultivated, but it had its root in Aristotle, which still continued to impart vigour to it.

Professor Thiersch, with whom I once discussed this period, said that in his opinion there never existed a period more charming, in an intellectual point of view, than the age of Menander at Athens; but, in my opinion, it was a melancholy

time: it was an age of refinement and of a widely-spread intelligence, but everything was mere form and outward appearance; the inward active life of former times was gone."

Let us now return to the disputes among the generals of Alexander, which to me are the most confused events in history. I have very often read them attentively, in order to gain a clear insight into them; but, although I have had a tenacious memory from my early youth, I never was able to gain a distinct recollection of the detail of those quarrels and disputes: I always found myself involved in difficulties. And such is the case still; for although I have again read the authorities for the purpose of these Lectures, I find it impossible to group the events in such a manner as to afford an easy survey. This confusion arises from the fact, that we have to deal with a crowd of men among whom there is not one that stands forth prominently on account of his personal character. The question always is, whether one robber or another is to be master, and it is impossible to take pleasure in any one of them. One is, indeed, better than another, and Ptolemy is, in my opinion, the best: he was a blessing to Egypt, which under him became happy and prosperous, for his government was rational; but still he is morally a man in whom we can take little interest. His personal character leaves us quite indifferent, when we have once formed a notion of him. Eumenes is the only one who is important on account of his personal character; all the rest are imposing through their deeds of arms alone. In the earlier history of Greece we like to follow the great men step by step; but all these Macedonians leave us perfectly indifferent; we feel no interest whether the one is defeated or the other; not even the tragic fall of Lysimachus can make an impression upon us; I look upon it with greater indifference than I should feel at a bull-fight, in which a noble animal defends itself against the dogs that are set at it. I could wish that the earth had opened and swallowed up all the Macedonians. Every one intimately acquainted with ancient history will share this feeling of indifference with me. And when we are under the influence of such a feeling, it is not easy to dwell upon a history like this: it does not impress itself upon our mind.

It would be most easy for me to relate to you the history of the successors of Alexander as minutely as it was given by

Trogus Pompeius, and as we still have it in Diodorus; but you would then have before you only a vast chaos. Even where we have ample information, we must advance rapidly. When we go through the history of our own time, and take a number of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* from among those of the last three years, we find it so wretched, that if we were called upon to read it again it would be quite unbearable; and the Macedonian history possesses even far less moral interest. I shall accordingly endeavour to be brief, believing that this will be the most appropriate manner of treating that history. You may read the accounts in Justin, whose work shall constantly be my guide; but I shall not observe the symmetry with which Trogus thought it advisable to relate this history.⁸

I shall accordingly select only the principal events. Whoever wishes to investigate this history, must study the 18th, 19th, and 20th books of Diodorus; but he ought not to forget that there are many gaps in Diodorus. The 18th book, in particular, is very much mutilated, and some of the gaps are concealed; for the manuscripts of Diodorus were made with the intention to conceal the fact that they are not complete. The student, however, must compare also the Excerpts in Photius from Arrian's lost work, τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον.

The sham government of Arrhidaeus was now to commence. He must have been staying with the army, but, strange as it may seem, I cannot find any mention on this point.⁹ The phalanx no doubt did not believe that Arrhidaeus was an idiot, but probably considered him to be a wise ruler who was only calumniated: just as even in Denmark, no one would believe that Christian VII. was mad, from fear of wronging the king's majesty. The king's madness was in Holstein such a secret, that persons at the utmost whispered it to one another,

⁸ The narrative which here follows concerning the struggles of the successors of Alexander is very confused in the MS. notes, because it extends over two Lectures (83 and 84), and because, in the second (84), Niebuhr followed a different plan from that which he had adopted in the first (83). Hence there is no proper connexion, which is, in fact, interrupted in several places. Nothing, therefore, remained, but to take the narrative to pieces and re-arrange it; but, beyond this, no alteration has been made.—ED.

⁹ Compare, however, above, p. 22. In 1825, Niebuhr, quite consistently with the above passage, said, "Arrhidaeus was in the camp. Latterly, at the time when enmity had broken out between Antipater and Olympias, Alexander seems to have ordered Arrhidaeus to quit Macedonia and come to Asia, that he might have him under his control."—ED.

and to believe it appeared to the people like a culpable act. Such also is the case with a prince who is still alive, and is an idiot: there is something mystic in the belief that it is not madness, but profundity of thought. This may have been the feeling of the phalangites.

The *ἱππεῖς* were satisfied, as soon as they had him in their power. Perdiccas was chiliarchus or administrator, and Craterus was to take care of the king's person, as the queen took care of the person of king George III., while the successor managed the government. Craterus was assigned to him as a kind of tutor, who took care of him, and always kept him in order: this shows how imbecile he must have been. Arrhidæus disappears altogether from history, and he was no more king than his nephew Alexander, the son of Roxana, and is mentioned only as a name. But in order to understand many coins and some inscriptions, we must bear in mind that Arrhidæus assumed the name of Philip. The coins bearing the inscription *βασιλέως Φιλίππου*, and not simply *Φιλίππου*, belong to him, whereas those of the son of Amyntas are marked simply *Φιλίππου*. Thus Champollion has discovered in some hieroglyphic inscriptions the name "king Philip," of which he does not know what to make: he is, however, no other than Arrhidæus—a proof how unjustly Champollion's reading has been attacked. In like manner, Dionysius and Diodorus found accounts about ancient Rome, of which they did not know what to make, but we can discover from them what Fabius said.

The satrapies were now distributed afresh.

But before proceeding to the history of the satraps, or governors, I must relate the first of the horrible scenes of that time, viz., the insurrection of the unfortunate Greeks in the *ἄνω σατραπείαι* (Olymp. 114, 2): a term comprising Khorassan in its widest extent, partly the province, properly so called, and partly the whole of Persia, east of the great Median desert. There Alexander had settled the captive Greeks, who had served as mercenaries under Darius, as well as other Greeks from among his own allies: he formed them into military colonies. These people were driven by despair to revolt, probably when they heard the report of the Lamian war: they assembled and determined to force their way to Greece. A Macedonian army under Pithon was sent against them. The

fearful demoralisation among the mercenaries became manifest on that occasion: he would probably have been unable to do anything against them, if he had not bribed one of their commanders, who during the engagement deserted his post. Being overpowered, they now capitulated. Pithon had received orders from Perdiccas to put them all to the sword, that they might no longer be troublesome to him. But Pithon had formed a different plan: he wanted to employ those Greeks as a force, with the aid of which he hoped to play a prominent part; he was a Macedonian, and had claims upon the empire which was already beginning to be torn in pieces. Accordingly he spared their lives; but now his Macedonians rebelled against him—here we see the effects of the national hatred existing between the Greeks and Macedonians—for they found that it would be much more advantageous to kill the Greeks and seize the booty they had collected. They therefore made a general massacre among them, and took their property. After this was done, Pithon returned as if he had executed the orders of Perdiccas. It is as if we read a history of Ali Pasha. Soon afterwards, the hostilities among the governors broke out.

LECTURE LXXXIV.

THE generals and satraps of Alexander, called in Greek the *διάδοχοι*, were about twenty in number; none of them was inclined to play a subordinate part, but a great many could not entertain the thought of assuming supreme power. Some of them, therefore, at first kept aloof from the disputes; these were the men who had no great expectations for themselves. The great rupture at the beginning, was between Perdiccas on the one hand, and Antipater and Ptolemy on the other.

Perdiccas claimed the supreme power, because Alexander, by giving him his seal-ring, had conveyed it to him; and Antipater claimed it as regent of Macedonia, because he looked upon himself in that capacity as the representative of the nation. He was joined by Ptolemy because he was far off, for if they had been near each other, Antipater and Ptolemy

could never have become allies. But as it was, Ptolemy in a distant and inaccessible kingdom, considered himself safe, and Antipater could have no inclination to deprive him of his kingdom.

Ptolemy showed himself as a very practical and intelligent man; for he never thought for one moment of making himself master of the whole of Alexander's empire, while the others were more or less harbouring such notions; but he was satisfied with the enormous prize he had carried off from the lottery, the possession of Egypt; and he only sought such provinces as could be maintained from his own kingdom, that is, Syria, Cyprus, and the countries on the opposite coast of Asia, which formed the monarchy under Philadelphus and Euergetes, who were masters of the opposite coast. This was very natural, as he could not but wish to secure himself on all sides. "Ptolemy was a man of a very cultivated mind. He was too young to have been invested with any office under Philip; but he gained Alexander's confidence, and deserved it as a talented man, and as the only one among Alexander's generals that knew how to manage the administration of a country. But when his ambition was to be gratified, he was faithless, and no means were left unemployed.

Antipater aimed at power, but despised the diadem, still having the feelings of a soldier of Philip. He was already very far advanced in years, being the oldest of the generals; and Philip had had none who surpassed him in ability, and he had honoured him more than any other, as, for example, by the embassy to Athens. We know little of his circumstances under Philip; for it seems that he, like Napoleon, threw his generals into the shade, that they might appear insignificant in comparison with himself, and occupy the second or third place after their great master. After his death, they came forward more prominently, and we recognise Antipater and Parmenio as the greatest among Philip's generals. Antipater was a man of the old school, and affected great simplicity. We can best compare him with Suwaroff, who when he had the greatest power in his hands, yet continued to live as a common Russian. In like manner, Antipater, though he was in possession of the highest power, yet continued to affect the simple mode of life of a common Macedonian soldier. While the other generals appeared in purple chlamydes, he used the common Macedo-

nian garment, the *τρίβων* (resembling in form and material a monk's cowl, to which a hood also may have been attached), and a stick, so that no one could distinguish him from an ordinary Macedonian. Such an affectation, combined with internal rudeness, is very often found in men of a bloodthirsty disposition. Not even Plutarch is able to conceal his cruelty. He clearly shows his want of criticism in the fact of his measuring Macedonians by the Greek standard, and thus comparing them with Romans; he himself perceives the awkwardness indeed, but does not know how to get out of it. The rudeness of Antipater is further attested by the contempt which he showed towards the venerable philosopher Xenocrates: the virtue of the philosopher was contemptible in his eyes, and for his wisdom he had no taste. The most distinguished member of his numerous family was Cassander, who was as cruel as his father, but not a man of the same simplicity. His father certainly would never have assumed the regal title, because it would have taken him out of his own sphere, and its lustre would have been troublesome to him; just as in modern times, there have been men who despised the honour and glory offered to them by Napoleon, because they were contrary to their revolutionary ideas. Cassander, however, lived in a different age, and, longing for the diadem, he seized upon the kingly title as soon as he could. His reputation is worse than that of his father; but we must probably limit this to his cruelty against Olympias, and his hatred of her was no doubt inherited from his father. Antipater was distinguished for his attachment to Philip; and I suspect that his hatred of Alexander was chiefly excited by Alexander's murder of his father. It was, perhaps, increased by the stupid neglect which Alexander showed on receiving the news of the battle of Megalopolis. I myself once was with a general who had been engaged all the time at Marengo,¹ and had been the chief instrument in deciding the battle: when he received Berthier's report, in which his services were mentioned only in a few lines, I saw the man trembling and throwing the report on the ground. Antipater had taken his revenge for this, and had not yet forgiven him.

¹ The report here alluded to is not the bulletin of the battle, but the *Relation de la bataille de Marengo*, which appeared in the spring of 1805. The general whom Niebuhr saw, is, no doubt, Carra St. Cyr.—Ed.

Perdiccas was the worst of all. He seems to have been a Macedonian noble. Although we read little of a nobility and the like among the Macedonians, yet he appears in all circumstances as a person of great pretensions. He was guilty of every licence, even the greatest cruelties, without being blood-thirsty like Antipater, who was another Duke of Alba. Perdiccas was a purely Oriental and unprincipled character: a man of very moderate talents, to whom nothing was sacred."

He had no friends: Eumenes of Cardia alone was in connection with him, and drew close to him. As Craterus was the most chivalrous and gallant among the Macedonians,² so Eumenes was the cleverest, and very much distinguished by his great talents: he would have been a distinguished man at any time. He is the only man of that period (if we except the Craterus, who fell early), in whom we can take a personal interest: he was a true Odysseus, inexhaustible in resources. It is one of the happy ideas of Plutarch to compare him with Sertorius, though Sertorius was unquestionably a nobler nature. Still, however, Eumenes appears as the best among those leaders of bands of robbers. With strict conscientiousness men cannot get on in such times, if they want to act a prominent part, "and Eumenes acted upon moral principles which are different from those, according to which we, thank God, should act;" but still there is a limit, and Eumenes was a faithful friend. He never made his way at the cost of his friends, and never sacrificed a friend to his own interests. He always obeyed the dictates of humanity, and whenever in his life there occur actions, which would be deplored in better times, still they are praiseworthy in comparison with what others did at the time. Being inexhaustible in counsel, he also had quite different ideas from those of the Macedonians. Had he been a Macedonian, he would unquestionably have gained the inheritance of Alexander, as far as it was possible, and as far as it could be concentrated in one man's hand. But he was a stranger, a native of Cardia in Chersonesus, and this circumstance placed him in a position among the Macedonians, which prevented his ever rising to the height which he might otherwise have attained.

² "A beautiful statement about Craterus, which has not yet been noticed, occurs in Suidas, probably from Arrian's work on the successors of Alexander."
—1825.

Eumenes had not risen, like the rest, by his military talents alone, but more especially as a statesman. At the age of twenty he had entered the cabinet of king Philip, and was employed by him for seven years as secretary; he had then, without interruption, been with Alexander until the king's death, so that for twenty years he had been the organ of the royal government. But he was by no means unfit for the calling, by which men at that time rose to greatness; for he was also a good soldier. Alexander had a horse-guard consisting of two squadrons, and one of them was commanded by Eumenes. If he had been a native of Macedonia, he would unquestionably have eclipsed all others. He afterwards displayed the very greatest talent as a general, which is the more wonderful, as in the time of Alexander he had never commanded an army: he had only acted the part of a looker-on. He was then forty years old, but he was like the men of the revolution who displayed their military skill, although no one had suspected that they possessed any.

Eumenes was appointed governor of Cappadocia and Pontus, as Lysimachus was of Thrace. These two men had beautiful countries assigned to them, but they had first to conquer them. Perdiccas, feeling that Eumenes was very useful to him, assisted him in his conquests, but Lysimachus was obliged alone to conquer his province. He accomplished it quite alone in a very brilliant manner, and there established his Thracian kingdom. We shall afterwards say more about him. His kingdom at that time was a very remarkable phenomenon. The war of Eumenes drew Perdiccas into Asia Minor.

This expedition of Perdiccas into Asia Minor is the most important exploit of his reign. He destroyed the Persian principality in Cappadocia, which had existed there for a long time, and had arisen, if not in the time of Darius Hystaspis, at least soon after—I mean the principality of Ariarathes, from whom the royal family of Pontus, and afterwards Mithridates, were descended. This principality now disappeared, but afterwards the descendants of the dynasty rose again, until they became extinct in Mithridates.

While Perdiccas was tarrying there, the women of the family of Alexander began a commotion with a view of taking possession of the reins of government. Even during the life-time of

Alexander, his sister, Cleopatra, the widow of the Molottian, ambitious like her step-mother, Olympias, and her whole race, had tried to interfere in the affairs of Macedonia. Even before Alexander's death, Olympias quarrelled with Antipater, and went to her family in Epirus. Cleopatra now endeavoured to obtain influence with Antipater, but he would not allow her any; it would, however, seem that she acted on the authority of her brother, who wished to prevent Antipater establishing himself too firmly, and therefore allowed her some influence along with Antipater. She seems to have been the spy of her brother. After Alexander's death, Olympias remained in Epirus for several years, until she unfortunately returned after Antipater's death. Cleopatra fearing Antipater, who was master in Macedonia, went to Sardes where she kept a princely court, which became the centre of the intrigues and endless complications of the time. As Queen Elizabeth continued to deceive many by allowing them to believe that they might hope for her hand, so Cleopatra held out hopes to several of the generals, partly because she had no confidence in her own situation, and partly because she expected brilliant results from her marrying one of the commanders. Thus she contrived to keep up a hope especially in the aged Perdiccas. This was a cause of great alarm to Antipater, who endeavoured to counteract the scheme, and to connect Perdiccas with himself by offering him his daughter, Nicaea, in marriage. This double intrigue was quite in the spirit of all the transactions of that time; it has all its meanness and untruth. The result was, that Perdiccas, through these negotiations, was placed in great difficulties. He thought it dangerous to offend Antipater; but the latter was not in earnest, wishing only to put off Perdiccas and to gain time, and thus both negotiations came to nothing. It is sometimes said, that Cleopatra first married Perdiccas and afterwards Cassander, but there never was anything beyond negotiations with both; and both were duped.

About the same time there appeared in Asia Minor another daughter of Philip, who is called by some Cynna, and by others Cynnane, a Barbaro-Macedonian name. She was a daughter of Audate, an Illyrian woman, for king Philip, according to Macedonian custom, had lived in polygamy, like other barbarian kings. The fate of this Cynna was very tragic.

The fact that no one has ever made the last misfortunes of the family of Alexander the subject of a historical tragedy, shews how little the history of that time is known; we have here a most excellent subject for a tragedy, and if Shakespere had known the fate of that princess and of Olympias, he would unquestionably have seized it as a subject for his muse. Amyntas, a son of Perdiccas, the brother of Philip (who had several brothers) was a cousin of Alexander, and accordingly laid claim to the throne. Amyntas and his friends were among those who, after Philip's death, were proscribed, while all pretenders to the crown were put to death by order of Alexander, that he might feel safe in Asia. Amyntas, fleeing from Macedonia, sought safety in Persia; he there stayed for a time with Memnon, formed a corps, and served with it against Alexander. After the battle of Issus, he fled into Egypt, which he endeavoured to defend against Alexander; no Persian could succeed in this, and Amyntas perished. In what manner he died is uncertain, and nothing definite can be said. Cynna had been married to him, and she had remained behind in Macedonia with her only daughter, Adeia. This name, Adeia, occurs in Macedonia as well as in Macedonian Syria; and there is also a Macedonian poet of the name of Adaeus. Photius³ has the form Adea, but Adeia is well established. She afterwards adopted the Greek name, Eurydice, which had also been assumed by her grandmother, the mother of Cynna, whose Illyrian name was Audate; Eurydice was a common name in the family of Philip (his mother also bore it), just as Laudice or Laodice was common in the family of the Syrian dynasty. The names of the Macedonians are very often confounded; it is remarkable, that among the Macedonian princes sometimes even brothers have the same name; two brothers of Antigonus Gonatas, *e.g.* were called Demetrius.

Cynnane was an Amazon character, having accompanied her father on his last expedition, and she educated her daughter in the same way. She went to Asia Minor for the purpose of creating a revolution; she belonged to Antipater's faction, and it was, no doubt, according to a pre-concerted plan with Cleopatra, that Perdiccas caused her to be murdered by his brother, Alcetas; she died like a heroine.

This made a terrible impression upon the Macedonians, and

³ P. 125, Hoesch.; p. 70, b. 6, Bekker.

I am convinced that this was the main cause of the fall of Perdiccas.

Soon afterwards, hostilities broke out between Perdiccas and Antigonus, the satrap of Phrygia, during which Eumenes declared in favour of Perdiccas. This was followed by a general contest in which Perdiccas was joined by Eumenes alone; all the rest, not only Ptolemy, Antipater, and Antigonus, but also Lysinachus and Craterus, were arrayed against Perdiccas.

Perdiccas, who was under the necessity of undertaking something, in order to maintain himself, now (Olymp. 114, 4) undertook an expedition against Ptolemy, whom he wanted to drive out of Egypt, while Eumenes was defending himself in Asia Minor.

This undertaking, which was indeed very difficult, failed; Ptolemy had very prudently fortified himself behind the Nile, and made excellent preparations for defending himself. The army followed Perdiccas very reluctantly, and after having tried in vain for weeks and months to break through the lines of Ptolemy, a rebellion broke out among his men, and he was murdered by his own troops (Olymp. 114, 4). His power had lasted three years, beginning with the death of Alexander; and during that period he had always carried Arrhidaeus with him.

Antipater, who had even before gone to Asia Minor, now came forward in the camp. The generals of Perdiccas gladly concluded peace with Ptolemy. Antipater now assumed the supreme power in the empire, which had been possessed by Perdiccas, and all acquiesced in it, because he was at the greatest distance. The fact of his then going to Asia saved the Aetolians.

The show-kings were now handed over to Antipater. The unfortunate Philip Arrhidaeus was married to Eurydice, the daughter of Cynna—a circumstance which is of interest only in the tragic fate of the house of Philip. Eurydice, on account of her ambition, now endeavoured to throw matters into confusion, but Antipater took her and Arrhidaeus, as well as Roxana and her child, to Europe with him, and compelled them, as long as he lived, to be more humble. It may in some respects have been disagreeable to the ambitious Macedonian rulers in Asia, that the members of the royal family were in

Macedonia in the hands of Antipater; but at the same time it was this very circumstance that obviously paved the way for their independence.

A new distribution of the satrapies also was then undertaken, which, however, was soon set at nought by Ptolemy, who by force made himself master of Phoenicia and Syria, and expelled the governors of these provinces.

In the meantime, there had been going on in Asia Minor, the war between Eumenes, the satrap of Cappadocia, and Antigonos, the satrap of Phrygia, with the party of Antipater; and in that war Craterus had fallen. He had come to the assistance of Antigonos, but Eumenes gained a brilliant victory over him, and Craterus lost his life. But now a storm was rising against Eumenes: a superior force, for which he was no match, was assembling against him. He was sometimes, successful, but he succumbed in the end.

The facts are these. After the death of Perdiccas, Eumenes, together with the other partizans of Perdiccas, especially his brother Alcetas of Pisidia, was declared an outlaw in an assembly of the Macedonian army, which on such occasions represented the nation. Antigonos was commissioned to carry the sentence into effect, and he also received the means necessary for this object—but he employed them for the purpose of establishing for himself a larger dominion.

An account of this war you may read in Plutarch, and also in Cornelius Nepos: the life of Eumenes is one of the better ones in that strange collection. I cannot here enter into the detail; but it is interesting to read, *e. g.*, how Eumenes, after having lost a battle in Cappadocia, in the face of Antigonos, shut himself up with 500 men, in the mountain fortress of Nora in Cappadocia, and disbanded his whole army, in the hope that, if circumstances should improve, his soldiers would be drawn towards him as towards a magnet. He sustained the siege for half a year. Then, after having in vain been besieged during the winter, he escaped from the besiegers, having kept them engaged, until he had collected strength in other parts. He fled into Syria, and then to the upper satrapies (which had taken no part in the earlier war) to Antigones of Susa, and Peucestes of Persia. A second war then broke out between Eumenes and Antigonos.

The death of Antipater, which had taken place in the

meantime, had greatly altered all circumstances. He had appointed Polysperchon regent, and the latter called upon Olympias to come forward again. Antigonus, Cassander, and Ptolemy (though the last did not do so actively), declared against him; Polysperchon, on the other hand, put himself in connection with Eumenes, on behalf of Olympias and her grandson, and called upon him to take the family of Alexander under his protection.

Eumenes now appeared in Upper Asia with full authority from Olympias. The argyraspidæ and most of Alexander's veterans were likewise in those parts, for what reason, we know not. They looked upon themselves as a station of invalids, were in the enjoyment of perfect leisure, and lived in the greatest abundance, like the followers of the Normans in England. They were all *seigneurs*. They had hitherto joined no party, and lived like a nation of Mamelukes, almost in the forms of a republic. Eumenes, provided with the authorisation of Olympias, now applied to them, and gained them over to his side. The satraps also declared themselves in his favour, and he obtained possession of the royal treasures. With these means at his command, Eumenes for years carried on the war on behalf of Olympias and young Alexander. For years he overcame the jealousy of the Macedonian commanders, who hated him as a foreigner, and controlled those old faithless men of the sword. He induced them to quit their merry quarters for the objects he stated to them, to follow him, and to risk their own existence for his personal objects: he guided them all by assuming the appearance that they were all equal, and by erecting a symbolical throne of Alexander.

All the Macedonian world was now divided into two masses, which fought against each other both in Europe and in Asia. Cassander was engaged in Greece against Polysperchon, and Antigonus in Asia against Eumenes, still pretending that he was obliged to carry into effect the decrees of the Macedonian army against Eumenes.

The power of Antigonus, however, increased immensely through the war with which he was commissioned: he not only made himself master of Eumenes' satrapy of Cappadocia in western Asia, and of other satrapies in Asia Minor, such as Pisidia and Lycia, but he also occupied Media and the intermediate provinces, so that his rule extended from the Hellespont to Persia. He took his head-quarters at Ecbatana, whence he

made war upon the southern provinces. In order to attack them he had to pass through the desert of Rhei and Kom, which separates Fars and Kerman from Media. Antigonus there undertook the celebrated expedition through the desert, in order to attack the allies in their winter quarters; but the manner in which Eumenes discovered and thwarted his march, is much more brilliant, for he deceived his enemy, and induced him to give up his plan, which could not have failed, and to make his retreat. You may read all this in Plutarch; it is sufficient for our purpose to state, that, in the eighth year after Alexander's death,⁴ Antigonus concluded the war against Eumenes, by attacking him with a far superior force. Peucestes had displayed a miserable character, but Antigonus had conducted the war in a most able manner. In the end (Olymp. 116, 1), he defeated the allies, and conquered the immense oriental train and their harems, which they carried about with them; and in order to recover these, they concluded peace with Antigonus. This was the price for which the unfortunate Eumenes was delivered up by his own troops, as Charles I. was delivered up by the Scotch. Antigonus would willingly have saved him, but he was obliged to sacrifice him to the national hatred of the Macedonians against the Greeks. He would have liked to keep him with him as an adviser and assistant, for Antigonus was not one of the worst, nor was he very cruel; there can be no doubt that, on the whole, he shed the blood which he did shed with reluctance.

This war established the dominion of Antigonus, who through his victory over Eumenes and the satraps under him, obtained the supremacy over their provinces, and now was in possession of a large empire. He was the first who was courageous enough to drop all hypocrisy, and at once assumed the diadem and the kingly title. No one had as yet ventured to do this, just as Napoleon hesitated for a long time to assume the imperial title. Antigonus was already advanced in years, "being of about the same age as Perdiccas, and somewhat younger than Antipater (who was the oldest among the generals) if we take into consideration the age at which he died in Olymp. 119." He was one of the old officers of Philip, and a good one too. He was, indeed, like most of them,

⁴ "Olymp. 116, 1, though I will not deny that the war may, perhaps, not have been concluded till Olymp. 116, 2."—1825.

nothing beyond a soldier, but in ability he was superior to most of them. Among those who contended for the empire (if we except Eumenes the stranger and Craterus who fell early), he and Lysimachus were probably the best. Besides Antipatèr and his son Cassander, they alone were true generals. Ptolemy distinguished himself only by his skilful defence of Egypt against Perdiccas: subsequently in the war against Antigonus, not much is to be said of him. "Long after the death of Antigonus, a Phrygian peasant was seen weeping while digging on the battle-field of Ipsus, and on being asked, why he wept, he replied: I am trying to dig up Antigonus. When we had him, we imagined, that we were ruled tyrannically, but now we are under still greater tyrants." This remark was quite true. Antigonus was neither good nor noble, nor does he deserve at all to be praised, and he must be particularly blamed for his faithlessness towards his competitors; but he was much better than his son Demetrius, and especially in regard to his subjects he was a better master. It was a great thing that during this period of disorder he maintained discipline. When a prince took all the money from his subjects, the injury he did them was comparatively very small, and he might nevertheless be a great benefactor, if he checked the fearful horrors committed by the soldiers. Anything more cannot be expected of a Macedonian, for Craterus was an exception. Antigonus was much beloved, like some of the commanders in the thirty years' war. His reputation as an able general is extraordinary; he does not, however, so fully deserve it, for he was favoured by fortune; but he still was a great general.

In the mean time great changes had taken place in Macedonia. Antipater had been quiet during the latter years: he reigned in the name of Arrhidaeus, and of the little son of Alexander, who at his death was not yet seven years old. Heracles was older, but as a *vóθος*, he was regarded as incapable of succeeding his father: he too was in Macedonia with his mother Barsine. Antipater kept the royal family at Pella in a state of splendid captivity, while he himself lived in the greatest simplicity. He treated Alexander's family as Nadir Shah treated Shah Abbas, whom he allowed to live for the sake of the name. But Antipater died, before the time came when he thought it expedient to murder them. Just as a

Turkish pasha considers it better to pay a tribute, provided the sultan allows him to rule, so Antipater also acted on the same principle: he would have risked much, if he had undertaken anything.

But when his end was approaching, he made a singular arrangement concerning the regency (Olymp. 115, 2). Two of his sons were still alive: the one, Iollas, who is said to have poisoned Alexander, was dead, but Cassander and Philip were still living. Antipater did not give the regency and his power to either of them, but to a petty Epirot prince of the name of Polysperchon or Polyperchon, for both forms occur.⁵

Polysperchon was a prince of the Aethicans, a small Epirot tribe. He himself was quite powerless, and therefore entered the service of more mighty rulers. He thus served in the Macedonian army of Philip, just as the petty princes of the German empire, for example, the prince of Dessau, served under Prussia. In the reign of Alexander, he is little spoken of, and personally he was not a man of great consequence. "But he was an able general and a prudent man. In his rough and unpolished manners, he and the prince of Dessau were alike; but the acts which Polysperchon committed, were such as no prince of Dessau was guilty of. His last horrible deed was, that he sold the life of Heracles, the son of Alexander, to Cassander; and the degeneracy had gone so far, that this was mentioned as a matter of no importance." This deed is spoken of by Lycophron, and an allusion there is explained by the scholiasts,⁶ from which we learn that he was prince of the Aethicans. Lycophron calls him *πρόμος*, which is perhaps an Epirot name for prince.

Antipater, to the great mortification of Cassander, entrusted the management of the royal family and the administration of

⁵ "The same difference appears in the name of Robespierre, which at the commencement of the revolution was written Robertspierre or Roberspierre, which is, perhaps, more correct than Robespierre. The name Sièyes is written in at least five different ways. Similar differences in names also occur in antiquity, and such is the case with that of Polysperchon. In Trogius Pompeius, in the prologues and in Justin, the form Polyperchon is well established; while the Greeks, as Plutarch and Diodorus, generally call him Polysperchon, though not always. We shall adhere to the common form Polysperchon."

⁶ Tzetzes *ad Lycoph. Alex.* 802.

the kingdom to this Polysperchon. He was, perhaps, led to this act by his own sense of justice; for it is really possible that, at the end of his life, his conscience may have been roused. He must have known Cassander, and must have been aware that he would murder any one that stood in his way, and that he entertained a deadly hatred of Alexander's family. In his last moments Antipater may have thought, that it would be cruel to deliver up the unhappy Arrhidaeus and the harmless child to Cassander: he knew that they were lost, if Cassander obtained the power.

Antipater accordingly appointed Cassander chiliarchus, as it were, *praefectus praetorio*. The chiliarchia was a Persian institution, which the Macedonian generals had adopted: it was a kind of viziership. But Antipater while giving the real power to a stranger, gave to his son only the power of revolting.

This arrangement made Cassander and Polysperchon enemies. As soon as the father had closed his eyes, and Polysperchon had entered upon the administration, Cassander quitted Macedonia, went to Ptolemy in Egypt, assembled troops, and prepared to attack Polysperchon. He was conscious of his own superiority: he was a man who in great difficulties knew how to extricate himself; he was a general who undertook little, but was very cautious in what he did undertake, and a remarkable instrument in taking revenge for Alexander's cruelty against the Greeks. Antigonus and Ptolemy, as I have already mentioned, joined him; though the latter took no active part in the war, being desirous firmly to establish his own dominion in the interior.

A war now arose which was carried on with the most fearful devastation of unhappy Greece: the ravages were constantly repeated, until the country was brought down so completely, that it was entirely annihilated, in which condition we shall afterwards find it.

LECTURE LXXXV.

THIS war between the two pretenders to the crown of Macedonia, and to the guardianship of the unfortunate royal family, however, inflicted even more suffering upon Macedonia than upon poor Greece.

Polysperchon favoured Olympias, with whom he was already connected by his nationality. She was still living among her countrymen in Epirus, whither she had gone even in the reign of Alexander. The fact that Aeacides, a petty prince of the Molottians, who had been expelled by her, now supported her, and on this account brought great misery upon his family, shows that national ties were stronger than those arising from family connection. Polysperchon, as I said before, connected himself with Olympias, and called upon her to return to Macedonia, and undertake the government as the guardian of her grandson, Alexander, the son of Roxana. She readily accepted this proposal, and both now formed connections with Eumenes (Olymp. 115, 3).

The latter obtained from Olympias full power to act as he thought fit, as if he were *Lieutenant du Roi*, and this induced the argyraspidæ and the satraps of Upper Asia to declare in his favour. Olympias, however, appears still to have remained in Epirus.¹ Eurydice, on the other hand, joined the party of Cassander, and the feud between the two queens became the cause of the civil wars in Macedonia. Polysperchon seems to have had less ambition, and was satisfied with being the first general.

At the same time, however, Polysperchon also endeavoured to secure the assistance of the Greeks, and in the name of the king he issued a proclamation to them. This proclamation, which is preserved in Diodorus,² is a curious document: we see in it the form and style of such state documents at that time; we find that the style had been established ever since the time of Philip and Alexander, for it is the same as that which

¹ In 1830, Niebuhr, evidently by mistake, mentioned the return of Olympias in this place.—Ed.

² xviii. 5, 6.

is employed in the decrees of the Syrian kings in the first book of the Maccabees. There is something oriental in it, not indeed in bombast, but in its diffuseness and hollowness. The same form afterwards occurs again in the rescripts of the later Roman emperors, where we meet with the same diffuseness, emptiness, common-places, and dissertations. The oriental ordinances were the models of the later Roman court style, especially since the time of Constantine; and we may say in general, that a vast number of forms were transferred from Alexandria to the institutions of the later Roman empire. But to return, in that proclamation, Polysperchon, in the name of king Philip Arrhidaeus, employing the language of hearty sympathy, declares, that the Greeks ought not to impute the harsh cruelties which they had experienced from the generals (Antipater and Craterus) to the king; that he had neither approved nor known of them. That he disapproved of the change in their constitutions, and that they should be restored just as they had been under Philip and Alexander. All the exiled Greeks, moreover, with the exception of a few, were to return; only those condemned for criminal offences, and the exiles from Tricca, Pharcadon, Amphissa, and Heraclea, were to be exempted. All those who had been exiled by Antipater were to be allowed to return. This was a complete revolution. For the number of exiles from all the Greek cities was very great; and all those cities were then governed by small oligarchies, which had been established by Antipater and his satellites. The king, moreover, promised the Greeks that all the Macedonian garrisons should be withdrawn(?), and the Athenians were made to believe that Samos was to be restored to them. In short, it was a measure, which owing to its appearance pleased the credulous minds, but not those who until then had ruled under the auspices of Antipater. For Thebes alone nothing was done.

For the purpose of carrying this measure into effect, Polysperchon proceeded to Greece, and first of all to Phocis. Menyllus, the commandant of Munychia in Attica, a humane officer, had in the meantime been succeeded by Nicanor, an intimate friend of Cassander, who had sent him into Attica, during the feebleness of his father, and shortly before his death, for the purpose of securing that important post. Nicanor now received orders to quit Munychia; but this was

just such an order as that which Omar Pasha received to evacuate Euboea—it was not obeyed: a common disobedience, which on such occasions is very graciously acknowledged. Meantime Nicanor,³ with his small garrison, was in a very difficult situation, and the Athenians would have compelled him to evacuate Munychia, if those who had the government in their hands, had seriously wished to compel the Macedonians to depart. But there were intrigues at Athens itself, and Phocion and the Macedonian party do not seem to have wished the evacuation. Nicanor, instead of quitting Munychia, found time to assemble a sufficient number of soldiers, especially from Salamis and Corinth, so that he was not only enabled to keep possession of the fortress, but even made himself master of Piraeus, which until then had not been in his hands, and thus occupied the fortress together with the arsenal and ships.

It is generally related, that Phocion, who was then strategus, and directed the helm of the state at the time when the oligarchy was still in power, was warned that Nicanor intended to take Piraeus by surprise, and that even a decree was passed ordering all the Athenians to arm themselves. But Phocion is said to have disregarded all this, and to have thus assisted Nicanor in gaining possession of Piraeus. This charge seems to be well founded. Even Plutarch does not deny that he abandoned Piraeus to Nicanor, in order to prevent the people from stirring; for he with all his followers was in great danger, in consequence of the return of the exiles. There were in the city loud clamours and complaints about Phocion and the tools of Antipater, who had still the power in their hands; and Phocion did not consider himself and his party safe, unless the Macedonians remained masters of Athens, and kept the city occupied by their soldiery. He therefore sent word to Polysperchon, that it would be the greatest folly to give up fortified places in Attica, and explained to him how it was necessary for any ruler of Macedonia to keep possession of Athens.

³ In 1825, Niebuhr observed, about this Nicanor, "Nicanor, who was mentioned before in Olymp. 114, was probably murdered soon afterwards." Niebuhr, therefore, appears to have considered him to be the Nicanor who proclaimed Alexander's edict at the Olympian games. The conjecture, that he was soon afterwards murdered, seems to be founded on the fact, that a Nicanor, a son of Antipater, was murdered by Olympias.—ED.

Accordingly, while Munychia was to be evacuated, he, to the great consternation of the Athenians, delivered up Piræeus to Nicanor. Athens was thus entirely in the power of the Macedonians. From Piræeus Athens had derived its supplies, and the revenues from import and export duties: all this, and the whole existence of the state, was endangered.

The first movement of despair called forth a revolution. Meantime Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, a detestable man, had arrived in Attica with an army, in order to carry into effect the decrees of his father. The Athenian exiles returned in his army; they were received, the ancient constitution was restored, and the new offices were abolished. Phocion and his partisans were declared guilty of high treason. His own inclination drew him to Cassander, the son of Antipater; but any one that afforded him protection was welcome to him, and he accordingly fled to Polysperchon. But the Athenians despatched an embassy demanding his surrender; and Polysperchon, who had no reason to look upon him as an old partisan, delivered him up. The Athenians condemned him and all his followers to death; this measure was very cruel and culpable, seeing that he was an old man. It is true, if high treason was not an empty word, he had always been a traitor during the latter period of his life; but there is something horrible in putting to death a man who is upwards of eighty years old: it is as if the rights of nature were interfered with. Phocion died in a very calm and dignified manner.

Cassander had already arrived in the vicinity of Athens. The Athenians relied upon Polysperchon; but his son Alexander was faithless towards them. He began to negotiate with Nicanor about the evacuation of the fortresses; but these negotiations remained purposely without any result, and it is not unlikely that even then he had the intention to become reconciled to Cassander. Nicanor behaved with great skill, and maintained himself in possession of Piræeus and Munychia, until his assistant, Cassander, arrived in the neighbourhood with a sufficient force. When the latter appeared before Piræeus, Nicanor surrendered the place to him, and remained himself in possession of Munychia.

Cassander had appeared with a few thousand soldiers, whom he had collected in Asia. With this small force he commenced the war, in which he recovered the dominion of his father and

a great deal more. When Cassander had established himself there, Polysperchon no longer attacked him, but turned to Peloponnesus, to carry his decrees into effect. There the constitutions were restored such as they had been before the time of Antipater. This was done everywhere with great joy except at Megalopolis, which was one of those cities, that for the sake of their own existence were always obliged to seek foreign protection, and thereby to become traitors to their own country. It had risen under the patronage of Thebes; and when Thebes fell Megalopolis also sank, and was then obliged to solicit the assistance of others. If, at the time when Megalopolis was besieged by the Spartans, and when Thebes could no longer protect it, the Athenians had sent succours, as Demosthenes advised them, the Athenians would have acquired patronage in Peloponnesus, and have had auxiliaries in their war against Philip. But they did not do so, either from hatred of Thebes, or from a reverence for the ancient name of Sparta; and the Megalopolitans, together with the Messenians, were thus obliged to apply to Philip. In this manner, the existence of that city became a misfortune to Greece. Ever since the time of Philip, Megalopolis wholly sided with Macedonia: he had been their benefactor, and in the war of the Macedonians against Agis, they became still more closely connected with Macedonia. They were now determined to risk everything for Cassander, and therefore despised the proposals of Polysperchon. The latter then appeared with a large army before Megalopolis. The result seemed doubtful. Megalopolis was a city of large extent, and hence difficult to defend. Polysperchon besieged it with his artillery, and threw down a great part of its walls; but its inhabitants had cautiously erected new fortifications behind them. Polysperchon sought to conquer these by means of elephants; but the Megalopolitans had covered the space between the fortifications and the walls with foot irons and long pointed nails, in consequence of which the elephants were partly killed and partly thrown into disorder. After many fruitless attempts, Polysperchon raised the siege.

Meanwhile Cassander was besieging Salamis; and there seems to be no doubt that he conquered that island, together with the fort of Panactum (towards Cithaeron, on the Boeotian frontier) and Phyle, after Polysperchon had raised the siege of

Megalopolis. It is at least certain that, from Olymp. 115, 4, he had garrisons in all these three places as well as in Munychia.

When, however, the Athenians saw that they could no longer rely on Polysperchon, they concluded peace with Cassander (Olymp. 115, 3). The terms of this peace may possibly have been milder than those of the peace with Antipater. The constitution, however, was changed, and it was demanded that a citizen should possess at least 1000 drachmae. The exiled oligarchs may have returned at that time, but they did not obtain possession of the government, which Cassander intrusted to Demetrius Phalereus.

While Polysperchon and Cassander were thus arrayed against each other in Greece, Olympias ruled in Macedonia with a tragic fury. The Macedonians hated and despised her both personally and because she was a foreigner; and she knew this quite well. She remembered that the old national party in Macedonia had regarded Alexander as the son of a foreigner; that on the other hand, the marriage of Philip with Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, had been hailed with general rejoicings, and that she had been obliged to withdraw with Alexander. She therefore looked upon the real Macedonians as her personal enemies, and the more terrible her natural disposition was, the more she felt irritated, and the more she abandoned herself to acts of infuriated cruelty. The accounts of them are certainly not exaggerated, for we are moving during this period on perfectly historical ground, though it is indeed a barren and exhausted ground, which does not produce a single blossom of poetry. The history of that time is quite authentic; but we may rejoice that we have no very minute accounts of it. Two historians of different importance were the principal authorities for that period. The one is Duris of Samos, whom Dionysius ranks among the careless writers, and with justice, for he was like most of our own prose writers. He wrote as badly as men now write, that is, he wrote as the people spoke. It is, however, nevertheless, a great loss to us that his work has perished, for he was a well-informed man and a good authority. The second historian was one of those who wrote a continuation of Ephorus who experienced the same fate as Hume, whose history has been continued by Smollet and others. Continuations

of Ephorus were written by a long series of authors; and one even by Eunapius in much later times. The person who made the first attempt of this kind, and the one to whom I am here alluding (we have no fragments of these continuators, for no one quoted their words, because they had written too badly), was Diyllus of Athens, who lived about the time of Pyrrhus. The history of the wars of the successors of Alexander, was also written by the excellent Hieronymus of Cardia. But I am not certain whether he commenced his history immediately after the death of Alexander, or at a later point, after the battle of Ipsus. But I will return to my subject.

Among the victims of Olympias, we find her step-son, the poor Arrhidaeus, and his unfortunate wife Eurydice, the daughter of Cynnane. This Cynnane was persecuted by her in every way as a mortal enemy, and Eurydice was looked upon by her as the grand-daughter of a rival. In early life, Philip had loved Olympias, but afterwards he was shocked at her, and withdrew from her: she had become detestable to him. He lived in wild polygamy, and his mistresses were to her the objects of a truly Oriental hatred. Eurydice, the grand-daughter of such a rival, was young, lively, and equally ambitious. Olympias cherished against her the hatred of fading age and a malign disposition against the freshness of youth. It is a general truth, that kindly natures love youth, and that the wicked hate them, even from mere jealousy. There have been Eastern despots, who, in the hour of death, ordered their enemies, wasting in their dungeons, to be put to death, merely that they might not live longer than they themselves. Persons of such dispositions hate youth from sheer jealousy. It must also be borne in mind, that Eurydice's mother had been married to Amyntas, the champion of the party which drove Olympias from Macedonia. Her mother, Cynnane, was a bold woman, and Eurydice was a person of the same character: she wanted to rule in the name of her husband. While Polysperchon was forming a connection with Olympias, Eurydice entered into a relation with Cassander. Olympias seems still to have been staying in Epirus at the time when Polysperchon went to Phocis and thence into Peloponnesus. He took Arrhidaeus with him on this expedition, but he must afterwards have sent him back to Pella. Olympias now returned to Macedonia with an army of Epirots and

Actolians, which was opposed by Eurydice and a Macedonian force. Olympias made use of the influence of her own name and of that of her son, for the purpose of gaining over the followers of Eurydice. The Macedonians were extremely untrustworthy, and they seem to have been induced to desert to their opponents not only by bribery, but often by mere caprice; and it is not till the time when the dominion of the Antigonidae had become established, that this faithlessness ceases. Eurydice and Arrhidaeus accordingly being deserted by the Macedonians, fell into the hands of Olympias, who now ordered them to be put to death. Wishing to enjoy their death, she first intended to kill them by hunger, and ordered them to be walled up in a dungeon—as persons have often been immured in convents—and then a little food to be given to them. But as this lasted too long, Olympias becoming impatient, and fearing lest a tumult should arise, ordered the dungeon to be broken open and the harmless idiot to be murdered by Thracians (Olymp. 115, 4). Eurydice was obliged to choose the manner in which she was to die, and died with great firmness. Olympias now put forward her little grandson Alexander with his mother Roxana. In the same manner she raged against the whole house of Antipater, one of whose sons was likewise killed.

But the cruelties of Olympias excited discontent and rebellion among the restless and mutinous Macedonians. They were one of those barbarous nations which never thought of procuring for themselves a free constitution from their kings, nor of protecting themselves against despotism by forms, but they were in the highest degree mutinous, and extremely dangerous to their autocrats, never scrupling to shed their blood. Such had been the case in their earlier history, and such it was more particularly at this time. When Cassander appeared, all Macedonia joined him.

Polysperchon's expedition in Greece had been quite fruitless, for, as he was a stranger, the Macedonian garrisons declared in favour of Cassander. Such an antipathy to foreigners is shown more particularly by barbarous nations, especially when they perceive that their princes give preference to foreigners. The Macedonian generals accordingly gave in to Cassander, and the oligarchs, who, through Antipater's influence ruled in Greece, likewise adhered to him;

so that when Polysperchon was obliged to retreat from Megalopolis, most of the Greek cities declared for Cassander.

It cannot, however, be denied, that Cassander was a man of superior ability; he was, indeed, cruel and faithless, and, perhaps, even more cruel than the others, but not more faithless than the other Macedonian princes. I cannot exempt one from this charge, except Ptolemy, who, in his fortunate position, had no occasion to be faithless; but Cassander displayed great talents, and what, considering the age he lived in, I consider to be a mark of great wisdom, is the fact, that, in his undertakings, he correctly calculated how far he could go, and did not run on as wildly as Demetrius. He knew what he wanted: it was, to be king of Macedonia, and he abstained from forming plans like those of Antigonus, Seleucus, and Demetrius Poliorcetes.

Cassander thus gained a firm footing in Greece; and, while Polysperchon retreated, Cassander followed him into Macedonia, where the people declared for him. It was after Olymp. 115, 4, when Olympias had already caused the murder of Arrhidaeus and his wife, that Cassander arrived. Polysperchon had formed an alliance with the Epirots and Actolians, and had the disposal of the royal treasures. The Actolians took possession of the passes of Thermopylae, to cut off Cassander's road to Macedonia; as, therefore, he could not advance there, he proceeded from Boeotia across to Euboea, and thence into Thessaly, so as to avoid the army of the allies altogether. On entering Macedonia, he met with but little resistance, Pella, Pydna, and Amphipolis, alone declaring against him. Olympias, with her grand-son Alexander, Roxana, and others, had fled to Pydna. Polysperchon was deserted by his troops, who were bribed by Cassander, and was obliged to flee with a few faithful adherents into Aetolia.

Olympias was thus shut up in Pydna; it was situated quite close to the sea, and there was no one inclined to afford her assistance. Eumenes was then in Upper Asia, engaged in the war against Antigonus. If Antigonus, as he himself wished, had become reconciled to Eumenes, the latter would have been able to act as mediator on behalf of Olympias; but, at all events, the assistance from that quarter would have come too late. The party blockaded at Pydna were suffering from

the most terrible famine, and Olympias was compelled, by a *Perusina fames*, to surrender. She stipulated for her life, and Cassander promised to spare her, but had no intention of keeping his word. The widows and orphans of those who had been murdered by Olympias brought charges against her before the Macedonians, who again formed a *champ de Mars*. Olympias did not appear, and was sentenced to death (Olymp. 116, 1). Afterwards, she declared her willingness to appear before a court of Macedonians; but Cassander ordered her to be executed, saying, that he must obey the will of the nation. Young Alexander, and his mother, Roxana, were sent to Amphipolis, where, for a time, they were kept in close confinement, and afterwards put to death. Heracles, the son of Barsine, was likewise murdered, and that too by Polysperchon; but when this happened cannot be accurately determined.

Polysperchon now disappears from history. His son, Alexander, continued to play a part for some time, but it did not last long; after him his widow Cratesipolis, was, for a time, at the head of the troops, as we so frequently see in the East, and as, even about twenty years ago, a Begum also was, in the country of the Mahrattas, after the death of her husband.

After the fall of Olympias, all the other places, which had till then held out, opened their gates to Cassander; and he now was king of Macedonia, without having the regal title.

About the same time, Antigonus, by his conquest of Eumenes, became master of all Asia, while Lysimachus ruled in Thrace, and Ptolemy in Egypt. I need hardly observe, that Antigonus' dominion in the most eastern satrapies was merely nominal, or did not exist at all; but, in regard to Babylonia, Persia, and other interior provinces, the case was different, for there he really ruled as master. But none of the princes had yet assumed the kingly title. This was the state of things in Olymp. 116, 1.

In the feuds which henceforth arise among the rulers, a younger generation of men already appear on the stage, and they can in no way be compared with the older men who had gone forth from the school of Philip. Seleucus was one of these younger men; he had not yet distinguished himself, but may have become acquainted with war as early as the time of Philip. He was of about the same age as Alexander,

and in every sense an *enfant de la fortune*, who rose only through his extraordinary good fortune. Antigonus had conquered for himself an empire by campaigns, labours, and hardships; he lost one eye, and, in the end, his life. Ptolemy had been a companion in arms of Philip, and had greatly distinguished himself under Alexander. Of Cassander I have already spoken; and Lysimachus had been obliged to conquer Thrace, the possession of which he was now enjoying. It had been given to him to be conquered, for it was not a satrapy, having been under the administration of Antipater. The country had become tributary as early as the time of Philip, but had retained its ancient dynasties. The princes of the Odrysians, though dependent on, and weakened by, Philip, still existed; and, in the reign of Alexander, Thrace was always united with Macedonia. But, after his death Perdiccas separated the two countries, for the purpose of weakening Antipater, and changed Thrace into a satrapy, which he gave to Lysimachus, and which Lysimachus subdued.

It is uncertain whether Lysimachus was a Thessalian or a Macedonian. His father bore the purely Greek name Agathocles, which, however, does not prove that he was a Greek, nor disprove his Macedonian origin; for many Macedonians had genuine Greek names. There are also quite barbarous names, such as Seleucus and Derdas, which are, no doubt, genuine Macedonian, and cannot be derived from Greek roots; we also find in Macedonia ancient Doric names, such as Amyntas, and others of common occurrence in Macedonia, but rare in Greece; but beside these we meet with many genuine Greek names in Macedonia. Some authors state that Lysimachus was a native of Macedonia, while others call him a Thessalian. His relation to Alexander is likewise described in different ways; certain it is, however, that he was an old companion of his and a little older than he; that he was captain of the king's body-guard and very distinguished, especially for his lion-like bravery. It is also certain that for a time he was in disgrace with Alexander. Of him the same story is related as of Hermann Gryn, at Cologne; for Alexander is said to have cast him before a lion, and Lysimachus, folding his cloak round his arm, is said to have defended himself against the beast, just as Hermann Gryn is said to have done when the bishop gave him up to the lion. This same story is often

repeated, from which it does not indeed follow that it is not true, but it will always remain doubtful. The statement that Lysimachus was connected by friendship with Callisthenes, has likewise been doubted, though it seems probable enough; when Callisthenes was tortured by Alexander, Lysimachus, on seeing his frightful condition (I do not know whether his nose or ears were cut off) gave him poison out of compassion—a bold thing to do under a tyrant of Alexander's temperament. This story, at all events, shews that Lysimachus was considered as a man of independence of mind, who preserved his free and proud spirit, when Alexander had already become an eastern despot.

He established his empire with small means, and for the greater part of his life he was reasonable enough to be satisfied with his dominion. It was not till his old age that ambition overcame him and carried him away, though, perhaps, not without some deeper motive and the desire to save himself. He once crossed the Danube in the vain attempt to make conquests in the country beyond the river; this may, perhaps, have been only an attempt to keep off the invading nations of the north. He had a difficult problem to solve, to conquer the wild and warlike Thracians, whose country appears to us northern people as a fair southern sort of paradise, but was terrible to the Greeks on account of the severe arctic cold; and the terror was increased by the savage manners of the inhabitants. On the coast, however, there were large and magnificent Greek cities, and the beautiful Chersonesus. We know little of the reign of Lysimachus, and we are not even informed whether he resided at Byzantium or elsewhere. In later times, during the war against Antigonos, his residence seems to have been in Asia, at Sardes or at Ephesus.

LECTURE LXXXVI.

WHEN Cassander was once in possession of Macedonia, he extirpated the family of Alexander, without a hand being raised in their defence. Aristobulus, who wished to interfere, was delivered up and sacrificed. Hence it is remarkable that

he married Thessalonice, the only surviving daughter of Philip; but this may have arisen from the pride of the usurper, or from the hope of thereby establishing his dominion. His government of Macedonia was at the same time a perfect dominion over Greece, with very few exceptions, one of which was Sparta.

The Macedonian conquerors displayed the same combination of violence and indolence, which is so peculiar to eastern despots, and which there enabled so many insignificant little places to maintain their independence. Ali Pasha was the first to subdue the small tribes of Epirus. In like manner, the Macedonian rulers overlooked the small states which were not in their way, and allowed them to remain independent in the midst of their own dominions. Many districts remained free, because they were too far distant, and because it was feared lest a war against them should induce them to throw themselves into the arms of other and larger states; the prize was not thought worth the trouble. Thus Aetolia also was spared. At a later time, the wars of Demetrius Poliorcetes prevented those countries being taken possession of. But the most important places in Greece had Macedonian garrisons and obeyed; Athens had garrisons in Piræus and Munychia.

It may, however, be said with justice, that Cassander entertained a kind of good will towards Athens; and that city had no reason to complain of him. It could not be expected that he should remove the garrison as this would have opened the place for others. Such a garrison (*φρουρά*) in those times cannot be compared with what it has been in modern times ever since the latter part of the seventeenth century; for in modern times the discipline is so well regulated, that a garrison, far from being a burden, is rather looked upon by most towns as a favour, because thereby money is put into circulation; but those Macedonian garrisons were as bad as those in the thirty years' war, or those of the Spaniards in the Netherlands and in Italy. The troops were mercenaries, generally the outcasts of society, bandits, and malefactors, who entered upon military life for the purpose of escaping from the hands of justice, that in war they might perpetrate all crimes with impunity, and in time of peace they might not be obliged to deny themselves anything. Hence such a *φρουρά* was always a fearful calamity. A Roman *praesidium*, however inhuman the Romans were in their conquests, was yet a blessing

compared with a Greek *φρουρά*; they formed the same contrast as the Swedish troops, under Gustavus Adolphus, did to the German troops who were enlisted after his death, or to those of the League. The Romans had a very different and much more severe military discipline; a *φρουρά* behaved in a city, as if it had been taken by the sword. But at Athens the fate of Piræus was greatly alleviated by the fact that Cassander gave the command to Demetrius Phalereus, an Athenian.¹

The fact of Demetrius being governor of Athens was a very fortunate circumstance for the city. The more ancient writers, indeed, call him a tyrant; but the relation in which he stood to his fellow-citizens, was precisely like that of the Medici, who stood beyond and above the state, as had been the case with Pisistratus. Demetrius resembles Cosmo and Lorenzo, surnamed *il magnifico* (i.e., the excellent, not the magnificent), because he had been *gonfaloniere* of the republic: he retained the title all his life. The dukes of Milan had the title of "excellence;" but the *gonfaloniere* was everywhere called *magnifico*, though his office lasted only two months. Demetrius also was once *ἄρχων ἐπώνυμος*.

His great influence arose from the weakness of Athens; it was not forced. He himself had neither arms nor troops to maintain his power,² and the troops on whom he had to rely were Macedonians. His administration was excellent; and as the Athenians were so powerless, exhausted, and reduced, the power which he had was certainly of the most beneficial influence upon Athens.

Through the capitulation with Cassander, the oligarchical constitution had been restored, after an interruption of one year, and a property of at least one thousand drachmac had been fixed as the amount required for the franchise. Demetrius altered the constitution in several other points, and, according to Pollux and Harpocration, more especially in matters connected with the administration of justice: he restored the ancient division into classes. The exiled oligarchs may have returned at that time, but the government was not placed in their hands.

¹ "He was a son of Phanostratus, probably a stranger who had obtained the franchise, and belonging to that class of citizens who could not obtain any offices, a client of the family of Conon, *οἰκότερα* of Timotheus."—1825.

² In 1835, Niebuhr observed, "Demetrius had also enlisted a small number of mercenaries, in order to keep Athens in submission."

Samos was and remained lost to Athens; but still more was lost; and it must have been at this time that Athens was deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. These islands had been conceded to Athens in the peace of Antalcidas, and in the time of Philip they still belonged to her. We cannot suppose that she lost them in the peace with Philip, since she retained all her possessions; but afterwards they no longer belonged to Athens. I can prove that Antigonus the Blind restored them to Athens in Olymp. 118, 2. Lemnos, however, was so far from being in the possession of Athens, that Cassander, in his war with Antigonus, about Olymp. 116, 4, not only besieged it, but supported an Athenian squadron in the siege of it. And in this state it remained, when the Athenians submitted to the peace with Cassander; nay, I suspect that on that occasion Cassander granted autonomy to Salamis; for it is known from inscriptions that at some time it possessed autonomy. It is, moreover, clear from all circumstances, that at one time Athens sent cleruchiae to Salamis, from which it is quite obvious, that for a time the island must have been independent of Athens. We also find at a later period, that Eleusis had for some time been separated from Athens. Had it been possible to treat all the Attic towns as towns, they, too, would have been separated from Athens. From some obscure inscriptions, it is probable that even Piraeus was for a time in the enjoyment of autonomy, and independent of Athens, with its own magistracy: this may have been during the period when Antigonus Gonatas was at war with Athens.

It is very surprising, that under the administration of Demetrius, Athens was very populous and flourishing. It is possible that in the reign of Alexander, before Alexandria became a great commercial place, the destruction of Tyre and the war itself, together with the maritime intercourse between Macedonia and the Macedonian provinces, contributed to raise the maritime power of Athens; but how the large sums of money which the city had to pay, and which drained the marrow of the country, were raised, it is difficult to understand, especially as the cleruchiae in Samos, Lemnos, and other places, were lost, which must have plunged many citizens into poverty.

Under the administration of Demetrius was instituted the great census, the result of which was, that Athens contained twenty thousand citizens, ten thousand metoeci, and four

hundred thousand slaves. The last number is incredible, though there seems to be no mistake on the part of Athenaeus, who evidently read what we now see in his work; but the question as to whether his authority was honest and his text correct, is one of those which, unfortunately, we cannot answer. But certain it is, that the number of citizens and meteoeci cannot be doubted. That this large population was at the same time wealthy, is clear from the statement which is likewise preserved in Athenaeus, that the revenues amounted to one thousand two hundred talents; and these revenues, no doubt, consisted almost exclusively of import and export duties, and indirect taxation, for Athens had no longer any subjects; so that the revenue was raised by the city itself and by the commerce of the Athenians. It is probable that at this time Athens enjoyed the advantages of neutral navigation, that, although it had a Macedonian garrison, it remained neutral during the wars of the time, and that its ships were allowed to enter the ports even of enemies. It is evident from Demochares (in Polyb. xii. 13, edit. Schweigh.), that Demetrius increased the revenues of Athens and boasted of it; and he also remarks, that he was not ashamed that under his administration the Athenians had given up all claims of making a great appearance among the states of Greece.

It is worthy of remark, that Demetrius applied a portion of his revenues to increasing the armed force, and appropriated the rest to himself. However, considering the great amount of the revenues, little was done to increase the armed forces of Athens. Although the city had been obliged to surrender the ships to Antipater, yet it had not entirely given up its fleet, for Athenian ships are mentioned in the history of Perdicas; but when Demetrius quitted the city, it had no (?) fleet. Much of its revenues, therefore, must have been employed in embellishing the city. The Athenians erected to Demetrius alone 360 statues; and it may be observed in general, that in his time there must have been much building and painting at Athens. The expensive games given by Demetrius are mentioned in Athenaeus.³

³ "The mechanical arts had, at that time, risen to such a perfection at Athens, that, during the games, Demetrius caused an enormous mechanical snail to crawl along before the *πομπή*; it was an automaton, moving along by its own machinery: at the same time, it contained a playing fountain, water being thrown up to a great height through its feelers. According to Demochares, he

Demetrius Phalereus was a benevolent, noble, and talented man; he was still ranked among the orators, and Cicero in his "Brutus" mentions him among the great orators; he might even be one of the ten, if the number of the three kings could be four. As he was not ranked among them, nothing has come down to us of his orations. He was a peripatetic; and the peripatetic or Aristotelian school of philosophy was distinguished above all others, by the fact that its ethics are based upon a most rational and clear perception of the realities of life. It contains nothing extravagant, it demands of man attention to himself, a knowledge of what is pure and beautiful in human nature, and of its opposite, which is evil; and lastly, a careful cultivation of what is good, and the suppression of what is evil, without indulging in the fantastic dream, that man can regenerate himself, or radically destroy that which is evil. Man, they say, must feel himself happy in the strength of the good which is in his nature, and he must despise and combat that which is corrupt. This demand, which forms such a strong contrast to that of the Stoics, of which I shall speak hereafter, did not place man in a constrained position, but in a very simple, true, and cheerful one, and the consequence was, that a peripatetic, without pretending to be more than a man, strove to be a good and a noble man. The whole of the philosophy of Aristotle did not, like that of the Stoics, consist in despising that which God has created, but in the conviction that everything in the world is fit to be an object of reflection, and is worthy of attention and investigation. It thus gave food to the mind through substantial thoughts; it directed attention to physical objects, and thereby furnished the mind with rich materials for contemplation. A peripatetic was at once a practical man; Aristotle himself was the most practical man, and such was his whole school. It was in that school that Demetrius was trained. At the same time, he was naturally a good man; we cannot blame him for having been selected by the terrible Cassander; the latter was a man of extraordinary parts, he knew how to value those who possessed abilities, and in this instance he recognised the right man. The fact that afterwards, on the appearance of Demetrius

was not a little proud of this exhibition. When poetry and the higher genius of man disappear, such arts are generally brought to high perfection."—1825.

Poliorectes, the Athenians proscribed him, was an act of recklessness, and those who induced the people to do so, were unworthy persons: the blame falls back upon those alone who urged the people on to disgrace his memory. It is true, he himself is severely censured, especially in Athenaeus; but it must be remembered, that Athenaeus collected dirt from anecdotes and gossip, against all eminent characters, for the purpose of exhibiting them in an unfavourable light. Athenaeus, in regard to his own mode of thinking, is one of the most wretched authors that have come down to us from antiquity. It may be true nevertheless, that Demetrius, when he had obtained wealth, abandoned his former frugal mode of life for a more luxurious one, that he lived with mistresses, and spent much money upon them, courting them in a most flattering manner, and kept a very exquisite and luxurious table.

It was unfortunate for Demetrius, that his position was connected with the servitude of his country; but his conscience was free, for, although he was then still young, he did not surrender his country to the Macedonians. His brother, Himeræus, fell a victim to Antipater;⁴ he himself does not appear to have been persecuted in connexion with that event, but it is possible that, at that time, he did not yet take any part in political matters; and this much, at least, is certain, that the whole of his youthful years had been nurtured by different feelings. But he lived for the circumstances by which he was surrounded.

Afterwards, when he was obliged to quit his country, and Athens treated the recollection of him with scorn, he lived at Alexandria, well received and honoured by the most distinguished among the Macedonian princes, and he preferred remaining there, when he had it in his power to return. He employed his whole influence in endeavouring to make the Macedonians appreciate literature and science; he is venerable as the founder of the library and museum, as the patron and supporter of learned men, for which purposes he received money from the Macedonian kings. The rhetorical work bearing his name is not by him, and fragments of his writings, to any extent, were not discovered till very recently, when an opportunity was afforded of becoming acquainted with his

⁴ "Athenaeus relates, that Demetrius sacrificed to his brother to effect his *ἐπιφάνεια*, probably to make his spirit appear to him."—1825.

style and diction, through the Vatican fragments of Polybius, published by Mai. Among them, there is a very beautiful and interesting piece, from a work of Demetrius, which is, indeed, brief, but still large enough to enable us to form a conception of his style and manner of writing.⁵ In my opinion, Demetrius is not valued as he deserves.⁶ He was opposed at Athens by a man who followed a different system, but who is likewise deserving of high respect, though in quite a different manner, and whose worth must be pointed out the more, because his reputation has been injured by the disgraceful calumnies of Timaeus. I allude to Demochares, the son of Demosthenes' sister, a man of great eminence, who, during the stormy times which followed the appearance of Demetrius Poliorcetes in Greece, acted a very important part, and did things which show that he was an able practical man. He too was a good orator: in him we have the last spark of the old strong school of Antiphon, the Rhamnusian. The passion of his whole life was, antipathy against everything Macedonian. He may have been somewhat blind as to what was possible and desirable in those times, and may have been seeking remedies where none were to be found; but he acted like an upright man according to a noble feeling, and exerted himself earnestly to attain his great ends. An imaginary discussion between Demetrius Phalereus, and Demochares, on the state of Athens, would be an admirable subject, if it were taken up by a man who had the talent of constructing a dialogue like Diderot, or who had the mind of a Montesquieu.

Demetrius was appointed *ἐπιμελητὴς* of Athens in Olymp. 115, 4, and his administration lasted ten years, that is, till Olymp. 118, 2. Cassander, in the mean time, kept garrisons in Munychia, Panactum, and Phyle.

Thebes had been restored by Cassander immediately after the conquest of Macedonia (Olymp. 116, 1 or 2), for, in his hatred of Alexander, he undid all that Alexander had done. By their possession of the Theban territory the Boeotians were so much bound up with the interests of Macedonia, that it

⁵ In 1825, Niebuhr said, "Demetrius was a disciple of Theophrastus, and and we may conceive him to have been a man of the same kind, extremely neat, elegant, and modern, but incapable of producing any great effect upon his audience. These charms are mentioned by Cicero."

⁶ In 1830, Niebuhr evidently judged much more favourably of Demetrius than in 1825; in 1826 he does not appear to have spoken of him at all.—Ed.

became a question as to whether it was prudent to restore Thebes. It is not certain whether they had incurred the suspicion of Cassander. It was a matter of great difficulty to induce the Boeotians to consent to the restoration; in all the rest of Greece it was regarded as an act of the greatest justice, and it seems to have been a general national consolation. But, of all the Greek cities, the Athenians were most zealous in their co-operation, and the Messenians and Megalopolitans also distinguished themselves by the interest they took in it. But still, Thebes ever after remained only a shadow of the ancient city. Its restoration took place twenty years after its destruction, and its population had already been too long dispersed, and become too much reduced. From this time forward, Thebes was only thinly peopled, although the walls were restored by Cassander in their ancient extent. It is probable, that the Boeotians retained a portion of the Theban territory; at least, it is no longer spoken of. The restoration was little more than a kind of homage paid to the Greeks. The Boeotians formed a sympolity, in which the Thebans never again predominated. Thebes was the seat of the government, but that was all. In the Achaean war, even these remains of Thebes were destroyed by the Romans, and Pausanias describes it, in his time, as a deserted place, containing only a few temples and houses.

About the same time (Olymp. 116, 1 or 2), Cassander founded Cassandrea, a remarkable proof that he was a man of practical sagacity. Philip had extirpated or sold the Greek population on the Macedonian coast, with the exception of that of Amphipolis and Pydna. One of these destroyed cities was Potidaea, which had at first been a Corinthian colony, but afterwards belonged to Athenian cleruchi. Now, on that site, Cassander assembled, not only many strangers, but all the Greeks, especially those Olynthians who were still surviving from the destruction of their city, and built Cassandrea. On the site of the insignificant town of Therma, he founded Thessalonica, which he called after the name of his wife. This act also shows great practical wisdom. Therma, situated on an excellent harbour, and in a fertile district, being now extended, became the chief commercial place in Macedonia, a rank which it has maintained down to the present day. Cassandrea (now Cassandra) soon became great and powerful;

it has often been destroyed, but it was always restored again; and its situation was so happily chosen, that it naturally always recovered. The peninsula of Pellene is so fertile, that, at present, wheat not only requires no manure, but it is always made to produce some very exhausting crop before wheat is sown; tobacco being generally grown before wheat. Cassandrea is the natural port of this fertile peninsula, and connects Pellene with Crossaea, where Olynthus was situated. Both towns were always places of great importance, and, at a much later time, play a very prominent part in Macedonian history.

It is singular that the Macedonian princes gave Greek republican constitutions to those Greek cities which they founded, and that even in Asia. Thus Cassandrea, a few years after its foundation, was the scene where the detestable Apollodorus usurped the highest power; but at first it seems to have been destined to be the residence of the dowager queens of Macedonia.

This was the condition of Greece at the time when the appearance of Demetrius Poliorcetes, the son of Antigonus (Olymp. 118, 1) stirred up everything without doing any good. He had even before been actively engaged in a war against Ptolemy.

The defeat and death of Eumenes put Antigonus in possession of a vast monarchy, extending from the Hellespont as far as India. According to the early invented principle of the balance of power, the others now demanded, that he should give up a part of his conquests; they even thought it necessary, for the sake of justice and for the balance of power, that the countries of upper Asia should form a separate state.

Seleucus, the child of fortune, was destined to obtain that empire; a man who was the pet of fortune, but in no way distinguished as a hero or statesman. In the same year (Olymp. 116, 1) in which Cassander had conquered Macedonia, and Antigonus, after the conquest of Eumenes, returned from upper Asia, Antigonus intended to order Seleucus to be arrested at Babylon. But he escaped, and the Chaldaeans now foretold Antigonus, that the fate of his family was involved in the affair. It was easy to foretell the beginning, but not the end, for the Seleucidae did not overthrow Antigonus. Seleucus

now went to Ptolemy whom he urged on to wage war against Antigonus.

Thus arose, in Olymp. 116, 2, the second or third great internal war among the Macedonian princes—I say the second or third, because the re-commencement of the war in Olymp. 115, 3, may either be regarded as a continuation of the first or as a second war. In this war, Antigonus fell out with Cassander, and Ptolemy allied himself with Cassander and Lysimachus against Antigonus. Lysimachus, however, was cunning enough to keep aloof as much as he could, and Cassander, too, at first took much less part in it than Ptolemy. In the beginning it was, properly speaking, only Antigonus and Ptolemy that were arrayed against each other.

The war was at first carried on especially in Syria and Cyprus. Ptolemy had taken possession of Coele Syria and southern Phoenicia (in Latin not *Phoenicia* but *Phoenice*). We must first define the meaning of Coele Syria; it would be most correctly termed South Syria, if this were not a disagreeable sound. It is not the valley of Lebanon, but the whole of southern Syria, including Palestine, so that Damascus was its capital, and this country embraces the whole range of Lebanon. These districts had been occupied by Ptolemy. Antigonus now directed his arms against him, and at first generally with success, so that he made himself master of Syria and a great part of Cyprus; until, in the fourth year of the war, Demetrius Poliorcetes lost the battle of Gaza against Ptolemy, of which I shall speak hereafter.

In the meantime, however, the generals of Antigonus were carrying on a war in Greece against Cassander, from Olymp. 116, 2, till the end of Olymp 117, 1. It is worthy of remark that both Antigonus and Ptolemy considered the Greeks of sufficient importance, to endeavour to gain their favour by proclaiming the struggle a war of independence for the Greeks; neither of them, however, had any serious intention of this kind. In the very first year of the war, Antigonus sent Aristodemus of Miletus with a fleet and large sums of money to Greece, probably with no other intention but to make a diversion against Cassander and prevent him from crossing over into Asia.

This brought unspeakable misery upon Greece. Each city

was too weak, and also but little inclined to defend itself; each threw itself into the arms of the party that happened to be at its gates. Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, had remained in Peloponnesus, establishing himself mainly at Corinth and Sicyon; he now joined Antigonus, from whom he received money and troops. He and Aristodemus also enlisted soldiers in Greece, and the war now broke out, especially in Peloponnesus.

Cassander, forcing his way into the peninsula, conquered Cenchrae, the port of Corinth. He also took possession of Argos, but a conspiracy was formed there to let in Alexander. Argos had been the scene of bloodshed even before the death of Philip. After the Lamian war, it had been fearfully oppressed by the partisans of Antipater, and after the proclamation of Polysperchon, a revolution had broken out there, in which the friends of Antipater were partly murdered and partly sent into exile. When Cassander took Argos, the partisans of Antipater naturally took revenge in their turn. When Cassander learned, that a plan had been formed to surrender the place to Alexander, he⁷ hastily returned, and ordered five hundred of the friends of Polysperchon to be shut up in a house and to be burnt alive. Orchomenos did not fare any better, for he there allowed the exiles to fix upon the punishment.

But all on a sudden, Alexander deserted Antigonus, and faithlessly concluded a peace with Cassander in his own name and that of his father. By this means, Aristodemus was driven out of Peloponnesus, and now went to Aetolia, whence he carried on the war against the opposite countries of Peloponnesus, Achaia and Elis. The watchword always was, "Liberty and Autonomy for Greece;" but the towns were, notwithstanding, treated in a most terrible manner. During the first campaign, the principal scene of operation was Arcadia and Argolis, and in the second, Elis and Achaia. Almost the whole of Achaia was laid waste during this campaign, and Patrae and Aegeum were taken.

Alexander was then murdered, and Cratesipolis, his widow, keeping possession of Corinth and Sicyon, ruled there almost as an absolute queen.

But Cassander transferred the war into Aetolia; these occurrences rendered the conflict more and more important, and

⁷ It was not Cassander himself, but his general, Apollonides.—Ed.

the Acarnanians, therefore, beginning to be apprehensive, threw themselves into the arms of Cassander and the Macedonians. Being now supported by Cassander, they endeavoured to rid themselves of their connection with the Aetolians. In Olymp. 116, 3, they assembled in larger towns, having previously lived *κωμηδόν*, and the year following saw the commencement of the war of Cassander against Aetolia.

In Olymp. 117, 1, Antigonus made great preparations, and under the command of Ptolemy, a son of his sister, sent an army into Greece, more especially into Boeotia, which was exasperated against Cassander, for having been obliged by him to give up the territory of Thebes. In conjunction with them, Ptolemy conquered Chalcis, and wherever they went, they were successful in expelling the garrisons of Cassander, who had no other city in Greece left that sided with him except Athens.

But while Antigonus was victorious there, he was losing ground in other parts; and thus he found himself obliged, in Olymp. 117, 2, to conclude a peace with his opponents.

In Syria, Antigonus had intrusted the supreme command against Ptolemy and Seleucus to his son Demetrius, who was then still a very young man. This Demetrius plays a very prominent part in history. He has the honour of having his life described among the biographies in Plutarch. They contain immense stores for an historical inquirer, and are most pleasing to read, being the compositions of a lively, ingenious, and uncommonly good man. Hence I call it an honour to have a place among his biographies, an honour which we might reasonably grudge Demetrius, for he is a despicable person. We know him, partly from Plutarch's biographies, and partly from a number of anecdotes in Athenaeus, to have been the most unprincipled and most detestable man in existence; the acts of faithlessness which he committed against Alexander, the son of Cassander, are not the only things for which he deserves our detestation. He was also a voluptuary of the vulgarest and most abject description; the lowest crapule were the element in the filth of which he revelled; and he was quite a heartless man, who knew no friendship; the basest creatures, the companions of his lusts, were his only friends. Cassander was, after all, capable of distinguishing persons deserving of respect, as he showed in the selection of Deme-

trius Phalereus, and so also was Ptolemy; but we know that Demetrius Poliorcetes lived at Athens in intimacy with the most abject and abandoned persons of the time. He also showed towards his soldiers an ingratitude and a heartlessness, which are quite revolting; they were perfectly indifferent to him, and he regarded them only as his tools. They accomplished great things for him, but he always sacrificed them without any scruple, leaving to destruction on the morrow those who had saved his life the day before. In addition to this, he was a gambler, whose dull torpor could be excited only by great changes of fortune, and who staked everything upon a card. He is remarkable for his enormous good fortune: "fortune raised him beyond all conception, and then deserted him, but when he seemed entirely lost, she again held out her hand to him," says Plutarch, in a verse which he applies to him. Such a man would deserve no attention at all, were it not that he acted a great part, and that nature had endowed him with great abilities, especially in mechanics, according to the leaning of that age towards the mechanical sciences. In this respect, as in many others, we may compare him with a modern person, the regent Philip of Orleans, who, however, was a far better man; he was not nearly so bad as Demetrius; his crapule was not vulgar and abject in the same degree, and he, moreover, had a heart and loved his friends. But he had likewise a great talent for mechanics, was acquainted with Vaucanson, and busied himself about automaton and hydraulic engines. He was not, however, equally faithless, and had a feeling of respect for good men. His bad friends, such as Law, were sacrificed by him; and although good men were never among his favourites, yet we know instances of his having shown them respect. But otherwise there is a striking resemblance between them. Demetrius was a great inventor in mechanics, and he did much for the improvement of military engineering: this is a merit which he did not unfairly assume, but he is fully entitled to his reputation in this respect. A short time before, a great impulse had been given to mechanics in the affairs of war, and machines of every description were improved. Engines, which for centuries had remained unchanged, were now, partly through the progress of mathematics, and partly through the increased wealth that

could be employed upon them, improved in one year, more than they were formerly in the course of centuries.

Demetrius was eighteen years old, when Antigonus commissioned him to undertake the command of an army against Ptolemy. The first attempt failed (Olymp. 117, 1), for at Gaza he was completely defeated, and Ptolemy again took possession of Coele Syria. Ptolemy carried on the war in a generous spirit, for, declaring it to be a civil war between Macedonians, he set the prisoners free without ransom, whereby he gained the good-will of the Macedonians. Antigonus now undertook the command himself, and Ptolemy again evacuating the towns of Coele Syria ravaged them.^a "Seleucus had, in the meantime, re-established himself in the abandoned parts of servile Upper Asia."

Peace was then concluded (Olymp. 117, 2), but it lasted only for a short time. The terms are not clear, yet we see this much, that the *status quo* remained, and the armies were not withdrawn from Greece. The peace was concluded by all parties without any honest intention of keeping it long, but only with a view to strengthen themselves and gain a short breathing time.

The peace, therefore, lasted only one year. It was broken (Olymp. 117, 3) by the circumstance that Cassander succeeded in inducing Ptolemy, the nephew of Antigonus, who was stationed in Bocotia, as well as another general on the Hellespont, to revolt. Yet Antigonus soon recovered those countries. In the same year Ptolemy took Cyprus and extended his power on the coast of Asia Minor.

In the meantime, Cassander had caused young Alexander and his mother, Roxana, to be murdered (Olymp. 117, 2), and Heracles, the illegitimate son of Alexander, being proclaimed king by Polysperchon, who had been staying in Aetolia, was approaching from Pergamus. The Aetolians declared in favour of Polysperchon, who accordingly advanced across the mountains between Pindus and the lake of Janina (Thessaly

^a "The taking of Jerusalem by Ptolemy Lagus must be referred to this period. Ptolemy entered on a sabbath, took the city, and carried a great many Jews with him into Egypt as slaves. This agrees with the statement of Diodorus, who says, that, after the battle of Gaza, Ptolemy destroyed Samaria, etc. (Jerusalem is not mentioned), and carried away their inhabitants. Josephus refers only to Agatharchides of Cnidus."—1825.

was in the hands of Cassander) towards Stympheia. Here negotiations were carried on between Polysperchon and Cassander; the former obtained a considerable sum of money and a corps of troops, on condition that he should kill Heracles and his mother Barsine⁹ This being done, Polysperchon proceeded to Peloponnesus, which he subdued, so that now he became, as it were, master of Greece.

These events may be regarded as the reason, why in the year following (Olymp. 118, 1) Ptolemy appeared with a fleet in Greece, having until then been the ally of Cassander. It was probably the Boeotians and Peloponnesians that called in his assistance against Polysperchon, and he had the fair opportunity of being able to say that he was coming to avenge the murder. Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander, the last member of his family, with the exception of Thessalonice, the wife of Cassander, had been murdered about the same time. Ptolemy was then on the coast of Caria, near Mindus, and he sailed thence to Peloponnesus. On his arrival there, Cratesipolis surrendered to him her principality of Argos and Sicyon, being unable to maintain those cities any longer; but it was not without difficulty that the mercenaries were prevailed upon to surrender: it was effected only by stratagem. The Peloponnesians afterwards were slow in doing what they had promised, and Ptolemy himself probably did not care much about the conquest. Hence he concluded, in Olymp. 118, 1, a treaty with Cassander, whereby he obtained possession of Peloponnesus with the exception of Argos and Sicyon.

Antigonus now sent his son Demetrius with a fleet to Greece (Olymp. 118, 2). No one there was willing to sacrifice himself for Cassander, who had no fleet, so that he was unable to undertake anything against Demetrius. The latter appeared unexpectedly before Piræus: the harbour not being closed, he landed and quickly took Piræus, before the posts could be occupied. He immediately proclaimed, that the expedition had been undertaken for the purpose of restoring to Athens her freedom and autonomy, and he was accordingly received with enthusiasm. The Macedonian garrison under Dionysius shut itself up in Munychia, and negotiations were commenced between Demetrius Poliorcetes and the city.

⁹ Comp. above, p. 76, from the Lectures of 1830, when Niebuhr was doubtful as to the time of the murder.—ED.

Demetrius Phalereus was sent as ambassador down to the camp in Piræus; Demetrius promised the Athenians an amnesty, the city was declared free, and the ancient democratic constitution was restored; but Demetrius Phalereus was sent into exile.¹⁰

Demetrius Poliorcetes now besieged the Macedonians in Munychia. He would not go to Athens till he had taken that fortress; it was at first blockaded, while the preparations for a siege were going on. While the engines were building, Demetrius marched against Megara, where there was a garrison of Cassander. The town was taken by storm and plundered, and it was only at the urgent request of the Athenian ambassadors, that its inhabitants were saved and not dragged away into slavery. He then returned to Piræus, where he attacked Munychia, until the feeble garrison being exhausted, was obliged, after several days, to surrender, and then departed. The fortifications were razed to the ground, and the place given up to the Athenians. Athens was now free, but Demetrius, for the protection of the Athenians, gave them a garrison of his own troops.

After this he stayed for a time at Athens, where he was received with enthusiasm. The manner in which this was done, and in which they flattered him as long as they were favourable to him, is the worst and most indelible stain in the history of the Athenians. We must suppose that they were intoxicated with joy, and that thus they were led into the indecencies, which, however, we can never forgive them. There was at that time no want of intellect, intelligence, and wit at Athens; Athenæus has preserved a song which they sang in honour of him, and which is worthy of the age of Aristophanes;¹¹ but among all the leading men of the republic, Demochares was the only noble-minded person, who tried to make use of Demetrius only for the purpose of delivering his country, and recovering for it that independence which existed in his imagination. He therefore was no favourite of Demetrius, who gave his confidence to Stratocles, a man combining the impudence of Cleon and Hyperbolus, with the servility,

¹⁰ "With an escort given to him by Demetrius Poliorcetes, he went to Thebes, and afterwards to Alexandria. He there lived highly respected until the death of Ptolemy Soter. As he opposed the will made by the old king, Demetrius was exiled by Ptolemy Philadelphus, and died soon afterwards."—1825.

¹¹ See below, p. 111, note 5.

the frivolity, and villany of Demades; and had been the principal accuser of Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus. He seemed to have taken Demades for his pattern, and to become wealthy was the object of his πολιτεία. To this man belongs the shame and disgrace of having devised those flatteries, for it was he who induced the Athenians to decree the most extravagant and indecent honours to Demetrius.

At first Antigonus and Demetrius were saluted with the title of kings—this might pass uncensured, but they were literally declared gods. They were worshipped as θεοὶ σωτῆρες, altars were erected to them, sacrifices were instituted in honor of them, and their portraits were to be woven in the peplos by the side of the images of the gods and heroes. This was an Asiatic idea: in Asia such things were not uncommon; and in Egypt, too, Ptolemy already enjoyed divine honours as σωτήρ; but it was disgraceful for the Athenians to do the same—the countrymen of Thucydides and Demosthenes ought to have left that to the Asiatics. It was at least some consolation to those who felt the humiliation of their country, that during the Panathenaea, when the peplos was carried about in the procession, it was torn to pieces by a whirlwind. It was further decreed, that the gilt statues of Antigonus and Demetrius should be set up in quadrigae, and two hundred talents were given to them; every year, moreover, the ἄρχων ἐπώνυμος was to appoint a priest of the σωτῆρες, after whom the year should be called.

All these marks of honour passed away after a few years, and do not seem to have been restored afterwards, when Demetrius completely subdued the Athenians. But the institution by which Antigonus and Demetrius were raised to the rank of eponymic heroes, and by which two new phylae, the Antigonis and Demetrias, were established, remained. Athens thus had twelve phylae, and the two new ones remained, though their names were afterwards changed into Ptolemais and Attalis. The names were, no doubt, often changed. This innovation was followed by important consequences, for the senate was now increased to six hundred (βουλὴ τῶν ἑξακοσίων), which lasted until the time of Hadrian, when a thirteenth phyle, the Adrianis, was added, and the number of senators increased to six hundred and fifty.

It is revolting to find that the ambassadors, who were sent

to these two, were styled *θεωροὶ*, and their answers *χρησμοί*. The ambassadors who were now despatched to Antigonos in Asia, were graciously received. They obtained a quantity of corn, timber for one hundred galleys, money, and the island of Imbros—not Lemnos, which is proved by the silence about it.¹² Demochares opposed all these base acts, and was inflexible.

If Demetrius had at that time remained at Athens, and continued the war against Cassander, he might easily have conquered all Greece; but he was called away by his father Antigonos, because Ptolemy had made himself master of Cyprus.¹³

About the month of Hecatombæon, Olymp. 118, 2, Demetrius sailed to Cyprus; and now, by a brilliant victory of Demetrius over Menelaus, the brother of Ptolemy, near Salamis in Cyprus, Antigonos and Demetrius gained the mastery at sea. Cyprus was reconquered. Menelaus, with all his forces in the island, was obliged to capitulate; and thus the sea far and wide was in the power of Antigonos and his son. But an expedition which the two undertook against Egypt (Olymp. 118, 3), proved a failure.

“Until now, none of the princes had assumed the title of king; but after the victory of Salamis, Antigonos took the diadem for himself and his son. Immediately afterwards, Ptolemy, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, did the same; and the years were now counted from their accession: these are what are called the Macedonian eras.”

Demetrius now remained absent from Athens for a period of three or nearly four years—from Olymp. 118, 2, till 119, 1; during this time the city was left to itself, and a hard time it was. We may easily imagine that Cassander was not idle, and endeavoured to recover Athens, which was of such importance to him. He was in possession of Panactum and Phyle, and inflicted the severest sufferings upon the city. This war must

¹² “Under Lysimachus the Athenian colony was expelled, until under Seleucus it was restored as an Attic colony, whereby Lemnos became again connected with Samos.—1825.”

¹³ Niebuhr here briefly inserted the account of the sojourn of Demetrius at Athens; and from the expressions in the MS. notes, it appears that for the moment he confounded the second sojourn with the first. As in the Lectures of 1825, the second stay of Demetrius is mentioned in the proper place, and that, too, very minutely, we have here omitted the brief statement.—ED.

unquestionably be regarded as one of the chief causes of the terrible poverty in which we afterwards find Athens; for there can be no doubt that the whole territory was laid waste during the incursions from Panactum and Phyle. In this war, Demochares was strategus of Athens, and with her resources alone he operated against Cassander for four years in a most able manner, until Demetrius returned. All the detail is very obscure, and the history of that period has yet to be written. The war is called *πόλεμος τετραετής*, a name which I have discovered in an unequivocal authority, I mean the psephisma, in Plutarch,¹⁴ in honour of Demochares and his descendants, which was passed on the proposal of his son. In this psephisma it is said, that Demochares *ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς πολέμου* superintended the fortification of the city, procured the instruments of war, and concluded an alliance with the Aetolians. Pausanias (i. 26, § 3) refers to the same war in a passage which has likewise been misunderstood. He there says of Olympiodorus, that in the war of Cassander, he went as ambassador of Athens to the Aetolians, concluded an alliance with them, and thereby kept Cassander away from Athens. Diodorus and Plutarch only mention the war.

To the same time I refer the insurrection of the Phocians (Paus. *l. c.*), and especially of the Elateans against Cassander, in which Olympiodorus saved the Elateans from Cassander.¹⁵

¹⁴ *Vit. X. Orat.* in fin.

¹⁵ "There is a celebrated psephisma which was passed at Athens, and of which it will be impossible to discover the accurate date, though it belongs to this period. I mean the decree of Sophocles, the son of Anticlides (Diog. Laert. *vit. Theophrast.*), which enacted that no one should keep a philosophical school without the sanction of the *bule* and the *demos*; and he who transgressed this law was to be put to death. In consequence of this psephisma, Theophrastus went to Chalcis. Its character strikes us as rude, and, in the opinion of some, it shows unmistakeable symptoms of an influence of the priesthood, an influence which was at work even in the case of the death of Socrates. But it must have had a different origin. The author of this psephisma was, the year after, accused by the peripatetic Philo *παρανόμων γραφῆς*, and actually sentenced to pay a fine of five talents. Demochares, however, undertook his defence (Athen. xi. p. 508, foll.), quoting instances of philosophers having become faithless to their country, and having committed other acts of injustice. And this fact makes us suspect that there was something in the circumstances of the time to recommend the measure. It cannot be denied, that, although we meet at that period with men like Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and others, they were rare phenomena, and that on the whole, the philosophers of the time were quite a contemptible set of hypocrites and sophists, and even worse than the sycophants had ever been before. The Academy, in particular, shows a whole series of

LECTURE LXXXVII.

ACCORDING to the order observed by Trogius Pompeius—though not according to that of Justin, who has here quite without judgment omitted many things—we now come to the expedition of Demetrius against Rhodes, which took place in Olymp. 118, 4, one year after the unsuccessful undertaking against Egypt. Trogius had in this place inserted the earliest history of Rhodes, and I shall follow his example.

The island of Rhodes is mentioned as a Greek state as early as the Homeric catalogue. But this is one of the interpolated passages, and a proof of the manner in which passages were introduced in that portion of the Iliad. The Catalogue there speaks of Doric settlements in the southern part of the island, while in the north it does not notice any Greek settlements, and describes in Greece proper a state of things which we do not know how to reconcile with history, and which has, properly speaking, nothing corresponding in history. The ancients themselves made things unnecessarily difficult for themselves, and speculated and fabled much about the ancient Greek settlements in Rhodes. The mention of Rhodes in the Catalogue is obviously of later origin. There can be no doubt that the Doric settlement in Rhodes belongs to the time when the Doric Argos in Peloponnesus was a powerful state; the settlers proceed from Argolis, perhaps in the time of Pheidon,

men, one of whom was more infamous than another. If we except the stoics, the philosophers of that age did not exercise a good moral influence upon the people. We must, moreover, bear in mind, that the philosophers considered themselves to be so far above mortals, that they were perfectly indifferent as to who ruled over the state, and that most of them were strangers at a time when Athens had so much reason to dread all strangers. The philosophers, it must also be observed, were honoured with presents by the Macedonian princes; Theophrastus was a friend of Demetrius Phalereus and Cassander, and dedicated some books to the latter. Now, considering that Theophrastus had 2,000 hearers and followers, is it not possible that a patriot should fear lest such an assemblage should become dangerous to his country? I place this decree towards the end of Olymp. 118; it must have been passed after Anaxicrates. Soon afterwards, Demochares was exiled from the city (at the beginning of Olymp. 119), and about the middle of Olymp. 121, he appears to have completely withdrawn from public life. Philo was a *γνώριμος* of Aristotle, which presupposes that he was a man of about the same age.”—1825.

that remarkable lawgiver, whose importance we do not appreciate as much as the ancients do. As the Dorians everywhere established themselves in three divisions, either in three tribes or in three different localities, so Rhodes also was peopled in three places: Lindus, Ialysus, and Camirus, which continued to exist down to the time of the Peloponnesian war. Until the period of that war there existed in Greece at first an unconscious, and afterwards a conscious tendency of the places, when left to themselves, to separate; the ambition of one had for its counterpoise the centrifugal tendency towards independence of the others. During the Peloponnesian war, it began to be felt in many parts, that small places could not maintain themselves, and a desire among the towns manifested itself not to separate, but join one another more closely. Thus the Chalcidian places on the Thracian coast united at Olynthus, and the three Rhodian towns built the city of Rhodes. It was founded near the most excellent harbour of the island, which until then had been unknown, but from that time always remained flourishing and became great. The first settlers had overlooked the most favourable spot in the island: it is singular to observe how thoroughly the first Greek settlements often were without any plan, and with how much thoughtlessness and indifference they were formed, the most favourable situations being overlooked. The same may be said of modern European settlements.

In the new arrangement, the three ancient towns continued as *δημοί*, but Rhodes became the centre of the whole island. The places, Lindo, Ialiso, and Camiro, still exist, but they have been mere villages ever since the middle ages. The new city, within a very short period, acquired great importance. We can trace its history only in the results; but we see that Rhodes, as early as fifty years after its establishment (Olymp. 93), was a place of great consequence among the allies on that coast, who cast off the Athenian supremacy. Afterwards, Rhodes was endangered by the internal feuds, about the constitution, between the aristocrats and democrats; and it then came under the dynasty of the Carian princes, with whom it had been obliged to form close connexions during the undertaking against Athens I have just mentioned. Afterwards, the fact, that its illustrious citizens, Mentor and Memnon, possessed such a powerful influence among the Persians, was,

for a time, a very dangerous circumstance for Rhodes. They exercised their power also over their native city, and ruled over Rhodes without any legal authority having been conceded to them. After Memnon's death, Rhodes, probably without any force being employed, fell into the hands of the Macedonians, but Alexander did not make them feel, that his two greatest enemies had been Rhodians. Afterwards, we find Rhodes very independent and free; and, while the other towns, though in form republics, were, in reality, subject to the neighbouring Macedonian satraps, Rhodes itself was free and extremely independent. How it came to be so, we do not know; and all we do know is, that, shortly before or after Alexander's death, the Rhodians revolted against the Macedonian garrison, whose conduct had become insufferable. It is surprising to find that the Rhodians got off so well, seeing that such fearful vengeance was taken in other Greek places.

In Olymp. 118, sixteen years after the death of Alexander, Rhodes was a free and powerful city, which was even recognised as perfectly independent. Its inhabitants, it is true, flattered the Macedonian dynasts, and showed them great honour, but they yet maintained the substance of their independence, so much, that no Macedonian ships and garrisons were allowed to enter their towns and ports. They maintained a neutral relation towards the different generals of Alexander; they enjoyed the greatest prosperity, and their navy was very considerable at the time when Antigonus called upon them to break through their neutrality, and declare themselves in his favour.

No ancient author explains how Rhodes attained its great prosperity; what was the cause of it? The answer unquestionably is, that we must look for it in the change of all commercial relations. We have witnessed in our own time how, in that blessed country, quite insignificant towns rapidly increased when they applied to navigation, how easily navigation increases, and how this increase produces wealth in a very short time. Navigation among the ancients was, at the same time, commerce; matters then were different from what they are now. The manager of a ship was not a mere servant of the merchant, but the merchant himself, or, at least the merchant accompanied the captain as *ναύκληρος* (supercargo),

to the place of destination, and there sold his goods by auction. This is quite clear, from ancient stories, and from fragments of comedies. The business of bankers, on the other hand, was carried on in antiquity, and also in the East, in the same manner as with us. Double-entry in book-keeping, or the Italian mode of book-keeping, is not an invention of the middle ages, but even the Romans made use of it, and the books of the Roman farmers of revenues, and of the quaestors in the provinces, were kept according to the system of double entry. I have discovered this fact in a fragment of Cicero's speech for Fonteius, which I found at Rome.¹ A practised eye cannot mistake it, but those only understand it who possess a knowledge of book-keeping, for there are technical terms in it. Throughout the East, the banking business is based upon the same principles as the whole of our modern method. It is also a mistake to suppose, that bills of exchange are the invention of the Lombards; it is only the law concerning bills that originated with them; bills of exchange were used very commonly in antiquity, and in the East they occur at a very early period. But the case of commerce is different. Great commercial houses, as, for example, houses purchasing merchandise at Alexandria, and sending it, on their own account, to Athens or elsewhere, did not exist; but the merchant, as *ναύκληρος*, went with his ships (just as in the middle ages), to a certain place, where he sold his goods and purchased others. Hence in ancient commercial treaties, we always find stipulations about the auctions, all business being carried on by auctions. The conquests of Alexander changed the course of commerce in the ancient world. Within an extremely short period, Alexandria became a mighty commercial city, where everything became concentrated. Egypt, however, is not a country destined by nature to have a naval power; and though the Pasha may, on the advice of France, do as much as he pleases, to form a fleet, he will not be able to accomplish his object. The Egyptians are altogether unfit for navigation; they are like the Jews that are pressed in Russia to serve as sailors in Russian ships; all that is necessary for ship-building, moreover, is wanting in Egypt, and has to be imported from abroad. Hence Egypt can never have a fleet for any length of time. The Mamelukes in the fifteenth

¹ See *Fragm. Cicer.* ed. Rom. 1820, p. 53, note.

century also made attempts, but they failed, and ten years hence the present Egyptian fleet will no longer be spoken of. Amasis also had a fleet, which was soon gone. Egypt obtained all its timber from Cyprus or from Lebanon. The port of Piræus was then in the hands of Cassander, and the navigation of Athens was thus naturally crushed. Rhodes, on the other hand, had already a fleet, and everything necessary for navigation was ready; and with a people which, like the Greeks, is born for maritime life, navigation quickly increases at an enormous rate. In my early youth, before the outbreak of the French Revolution, Hydra possessed only from twelve to fifteen small vessels, which sailed between Constantinople, Smyrna, and Alexandria; and Spezzia was still more insignificant. But during the war of the revolution, there was formed an extraordinary Hydriotic and Spezziotic commercial fleet, so that at the beginning of the Greek revolution they had one hundred and twenty large ships, some of them armed with twenty pieces of cannon: this was the work of thirty years, during which the population had become six or eight times as numerous as it was at first. Such also must have been the case of Rhodes. A wide sphere was now opened to its commerce, just as the Dutch made their fortune in the Baltic at the time when ships did not yet exist there, and when the Dutch brought thence all commodities. The Rhodians became the carriers for the countries far and wide; they were not only skilful sailors, but at the same time bold and brave like the Hydriots: they defended themselves against the pirates, and their mercantile fleets were escorted by their own galleys.² We have witnessed similar things, and in the history of the middle ages, we find that Pisa and Genoa became great in a very short time.

Rhodes had become a commercial *entrepot*. Many kinds of business had to be settled in ready money, while others were done by barter. Many goods from Egypt were disposed of in the Black Sea, and others were not; the Egyptian grain, *e.g.*, could not be exported thither, as the coasts of the Euxine

² "Diodorus states that the Rhodians rose to great power and honour by extirpating the pirates in the Greek seas. But this war must be placed at a much later time, though he thinks that it belonged to an earlier date. The period of piracy lasted even till after the time when Cassandrea was taken by Antigonus Gonatas. The rhetorician Aristides says, that the Rhodians destroyed the piracy of the Tyrrhenians (tom. ii. p. 342, 399, ed. Canter.)."—1825.

produced it in abundance, but linen was sold there in all parts. The salted and dried fish of the Euxine, on the other hand, were articles of great consumption in Egypt; and it was for this trade that Rhodes was the natural entrepot. The consequence of this was, that the Rhodians and the Ptolemies were natural friends and allies, and that Rhodes would on no account separate itself from Egypt; its whole existence depended upon the commercial advantages, which even the first Ptolemy conceded to them. Rhodes, therefore, was a sore place, in which Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonus might attack the Egyptians; and it would have been an immense loss to Egypt, if the two princes had conquered the island the possession of which was to them of equal importance.

Hostilities commenced by Demetrius capturing the Rhodian merchant vessels, which were sailing to Egypt: the first example in antiquity of neutral vessels being seized upon. The Rhodians paying in equal coin, captured the ships of Antigonus, who now declared this measure to be an act of open hostility; and Demetrius was commissioned to lay siege to Rhodes. While Antigonus was engaged in preparations, the Rhodians, seeing that Ptolemy's fleet had been defeated, made an attempt to obtain peace; but the terms which were offered to them, were such as to prevent their accepting them. Antigonus demanded one hundred hostages, whom he himself was to select, the right freely to use the harbour of Rhodes for his ships of war, and an unconditional alliance against Ptolemy. These terms were rejected by the Rhodians.

Demetrius then landed at Rhodes. His preparations were immense: the determination of the Rhodians to defend themselves manfully could not be doubted, and hence every effort was made to compel them by force. Demetrius appeared with two hundred ships of war, one hundred and seventy transports, and many small vessels;³ he is said to have embarked no less

³ "The fleets of this period were very different from those in the Peloponnesian war, both in regard to the size of the ships, and to the mode of attack and defence. In the wars between the Carthaginians and Syracusans, quadriremes had already been substituted for triremes, and afterwards quinqueremes were added. The last formed the great bulk in Alexander's and Memnon's fleets. Demetrius went still further. The quadriremes, which in the Lamian war were the most numerous in the Athenian fleet, disappeared, and *hexeres*, *hepteres*, nay, *hendeceres*, came into use. The other great change which had

than 40,000 men, partly sailors and partly soldiers. He assembled his forces at Loryma, opposite to Rhodes, and during his passage across, the sea between Caria and Rhodes was covered with his ships. He landed without opposition, made a harbour for his ships of war, and approached with besieging engines. The whole island was in the meantime overrun, the country was laid waste, and all who had not fled into the city, were led away into slavery.

While Demetrius was thus encamped before the walls of the city, the Rhodians were making the most extraordinary preparations. Their citizens were called to arms; in their enumeration only 6,000 were found capable of bearing arms, and not more 1,000 metocci and strangers, who were willing faithfully to undertake the defence. At first they do not appear to have employed mercenaries; but they allowed their slaves to take up arms, and after the close of the war they rewarded them with freedom and the franchise. They endeavoured to rouse the courage of the citizens by the promise that those who fell should be buried at the public expense, that their daughters and families should be provided for, and that their sons should receive suits of armour, which they were to be allowed publicly to bear in the theatre.

This siege is as interesting and as important as the siege of Rhodes under Soliman against the noble Grand Master de l'Isle Adam in 1522, which was one of the most heroic defences in modern history. In like manner, the siege of ancient Rhodes is one of the most glorious achievements in the later history of Greece. It is very agreeable to find a minute account of this siege in Diodorus of Sicily: and to this account I must refer you, as one of the oases in the work of Diodorus. You may there read, with what skill Demetrius planned the siege, and with what incomparable heroism and adroitness the Rhodians defended themselves. No one will regret having read it. This siege is remarkable also in the history of the arts. The painter Protogenes (Apelles may be

taken place in naval tactics was this, that it was no longer the object, as it had been in the Athenian system, to run down the ships, and to destroy everything by means of the *rostra*, but the great skill consisted in using the missiles. Thus Demetrius, in addition to the *ἐμβολοι*, had a platform in the front part of his ships, which was covered with catapulta, for purposes of attacking the enemy's ships."—1825.

compared with Raphael; Protogenes painted in the style of Apelles, but he was not an Apelles; he painted with immense care, and went so far in his accuracy as if he had painted miniatures)—Protogenes, I say, had his studio in a suburb, and was engaged in painting his celebrated picture of the hero Ialysus, on which he had been at work for seven years. The wretched tribe of rhetoricians are quite beside themselves with admiration of Demetrius for having spared the studio of that artist during the siege. This was either a matter of course, the studio not being the place where he could make the attack, and then it is a mere farce on the part of the rhetoricians to pay him the compliment, or Demetrius was foolish, if he allowed the studio to thwart his plans. For it is a matter of greater importance to take a city than to respect a picture; he surely could have caused the picture to be removed. History had become so wretched in the hands of those later writers, that you find this story related twenty times over: the good Plutarch, the silly Valerius Maximus, Pliny, and all the rhetoricians, relate it. But besides Diodorus, there is not one who mentions how manfully the Rhodians defended themselves against such an immense army.

Rhodes, like many other cities of the Mediterranean, was situated so as to rise from the sea in the form of a triangle, just as Algiers and Genoa gradually rise from the sea up the side of a hill. The highest fortification was on the top of the hill, which also contained the theatre, so that the spectators had the view of the sea before them. The sea is the peculiar element of the Greeks, whence their theatres command a view of it, wherever this is possible; this is the case even in half hellenised towns, such as Pompeii, nay even in the Latin town of Tusculum. It is as if Poseidon had had a mysterious charm for the Greeks. The theatres also served as places of meeting for the popular assembly: the orators stood in the orchestra, and the people sitting in a semicircle enjoyed the magnificent prospect of the sea. The theatre of Rhodes was situated within the circumference of the walls, which were very strongly fortified; the molo, on the other hand, was not protected by a wall, the harbour was indeed fortified by a wall, but it was only a feeble one.

Demetrius began the siege at the harbour, directing his

attack against the molo. He wanted to employ his engines on board his ships, and thus to overpower the Rhodians on the molo; but they too had availed themselves of the new inventions in the art of besieging, and had established powerful engines on the molo. It was probably on this occasion that, instead of the hempen ropes, the Rhodians used, with their catapulta, ropes made of the hair of the Rhodian women. Demetrius employed principally four large engines, two catapulta for throwing large blocks of stone, which were stationed under a protecting roof, and two towers which were to operate with smaller missiles. These engines were erected on ships fastened together, and surrounded with palisades; which floated in the sea fastened together with chains, that no one might be able to approach and upset them. With these engines and a large number of *lembi* (Illyrian brigantines, which it appears moved only by means of large sails), on which he erected bulwarks with holes, Demetrius made the attacks upon the molo. The first was repelled, in the second he succeeded in gaining a footing on the molo, either through the carelessness of the Rhodians, or by means of treachery. He was now enabled with his floating engines to enter the harbour, and made an attack against the walls; at the same time he was anxious to destroy the Rhodian ships (probably in the lesser harbour). The Rhodians made an attempt to destroy the engines by means of fire ships; but although they acted with the greatest heroism, they could effect nothing on account of the palisades. For eight successive days Demetrius entered the harbour with his engines; the wall of the molo was thrown down, and that of the city was injured. The Rhodians now endeavoured to upset the engines by means of their ships of war; and in the case of two of them they succeeded with great difficulty, having forced their way through the palisades. Excectus, one of their generals, together with several others, fell on that occasion into the hands of Demetrius. After these efforts, Demetrius was obliged to abstain from further attacks, and rested for seven days. The Rhodians made a sally from the city, and ran down all the men and boats that attempted to land.

After this, Demetrius attempting a second storm, ordered an attack to be made upon the walls of the city on all sides. But this attempt did not succeed any better, and his engines

were again destroyed. He ordered the rest to be withdrawn from the harbour, and while he was preparing himself with fresh vigour, a Sirocco gale destroyed the ships with their engines, which were stationed in front of his camp, and threw them upon the Asiatic coast. During this storm, the Rhodians having recovered the end of the molo and taken the Macedonians prisoners, restored everything, fortified the molo and even received auxiliaries from Ptolemy.

Demetrius was now obliged to confine himself in his attacks upon Rhodes to the land side. But it is inconceivable what had become of the two hundred galleys on the flat (?) coast; they seem to have been sent away to meet the fleet of Ptolemy, which had perhaps been restored at this time. He made his preparations for an attack on the land side in a very favorable position. The Rhodians well knowing against what part he would more particularly operate, erected behind it a wall, consisting of the materials of the demolished theatre, and of the temples which after the recovery of freedom they intended to restore with greater splendour. Demetrius now erected his celebrated helepolis, a tower of nine stories; on each side of it was a protecting roof (for undermining the walls), a petrobolus, and an enormous battering ram, which was swung by 1,000 men. The helepolis was moved onward by 3,400 men.

The situation of the Rhodians was now indeed much more favorable; they made a sally by sea, sent out several small squadrons under Demophilus, Menedemus, and Amyntas, the appearance of which was quite unexpected, as Rhodes had so few men for its own defence; and these squadrons burnt the transports, and destroyed the ships of war on the coast of Asia Minor; they even sailed out as far as the Cyclades. Still, however, they endeavoured to obtain peace; but the demands of Demetrius were too hard and inexorable. The Rhodians, nevertheless, did not lose their presence of mind: a proposal was made to demolish the statues of Antigonus and Demetrius, which stood in the city; but they did not do so, and it was resolved to allow all the relations with Antigonus to continue as before.

Demetrius now endeavoured to undermine the wall, but in vain; he then tried to bribe the commanders of the auxiliaries sent by Ptolemy, but they remained faithful. The towers of the walls were much injured, but the Rhodians throwing fire

upon the engines, did so much damage to them, that it was necessary to remove them. In the mean time, quantities of provisions and supplies of every kind had arrived from Ptolemy; and within the city, the Rhodians erected a new wall, and made a trench behind the heaps of ruins.

Demetrius then made another great attack with 1,500 men, which was directed mainly against the theatre; but at the same time everything was ready to make the attack on every side. The Rhodians, who foresaw this, remained composed, and left the necessary garrisons at all the posts which might be in danger. The enemy entered through a breach into the theatre. It is not known in what manner the Rhodians, after a short struggle, succeeded in cutting off the 1,500 who had entered from those who followed them; but the 1,500 were overpowered and killed in the theatre, and the attack was repulsed on all sides in the most brilliant manner.

Still, notwithstanding the Egyptian succour, the Rhodians must have succumbed, had not Demetrius at last become tired, observing that the game was not worth the chase. The siege would have lasted a few months longer, and this prospect made him impatient, as he was losing immense numbers of men and ships. In addition to this, Cassander was completely gaining the upper hand in Greece, and Antigonos found that all around, everybody was rising against him. Demetrius accordingly, on the mediation of Athens, and several other Greek cities, concluded a peace, by which he hoped to save his honour (Olymp. 119, 1). It was based on the terms which the Rhodians had been willing to accept from the first: they were to assist Antigonos and Demetrius in all other wars, but not against Ptolemy, "and as the wars of the two princes were chiefly directed against Ptolemy, the Rhodians had neutrality guaranteed to them."

They were further to retain their city with perfect freedom, as well as all their subjects (*αἱ πρόσοδοι*, that is towns and districts paying tribute, Diod. xx. 99). They were also exempted from Macedonian garrisons, and it is further evident, that their harbour was to be free from the ships of Antigonos, although this point is not mentioned. As a security for this peace, they had to give one hundred hostages, who, however, were restored to them soon after, at least after the battle of Ipsus.

Ptolemy was wise enough not to be angry with the Rhodians for this treaty. The respect which their heroic resistance had gained for them far and wide, repaid them amply for their losses and their sufferings. Their greatness and importance as a state, must be dated from this time: their authority henceforth was established. "Never has a state displayed such invariable prudence; the Rhodians comprehended the real nature of circumstances, except in the war with Perseus, and never forfeited their dignity. They kept up everywhere friendly relations, and thus became more and more wealthy. They extended their trade in grain for Alexandria over the whole of the western world; and were in connection with Rome, and probably also with Carthage, at a very early period. No Greek island was as populous as Rhodes. Its prosperity continued without interruption until the earthquake, in the reign of Antoninus Pius; under the knights, too, the island was flourishing, although they ruled over it as tyrants."

Demetrius now returned to Greece. Cassander had been blockading Athens, while Demetrius was besieging Rhodes; and the latter now appeared with a very considerable fleet to relieve Athens.⁴ He landed at Aulis on the Euripus, between Oropus and Chalcis, to come upon the rear of Cassander and compel him to withdraw from Athens. Demetrius had a good harbour at Aulis. Chalcis was in the hands of Cassander, and had a Boeotian garrison; but it was a large, desolate place, and was easily taken. In order not to be cut off, Cassander was obliged to break up, and proceeded through Boeotia towards Thessaly. He succeeded in reaching Thermopylae; Demetrius pursued him, and Heraclea surrendered to him; while 6,000 Macedonian troops declared in his favour.

Demetrius, then entering to Attica, conquered Panactum and Phyle, which had been occupied by Cassander, and through which he had had Attica under his control. The Athenians received Demetrius with enthusiasm, as their benefactor. All that impertinent flattery could devise had been exhausted; and what was done now had the character of caricature. On the proposal of Stratocles, they decreed an invitation of Athena to Demetrius to be her guest, and offered him the opisthodomos of her temple as his habitation. He

⁴ "I have made up the history of these campaigns of Demetrius from Diodorus and Plutarch, but not without great difficulty."—1825.

there dwelt with the most abject prostitutes; and in the temple of the goddess he led the most dissolute life. The fate of Athens was terrible: Damocles, a chaste youth, made away with himself, that he might not fall into the hands of Demetrius. Less terrible cruelties were of every-day occurrence. He ordered Aphrodite-chapels to be built for his courtesans, Leaena and Lamia, and hero-chapels for his parasites. Men who had spoken against Demetrius, were sent into exile. According to the statement of Theophrastus, we must believe that Demochares was exiled for having ridiculed the decree of Stratocles; at all events his exile belongs to this time, which is suggested also by a passage from the twentieth book of his history (Athen. vi. p. 253).

From Athens, Demetrius made several expeditions in different directions, but the city remained his head quarters. During these expeditions, the desolation of the country increased more and more, and it is surprising that Attica did not become a complete wilderness as early as that time.

In the spring of Olymp. 119, 2, Demetrius entered Peloponnesus, which was in the hands of Cassander and Ptolemy; and he again showed himself in the field as an excellent and active commander. He first conquered Cenchreae, the port of Corinth, which prevented his passing by land into Peloponnesus; he drove its garrison back to Corinth, and made himself master of the Aete (*i. e.*, of the town and country of Argos, Troezen, Epidaurus, etc.), and of all Arcadia, with the exception of Mantinea. Having thus strengthened himself, he undertook the conquest of Sicyon, which was far separated from its ἄκρα, the latter being situated on a hill, and the city on the sea coast. Both were taken by him, and afterwards Corinth also; the ἄκρα of the latter city fell into his hands by capitulation, probably through money, he giving to the garrison the arrears of their pay. This is the siege spoken of in the "Curculio" of Plautus (iii. 25), whence we may see when the Greek original was composed. As Sicyon, from its situation, was difficult to defend, he induced the Sicyonians to destroy their ancient city, and remove to the ἄκρα. This is the origin of New-Sicyon (out of flattery this new town was called Demetrias, a name which does not seem to have been long in use), which in later times acted a very prominent part. After this he marched into Achaia, where he took the towns

of Bura and Aegium. Twelve years before this, Aegium had been stormed by the troops of Antigonos and it was now taken by storm a second time. Demetrius ordered the commander of the place, and fifteen of his men, to be run through with spears; and they were, perhaps, not the only ones that suffered in this way.

Thus far we are guided by Plutarch and Diodorus; but from a passage of Demochares in Athenaeus, we know that Demetrius undertook an expedition with his fleet to Leucas and Corcyra. The Corcyraeans were enemies of Cassander. While Demetrius was engaged in those parts, the Romans had advanced to the extreme point of Messapia, and accordingly were very near to Demetrius.

From thence Demetrius returned to Corinth, where he convened a congress of the Greeks, the first after the time of Alexander. He was there proclaimed hegemon of the Greeks, and at the end of Olymp. 119, 2 (in spring, in the month of Munychion), he proceeded to Athens, where he was received as a god with incense and processions by the Athenians, who, being adorned with wreaths, came out to meet him.⁵ He had a desire to be initiated in the mysteries and to advance to the degree of epoptia; but when he arrived in Munychia, two months had already elapsed since the celebration of the lesser mysteries; there were yet four months until the great mysteries commenced, and from that date a full year had to pass before he could be admitted to the epoptia. Accordingly Demetrius ought to have waited ten months longer, and then again eighteen months; but he wanted rapidly to pass through everything. No man at that time had much faith in those

⁵ "Duris of Samos (in Athen. vi. p. 253) has preserved the singular ithyphallic poem, with which he was received. This poem is exquisite as a fine composition and on account of its beautiful language; it is quite unique of its kind. Isaac Casaubonus has restored it, but it is still neither quite mended nor understood. The Athenians call Demetrius the son of Poseidon and Aphrodite, the Sun, and his friends are called Stars. They sing of how Demeter, wishing to celebrate her mysteries, and Demetrius arrive in the city at the same time. They pray to him to grant peace, and, in case of this being impossible, to punish the Aetolian sphinx. This probably refers to the increasing piracy of the Aetolians. Athens may not have been connected with Aetolia by a treaty, though both were allies of Demetrius. [In 1830, Niebuhr, at the end of Lecture LXXXVII., observed, that at this time the Aetolians were allied with Cassander, which is probably more correct.—Ed.] Those pirates did not scruple to throw their captives into the water when they could not sell them as slaves; hence, they are compared to the sphinx."—1825,

matters, as we see from the *ithyphallus*, in which he is praised as the true and only god: all was mere curiosity, and an obscure remnant of superstition. In order to enable him to be initiated in due form, Stratocles got a decree passed, that the month of *Munychion* in which they then were, should be called *Anthesterion*. The lesser mysteries were then celebrated; the day after was made the month of *Boëdromion*, and he was initiated in the great mysteries. After this the lapse of a whole year was feigned, and when his initiation was completed, the year was set right again. Afterwards Athens had to pay a war contribution of 250 talents, which Demetrius under the very eyes of the people gave to his courtezans while he ridiculed the Athenians. Things like these naturally goaded the people into madness.

Demetrius was now master of the greater part of Greece. In the following year (*Olymp.* 119, 3) he assembled a large army of his allies, and proceeded by way of *Chaleis* into *Thessaly* with 56,000 men, to meet *Cassander*. He took from him a great part of *Thessaly*, and then after both had dragged each other about without anything being decided, they separated, Demetrius being called to *Asia* by his father, because a great coalition had there been formed against him. In order, therefore, to withdraw honourably, Demetrius concluded a peace with *Cassander*, in which Greece was declared free, and then crossed over into *Asia*.

Seleucus who was now master of *Babylon* and the upper satrapies, after having subdued all *Iran* as far as *India* without any effort, had formed, together with *Ptolemy*, *Cassander*, and *Lysimachus*, a coalition against *Antigonus*. This is the first instance known in history, of a great coalition of princes of equal rank and equal independence. "Antigonus, who now possessed only *Asia Minor*, *Cyprus*, a portion of *Syria* and the greater part of Greece, was thus opposed by all the rest of the *Macedonian* world;" and it was against this coalition that Demetrius led his army into *Asia Minor* (*Olymp.* 119, 4). "We know very little about the details of the war, but it appears that the enemies pressed into *Asia Minor* from all sides." The decisive battle was fought in *Olymp.* 119, 4, near *Ipsus* in *Phrygia*; it was decided especially by the admirable infantry of *Lysimachus* and *Cassander*. *Seleucus* had only *Asiatics*; the phalanx of *Ptolemy* was of little importance, and

only his mercenaries fought bravely; but the truth is that in reality he had no talent as a commander. Antigonus fell in the battle, and the defeat was so complete, that his whole empire was destroyed. Demetrius escaped with a small band to the maritime towns of Ionia, but behaved in a praiseworthy manner. His adversaries, after their victory, unfortunately for themselves neglected to pursue him; they ought to have annihilated him completely and at once, but they allowed him time, which he employed in collecting fresh troops. It is often a kind of humane feeling which, in our joy at a perfect victory, prevents us from completely destroying our enemy; and Ptolemy was indeed capable of such a feeling, but the others did not possess a trace of it. Many a one may have thought, that Demetrius was no longer formidable to him, but that he ought not to be utterly destroyed, because at some future time he might be a useful ally against others.

The empire of Antigonus was now cut up: the western provinces were divided between Cassander and Lysimachus, the upper provinces were assigned to Seleucus, and Cyprus and Syria to Ptolemy, who, however, did not maintain upper Syria, but confined himself to Phoenicia and Cyprus. Pleistarchus, a brother of Cassander obtained Cilicia as a special indemnification for Cassander, who himself received Caria and Pamphylia, while Lysimachus acquired Lydia, Ionia, Phrygia and the north coast of Asia Minor.

Trogus here introduced the history of Heraclea on the Euxine, and I shall do the same, though I cannot give it here with the same minuteness as he did. Heraclea was a Boeotian colony, which was sent out at a time, of which we cannot form an accurate idea, because according to our notions of the condition of Boeotia we cannot conceive that that country had much navigation. We do not know how nor when the colony was founded, though it is possible that its foundation took place in the 20th Olympiad, when Greece had a very dense population. It was one of the earliest Greek settlements on the coast of the Euxine; they afterwards continued to extend farther in the north of Byzantium and on the east of Heraclea as far as the coast of Scythia. Most of them belong to the period from Olymp. 45 to Olymp. 50, that is the time of the last Median kings. It is an inconceivably childish idea of certain writers who, whatever their other merits may be, are

not competent to write on philological subjects, to assert that that country was the original seat of the Greeks, and that the Greek towns on the Black Sea were remnants of the original Greece, from which all the other Greeks proceeded. This has been asserted even by Fallmerayer in his history of the empire of Trebizond, though he is otherwise an estimable and intelligent author. If this folly, one of the excrescences in the treatment of ancient history, which arise from a want of philological knowledge and of clear perceptions, required to be refuted, it would only be necessary to follow the course of history. We know when Sinope was founded, and that Trebizond was a colony of Sinope: and those writers would make us believe that Trebizond was a very ancient place, and Trapezus in Arcadia is represented as a colony of it!

Heraclea is remarkable in the traditions of antiquity, because it kept the neighbouring tribes, such as the Mariandyni, in a condition of perfect helotism. This relation occurs frequently: thus the Oenotrians were in a state of servitude to the Greek cities in Italy, though that condition gradually disappeared. The Mariandyni, however, remained in their state of helotism, because they were purely Asiatic barbarians, who did not assimilate themselves to their masters; they always remained serfs and subjects, like the negroes among their European masters, who likewise never assimilate themselves to them. Heraclea was wealthy through its navigation and the commerce on the Black Sea, which is always very profitable. At the time when there existed no other Greek settlements in those parts, it must have been a still more important place. It was also, notwithstanding its great distance, one of the main seats of Grecian art, as we may see from its beautiful coins. The city was very great, but it decayed at the time when its ancient institutions grew obsolete, and when the ancient gentes—the original settlers—and the demos which had been formed around them, made war upon each other.

LECTURE LXXXVIII.

HERACLEA was one of those cities which, being situated on the frontiers of the Persian dominion, were little interfered

with by the Persians, and were very well off under their protection. It was connected with the empire of the great king by nothing but by paying tribute, being in the same relation in which Ragusa once stood to Turkey. During the decay of the Persian empire and the increasing state of dissolution in western Asia, while Ariobarzanes and Datames were in revolt against their masters, those distant cities also recovered their freedom. In the *Anabasis*, *e. g.*, Sinope appears as a free town, and Heraclea still more so. Heraclea had not been involved in the Greek wars on account of its dependence on Persia, and was affected by them only in a transitory way. At the period of its greatest prosperity, Clearchus set himself up as a tyrant, and made himself master of the city. He was one of the non-Athenians who went to Athens to receive an Athenian education, and became a disciple of Plato and Isocrates. Plato cannot be made responsible for the fact that a man like Clearchus went forth from his school; but at the same time it shows that his school must have had very little influence upon the formation of the character of its disciples. Dionysius remained what he was, and Dion was in reality no better than any other adventurous and restless man of that age. Clearchus returned from Athens provided with the culture of an Athenian, and must have been greatly looked up to by the Boeotian colonists on the Pontus; it is only to be wondered at, that they attached any value to it. He acquired power as a demagogue, gained the confidence of the demos, and usurped the supreme power, which he maintained with the greatest distrust towards every one, and with extraordinary cruelty, until in the end he was murdered in a conspiracy by Chion. Among the Hellenic letters there are some forged under the name of this Chion, and in the eighteenth century, they were thought worthy of the honour of a critical edition, although Bentley had long before decided on the spuriousness of this and all similar forgeries. I hope, that henceforth it may occur to no one to consider all those letters of Demosthenes, Aeschines, and others, as genuine. Only the two bearing the name of Plato (I mean the seventh and eighth) may be defended with some reason; I for my part consider them to be equally spurious, but I can conceive that others may entertain quite a different opinion. The letters of Phalaris, Themistocles, Isocrates, and in general all the collections of

letters down to those of Brutus, are spurious. Barthélemy still made use of those letters of the orators, as if they were historical documents. What Lucan (i. 45) says of the war of Pharsalus, "it is fortunate *quod sibi res acta est*," may be said also of those letters. Bentley has written upon them in a most excellent manner; and his dissertation on the letters of Phalaris is the most masterly production in the whole history of philology.

Clearchus, who was one of the cruel tyrants, was succeeded by his still more cruel brother Satyrus, who avenged the murder of his brother in the most fearful manner, and at the same time gratified his own cruel disposition. He was a strange compound, such as we also meet elsewhere. Jacobi somewhere says, that we ought not by any means to mistake a mystic for a pious man; for that there are virtues of which a person may seem to be possessed, who, after all, is a thoroughly bad man. In speaking of a city of the empire, which he does not name, though it may easily be guessed (*Woldemar*, vol. i.), he says: "Only think of the city of X. and its environs," replied Woldemar. 'You know, the inhabitants of that populous district are the most active and orderly people in the world. They are passionately attached to their calling, to their families, to their constitution, to their religion, to their homes, and yet what unfortunate, what wretched men are they? how full of envy and malice towards one another! how full of distrust, injustice, and wickedness! Their hearts are closed against benevolence, against friendship, and every cheerful and noble sentiment; their brows are marked with the most odious obstinacy and hostility against everything which tends to elevate the human mind.'" Such is the case with fraternal affection. Modern history tells of a real monster, who was a perfect pattern of brotherly affection, but withal deserves everything that report says of him. Such a man was Satyrus: his love for his brother acquired the appearance of virtue. His ruling passion was to avenge the murder of his brother, and to preserve the power for his little children. He gave them an excellent education and protected them against every danger; nay he divorced his wife, that he might not have any children himself, and might not be tempted to neglect his duty towards his brother's children. We here see that he was conscious of the fact that he was little better than a savage beast: he would

have been unable to resist the temptation to tear his nephews to pieces to benefit his own children. Such characters are curious ethical phenomena; and to a man like Aristotle, looking upon characters as natural phenomena, they are important. Timotheus and Dionysius, the sons of Clearchus, were the very opposite of their father. Timotheus died at an early age, but Dionysius ruled for a long time: they were the benefactors of their country. Such a government of a mild usurper, was, on the whole, a blessing for the Greek cities of that time, and the best thing that could happen to them. They had completely lost the power of moving in the ancient republican forms; and being left to themselves, they sank into confusion: the saddest change that time can bring; and the world may gradually lose the power of moving in legal forms, as we may see in the history of Asia at different times; and this was then the case in Greece in its full extent, as it was afterwards at Rome. Dionysius and Timotheus, as I said before, were true benefactors of their country. Dionysius was in a very difficult position in the reign of Alexander, who was hostile towards him; but with incredible skill he passed unscathed through the dangers during Alexander's reign; and after the king's death, better times appeared for him and for Heraclea. He married Amastris, a daughter of a brother of Darius Codomannus, and an aunt of Roxana, whereby he was enabled to steer through the dangerous period of Antipater, so long as Eurydice and Arrhidaeus were on the throne, until the time of Antigonos, whose favour he won. He thus guided his ship through rocks and shallows. On his death, he left his wife Amastris as the guardian of their common children, two sons and a daughter. His principality comprised several towns on the coast; and it was extremely prosperous under her administration. She was there regarded as an extremely wealthy woman, and many sued for her hand. Lysimachus married her, and thus acquired his influence on the coast of Asia. He left her her principality, but in a state of dependence. Those princes indulged in every licence, especially in their matrimonial relations, and thus Lysimachus afterwards abandoned Amastris, in order to marry Arsinoë, the daughter of Ptolemy, who being discontented, came over from Egypt with her brother Ptolemy Ceraunus; but Lysimachus continued to manifest a kindly disposition towards his former wife, just as Napoleon

always showed kindness and affection for Josephine. When the children of Amastris became of age, they took possession of the government, and indulged in the practices of the time—they murdered their own mother. Lysimachus now had no more sacred duty, than to avenge the mother and take possession of her dominion. He conquered Heraclea and united it with his empire. This is the history of Heraclea, and we have here again arrived at the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes.¹

After the battle of Ipsus, Demetrius had escaped with a few thousand men to Ephesus, where he had a fleet; and he did not altogether despair of the success of his cause. Cyprus, Sidon, and Tyre, as well as several of the Ionian towns and islands, were still in his possession, and he was anything but an insignificant man. He now displayed great skill, and drew all his forces together, with a view to establish himself in Greece, and there again to try his fortune. For he saw well, that the coalition of the generals who had invaded his father's empire must soon break up, and that then his assistance would probably be sought by one or other of them, which was, in fact, afterwards done by Seleucus and Ptolemy. He sent the great Pyrrhus first as negotiator, and afterwards as hostage, to Ptolemy. Pyrrhus had been his companion in arms; he had lost his kingdom through Cassander, and was now wandering about in the world in the hope of conquering a kingdom for himself. The expedition of the adventurer Cleonymus also belongs to this time, or, rather, to a somewhat earlier one; he was a pretender to the throne of Sparta, from which he was, perhaps, unjustly excluded. He was the second son of Cleomenes, after whose death, in Olymp. 118, a dispute about the succession had arisen between Cleonymus and Areus, a grandson of Cleomenes by his first son. The ephors decided in favour of Areus. Discontented with this,

¹ "The period of Greek history, beginning with the battle of Ipsus, is one of the most obscure. Up to that battle we have the narrative of Diodorus, which proceeds in the form of annals from year to year; however bad his accounts are, still we are enabled by him to draw up a regular history. It would be ungrateful unconditionally to blame Corsini's *Fasti Attici*, yet they do not deserve the reputation which they enjoy. They contain inconceivable blunders, rash assumptions and contradictions, especially in regard to the period which we are now entering upon. Corsini, e. g., places all the events which Plutarch relates for the period from Olymp. 120, 1 to 121, 3, in the year following that of the battle of Ipsus."—1825.

Cleonymus went away, and became a condottiere, a very rough and unprincipled soldier. At Taenarus, the general recruiting place, he collected a horde of mercenaries, with whom he served wherever he could get pay. For a while he assisted the Tarentines with his troops against Rome; then, having quarrelled with them, he made private expeditions in the Adriatic, and established himself in Corcyra. Thence he was expelled by Cassander, whose empire was daily extending, and who was then in possession of Macedonia, Epirus, Corcyra, and the greater part of Greece; the whole of Thrace belonged to Lysimachus. The territories of the various princes, however, were all mixed together, presenting an aspect like that of a map of Germany, a circumstance which modern historians have not understood. That period has altogether been treated by recent historians in a very miserable manner. Nothing good has been written about it since the time of Ruperti, who, about the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote very admirably on this period (on Besoldus). He was a contemporary of Th. Reinesius. After the middle of the seventeenth century, we meet with German philologists, who were not, indeed, of the first order, but possessed a vast amount of learning, good sense, judgment, and historical tact; and Ruperti (also Rupertus) and Reinesius belonged to this class. All they required, to enable them to unfold their pinioned wings, was, to have lived in a happier age.

From Ephesus, Demetrius sailed through the Cyclades to Athens, where he wanted to establish himself first. But the Athenians were determined to avail themselves of the jealousy of the princes among each other, to secure their independence; and accordingly they sent an embassy to meet Demetrius, and declare to him, that they would not receive him. Demetrius was enraged at the ingratitude of the Athenians, but their determination was firm. It is curious to see how the sensible Plutarch, after having himself related the cruelties perpetrated by Demetrius on the Acropolis, charges the Athenians with ingratitude, for having closed their gates against that ferocious man; and he himself relates, that a modest youth made away with himself, not to fall into the hands of Demetrius, at a time when everything would have been profaned and polluted! The Athenians

behaved, at that time, altogether in a dignified manner. It was, indeed, the period of Stratocles, and of men like him — who would deny that? but there soon appeared Olympiodorus, and other men, whom we might wish to meet with in the best period of Athenian history, and even the *faex Thesei* behaved nobly. They showed their noble disposition in allowing Deidamia, the wife of Demetrius, with all her retinue and property, to proceed unhurt and uninjured to Megara, and in not taking possession of his treasures, although they shut their gates against him; nay, they even gave up to him the ships which were stationed in Piræus, and which he had intrusted to them, when he demanded of the ambassadors to surrender them and his treasures. This was, assuredly, a conduct as honourable as can be imagined: modern history furnishes examples of very opposite actions, and that too in the case of states which we are accustomed to admire. (This was about Olymp. 120, 1, or 119, 4).

Athens was now spared for a time, and Demetrius, before attacking the city, undertook several other expeditions. He first directed his course, with his squadron, towards the coast of Thrace, gained a footing in the Thracian Chersonesus, and made war upon Lysimachus, who, in the meantime, had taken possession of Lydia, Caria, and Phrygia. Lysimachus was not supported by the other princes, nor was it necessary, and Demetrius made no conquests there. Meantime, however, a new lucky star was rising for him through Seleucus, who, having fallen out with Ptolemy, and being dissatisfied with his share, was ready to form a friendship with Demetrius. He sued for the hand of Stratonice, a daughter of Demetrius, whom, however, he afterwards gave up to his son, Antiochus. Demetrius now sailed with his fleet to Cilicia and Syria, and, in passing, made himself master of Cilicia, and the treasures which Pleistarchus, the son of Cassander, was guarding there, and then began to quarrel with Seleucus. For when Cilicia and the Phœnician cities were in the power of Demetrius, Seleucus in vain asked that they should be given up to him; and it was not without difficulty that Demetrius escaped from his plots: a formal rupture, however, did not take place. Demetrius then became reconciled with Ptolemy also, and that, as I have already mentioned, through the mediation of

Pyrrhus. He now again appeared in Greece, with increased forces. He gained a firm footing in Peloponnesus, though it is uncertain how many towns he subdued there.

Meantime, Cassander died (Olymp. 120, 3), and Demetrius, supported by a newly-increased fleet, began the siege of Athens² (Olymp. 121, 1). He had then again fallen out with Ptolemy, who now sent a fleet to assist the Athenians.

What had taken place at Athens in the interval which had elapsed since the battle of Ipsus (from Olymp. 119, 4 to 121, 1), is rather obscure. After that battle, and probably down to Olymp. 120, 4, Demochares seems to have guided the counsels of the city. From the psephisma concerning him in the Pseudo-Plutarch,³ we see, that after the extravagance of Demetrius, Demochares was the first again to restore economy in the administration, and procured subsidies from Lysimachus, Ptolemy and the younger Antipater. I would change the obscure expression *καὶ τὰ Ἑλευσίνια τῷ δήμῳ* into *Ἑλευσῖνα*. Cassander and his sons had been in possession of that place,⁴ and Demochares negotiated about its restoration to the people.⁵

² "That the war which ended in the capture of Athens occurred after the death of Cassander, is proved by the psephismata in the Pseudo-Plut. *Vit. X. Orat. fin.* which refer to Demosthenes, Demochares, and Lysurgus. In the second of them, it is expressly stated that Demochares, on the one hand, went himself as ambassador to the kings Antipater, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, and that, on the other, embassies were sent, on his proposal, to those who wanted subsidies from Athens. Although the succession of events is obscure, still it is clear, that these embassies must be placed after the *τετραετὴς πόλεμος* and the banishment of Demochares from Athens, which took place in Olymp. 119, 3. This Antipater, therefore, cannot have been the old Antipater, the restorer of the oligarchy, but must be the son of Cassander, who ascended the throne at the earliest, in Olymp. 120, 4. The embassy accordingly belongs to Olymp. 120, 4, or 121, 1, and the siege of Athens by Demetrius cannot be assigned to an earlier date than Olymp. 121, 1."—1825.

³ "After the services of Demochares to the people are set forth, there follow the words, *ἀνθ' ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον*, from which it would appear as if, after the four years' war, an aristocracy was established, which caused him to be exiled. But this does not accord with history; and I refer the words *ἀνθ' ὧν* to what he had done in the Lamian war, and I assume that he was one of those who, after the Lamian war, were exiled during the oligarchy of Antipater. He may have returned at the time when Polysperchon recalled the exiles, and then remained at Athens under the mild administration of Demetrius Phalereus. I further refer the words, *ἐπὶ Διοκλέους ἄρχοντος*, to the eponymus, under whom Polysperchon, in Olymp. 115, 3, recalled the exiles. But we must, probably, read *Νικοκλέους*."—1825.

⁴ Comp. above, p. 81.

⁵ "The psephisma closes with the following remarkable circumstances. Demochares was exiled by the democrats, but never had any share in any oligarchy;

During the first period after Cassander's death, Demochares was still conducting the affairs of Athens. At the time when Demetrius was besieging Athens, the power was unfortunately in the hands of one Lachares, who had been a demagogue, and ruled at Athens, without exactly setting himself up as tyrant.⁶ He maintained Athens, and compelled her to offer a desperate resistance.⁷ Demetrius blockaded the city by land and by sea, and the Athenians, being cut off from the sea, were visited by a fearful famine. They fed upon all kinds of animals, upon indigestible herbs, and the grass which grew on the Acropolis. An Egyptian fleet, attempting to introduce provisions into Piræus, was repelled by Demetrius. At length, after an obstinate defence, they were compelled by the famine to surrender. Lachares, in the disguise of a slave, and by means of a horse which he found outside the city, escaped into Boeotia; on his road he scattered pieces of gold, in order to detain the mercenaries of Demetrius who were pursuing him; he thus reached Thebes, and then went to Lysimachus. An embassy now surrendered the keys to Demetrius who entered the city without any capitulation.

Every catastrophe brought the city nearer its downfall, though Demetrius, considering that he was the conqueror, displayed great mildness. He convened the Athenians, without their arms, in the theatre, and surrounded the building with his hoplites. But he was satisfied with having struck them with the horrors of death, and having reproached them for

this proves that there were several oligarchies at that period. Nor was he always absent during the existence of an oligarchy, but he would not hold any office under it. He was the only one among the Athenian statesmen of the time who did not attempt to bring about a revolution in the constitution of his country. Men of inferior minds made the attempt; but Demochares took the constitution as it was, and endeavoured to effect by it what could be effected. This fact shows him in all his greatness, and as a light in days of gloomy darkness."—1825.

⁶ "The fact that Lachares, at the last moment of distress, perhaps soon after the death of Demochares, assumed the tyrannis, is not opposed to the statement of the psephisma, that, during the first days after Cassander's death, Demochares had the administration of affairs; but it is opposed to a passage of Pausanias (i. 25, § 7), where it is stated, that Cassander set up Lachares as tyrant. It is probable that Pausanias made a chronological blunder, and that Lysimachus raised Lachares to the tyrannis."—1825.

⁷ "Pausanias (*l.c.*) calls Lachares one of the most unprincipled men that ever existed; but this is, probably, a mere exaggeration. If we consider the crimes of the others, he was not worse than they."—1825.

their ingratitude, he declared that he pardoned them. The Athenians were obliged at once to concede to him the right to keep garrisons at Munychia and Piræeus, but otherwise they fared better under him now, than at the time when as their friend he had revelled in his excesses. He even fed the Athenians, giving them grain and other necessities of life.

But notwithstanding the mildness of Demetrius, that siege was one of those events by which Athens sank lower and lower. "All the external splendour which had hitherto distinguished Athens, now disappears: the temples which had been spared before, were now plundered, and all their treasures were consumed." Lachares had stripped the sanctuaries, had taken the gold from the statue of Athena, and coined the anathemata in the Acropolis, partly indeed for the state, but mostly to keep the money for himself, and to send it away. Athens was completely humbled to the dust.

Demetrius now returned to Peloponnesus (Olymp. 121, 2). During this expedition, he was on the point of making himself master of Sparta. The Spartans, ever since the battle of Megalopolis, had taken no part in the struggle of the Greeks for independence (from Olymp. 112, 3 to 121, 2). Sparta had during that period become more and more powerless, although she was in the enjoyment of peace. That which now emboldened and induced her to declare against Macedonia, is left unnoticed by the historians of the time; and it would be inexplicable, if we did not know that Ptolemy and Lysimachus continued the war against Demetrius. We also know that down to the time of Cleomenes, there existed a constant connection between Sparta and Alexandria; whence we may suppose, that that alliance already existed, and that all the Lacedæmonians received pay from Alexandria. Acts of hostility had indeed occurred between Sparta and Demetrius, but they were not of any importance. It is unknown what forces Archidamus possessed, and what occasioned him to commence the war. All we know is, that Archidamus was defeated near Mantinea, that Demetrius advanced as far as Laconica, and that Sparta was now surrounded for the second time with palisades and trenches, and in some parts also with a wall: Pausanias at least places the fortifications at this time. He also calls the defeat of Mantinea, the third great blow to Sparta after the battle of Leuctra and that of Agis. Demetrius

might, no doubt, easily have crossed those fortifications, if he had not at the moment received intelligence that all his affairs were in a bad condition, and if he had not for this reason given up the war with Sparta.

For Ptolemy had taken possession of all the places in Cyprus, with the exception of Salamis, which city he was besieging, and which contained the children of Demetrius. Lysimachus was making himself master of the Ionian and other maritime Greek towns in Asia Minor, which had hitherto been under the dominion of Demetrius. The Egyptian fleet seems to have gained the ascendancy; probably because Ptolemy had become master of Tyre and Sidon, whereby Demetrius lost the means of obtaining timber and troops. The Asiatic province henceforth disappears from the history of Demetrius, and he was again in great difficulties.

But the death of Cassander, and the misfortunes of his family, opened fresh prospects for Demetrius. Cassander died of dropsy in Olymp. 120, 3. His eldest son Philip appears to have been his sole heir, but he died soon afterwards at Elatea Olymp. 120, 4; two other sons, Antipater and Alexander, then divided the empire between themselves. Both were very young, and their mother Thessalonice, a daughter of king Philip, was the only surviving member of the family; they can scarcely have been more than grown up boys, if the time of Cassander's marriage with Thessalonice is correctly stated in Diodorus. Thessalonice was appointed guardian, or she was commissioned to divide the empire between her two sons. To do this fairly, was a difficult task.

Antipater, the elder, thinking himself wronged by his mother in the division, murdered her; and applying to Lysimachus, his father-in-law, he was supported by him. But Alexander, who was confined to western Macedonia, applied to Pyrrhus, who in the mean time had returned to his paternal kingdom, to obtain his assistance; for this purpose he ceded to him the possessions which the Macedonian kings had in Epirus, together with Ambracia and Acarnania. But distrusting Pyrrhus, he applied at the same time to Demetrius. As Pyrrhus sold his assistance, we may suppose that Demetrius did not give his without some selfish motive either: he evidently caused Thessaly to be ceded to him, the whole of which had belonged to Cassander. Demetrius now entering

Thessaly, met Alexander at Larissa. Both intrigued against each other, and aimed at each other's life. After many attempts and repeated snares, Demetrius struck the blow, and caused Alexander to be murdered. The Macedonian troops of the latter now had no king; Demetrius came forward with a proclamation, in which he declared that he had acted only in self-defence; that his life had been in danger, which was really true—but all the Macedonian princes were equally bad—and called upon the Macedonians to submit to him. They felt no attachment to any family, after the race of Caranus or Perdiccas had become extinct, and Demetrius, therefore, was as acceptable to them as the family of Cassander; of Antipater, they might justly say that he was a *μυαίφονος*, because he had murdered his relatives. The troops thus submitted to Demetrius (Olymp. 121, 3), and he was proclaimed king. Lysimachus having put himself in possession of the dominion of Antipater, his son-in-law, who had made an attempt upon his life also, gave up his new Macedonian possession, in order to have peace, and also because he was forming other plans—it is however possible that the Macedonians refused to acknowledge him, and would not be divided—and made peace with Demetrius, who thus became master of all Macedonia.

He now ruled over Macedonia, Thessaly, Attica, Megara and most towns of Peloponnesus, from Olymp. 121, 3, till 123, 2. He not only had garrisons in Munychia and Piræeus, but fortified and even occupied the Museum in the heart of the city, for the Museum was one of the hills (*ἄκρα*) within the *ἄστυ*: this was the first foreign garrison which the city had seen for the last hundred and ten years, *i.e.*, since the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The Spartans, however, continued the war against him. The adventurous Cleonymus had in the meantime returned to Sparta, and the ephors, passing over the kings Archidamus and Areus, appointed him generalissimo. He must then have been regent for Areus, and perhaps also for Eudamidas, the son of Archidamus: Areus must have been very young, and Archidamus henceforth completely disappears. Plutarch remarks, that Cleonymus marched with an army into Boeotia, which refused to acknowledge Demetrius. But Demetrius also entered Boeotia, and although the Boeotians opposed him

with great vehemence, Cleonymus was overpowered and obliged to evacuate the country. Afterwards, however, a report having spread that some misfortune had befallen Demetrius, the Boeotians again revolted. During that period Thebes was taken twice, and we hear no more of hostilities between Thebes and Boeotia; Thebes was the seat of the government. According to Polyænus, Cleonymus conquered Troezen by a stratagem, which must be referred to this time.⁸

During these struggles, Demetrius wanted to take from Pyrrhus that portion of Macedonia which Alexander had ceded to him, and thus he began to quarrel with his most faithful friend. During his residence in Alexandria, Pyrrhus had married Berenice, a daughter of Ptolemy by his first wife; and as long as he lived, he was sure of the friendship of the Alexandrian court. The detail of the wars between Pyrrhus and Demetrius cannot form a part of this history, for they are petty and insignificant. Pyrrhus was allied with the Aetolians, who at this time greatly extended their dominion, for several cities, and even some Acarnanian ones, joined them as *συμπολιτεῖαι*. Pyrrhus defended himself with great skill against an immensely superior force; and after a few years he was victorious. It was fortunate for him that Demetrius was just then planning greater things; for he was thinking of recovering the empire of his father—a senseless idea under the circumstances of the time. He built an enormous fleet, and enlisted an army which is said to have amounted to 100,000 men. His empire comprised not only Macedonia and Thessaly, for nominally he was also hegemon of the Greeks, as Philip and Alexander had been before, and possessed a number of coast towns in Asia;⁹ the parts of his kingdom were very much scattered about. But he collected his army with immense exertions; his subjects were fearfully oppressed, and all his dominion was in a state of ferment. His government was on the whole unbearable to the Macedonians on account of his pride and his cruelty; they were not a nation to allow themselves to be governed in the Asiatic fashion. “He showed himself very rarely and accepted no petitions; but once he behaved with unusual kindness, receiving all petitions and

⁸ *Strateg.* i. 29, 1. This taking of Troezen seems to belong to the later war with Antigonus.—Ed.

⁹ *Comp.* p. 124.

throwing them into the folds of his garment (*χλαμύς*). Everybody was highly delighted; but when he rode over the bridge of the Axios, he threw them all into the river. Such things naturally exasperated all the people against him." He took no notice of the general excitement, and went on in his infatuation until there arose against him a general coalition, which for a time was either inactive or was interrupted by a peace; but in the end Pyrrhus, called upon by the more distant kings, and being no doubt invited by the Macedonians themselves, availed himself of the ferment, and invaded Macedonia with a small force. Demetrius marched against him; Pyrrhus manoeuvred and negotiated with the Macedonians, until they rose in a general insurrection, refusing obedience to Demetrius and ordering him to withdraw. He was glad to get away, and went (*Olymp. 123, 1*), I believe, to Demetrias in Magnesia, which he himself had built on the Gulf of Pagasae, near the ancient town of Iolcos, and which we afterwards find in the hands of his son Antigonus. Thence he proceeded into Greece. He was a great general; his keen discernment as a military commander is attested by the foundation of Demetrias and of New-Sicyon: the fortress of Demetrias exercised an important influence upon the fate of Greece. Demetrius had reigned over Macedonia five or six years.

When he had thus suddenly fallen from his height, many rose against him. The Athenians also threw off the yoke: this is probably the liberation of Athens by Olympiodorus of which Pausanias (*I. 26. § 1*, and elsewhere) speaks. He relates, that garrisons of Macedonians having been placed in Munychia, Piraeus, and the Museum, a few Athenians afterwards formed the determination to deliver the city, and chose Olympiodorus for their leader. He called all the citizens to arms and marched to the Museum, which he stormed and took. Pausanias does not mention the time, but I assign the event to this period after mature deliberation. It is quite clear that after the fall of Demetrius, the Athenians were their own masters; for soon afterwards, *Olymp. 123, 1* or *123, 2*, Pyrrhus being already king of Macedonia, appeared at Athens,¹⁰

¹⁰ "The Athenians showed confidence in Pyrrhus, by opening the Acropolis to him, and by allowing him and his retinue to offer up sacrifices there. It is one of his many noble features, that he did not abuse this confidence. He told them, that he was grateful for their confidence, but advised them, not to show the same to any one else. This reminds us of the confessor of

and was received in the city as an ally against Demetrius. Athens, therefore, must have been already free. It is also certain that in Olymp. 123, 4, Athens was not in the hands of Antigonos. The insurrection, moreover, must belong to the time, when the empire of Demetrius was falling to pieces. This chronological hypothesis also quite agrees with what we know of the life of Olympiodorus. When Pyrrhus was at Athens, Piræus and Munychia still had Macedonian garrisons; but afterwards we find the Athenians in possession of Piræus and Munychia; but I do not know, how they obtained possession of those places. One attempt to recover them must have failed; of this we find a trace in the confused collection of Polyænus;¹¹ but the Athenians did not rest, and in the course of time the fortresses must have surrendered, for during the war against Antigonos Gonatas, they were in the hands of the Athenians and their allies.

The Athenians were thus free, and for a long time they preserved their independence in a period of great distress. I have fixed the beginning and end of this period, the year of the insurrection of Olympiodorus and the year in which Athens again became dependent, being obliged to submit to Antigonos.¹² By this means a gap is filled up in the history of Athens, the outlines of which accordingly may be traced from the Lamian war down to Olymp. 144, when the history of Athens is taken up by Livy.

Demetrius soon concluded peace with Pyrrhus, and if he had waited patiently, he would have been certain of his restoration; but he could not wait, he wanted to decide everything at once, and thus in his restlessness he crossed over into Asia. He left behind him in Greece his son Antigonos, surnamed Gonatas, whose residence, I am convinced, was at Demetrias, and who remained master of a great part of Greece. His father had retained possession of Thessaly and of some Greek towns, in which he had garrisons, and the fortress of

Charles Emanuel, a Jesuit, who was the king's friend, and was much attached to him. On his death-bed he thanked the king, saying, that he would repay him with one piece of advice, which was, never again to take a Jesuit for his confessor."—(Transferred to this place from the end of Lecture 99).

¹¹ In 1825, Niebuhr referred the attempt of the Athenians to expel Heracles, which is related by Polyænus, v. 17 (Niebuhr there corrects, § 2, ἀδικίας into αἰκίας), to this time, and to Piræus and Munychia —ED.

¹² Olymp. 129, 2 or 3. Comp. Niebuhr's *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. i. p. 451.—ED.

Demetrius, where he had established arsenals and wharfs for ships of war, commanded Thessaly and Euboea. Demetrius landed in Asia Minor, wishing to undertake an expedition into the interior of Asia, like a man who has no more to lose: heaven knows what dreams he may have indulged in of overthrowing the empire of Lysimachus and Seleucus. It was impossible for him to conceive anything else but a successful result of his scheme. He accordingly first appeared with his troops in the Asiatic provinces of Lysimachus, where he was met by Agathocles, a son of Lysimachus, who successfully manoeuvred him out of those provinces, so that he was obliged to proceed to the interior. In this manner he dragged his army into Armenia, just as Charles XII. dragged his into the Ukraine. His desponding troops at length delivered him up to Seleucus, who had surrounded him and cut him off from the sea. He was accordingly taken prisoner (Olymp. 123, 4), but Seleucus treated him with great clemency. He continued to live for a time very contentedly and happily as a perfectly reckless man, Seleucus, who formed a correct estimate of him, having given him a large Persian palace with hunting grounds, etc., in Syria. Seleucus would perhaps have made use of him against Lysimachus, but Demetrius died in the meantime (Olymp. 124, 2).



LECTURE LXXXIX.

LYSIMACHUS had, during this period, after the murder of Antipater, his son-in-law, and the last heir of the elder Antipater (perhaps as a punishment for an attempt upon his own life) been in possession of a portion of Macedonia; but he had afterwards given it up to Demetrius. The Macedonians now recognised Pyrrhus as their king; but Lysimachus invaded his kingdom, and after having reigned alone for seven months, Pyrrhus was obliged to divide his empire between himself and Lysimachus (Olymp. 123, 2). The Macedonians deserting him as a stranger, surrendered to Lysimachus, whom they honoured as an ancient companion of Alexander, and whom they regarded as being nearly related to themselves, being either a

Thessalian or a Macedonian. All accounts represent Lysimachus as a Macedonian; but one, which is derived from Porphyrius, and in my opinion is more weighty than many others, says that he was a native of Thessaly, but that from his infancy he was brought up in the army of Philip, and afterwards became the most distinguished among the companions of Alexander. He was celebrated for the deep scar on his body from the claw of a lion, with which Alexander is said to have compelled him to fight, though I do not believe this to be true; I think it more probable that he received the wound during the celebrated lion hunt, in which he rescued Alexander from a lion. Physically he was a hero. But the Macedonians were a faithless and a fickle people, and always ready to find an excuse for their inconstancy; it occurred to them, that Pyrrhus was a foreigner, and Lysimachus their countryman, and this served them as an excuse for their fickleness. The division, however, between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus did not last for any length of time; for shortly after (Olymp. 124, 1, or 124, 2) Lysimachus drove Pyrrhus out of his kingdom. He had reigned over Macedonia altogether five years and six months, partly in conjunction with Lysimachus and partly alone.

The empire of Lysimachus had been gradually extended and consolidated. Greece did not become subject to him; Antigonus Gonatas, who had received the greater part of his father's fleet, maintained himself there with the remnants of his father's forces, and from Demetrias he ruled over a part of Greece, although many Greek cities asserted their independence. Besides Macedonia proper and Thrace, Lysimachus ruled over Lydia, Mysia, Ionia, Caria, and I have no doubt, over Phrygia Major also—an empire as beautiful as he could have wished, "and just of that extent which Alexander ought to have given to his empire in order to insure its stability." His real residence seems to have been Lysimachia in Chersonesus, in the neighbourhood of the ancient Cardia. With the exception of Thessalonice, all those Macedonian princes built new capitals for themselves: Alexandria was at least enlarged by Ptolemy.

Previously to the conquest of Macedonia, Lysimachus had undertaken an expedition across the Danube, against Dromichaetes, a king of the Getae. In the time of Herodotus,

we meet with the Getae in Bulgaria as a free people, and in Wallachia under the dominion of the Scythians. Pressed on by the Triballi, they passed, during the first years of Philip's reign, across the Danube, and drove back the Scythians; the Triballi either subdued the Getae on the right bank of the Danube, or drove them from it. There then arose, on the left bank, the great empire of the Getae, which, under the name of Dacia, extended over southern Russia as far as the Ukraine and the country about the Cimmerian Bosphorus. In Olymp. 121, 4, Lysimachus attempted to break up that empire, not so much for the purpose of extending his own dominions, as to prevent in those parts the formation of a state, which might become dangerous to himself and his successors. He accordingly crossed the Danube, but in the plain of Bessarabia his retreat was cut off, and he, with all his army, was taken prisoner. The generous conduct of the Dacian king, Dromichaetes, is celebrated in the collection of anecdotes: Lysimachus was set free, and his power was not weakened by this defeat.

But the royal house was soon to become the scene of a terrible tragedy; the occasion of which came from the family of Ptolemy. Ptolemy Soter, commonly called the son of Lagus, had a son by his first wife, who was born before his father ascended the throne. In the East it is a disputed point (it has never been finally settled), whether a son of a prince born before his father's accession can succeed to the throne, or the porphyrogenitus only. This is the case especially in regard to princes who are not born for the throne. The same question is often agitated in Russia. Such a dispute then arose between the first-born son of Ptolemy and the one who had been born at the time when Ptolemy was already in possession of Egypt. The quarrel became the more animated, because Ptolemy had divorced his first wife Eurydice, the daughter of Antipater; and his second wife, the intriguing Berenice, employed every means to cajole Ptolemy, who was enfeebled by age, and to get the question decided in favour of her own son. She succeeded so well, that the aged Ptolemy, two years before his death, resigned his throne to his younger son Ptolemy Philadelphus, and himself took the oath of allegiance to him. The first-born Ptolemy, surnamed Ceraunus, betook himself to Lysimachus, whose eldest son, Agathocles, was married to his sister Lysandra,

likewise a daughter of Ptolemy Soter, by his first wife Eurydice. Lysimachus, who received him in a friendly manner, was himself married to Arsinoë,¹ a daughter of Ptolemy by his second wife, by whom he had two sons. This Arsinoë now had recourse to the same intrigues in the house of Lysimachus. His eldest son, Agathocles, was already a man of very mature age (Lysimachus was seventy-four years old at his death) and of great eminence. In many a campaign he had successfully commanded his father's armies; he was very popular throughout the country, and it was he that was destined to succeed his father. "But Arsinoë hated him as the husband of her half-sister, against whom she entertained a deadly enmity; and also because he was an obstacle in the way of her own children." She accordingly determined to deprive him of both his throne and his life. It must be borne in mind, that in case of Lysimachus' death she had reason to fear for her own life, and that according to the practice of the age, the step-mother and her children would have been murdered by Agathocles as soon as he had ascended the throne. Arsinoë, therefore, calumniously informed Lysimachus that his life was threatened by his son Agathocles. The latter was at first treated with insult and persecuted by his father, and soon afterwards killed by poison. As this made a great impression, Lysimachus caused several others of his sons to be put to death, and began to rage against all whom Arsinoë pointed out as partisans of Agathocles. These things produced a complete state of anarchy both in the house of Lysimachus and in his kingdom. As every one felt that his life was in danger, his nobles began to apply for protection to Seleucus, to whom Lysandra, the wife of Agathocles, had fled with one of her husband's brothers. Seleucus had no objection to being thus called upon to interfere. He marched from Babylon across Mount Taurus down into western Asia, and, though chiefly by treachery, gained a decisive victory over the aged king in Lower Phrygia, ἐν τοῦ Κόρου πεδίῳ. Lysimachus, as at all other times, showed great valour, but fell in the battle (Olymp. 124, 3). With the exception of Cassandrea, where the widow Arsinoë resided with her children, the whole of the Macedonian state surrendered to Seleucus.

The whole of Alexander's empire, with the exception of

¹ In 1830, Niebuhr, by mistake, called Arsinoë a daughter of Eurydice; in consequence of which, the whole course of events was disturbed.—ED.

Egypt, southern Syria, a portion of Phœnicia, and Cyprus, was thus united under the sceptre of Seleucus. As he had not seen his native country since the beginning of Alexander's expedition, Seleucus now crossed the Hellespont to take possession of his native land, perhaps with the intention of there closing his days in peace. But while sacrificing in the neighbourhood of Lysimachia, he was murdered by Ptolemy Ceraunus, whom he had protected in his misfortunes with the view, according to the policy of the time, of having a dangerous pretender against Ptolemy Philadelphus (Olymp. 124, 4). The state of dissolution was such, that Ptolemy, without any difficulty, was recognised as king by the Macedonian troops of Seleucus, and by all Macedonia. He accordingly took possession of the empire. There was no hereditary family—that was the misfortune. Ptolemy Ceraunus had paved his way to the throne by murder and ingratitude; but he was in himself no insignificant man: he was very brave and resolute. What his morality was will be seen hereafter.

The Asiatic provinces of Lysimachus were quite united with the Syrian empire, of which Antiochus remained in undisturbed possession, Seleucus, even in his lifetime, having assigned to him the upper provinces. Antiochus endeavoured to avenge the death of his father; and a war broke out between Ptolemy Ceraunus and this Antiochus, who is surnamed Soter, for all the Macedonian kings bearing the same name are distinguished by surnames. He was called Soter, for having conquered the Gauls in Asia Minor. Ptolemy Ceraunus was also at war with Antigonus.

The war with Antiochus did not last long; for Antiochus was wise enough to confine himself to Asia, and not to extend his power farther. He would not come to Europe, because he would have been unable to defend his possessions there. He therefore soon listened to proposals of peace.

No definite peace seems to have been concluded with Antigonus; he was too weak to effect anything against Macedonia, and seems to have been reasonable enough to avoid everything (?) which might have called forth greater efforts against him.

Ptolemy endeavoured to establish his power firmly by treaties; and here our guide passes on to the history of Pyrrhus: Ptolemy tried to form alliances, renounced his claims to Egypt,

became reconciled with his brother Ptolemy Philadelphus, and tried to win the friendship of Pyrrhus.

I do not exactly remember whether at the beginning of these Lectures I explained to you the title of *Historia Philippica*, which Trogus gave to his work. He did so according to the example of Theopompus, who, as is well known, called his history "Philippic History," because it treated of Philip. The occasion of this imitation was, no doubt, the fact that Theopompus had interwoven, in his history of Philip, not only the contemporary history, but in treating of the separate nations also entered into their archaeology: his history was full of episodes. The loss of his work is much to be lamented, although in many things he cannot be relied upon, for he was very uncritical. His episodes resembled those of Herodotus. The characteristic feature of Trogus' history are these very episodes; and for this reason he applied the name "Philippic History" to his work—a strange idea, but sufficiently accounted for.

Theopompus, too, had given a minute account of the Epirot tribes, and explained their geography, either in speaking of Philip's first expedition into Epirus, or of his marriage with Olympias. All that Trogus says of Epirus was, no doubt, taken from Theopompus, as may be proved by certain quotations from Theopompus.

The name of Epirus is Ἀπειρος, and that of its inhabitants Ἀπειρώται; thus we read it on coins. We call all nations according to the κοινή, or according to the Attic form; but the ancients commonly called each nation according to its own dialect, and hence they, no doubt, commonly called the Epirots Ἀπειρώται. Thus we read in Plautus *Alii* for *Elii*—on coins they call themselves Ἀλίοι—and the Romans unquestionably called Pyrrhus king of the Apirotæ, and not Epirotæ. In the earlier times the name Ἀπειρος embraced a much wider range of country, for it extended as far as the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. Acarnania and Aetolia are even in Thucydides included in Epirus. Epirus is "the continent," in opposition to islands; we find it so especially in the Odyssey and in the Homeric Catalogue, where it is mentioned in opposition to the Cephallenian empire of the islands. Afterwards the name assumed a different meaning. After the Trojan war, the Acarnanians spread over that coast; the Aetolians, by

the side of the Curetes, rose from a small to a very large people, and a number of Greek colonies established themselves on that coast. The Acarnanians were late settlers in those parts; in the *Iliad* they are not yet mentioned there. In the time of Thucydides, the name Epirots is vague and indefinite, Acarnanians, Aetolians, and even Locrians, being mentioned under this name, but especially Arcanians and Aetolians; but in the proper sense, the name Epirots even then, and afterwards generally, was the designation of the nations between the Acroceraunian mountains—the perpetual seat of storm and thunder—and the Ambracian gulf; these nations in the earlier times had no common appellation. But Epirots, as far as their origin is concerned, dwelt even in Aetolia, and a great many of the Aetolian tribes were Epirots; the Dolopians, and other mountain tribes of Pindus, did not differ from the Epirots. “In the north the Epirots extended even as far as Argyrocastro in Macedonia, and down the Illyrian Aornus.”

Theopompus justly called all those tribes Pelasgians; their country contained Dodona, the centre and sanctuary of the Pelasgians, and the seat of the Pelasgian oracle, just as in the East Samothrace was the chief seat of the Pelasgian worship. Eighteen tribes in Epirus, whose names I need not detail, are considered to have belonged to the Pelasgians. They extended even into Macedonia; and the genuine Macedonians, in the narrowest sense of the name, were probably a kindred race; but having subdued Thracian, Illyrian, and Greek tribes, they had become greatly altered, while the Epirots had remained pure and unchanged. One Marsyas, a Macedonian author, according to the Scholia on the *Odyssey*, called them Siceli, and that with justice. Voss was the first to direct attention to that passage, and I have made use of it.² The Siceli in the *Odyssey* are the Epirots; the Pelasgians in southern Italy, and to the north, even beyond the Tiber, are known under the name of Siculi, under which they also appear in the island of Sicily; but all belong to one and the same race.

The question to what race the Epirots belonged was formerly answered with the greatest confusion, and people felt no uneasiness about it. They were without hesitation declared to be Greeks, although the expression of the ancients is ambiguous. During the latter period, after the downfall of

² Comp. *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. ii. p. 224.

the royal house of Pyrrhus, *i. e.*, in the sixth century after the building of Rome, the Epirots had greatly assimilated themselves to the Greeks, whence, in the latter period of antiquity, they were regarded as Greeks; but this belief is erroneous. They had, it is true, more Greek civilisation than the Macedonians, but this was only accidental, "and Polybius calls them Greeks only because they had become hellenised; but hellenised Greeks must be well distinguished from real Greeks." On this subject see Cicero's speech for Flaccus. The Lydians, Mysians, and Carians, were all regarded as Greeks; but Cicero expressly states, that the Greeks despised them as complete barbarians. Those nations, however, had become so much hellenised, that the Romans did not hear them speak any other language but Greek: they wrote Greek, their ordinary language and everything else was Greek, and the Romans, therefore, naturally looked upon them as real Greeks. "Thucydides calls the Epirots barbarians, and both Scylax and Dicaearchus reckoned Amphilochia as the commencement of Greece. Strabo, too, is not ambiguous on this point; and the fact that Herodotus calls Dodona one of the most ancient Greek sanctuaries, points only to a community of religious worship." As Siculi and Pelasgians, the Epirots were not, indeed, foreign to the Greeks, but still more foreign than *e. g.* the Franks were to the Goths. It may have been difficult for Goths and Anglo-Saxons to understand each other, but it was still more difficult for the Pelasgians and Greeks. Thucydides (?) in speaking of some Aetolian tribes with Epirot names, says that they were barbarians, and that, too, ἀξυνετώτατοι, while the Mysians and others are called only ἀξύνετοι. In like manner, the Russians and Bohemians understand each other more easily than the Russians and Poles; and the Russians and Croats, again, understand each other better than Cossacks and Croats. But the fact that the Epirots are called the most unintelligible, shows that there must have been at least a possibility to understand them.

During the Peloponnesian war, all those Epirot tribes existed separately from one another. The Molottians and Thesprotians alone were united under one prince; but the Chaonians and the other tribes were independent, "forming no kind of confederation; still, however, one or other of them predominated. This isolation rendered it possible to establish

there such a large number of Greek colonies; and, moreover, the fact that colonies were established there, is a proof that the Epirots were not Greeks; for we surely cannot suppose that the Greeks founded colonies in their own country." We find among them the same institutions as in Greece, but in their historical development they always were a couple of centuries behind the Greeks. They still preserved the ancient and simple mode of life, they were *ἄπυργοι*, and had no towns surrounded by walls, but lived in open villages containing only an acropolis (fort), into which, in times of war, they carried their property, and their wives and children. But the Acarnanians, whose settlements belong to a later date, dwelt in towns. They were free, and when they had kings, they were the descendants of heroic families, whose ancestors were generally connected with Troy, as we find to have been the case with all the Pelasgian nations; some also traced their origin to the heroes of Greece. Their states were mostly very small, or if not small, at least very weak, and their princes had no authority. This accounts for the circumstance, that when in the Peloponnesian war all the Epirot tribes were called to arms against Cnemus and the Acarnanians, they were so exceedingly feeble and powerless.

At the same period we meet with the guardian of Tharyps, king of the Molottians. The form Molossians, by which we generally designate that people, is quite arbitrary; the double σ has come into use, because the double τ is considered to be Attic; and hence the form *Molossi* has been introduced; but the name by which the people called themselves, was no doubt *Μολοττοί*. Aristotle, who cannot be said to employ Attic forms, calls them *Μολοττοί*; and the Greek grammarian Aelius Dionysius (in Eustathius on Iliad. κ) informs us that the double τ was a Thessalian form. The royal family of the Molottians, the Aeacidae, traced their origin to Achilles, as the dynasty of the Macedonians traced theirs to Heracles. But there is no historical idea either in the one case or in the other, for Achilles was unknown to the Molottians under that name: they called him Aspetus, and traced their origin to Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles. The two names of the son of Achilles, Pyrrhus and Neoptolemus, shows an amalgamation of two entirely different stories. It cannot but make us smile, to hear that at Troy Pyrrhus assumed the name of Neoptolemus,

and afterwards again took that of Pyrrhus. The stories of Neoptolemus and Pyrrhus were quite different, and refer to different persons, but were afterwards transferred to one. In the Trojan story the son of Achilles never had any other name but Neoptolemus; Euripides was the first that here introduced confusion.

At the time of the Peloponnesian war, great changes were brought about among the Epirots by the above mentioned king Tharyps or Tharybas (Tharytas is a mere slip of a copyist). Tharyps is the Greek form, and Tharybas the Pelasgian. The Pelasgian nations formed the names of Greek towns ending in *as* from the oblique case, as in Italy, Taras, Tarantum; in Sicily, Acragas, Agrigentum; and Byzas, Byzantium; and we may assert in general, that wherever there occurs a double termination in a name (Greek and Italian), the simpler form is Greek, and the longer one Pelasgian or barbarous. Tharyps is of the highest importance in the history of those tribes. I am surprised that no one in the eighteenth century has made him the hero of some historico-political novel, such as were written by the Chevalier Ramsay and even by the great Haller (Uson). At the beginning of the war his father died, leaving him as a boy under age; and his guardian sent him to Athens where he was to receive a Greek education. The Athenians, availing themselves of this opportunity, concluded a treaty with the Epirots, which however produced no consequences. In the meantime, the administration of his principality was carried on by his guardian in a faithless manner. When the young barbarian had finished his education and returned to his own country, he introduced among the Molottians, Greek forms, Greek manners, and the language of Greece as far as he could, for his power, like that of all other Molottian kings, was very limited.

LECTURE XC.

I HAVE already remarked that all the Epirot tribes had institutions, the foundations of which were the same as those

of the Greeks. Thus we have mention of γένη among them. Their government was by no means despotic, but a monarchy limited by laws. Aristotle mentions the Molottians along with the Spartans, as an instance of a μοναρχία πάτριος; and he says that the power of their kings was as limited as that of the kings of Sparta. By law their power was extremely narrow; but personal influence could change anything, as was the case, *e.g.*, with the kings during the middle ages. In England, the power of the Norman kings over their barons was limited by law; but as conquerors they set themselves above the law and ruled as sovereigns, not only in an arbitrary, but even in a tyrannical manner. Such also was the case with the Spartan, Epirot, and Molottian kings. Passaro was their capital: there they swore mutually—the king to observe the law, and the people to obey. I do not know whether this was done once for all, or whether it was repeated every year; but I believe that the latter was customary, and that the oath was taken at the πανηγύρις.

These Molottian kings had as yet no towns, and even in the time of Pyrrhus we find the greatest simplicity in their manners and mode of living. The king's wealth consisted in his flocks, and their shepherds were nobles, as in the Homeric poems. Down to the time of Tharyps, there are no Epirot coins; they are not found till a later period, which is another evidence of the simplicity of their manners.

Tharyps, then, was the king who hellenised the Molottians; and this change was communicated also, more or less, to the other Epirot nations. "This is all we know of his reign." He left behind him two sons, Alcetas and Neoptolemus, which names show his anxiety to trace his family to Greek ancestors. The earlier names are altogether barbarous, but they now claimed to be descended from Achilles: changing their ancestral hero Aspetus, the father of Pyrrhus, into Achilles; and as they adopted the Greek legend of the marriage of Andromache with Pyrrhus, Trojan names also occur: Neoptolemus, Troas, the sister of Pyrrhus, and Deidamia. Hence we must infer that the poems about Troy were not unknown to those nations. Alcetas succeeded his father, but had scarcely anything beyond the title of king. The Greeks at least do not mention him as king, and Xenophon gives him the title ὑπαρχος. He submitted to Jason of Pherae, who if he had

lived longer, would have established in Thessaly the empire which Philip founded in Macedonia. Neoptolemus being the youngest, his family ought not to have succeeded to the throne; but it was his good fortune that his daughter Olympias was married to Philip, and Philip took this opportunity of conquering for Alexander, his brother-in-law, a small principality in Cassopia, and then overthrew the family of his cousin Alcetas, and raised Alexander to the throne of the Molottians. He even extended the Molottian territory; but reserved for himself Ambracia, the great Corinthian colony, which was more powerful than all the Epirot tribes together, and was the great stronghold of the country. Alexander of Epirus, his expedition to Italy, his death in the war against the Lucanians and Bruttians, etc., have already been mentioned. At his death he left a child under age: "Alexander had quarrelled even with the elder branch about the succession;" Cleopatra was now enabled to maintain herself with her child, and the crown came into the hands of Acacides, the legitimate heir of the line. All relations now changed. Olympias ought in reality to have supported her nephew and the widow of her brother, but her Clytaemnestra-like hatred of Cleopatra and her brother, induced her to form a friendship with the cousin, who had dethroned her own line: this was the misfortune of Acacides. Cleopatra went to Macedonia, taking her child with her, and Acacides ascended the throne. But in the course of time, when Cassander had made himself master of the Macedonian empire, the Macedonian prince transferred his implacable hatred of Olympias to Acacides. The latter experienced many changes of fortune: the Dolopians, dissatisfied with him, joined Cassander, and he was obliged to take to flight. Pyrrhus remained behind as a child of two years old, and some faithful servants carried him, with the most imminent danger, across the frontier into Illyricum, where the Taulantians, who had before been subdued by Philip, had risen again and formed an independent principality. Its ruler was Glaucias, "an enemy of Pyrrhus' father," and probably a son of Bardylis. In manners, language, faithlessness, and rudeness, the Illyrians were the genuine forefathers of the Arnauts, or Arbanites, a very brave but terrible people. Among those wild barbarians Pyrrhus found a place of safety: the heart of Glaucias was moved by the sight of the infant. There are men who

exercise a magic power over the hearts of others, and this is often visible even in children, who, however, often lose it in after life. In like manner, Pyrrhus had a peculiar charm, and a power over the hearts of all who came in contact with him. Throughout his life, he won every one's affection by the frankness of his mind, by his cordiality, and his noble soldier-like character. There never was a prince in whom the character of a soldier had so much of poetry in it. The barbarian Glaucias could not resist the charms of the boy: the woman to whom he had been intrusted, placed the child on the domestic altar, and his aspect moved the barbarian. There are certain relations which are sacred to the Albanese, when they are not venal: humanity is not to be expected from them, for they are inhumanly cruel, and their avarice leads them to sell everything; but in some instances they pledge their word and are faithful, as *e.g.*, when they conclude an agreement of hospitality and accompany a person: thus Lord Byron had for his guide an Albanese robber, who told him of his murders, etc.; but he was quite safe. However, these are rare cases. The character of the ancient Illyrians was quite the same. Cassander afterwards offered to Glaucias a sum of money, which, considering his circumstances, was immense, if he would give up Pyrrhus: but he refused to do so, for the child had won his heart. When Glaucias entered, the boy crawled up to him with a friendly smile, lifted himself up by his leg, and embraced his knee; and Glaucias received him as his own child. Pyrrhus then grew up among those half-savages, and it is a proof of his extraordinary strength and unconquerable nature, that his noble mind was not stifled among the barbarians. When he was a grown-up boy, his foster-father undertook to restore him to his country, and the Molottians were prevailed upon to receive him.

At that time, Neoptolemus was on the throne of the Molottians; he is mentioned only by Plutarch in his life of Pyrrhus. This biography is the most beautiful of all Plutarch's productions, though it is written with his ordinary carelessness; he does not, *e.g.*, say a word about the parentage of Neoptolemus, whose father and family are therefore unknown. But who can this Neoptolemus be? My belief is, that he can have been no other than the son of Alexander and Cleopatra, who, according to the custom of the Greeks, had been called by his

father after his grandfather. Who else could have had this Aeacid name? Neoptolemus was obliged to assume Pyrrhus as his colleague in the government. I may observe here, that when Pyrrhus lost his throne a second time, Neoptolemus was king during the interval: I am not quite sure whether Pyrrhus, on his first return, found Neoptolemus already in possession of the kingdom.¹ When Pyrrhus was obliged to quit his kingdom, he bore it with an easy mind, and departed cheerfully and merrily, for he was a man of a singularly cheerful disposition, always thinking, what cannot be done to day must be left for the morrow. The great theme of his life was activity, and war was always of the highest interest to him. He liked war as an art: to win a battle and to improve it, afforded him the enjoyment which an artist derives from the work of his genius; he was not cast down when war brought about changes of fortune by which he lost all the advantages he had gained, for he always hoped soon to recover what was lost. He was like a gambler who does not care whether he wins or loses money: I know of no general who carried on war to such an extent for his own gratification. This circumstance was followed by terrible consequences for his subjects, and had he not been a noble-minded and thoroughly humane prince, he would have been a fearful scourge. Others carried on war from avarice and a love of dominion, but he did so because he had a talent for it, and because an inward voice urged him on, just as the poet sings for the sake of his art, because his nature compels him. Too rapid a termination of a war was even disagreeable to him; just as a thorough hunter praises or blames a stag or a fox, according to the degree of trouble it has caused him. Thus it was his maxim never to follow up a victory to the last, that his chase might not be too speedily terminated.

When he had lost his kingdom, he in a merry mood, like one whose heart is set upon nothing, went to Demetrius, under whom he served in the battle of Ipsus. On that occasion he distinguished himself greatly, and at the point where he commanded, the enemy was completely defeated. If the aged Antigonius had been as successful as Demetrius and Pyrrhus, the battle would have been gained; but Antigonius was so thoroughly beaten, that even the victorious part of his troops

¹ Comp. below, p. 143.

dispersed. Pyrrhus now accompanied Demetrius, who was already married to his sister Deidamia. Demetrius had the happy idea of sending him as ambassador to Egypt, where the irresistible charm of his character at once gained the attachment of Ptolemy and Berenice, his wife, and where he brought about a reconciliation between Ptolemy and Demetrius. Berenice gave him Antigone, her daughter by her first husband, in marriage. He remained for some years at Alexandria, contrived to break up the connection between Ptolemy and Cassander, and prevailed on Ptolemy to allow him to return to Epirus, and to support him in an attempt to effect a landing there. He arrived in Epirus with some Egyptian troops and Egyptian money: the attempt succeeded, and being recognised as king by the Epirots, he entered into an arrangement with Neoptolemus, according to which they were to rule as colleagues (what I said before on this subject is uncertain). But Neoptolemus was a man of the very opposite character to that of Pyrrhus: he was *sournois*, reserved, harsh, heartless, haughty, and unable to live on good terms with Pyrrhus: it was a connection like that between Theodoric and Odoacer. I do not know whether the story is true, that Neoptolemus plotted against the life of Pyrrhus, and that the latter, in self-defence, caused him to be put to death. I should like to believe it, for there is no character more loveable in his circumstances than that of Pyrrhus. I am not here speaking of Demosthenes, a holy, virtuous, and sublime man, but of men who are under the influence of ambition, and are not kept so pure by their own conscience: among these latter Pyrrhus is pre-eminent, and in antiquity he is unequalled. But, unfortunately, that story is very uncertain: the dead are always in the wrong. If it is true, Pyrrhus only defended himself. I have, indeed, no doubt that Neoptolemus would have rid himself of Pyrrhus in some way or another; but the question is, whether it is an undoubted fact, that the danger was so pressing, that Pyrrhus was obliged without delay to sacrifice him; and this question cannot be decided.

Pyrrhus was readily received by the Molottians, who rejoiced to have him alone for their king. There now followed a new era for the nation. Egyptian treasures flowed into the country in abundance, and Pyrrhus employed them in building fortified towns in Epirus, as Archelaus had done in Macedonia,

and had thereby laid the foundation of its strength. Pyrrhus founded Berenice, and no doubt also Antigonea, near Argyrocastro. In this manner his state became strong, and that too very rapidly. But Ambracia was still in the hands of the Macedonians, and so were Arcarnania and Amphilochia; after Polysperchon's death, moreover, Parauaea and Stymphaea were united with Macedonia, which was divided into Macedonia proper and *Μακεδονία ἐπίκτητος*, as in Aetolia we find the distinction between Aetolia proper and *ἐπίκτητος*. The fact that Cassander died before being able to undertake anything against Pyrrhus was particularly favourable to the latter. There now began a war between Antipater and Alexander, the two sons of Cassander. Alexander applied both to Pyrrhus and Demetrius, who was again possessed of a scattered empire in Greece and the islands; and before Demetrius had time to arrive with his forces, Alexander threw himself into the arms of Pyrrhus, promising him as a reward all those possessions, Stymphaea, Parauaea, Acarnania, Ambracia, and Amphilochia, whereby Epirus became a compact state. Pyrrhus now went to his assistance; but in the meantime Alexander had already fallen into the hands of Demetrius, who appeared under the pretext of raising him to the throne, but slew the young man, and as Pyrrhus withdrew, made himself master of Macedonia. Pyrrhus, however, retained his advantages, transferred his residence to Ambracia, a wealthy and strongly fortified Greek city, which derived immense advantages from him. He drew together the Epirots and all the tribes dependent on them, into one nation united under his sceptre; he was its *κτίστης*, and all were now called by the common name *Ἀπειρώται*, and no longer Molottians, etc.; and soon afterwards he married a daughter of Agathocles, whereby he obtained possession of Coreyra. It is not stated anywhere that he ruled over Leucas, but this must necessarily have been the case.

Demetrius, who was a terrible neighbour, forgetting the old friendship, regarded the acquisitions of Pyrrhus as wrongs done to himself, and like Cassander before him, began to show hostility against Pyrrhus. A war broke out, in which Demetrius penetrated into Epirus; but Pyrrhus gained brilliant victories over his opponent's generals. This war was very beneficial to him. His amiable and frank behaviour towards the Macedonian prisoners, so gained for him the affections of all, when

they compared the haughtiness and Asiatic licentiousness of Demetrius with the simplicity of Pyrrhus, that they wished to have him for their king. It thus came to pass, in the course of the war, that when Pyrrhus entered Macedonia, and united with Lysimachus, they deserted Demetrius and proclaimed Pyrrhus their king. But now Lysimachus also entered Macedonia from another quarter, and Pyrrhus not being strong enough to dispute the possession of the whole empire with him, was obliged to enter into an arrangement, and divide the kingdom between himself and Lysimachus. The fickle Macedonians, as countrymen of the latter, adhered to him against Pyrrhus, whom they looked upon as a foreigner; and the relation subsisting between the power of Pyrrhus and that of Lysimachus, was nearly like that which existed between Frederick II. and the Austrian monarchy. Lysimachus was master of Mysia, Lydia, Caria, Phrygia, and a part of Pontus and Thrace, and vast riches were at his disposal. Our chronological statements, which are based upon the invaluable and excellent work of Porphyrius, in Eusebius, mention that Pyrrhus reigned altogether only seven months over Macedonia. But this is a mistake; and I am convinced,² that the division of the empire did not take place until Pyrrhus had been sole king of Macedonia for seven months; and that these seven months are to be understood as applying to that time only, during which he alone was king. The five years and six months of the reign of Lysimachus, on the other hand, must be calculated from the time when Lysimachus and Pyrrhus divided the empire. Pyrrhus now probably gave up the title of king of Macedonia, but retained possession of a portion of that country. He was probably obliged to content himself with the greater part of Thessaly, that is, of Thessaly not to the extent in which it was taken by the ancients; for Magnesia and Phthiotis were no doubt in the hands of Antigonus. This happened not long before the time when Pyrrhus went to Italy.

² A passage concerning Lysimachus, and the reasons for which the Macedonians deserted from Pyrrhus to Lysimachus, has been omitted here, and transferred to a more appropriate place in p. 129.—Ed.

LECTURE XCI.

BUT even in that portion of the Macedonian empire, Pyrrhus did not remain undisturbed. The division exasperated the Macedonians, and after a few years, Lysimachus availed himself of their feelings for taking possession of Upper Macedonia also. When Lysimachus fell, and the empire passed into the hands of Seleucus, and from him into those of Ptolemy Ceraunus, the dominion of Pyrrhus was already confined to the kingdom of Epirus, and no part of Macedonia was in his possession. But he was still master of all Epirus, from the Ceraunian mountains to some distance beyond Anactorium, including Ambracia, Acarnania, and Amphilochia, and also Corcyra, through Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles. "He ruled with unlimited power over the subject nations; his power over the Molottians was professedly limited, though in point of fact, almost unlimited." In these circumstances, matters seem to have remained for a very short period, when Tarentine ambassadors came across, and induced him to go to Italy, by the offer to recognise his supremacy, to conclude an alliance with him, and furnish him with subsidies (Olymp. 124, 4). He was then about thirty-six years old.

Trogus treated the history of this expedition in a very summary manner, only hinting at the causes of it; and we must in this place likewise confine ourselves to a mere outline. The same occurrences often have to be related in two different histories, and are looked upon from different points of view; and such also is the case here: but it belongs more to the history of Rome than to that of Macedonia, and for this reason I have spoken of it minutely in my late Lectures on Roman History.¹ "We possess an excellent account of this war in Plutarch's life of Pyrrhus; we might, however, wish that it were a little more historically accurate; but the *Excerpta Valesiana* fill up the gaps in a satisfactory manner."

The foundation of Tarentum has been already mentioned in these Lectures. "Its development was not rapid. It was in a rising condition when, in Olymp. 76, it failed in an

¹ Vol. i. p. 527, foll.

undertaking against the Messapians; and the loss it then sustained was so great, that it did not recover till after a long time and with great difficulty. It did not rise to any eminence till after the fall of the other cities: their misfortunes became the cause of its prosperity, for everybody, with the wrecks of his fortune, sought safety at Tarentum, just as the calamity of Germany during the thirty years' war contributed to raise the Netherlands. From that time, that is, about Olymp. 100, it rose again to great prosperity, and when the war with Rome broke out, it had reached a height which it had never attained previously to its defeat by the Messapians, while the other Italiot towns had mostly been taken by barbarians, or were only shadows of what they had been. Heraclæa was in a condition of dependence upon Tarentum. Whatever our accounts may say of the previous power and wealth of Tarentum, certain it is, that it never was so powerful as at that time. But its power consisted not so much in the ability and vigour of its citizens, as in mercenary troops, whom its wealth enabled it to engage. The cavalry may not have been bad." I have, on a former occasion, noticed its power and greatness, and expressed my opinion, that it does not deserve to be treated with the contempt with which it is generally spoken of. The Tarentines, it is true, no doubt shared the faults of all the Greeks of that period, and also had the general faults of the Doric race, which could much less bear the possession of wealth and plenty than the Ionians; the former had neither the elegance nor the spirit to use those dangerous gifts of fortune with becoming grace; but the Tarentines were nevertheless a great state. They were industrious, had many manufactures, were active in commerce and possessed of wealth, and they may perhaps be compared most fitly with the Florentines of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, who were likewise obliged to carry on their wars by means of mercenaries, because their own valour had forsaken them. The Florentines, down to the latter half of the fifteenth century, were by no means an Attic people, as is commonly believed. After the time of Petrarch, Florence was certainly not the seat of the muses, though the plastic arts were flourishing; they were slumbering from the time of Giotto to that of Michael Angelo, after they had been awakened towards the end of the thirteenth century; and the mass of the people

was prosaic, as was the case in our German towns one hundred or more years ago, and that, too, for good as well as for evil. In regard to the Florentines, you must read Sacchetti and Ser Giovanni. But the Florentines were not a maritime people like the Tarentines. The history of Tarentum is one of those interesting histories, which are almost entirely lost, and of which a few traces only exist, which, however, are for this very reason the more attractive, and must be collected with the greatest care.

The Tarentines formed relations with Rome at an early period, and were in a close and hearty alliance with the Samnites, with whom they kept a up connection of true friendship, whereas the Lucanians and Greeks were foreign to each other. The Samnites were influenced by Greek civilisation: the traces of this influence upon those nations are feeble, but we must suppose it to have been a hundred times greater than it is said to have been. The statement in Cicero's book *De Senectute*, that there existed an ancient Pythagorean dialogue, in which Herennius Pontius was one of the interlocutors, justifies this assumption. The friendship between the Tarentines and Samnites shows itself at the beginning of the second Samnite war, in the attempts of the former to mediate and to defend the Samnites, and in their supporting them with large subsidies against Rome. Otherwise the Samnites would, in fact, have been unable to hold out against the Romans in that war. The Tarentines, however, rarely took any prominent part in those affairs, and do not appear much in Roman history. We see them only from time to time, and no continuous narrative exists anywhere. "They always intrigued, and never acted with energy; and they evidently neglected many favourable opportunities in the Samnite war, which might otherwise have taken a different turn." According to my conviction, it is clear, that after the second Samnite war, a treaty was concluded between the Samnites and Romans (U. C. 450, Olymp. 118), in which the Romans bound themselves not to sail with a ship of war to the north of cape Lacinium. I have compared this treaty with the fact, that the republic of Venice, for the sake of its own safety, and that of the Italians generally, stipulated with the government of Turkey, that no Algerian should sail within the Ceraunian mountains in the Adriatic; "the peace of Cimon and the

treaty of Rome with Carthage contained similar stipulations, and even at the present day many Christian powers have bound the Algerians not to sail beyond the Straits of Gibraltar." That peace lasted for about twenty years. In the third Samnite war, the Tarentines took no part, and the Samnites, no doubt, carried it on alone. But the Tarentines were drawn into it, when during its progress the Romans extended their power so much, that even the Lucanians entered into a relation of dependence upon Rome. The consequence of this extension was, that there arose a very large coalition among the several nations, of which, according to Zonaras, Tarentum was the soul. With a species of modern policy, they had established a very wide-spread coalition. A part of the Etruscans was constantly in arms against Rome; the Tarentines had encouraged the defeated Samnites, the Lucanians and Bruttians, and united them against the Romans, and had stirred up the Etruscans and Umbrians; even the Senones and Boians were enticed by them with subsidies to take part in the coalition, and attack Rome. But this coalition had the fate of all such undertakings: it contained within itself the germs of dissolution. Some nations became indifferent, the Tarentines themselves did not come forward energetically during the war, and the hostilities did not commence simultaneously. Some of the nations began too early, and the Romans, by directing their great efforts against these first, at once destroyed a part of the coalition, before the others had even taken up arms. The Romans cannot be blamed for looking upon the Tarentines as their decided enemies, although they showed themselves nowhere, and the Tarentines felt an indescribable exasperation against Rome.

A Roman *duumvir navalis* (Olymp. 124, 3) acted in the same manner as, in the time of Napoleon, French generals often, by the command of their master, ventured upon a violation of neutrality merely for the purpose of seeing how it might be taken, and of turning it to some account, if it passed unnoticed: the usual consequence was some advantage. In like manner the Roman *duumvir*, in violation of the treaty, sailed with a Roman squadron, consisting of ships furnished by the dependent Greek cities of Elea, Neapolis, and others, round the Lavinian promontory, under the very plausible pretext, that Thurii, which had placed itself under the protection of

Rome, was besieged by the Lucanians, and required his assistance. It may be that he had already assisted the Thurians. This was a case in which Tarentum, if it had wished to keep up its friendship with Rome, could not possibly have made any objection; and if the duumvir had been satisfied with conveying his support to Thurii, the matter would probably have produced no further consequences, and no complaint would have been made about the violation of the treaty; but he was not satisfied with this. All our accounts are extremely brief; and in dealing with ancient history we must often imitate the example of naturalists, when they receive dried and shrivelled skins of animals, which have lost their form. The skilful practitioner knows how to restore their elasticity and their original form. In like manner we must treat ancient history: our imagination must supply many things, and we must ask ourselves, what is wanting here? Where, does a gap exist? and where are the proportions lost? We may be quite certain that the Roman squadron had been cruising for some time near those coasts, without the Romans having communicated with the Tarentines, and that this was the subject of daily conversation at Tarentum. As this passed without notice being taken, the duumvir, wanting to attempt more, went beyond the boundaries of prudence. Tarentum had a double harbour, a small inner one and an outer road, one behind the other, just as at Syracuse, and he had now sailed into the outer harbour, as if there had been nothing to prevent him. Unfortunately for the Tarentines, there happened to be a popular assembly in the theatre, which was turned towards the sea, as was the case with all Greek theatres, as I have already observed. The people saw the ships gradually sailing in, and this appeared to them as such an act of insolence, and such a wanton insult, that, in their Greek irritability, and without considering the consequences, the people, in their first irritation, formed a resolution to man their galleys and attack the Romans. Some of the Roman galleys were taken, others were sunk, and the Roman duumvir lost his life.

The Romans were at the time in so precarious a situation, that, no doubt, indignation at the senseless conduct of their admiral was the first and predominant feeling; but, at all events, it was necessary to demand reparation. It was impossible to get over the occurrence, but their wish was to

protract the affair, and, for the present, not to be involved in a war. An embassy accordingly was sent, though more as a matter of form than anything else. Although we can very well understand, and even excuse, the Tarentines for at first not controlling their indignation, yet their subsequent conduct towards the Roman ambassadors was senseless. The democracy at Tarentum had reached its extreme height: the Roman ambassadors were introduced into the theatre to address the people, and, at the entrance, they were insulted by vulgar people in the most indecent manner. As the Roman ambassador spoke bad Greek, he was laughed at by all the assembly at every mistake he made, and his indignant complaint of the miscreant who had insulted him was received in the same manner. This shows the boundless exasperation of the Tarentines against the Romans, for it cannot have been their ordinary conduct. The insult had to be wiped away in blood; but the situation of the Romans was so perilous, that they, nevertheless, hesitated, and the majority of the tribes was on the point of not declaring war. But their national feeling gained the upper hand, and it was resolved to risk all, and to venture upon extreme measures. Rome was not so unacquainted with the state of affairs, and the nations of Greece, as we commonly imagine; they assuredly knew the affairs of the Greeks most accurately; the people at Rome must have foreseen that the Tarentines would invite Pyrrhus, and this circumstance may have contributed to making them undecided.

The Romans on that, as on all former occasions, showed their greatness and their wisdom. They concluded peace with the Etruscan states, in which those who were still holding out obtained such advantages as would have induced them long before to lay down their arms. The peace which the Etruscans thus obtained was most beneficial to them: for nearly two hundred years they felt so happy under the majesty of the Roman dominion, that they were not tempted to revolt, either in the time of Hannibal, if we except a few isolated cases, or during the social war, when they obtained the franchise, and were faithful allies. Those two centuries were the period of wealth and prosperity of the Etruscans described by Posidonius. The fact, that this has not been understood, has displaced the historical certainty of the Etruscans ever

since the time of Winkelmann, and in everything that has been written about them after his time. They are generally considered to have been, about that time, in an humble state of subjection, and all their works of art and their buildings are most erroneously assigned to an earlier date; the truth being, that all the beautiful master-works of Etruscan art belong to this period, or were produced a very short time before it; it is only a very small part of the Etruscan remains that is more ancient than their dependence on Rome. The relation in which they stood was most agreeable to them, and it was precisely such a peaceful condition that they wished and required.

“At Tarentum too, the people were not in any hurry about the war, and a party of peace were for negotiating; since the Romans, notwithstanding their distance, were very dangerous to the Tarentines, for the Romans had been preparing for the war against them for several years, by the establishment of fortified places. One of these fortresses was Venusia. But the opinion that Pyrrhus should be invited, gained the upper hand, as in former times they had called in the assistance of the terrible Agathocles, of Cleonymus who was no better than the former, of Archidamus, and of Alexander of Epirus. The fact that this plan was adopted without hesitation, can be explained only by the general enthusiasm for Pyrrhus; for the Athenians too, after having experienced much base treachery, invited him, with his guard, to offer up sacrifices on the Acropolis.” Pyrrhus received pressing invitations from the Samnites, Lucanians, and Tarentines; and we may add without hesitation, that all those nations offered him the supreme command, as the Greek nations did to the Macedonian kings. Nor was there any lack of poetical and half-foolish thoughts and recollections of Neoptolemus, by whose hand old Priam had fallen, and whose descendant was now coming to destroy the descendants of the Trojans. Pyrrhus was a man of a poetical mind, and about two years and a half ago, quotations have come to light from Timaeus, from which it is evident, that the Greeks of that period entertained the idea, that the Romans were descended from Troy.

Pyrrhus obtained auxiliaries from Ptolemy Ceraunus. The number of troops with which he crossed over into Italy is not the same in all accounts, and is in itself a question of no

interest. He landed (Olymp. 124, 4) amid great difficulties, for he had too much hastened the expedition, and crossed too early in the year. Those parts of the sea are extremely dangerous, and the storms about the Ceraunian mountains are fearful. A heavy gale scattered his fleet, many ships were lost, and he himself, with his galleys, reached the Italian coast only with the most extraordinary efforts. We must imagine the ancient long vessels to have been constructed on the principle of modern steamboats, for what is done in the latter by machinery, was effected in the former by oars and human hands. The rising from penteconteres to triremes, and from triremes to quadriremes and quinqueremes, took place with a view to increase the propelling power. The ancient ships of war, like our steamboats, were long and narrow, it being then still the object to make them independent of the wind. Afterwards attempts were made to employ sailing vessels, of the kind which are still used in the Mediterranean, with one immense sail, which indeed require many hands, but infinitely fewer than rowing vessels. The latter had been carried to the highest pitch, and it being impossible to go any further, sailing vessels began to be employed. Sailing vessels were at all times used for the transport of merchandise; and their structure always remained the same down to the seventeenth century. The ancient ships were built exactly like the Spanish and Venetian galleons, such as we see them represented in all the drawings of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Besides them, there existed in the Mediterranean small ships calculated for quick sailing, which had their large sail, but were otherwise very awkward. Pyrrhus crossed by means of transports, which were propelled by oars; and the greater part of his men were employed in rowing.

Many of his ships were lost, as I have said, during the storm. He went to Tarentum, where Milo, whom he had sent before him, had already put himself in possession of the Acropolis. Until the arrival of Pyrrhus, everybody had been treated with respect and deference, but as soon as he reached Tarentum, he acted as master, and gave his orders to the Tarentines. The latter, on that occasion, showed a great want of wisdom; they desired the war, and were wealthy enough to pay for it, but they would not be inconvenienced by it, and would themselves have nothing to do with it. But Pyrrhus

did not view the matter in this light: he wanted to conduct the war, but they were to do their part also, and he expected that every one should, like himself, take an active interest in it. He accordingly forced them to take up arms and be enlisted in his phalanx.

“It is one of the points for which Pyrrhus is censured, that he treated the Tarentines with great contempt and contrary to the stipulations which had been made; but this is not true, as we see from the *Excerpta* published by Ursinus. He made them work hard, and was not concerned about their not liking it. We find the Tarentines acting in the same manner as the Romans did in the war of Belisarius against Vitiges in A.D. 535, when the Romans did nothing at all, and did not reinforce the small army of Belisarius, but irritated him in the extreme by their talk and by their criticising his proceedings.”

The Romans, unfortunately, had, at that time, chosen a bad general, as was often the case in their elections, except in cases when there had been a protracted war, in which a distinguished character continued to attract public notice: all the ancient republics suffer from bad elections. P. Laevinus, who was now their commander, was, according to the testimony of the historians, a highly unfortunate choice. He was, however, right in advancing rapidly, and endeavouring to draw Pyrrhus into an engagement before he was joined by the Samnites and Lucanians. These nations had been almost annihilated during the preceding campaign, and were so reduced as to be unable to refuse the Romans a passage through their country, or to unite with Pyrrhus before the Romans reached Heraclea. But Pyrrhus was not afraid of an encounter, and Laevinus had advanced so far as to be obliged to fight a battle. If he gained it, an immense deal was gained, but, if he lost it, all might be lost. It is inconceivable why the Romans did not send a stronger force. It belongs to Roman history, to relate how, after a seven-times repeated attack, and after an enormous struggle, the Romans were at length routed (Olymp. 125, 1); fifteen hundred men fell into the enemy's hands, and among them many equites and members of the first families of the republic. The elephants, no doubt, contributed much to decide the victory; but the Romans try too much to conceal their defeat, and they are unjust in refusing to admit, that the victory was owing to the genius of Pyrrhus and to his

excellent troops. Pyrrhus experienced the same thing which Frederick the Great experienced in the seven years' war; at that time Frederick still had a beautiful army, like the troops of Frederick II. in the battles of Lowositz and Prague, who were very different from those of the latter years, when the old soldiers had disappeared. Such is always the case when a small nation has to carry on a war for many years. Even as early as the year 1758, the Prussian troops were no longer what they had been in 1757; hence his success was not what it would have been, if he had had the same troops as at Prague, Rossbach, and Leuthen. Such also was the case with Pyrrhus: in his latter campaigns, his phalanx was nominally the same, but the mass of his soldiers was different; they were no longer the veterans with whom he had gained so many laurels.

After this victory, Rome was saved by his disinclination to bring so interesting a war, as that with Rome, to so speedy a termination as he might have done; if he had briskly pursued Laevinus to Venusia, he might have destroyed the whole of the Roman troops, and the other Roman army would have come too late. But, even as it was, the success of his victory was extremely great. The Samnites and Lucanians had time to recover their strength. Pyrrhus advanced through Samnium, and on the Latin road across the Liris, by Arpinum, Casinum, and Ferentinum, as far as Praeneste. Many places which bore the Roman yoke impatiently joined him, and Praeneste in particular opened its gates to him. He himself saw Rome from the acropolis of Praeneste, and his horsemen had advanced within a few miles of Rome; they must have gone as far as Tusculum. But the Romans were unshaken; and, while he was advancing, they wisely concluded peace with the Etruscans, and made every possible effort. Their excellent system of colonies now proved useful to them; not a single colony revolted—the colonies were, in their very existence, bound to Rome—and Laevinus, being thus enabled to restore the army in the rear of Pyrrhus, advanced through the half-ravaged Samnium towards Campania. The army which had been engaged in Etruria had, in the meantime, returned to Rome, and Pyrrhus could no longer entertain the thought of making an attack upon the city. Many faithful allies also, such as the Hernicans, and others, were in arms. Pyrrhus

had made a *pointe* against Rome, and, a fortnight earlier, he might, perhaps, have gained his end. In such undertakings, everything always depends upon the time; and when the time is miscalculated, everything is lost. Pyrrhus found himself surrounded, the winter was approaching, and he was under the necessity of commencing his retreat, in order to take up his winter quarters. And, as he retreated, the whole issue of the war was already virtually decided against him, merely because he had come about a fortnight too late. "He took up his winter quarters at Tarentum. In the second campaign, he evidently gained another victory, near Teanum, as we may infer from the loss of the Roman camp, and from the fact, that the Romans did not maintain the field of battle; but it was not a victory like that of Heraclea. He now sued for peace; but the Romans refused it, and insisted upon his quitting Italy. This circumstance induced him all the more readily to accept the proposals of the Siceliots, to cross over to their island" (Olymp. 125, 3).

LECTURE XCII.

As Pyrrhus, through his expedition to Sicily, came in contact with the Carthaginians, we shall here at once enter upon their history.

We are generally inclined to form erroneous notions of the Carthaginians, for we imagine them to have been a people with extensive dominions, but rude and barbarous. But the arts had reached a high degree of perfection among them, as we not only know from passages in which they are accidentally mentioned, but roads, constructed according to principles of art, are first met with among the Carthaginians, and the art with which the Romans made their high roads was, probably, derived from the Carthaginians. The accounts of the capture of their city also give evidence of immense splendour. They had numerous manufactures, and the art of painting on glass, in particular, was carried to very great perfection. Many pieces of ancient glass, which are found in the tombs in the

interior of Guinea, and which can have been carried thither only by commerce, may still give us some idea of that art: I have seen pieces of surpassing beauty. The Carthaginians derived their civilisation from the Tyrians; and that all the arts of brass-founding, and those of an ornamental character, were developed at Tyre as early as the time of Solomon, may be seen from the historical books of the Old Testament; and there can be no doubt, that these arts were still further developed by the Carthaginians.

Ancient authors also praise the political constitution of Carthage, as one that was most wisely calculated by its equipoise to allow freedom on the one hand, and on the other to check the destructive energy of rapid movements. The *ἄκρατος ἐλευθερία* may be compared with that portion of our atmospheric air, which when inhaled unmixed causes death. There are persons of sickly constitutions, who can live only by inhaling an atmosphere, which is in itself unhealthy; such is the case also with nations, and many states cannot maintain themselves otherwise than in an unhealthy atmosphere, that is, by a faulty constitution. The Carthaginians, in regard to the arts and the civilisation of social life, were, on the whole, not inferior to the Greeks and Romans; their weakness consisted in their not being a warlike nation, and in the fact that from the first all their attention was directed to the acquisition of wealth, and that consequently they were in a condition, which other free nations attained only after a long period of time. They were not without a literature. Besides the works of Mago on agriculture, Carthaginian libraries are mentioned at the taking of the city, which afterwards fell into the hands of the Numidian kings. Sallust quotes several statements from them: what he adduces from them respecting the origin of the Libyan nations, sounds to us indeed foolish and strange; but it is interesting to see, how from an Asiatic point of view the settlements in northern Africa were regarded. Their idea is, that the Tyrian Heracles, Melkarth, on his expeditions led nations into Libya, and when it is said, *e. g.*, that the Medes accompanied Heracles, we have only a speculation about the native name of the Berbers, from which Maxyes and Maxytani are derived; analogies of this also occur in Greece. As Sallust quotes Punic works about those settlements, so the work *περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων* in one passage mentions *Φοινικοῖ* or

Φοινικικοὶ (the former mode of spelling was adopted only to avoid the cacophony) βίβλιοι on historical subjects. The compilation περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων is for the most part an extract from the history of Timaeus; it is printed among the works of Aristotle; but the accounts contained in it go down to the end of the fifth century after the building of Rome, that is, till after the time of Agathocles. In that compilation, I say, the φοινικικαὶ ἱστορίαι are cited, and this is no mere fable.

There was accordingly a possibility of giving a correct account of the history of Carthage, and if we possessed the work of Trogus, I do not know, why we should not place confidence in him, and why we should not see our way clearly in the early times of Carthaginian history. In the extracts of Justin, Trogus is miserably mutilated, but they are nevertheless important. "As matters now stand, we cannot entertain the slightest hope of ever obtaining more light on the history of Carthage: how interesting would it be, to observe how an oriental people developed itself gradually to the height of democracy! I think with pleasure of the prospect, which I have before me, that in the course of thirty years we shall see a perfect light thrown upon the history of the East; but in regard to Carthage I cannot entertain such a hope."

In their accounts of the foundation of Carthage, the Punic historians followed the Phoenician traditions, especially the account given by Menander of Tyre. He probably wrote in Greek, like Berosus and Manetho, and he also bears a Greek name. Under the Macedonian kings many a one thought, *omnibus sunt vulgata*, and therefore applied himself to writing Greek. Whether the names of those men were adopted from the Greeks, or whether they themselves were Greeks, is a question concerning which nothing can be said. The latter is not improbable; though the former supposition is supported by the fact, that, *e. g.*, in Phoenician inscriptions we find the name *Jemish*, and underneath it the Greek *Heliodorus*. Such things occur in the inscriptions of Palmyra down to the third century. Menander, therefore, may have been an assumed Greek name, or he may have had a Phoenician name of the same meaning as the Greek Menander. Josephus, in his work against Apion, has some very valuable extracts from those Phoenician works. According to him, the foundation of

Carthage falls 143 years and a little more after Hiram, and thirty-seven years before the first Olympiad, according to the Greek fashion of reckoning. This statement respecting the foundation of Carthage is by no means arbitrary or artificially made out, but is as historically certain, as the date of the foundation of Boston or New York. Hiram, therefore, was king of Sidon 180 years before the first Olympiad, and you may accordingly regard the age of Solomon as chronologically established, as Hiram lived at the time when the temple of Solomon was built. The building of the temple, which is generally placed 1004 or 1005 B. C.; and Rehoboam together with the division of Israel and Judah, which are generally assigned to 975 B. C., accordingly belong to a much more recent date than is commonly supposed.

Carthage was by no means the first of the Punic settlements in those parts: Utica was more ancient, and the names Utica and Carthage stand in the same relation as Palaeopolis and Neapolis; for Athica and Carchada mean nothing else but Old-town and New-town; and Utica must at first have had another name. These places were Phœnician factories from the period of the greatness of the Phœnician state, our doubts about which can have arisen only from our ignorance. The Phœnicians were masters of the Mediterranean, but not so of the Black and Ionian seas; from Cadiz they carried on commerce with the Cassiterides, and there was a time when they commanded the Mediterranean as far as Cadiz. This period precedes that of the greatness of the Greeks, whose commerce began to rise just because that of the Phœnicians was sinking in consequence of the misfortunes which befell them; it was not till the time when the power of Phœnicia was undermined by Nebucadnezzar, that Greek commerce began to flourish. At that time the Phœnician colonies were torn away from their mother country; some rose to the rank of independent states, and others not possessing sufficient strength perished. The foundation of Carthage took place sixty-four, sixty-seven, or seventy-two years before the time to which the building of Rome is assigned, which is a merely imaginary date; but we may say with certainty, that Carthage was founded about 310 or 320 years before the beginning of the consulship.

“Owing to its excellent situation, and to the fortunate circumstance that great men arose in the city, Carthage rose far

above the other Tyrian colonies on that coast." The first event in which Carthage is distinctly seen taking a part, is the treaty of commerce and friendship with Rome in Polybius, which is of such extraordinary importance. There the Carthaginians appear as a powerful nation, stipulating for Sardinia, as if it were a subject province, for a part of Sicily, and for the coast of Africa where we see them as rulers. This much we learn from that treaty, and to proceed historically, I refer to it what Justin relates as the most ancient information. It is concerning one Malcus, who was probably called Malchus, in Hebrew, Machleel. Justin has a confused and mutilated account of this man, which, however, has unquestionably some historical foundation. He is said to have been unsuccessful in an expedition against Sardinia, and being on that account condemned by the Carthaginians, to have declared himself with his soldiers an enemy of his country, and to have crucified his son, Carthalo, when he came to him as mediator, because he had not joined him. After this he pressed Carthage very hard, and the Carthaginians are said to have been obliged to open their gates to him. This, no doubt, belongs to the period preceding the treaty with Rome, as we may infer from the fact, that Mago, who succeeded him at the head of affairs, was the father of the elder Hamilcar and of the elder Hannibal. The Carthaginians have an extremely small number of names, which is very inconvenient, as it is very difficult to distinguish them, and may give rise to great confusion. We can, at the utmost, enumerate fifteen names: Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, Hannibal, Himilco, Mago, Gisco, Bosra, etc. We should be in the same difficulty with the Roman praenomina, if there were not so many gentile and family names.

The period of Malchus and Carthalo belongs even with eastern nations to a mythical age, or at least to an age, of which we have only confused information. I believe that, if we had Timaeus, we might go back to the origin of Carthage, but that origin, itself is no doubt mythical, and the story about the ox's hide is unquestionably fabulous, Carthage was nothing else but a Tyrian factory, which at first was very small, and extended itself very gradually; but the Carthaginians disliked the notion of having once been a small place, and thus invented stories, just as the Romans manufactured fables about the origin of their city.

The elder Mago is the real founder of the Carthaginian power; he must have lived at the time of the elder Tarquin, when the Carthaginians subdued Sardinia and a part of Sicily. This dominion of the Carthaginians in Sicily, however, must not be confounded with the subsequent great Punic eparchy, which was not formed until the time of Dionysius. Their more ancient province was on the north coast of Sicily, beginning at Lilybaeum and Drepana, and was not very extensive; nor did their dominion in Africa at that time extend very far into the interior; on the contrary, the Libyan or Numidian (Amsich) kings were not only independent, but received tribute from Carthage, just as the Genoese had to pay tribute to the Mongoles for their settlements at Caffa and Tana. The Genoese were powerful rulers in those parts, but were wise enough to pay a tribute to the Khan. Carthage stood for a very long time in a similar relation to the Libyan princes, paying them a tribute until about the time of the 80th Olympiad. But this circumstance did not prevent their settlements on the coast of Africa from continuing to increase in number, nor their dominion from extending over the whole coast. The several ancient Tyrian colonies, such as Great Leptis, Little Leptis, Utica, Hippo, and Hadrimetum, joined Carthage;¹ and Carthage herself became the metropolis of many other settlements. The city became immensely wealthy, and as it gradually extended, a demos, as everywhere else, was formed by the side of the ancient population. I have spoken on this subject on another occasion, and directed attention to the great Selden, a man who is at present unjustly neglected, and who wrote at once like Scaliger and Casaubonus. He has written most admirably on the isotely, or the relation of the communities existing by the side of the Jewish nation, and from his works sound information may be derived on these points. He has not, indeed, arrived at the general point of view, but any one who has done so, will find in him everything. The demos at Carthage was formed in the same manner, in which during the period of the second temple a community of isoteleis and metoeci was formed by the side of the Jewish nation. That demos which then began to appear in history, was, of course, of a mixed nature, consisting for the most part of Punians from the ancient Punic settlements, who

¹ "All these points have been satisfactorily treated by Bochart."

had even there been mixed with native Libyans, of Phoenicians, and Libyans who assimilated themselves to the Punians.

The change of the Carthaginian constitution is extremely obscure, but the origin of the council of the Hundred and Four must, no doubt, be regarded as a consequence of the formation of the demos, and that council represented the demos as opposed to the ancient Punic γένη. The division into phylae, phratræ and γένη is found in the East as well as in Greece; but the phratræ are often wanting, as in the case of the second temple. In the Roman consuls the highest civil power remained united with the supreme command of the army; at Carthage, on the other hand, there was, independently of the kings, the power of the Suffetes or Shoffetim; the kingly power was limited to judicial functions; and the power of the military commander, though in point of rank inferior to that of the kings, was in reality much greater, and undefined. This was a great mistake, and one of the causes of the disease of the Carthaginian state. A Carthaginian general remained in office for years, while the Roman consuls were limited to one year, and he was thus enabled to accomplish great things; but he was not at the head of the state, and another unfortunate circumstance was, that he was constantly an object of distrust and jealousy. The cruelty of the Carthaginians towards their generals was not the result of barbarism, but of calculation, as in the case of the Venetians; the object being to accustom the army to look upon their commanders as under the controul of the sovereign, and to find it quite natural that a general should be put to death by his sovereign.

Intercourse with Greece, and a knowledge of the Greek language, existed at Carthage at a very early period. A law was once passed there forbidding the γράμματα Ἑλληνικά; but it did not remain long in force, but was soon done away with altogether. Hannibal received an entirely Greek education; he enjoyed in his camp the society of the most cultivated Greeks, and wrote Greek himself. The transactions between him and the Romans were, no doubt, carried on in Greek. There exist only coins to attest the cultivation of the arts at Carthage in later times. The Carthaginians themselves seem to have had only counters, and not to have possessed any regular coinage; but in the Punic colonies, coins were abundant and extremely beautiful. The exquisite horse's head at Naples,

which was regarded during the middle ages as a charm, and is now in the museum (it is nothing else but a head, and that not as a part of a whole), occurs on Carthaginian coins; and I consider it to be a Carthaginian work of art, which must have been brought from Sicily into Italy.

The most ancient event of historical certainty in the history of the Carthaginians, is their defeat in Sicily by Gelo, of which I have spoken in the history of Greece.² But the whole story of it is related as mythically, and is as distorted as that of the taking of Veii by Camillus; in the history of Greece of that period, too, the mythical character still predominates. Three hundred thousand Carthaginians are said to have been engaged in that expedition: the Greeks forced their way into the enemy's camp, and slew their commander at the sacrificial altar. All this is entirely mythical; but what forms the historical substratum, is the fact, that about Olymp. 76 and 77 (not Olymp. 75, which is a mere invention for the purpose of bringing these events together with the battle of Salamis), the Carthaginians undertook an expedition to subjugate Sicily, but that Gelo of Syracuse, and Thero of Agrigentum, defeated the invaders.

After this, the Carthaginians for about sixty years, that is, until Olymp. 93, never again thought of conquering Sicily. When the Athenians undertook their expedition against Syracuse, the Greek towns as far as Selinus, according to the account of Thucydides, were perfectly independent and tranquil. The Carthaginians were in possession of only three points on the western part of the north coast, viz., Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, and on the western coast they were masters of Lilybaeum and Drepanum, "which they still maintained from the earlier times, just as the eastern empire, as late as the time of the emperor Mauritius, possessed and obstinately defended some places in Spain." The Carthaginians were very phlegmatic; and unless they were provoked, sought no opportunity for interfering in the affairs of Sicily, and often even allowed opportunities to escape, of which they might have made good use. Their state was great, wealthy, prosperous, and constantly extending; with this they were satisfied, and no one provoked them. One account belonging to Olymp. 60, shows that they were already masters of the western seas,

² See vol. ii. p. 103.

where they, together with the Tyrrhenians, prevented a settlement of the Phocaeans at Alalia in Corsica. Afterwards they were involved in a maritime war against the Massilians, who were always a thorn in their side, just as they had previously looked with envy upon the Phocaeans and their commerce with Spain. The first planting of olive-trees seems to belong to that period of peace, about Olymp. 80. Before that time, the Phocaeans exported the products of Greece and others from the Black sea, as oil and the like, into Spain, whence they fetched in return, quantities of silver. After the destruction of Phocaea, that trade came into the hands of the Massilians; and it must have been about that time that the maritime war between the Massilians and Carthaginians took place. The cause is said to have been a dispute about fishing, which may mean two things. It was either the tunny fishing, which is of such great importance near the coast of Sardinia: the tunny fish was a principal article of food with the ancients, as in fact even at the present day, the pickled tunny fish is the ordinary food of the sailors in the Mediterranean from Provence to Constantinople: it is to them what salt meat is to our sailors. With the Greeks, who are very strict in fasting, the tunny fish is a common article of food; they live for the most part upon olives kept in brine, onions, salad and bread; and when they want to give themselves a treat, they take pickled tunny. Tunny fisheries, therefore, were an object of great importance in antiquity. That fish goes into the Euxine as far as Sinope, occurs in the vicinity of Constantinople, on the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia, and on the coast of Spain, in the neighbourhood of Carthagera. Or, secondly, the dispute may have been about the coral fisheries. The inhabitants of Provence have carried on coral fishing about Bona, Calla, etc., from the remotest times and throughout the middle ages; and even at the time when the Arabs were masters of the coast, the Provençales still continued to sail across. They no doubt did the same in the time of the Romans, and even at an earlier period. At that time corals were as much valued in the south as they are now; and it is possible that the great maritime war may have arisen out of a quarrel about these coral fisheries. The Carthaginians and Greeks were always bitter enemies, and hence also the enmity between the former and the Massilians.

“The consequence of the Athenian expedition was, that the

Carthaginians again turned their minds to Sicily. Their power had, in the meantime, become very much consolidated, and when the Elymians invited them to come over into the island, they were quite ready to comply with the request."

LECTURE XCIII.

THE history of the magnificent island of Sicily is like the history of many a man, whose powers, after a short period of happiness, are crushed by repeated strokes of misfortune. It is, as if the cruelty committed by the Syracusans upon the Athenian captives had brought down a curse upon Syracuse and the whole island. The small kingdom of Syracuse still had a short period which may be regarded as one of comparative prosperity. Even at the time of the first Punic war, when the Syracusans were in the enjoyment of peace, their small country suffered severely, because it had to exhaust its strength. The period from Olymp. 92, till about Olymp. 130, that is, one century and a half, was a constant alternation of tyrants and revolutions, with very short intervals. During those intervals the island seems to have recovered from her previous sufferings; but in some respects this is only apparent, and in others it proves the incredible vital energy of those southern countries. With us all things go on slowly and with great labour, while in the south things are done, as it were, of themselves. If we compare Bengal, such as it is now under the dominion of Britain, with what it was formerly, we shall find that it has greatly recovered; it is an unfounded accusation to say that India has deteriorated under the dominion of the English, which is just and benevolent. When Shikh Daher Omar restored Acri from a heap of ruins, he built a wall round it, established a small population in it, and as he afforded it protection, and ruled over it with justice and benevolence, it became in the course of twenty years a handsome town of 20,000 inhabitants.

That period of tyrants was followed by the first Punic war, which left behind it a degree of devastation, of which we can

scarcely form any idea; then there came the second Punic war, and the insurrection of the island, and at last, when Sicily had already become desolate, and formed to a large extent only pastures for herds of cattle, the servile war broke out. In the time of Cicero the island was a wilderness even when compared with its present condition. The war of Sextus Pompeius was another scourge. Under the Roman emperors, the island did not recover at all, but continued to be a desolate country in which the vital power was extinct. Next came its conquest by the Arabs, which was followed by that of the Normans, and thus things went on to the present day. The island has now indeed double the population of that which it had in the reign of Charles V., but the misery and decay are very great, as though nature herself had become effete. Such southern countries can endure incredible things; we know what Gelo did, and how he transplanted entire populations, yet we find that hard as these things were, the country still got over them; the Attic war too does not appear to have injured it. "Nay, after that war, the Siceliot towns enjoyed a degree of prosperity such as they had never enjoyed before: all the mighty ruins, such as those of Agrigentum and Selinus, belong to that period, and there is not one that can be assigned, *e.g.*, to the time of the last Hiero." But, as I said before, it is as if the cruelty of the Syracusans against Athenian captives had brought a curse upon the island, the effects of which are still lasting. The expedition of the Athenians was not a just war; but still it is unfortunate for the whole history of the world, that they were unsuccessful. It was directed against a thoroughly rotten state, which could not govern itself, and the subjugation of which, by the addition of the resources of the country, would have secured the freedom of Greece. The Carthaginians would then have been unable to effect anything against Sicily.

"The misfortune of the island was the direct consequence of the Athenian expedition; for as the Syracusans wanted to take revenge upon the towns which had supported the Athenians, those towns sought the assistance of Carthage." It was not only the Greeks and Sicilians that were opposed to one another through distrust and a natural antipathy,—the Sicilians were at that time already hellenised in an incredible degree; their princes had Greek names, as Acimnestu,

Archonides, etc., and their institutions like those of the Italians, were analogous to those of the Greeks, but they, nevertheless, viewed the Greeks with distrust. The Sicani were not of so much importance, but the Greeks were divided among themselves: the Dorians and Chalcidians viewed each other with unreasonable hatred. During the Attic expedition they had been divided; and after the termination of that war, they were even more divided and exasperated than ever. The Athenians had been called into the island by the Elymians of Segesta, a Trojan people, because they were at war with Selinus, the most western city of Sicily, on account of a disputed tract of land. When the Athenian expedition had ended so deplorably, the Segestans endeavoured to obtain peace for themselves. They were by no means barbarians, but unquestionably Tyrrhenians; the ruins of the temple of Segesta are among the most beautiful specimens of Greek architecture, and their coins also are very beautiful. The Selinuntians, however, were no longer satisfied with the disputed tract of land, but demanded larger concessions, and took possession of a part of the territory of Segesta. The Segestans now applied to Syracuse, but there found only exasperated enemies, on account of their having supported the Athenians; and being thus compelled to seek foreign assistance they applied to Carthage.

The Carthaginians were then in the condition which I have described before: their power was greatly increasing. That power was not gained by steadily advancing onwards, or by the feeling of an inward energy that they must advance, but was rather an accidental gain. When a war arose, they carried it on successfully, but were not intentionally a conquering people, and their citizens were unwarlike. The Carthaginians themselves, therefore, were not inclined to undertake this war, but the republic happened to be headed by a grandson of the Hamilcar, who had fallen in the battle of Himera against Gelo, and whose father, Gisco, had been exiled on account of Hamilcar's misfortune. This is one of the strange anomalies by which the Carthaginians differ from the Greeks. We here find the son of a *φύλας* at the head of the state. This Hannibal persuaded the Carthaginians to venture upon the war in Sicily. Their immense treasures were employed in raising a large army of mercenaries, and in equipping a great fleet. The Siceliots might have averted the

misfortune if they had understood the circumstances and sought peace, but they were perfectly infatuated.

There existed three authorities for the history of this war, two contemporary writers and a later one, who, however, derived his information from original sources or contemporary authorities. Philistus, who wrote this history at the conclusion of his work, was a contemporary of the events; he was not a good man, but possessed immense talent, and was an excellent administrator and distinguished general. "Those who have never taken part in the administration of a state, cannot write history. No great historian can arise from a secluded study—a good historian must have seen the world. Hence the Greeks had only three able historians, Thucydides, Philistus, and Polybius; Theopompus and Ephorus were rhetoricians." Philistus wrote a general history of Sicily, and a history of the reign of Dionysius, or of his own time. He lost his life in an expedition against Dio; and at the commencement of this war he must have been very young. Ephorus, who was younger than Philistus, and a stranger, gave a detailed account of this war in his general history. Upwards of eighty years after him, Timæus of Tauromenium wrote his history. Being a Siceliot, or a native of Sicily, he had great advantages over Ephorus; he had an antipathy against Philistus, but did not disdain to make use of his materials. According to the statements quoted from him and Ephorus, the latter does not seem to have rightly understood the exaggerations so common among southern nations, and to have been much inclined to adopt and trust in such exaggerated numbers. The numbers in Timæus are more moderate; but even these may possibly be too large, and he may have included the immense train among the regular armed force. If we possessed either of these authors, we should know much about which we are now in darkness. Diodorus has indeed preserved many things, and gives pretty detailed excerpts about that period, but it is done with his usual want of judgment and clumsiness.

Another historian, who treated of this period, is Athanas, a Sicilian; but he lived at a later time, and we are unable to form an estimate of the value of his work. Cicero calls Philistus a *pæne pusillus Thucydides*, so that he must have been a distinguished author. I have often asked myself in what dialect he, as a Dorian, composed his works? He, no

doubt, spoke Doric, but did he write in the Doric or in the Attic dialect? I am almost certain that he employed the latter. He wrote his history in exile, and at a time when Attic prose had become perfectly settled; and I cannot believe, that any one should have undertaken to write in the Doric dialect, although Pythagorean books were composed in it. His truthfulness is much disputed, but we are unable to judge whether there was any ground for this. In the history of literature he was at all events a truly important character, and he also has a name in history. He was a man of a very strange character; being a person of great wealth and of rank, he first came forward during the revolution. When the elder Dionysius, after the dreadful confusion and defeat by the Carthaginians, rose against the bad leaders, in order to prevent complete dissolution, Philistus employed his large fortune in supporting Dionysius, whose friend he then became. Afterwards Dionysius sent him into exile for reasons unknown to us, because the wretched Diodorus says nothing about it. He seems to have lived for a long time in Apulia, and among the Italian nations on the Adriatic, until he was recalled by the younger Dionysius. About the close of his life he appears as an antagonist of Dio, and fell in a battle against him. His biography would be extremely interesting.

After the victory over the Athenians, Syracuse had become an *ἄκρατος δημοκρατία*, and all checks were removed. The lawgiver who brought about this change, was Diocles, the same who had proposed the cruel sentence against the Athenian captives. He abolished everything which was in the way of extreme democracy, and committed the greatest absurdity in introducing the custom of appointing persons to public offices by lot. It is true, the case is not very different in popular elections, unless they are meant to be a mere form by which chance raises a person to power; if the object of the election is to raise the best men to offices, the electors are altogether the dupes of those who propose the candidates to them. In urgent cases good elections may be effected by the influence of public opinion; but generally such elections are extremely bad, and they are worse in proportion as the electors are more honest in their intentions. In countries where there are twofold elections, by corporations and by the community, the worse persons are generally elected by the latter. We might

say in bitter irony, that in an extreme democracy the lot is a correction; for it is at least possible that able persons may be appointed, who would otherwise never have come into power, and an honest man thus has a better chance than at an election. Still, however, there exist persons so wretchedly incompetent that they cannot be elected; but the lot is blind, and often gives power to a worthless miscreant, of which we have an example in Stephanus, in the spurious speech of Demosthenes against Neaera. Owing to the state in which Syracuse then was, everything was going to ruin. Diocles is one of those men who are ridiculously enumerated among the heroes history: the loss of Himera was his fault through his miserable management of affairs, and he must be regarded as the cause of all the losses which Syracuse sustained. The fact that Diodorus praises him as one of the first men, shows his total want of judgment.

By the side of this absolute *ἄκρατος δημοκρατία*, there existed that actual power which resists all forms: I mean the power of wealth, which was immense, and bore down everything. The wealthy Syracusans could do anything with impunity; they bribed judges and everybody else; the rich alone were appointed to the highest military posts, which were not given by lot, and to all the offices which were given at elections.

Syracuse had been saved by Hermocrates, to whom Thucydides does full justice, and who really showed himself as a man of character and firmness. That man to whom the Syracusans owed everlasting gratitude, was attacked with every kind of virulence by Diocles and his party, and by the coalition of the worthless rich, who were then headed by Daphnaeus, a person "doomed to everlasting infamy" as an *ἀλάστωρ* and as the destroyer of Sicily: it is his and Diocles' fault, that the fairest garden of the earth is to this day an accursed ground. Instead of gratitude, there arose against Hermocrates distrust and envy. It was contrived not only to remove him, by giving him the supreme command of the galleys which Syracuse sent to the assistance of Sparta; but soon afterwards means were devised to accuse him during his absence, to depose and condemn him. As Athens deprived herself of the great Alcibiades, so now Syracuse deprived herself of Hermocrates.

The people throughout Sicily went on without any plan and without thought, giving themselves up entirely to sensual

pleasures; and when the Carthaginian fleet appeared, no one had expected it, and no preparations had been made. The Carthaginians at first proposed to the Syracusans to remain neutral, but they declined listening to any such arrangement. They might have prevented the expedition of the Carthaginians against Selinus, by deciding the case between the Segestans and Selinuntians; but they resolved to support the Selinuntians, if they should be attacked, but otherwise to keep up friendly relations with Carthage. The party wishing for war succeeded in carrying its plan. Hannibal, after having landed near Segesta, attacked Selinus. No auxiliary troops from Syracuse had yet arrived there, and the town was blockaded: it was an immense place, as we can see from its ruins; but what could it do against the overwhelming forces of Carthage? Trusting to the indolence of the Carthaginians, the Selinuntians had neglected even to repair their walls. Hannibal carried besieging towers with him, and after a struggle of nine days the walls were overpowered: a small number of the inhabitants forced their way through the surrounding enemy, and the city was taken and given up to destruction. The Carthaginians displayed inhuman cruelty: the town was intentionally destroyed, and its inhabitants given over to the barbarians. Only imagine a city taken by Albanese or Turks! "It is indeed said, that the temples were destroyed by an earthquake; but the ruins show, that the solid columns were undermined and then thrown down by means of battering rams."

From Selinus Hannibal advanced towards Himera, on the north coast, where Syracusan auxiliaries, under Diocles, had already arrived. "After the complete destruction of Selinus, the Sicilian Greeks clearly seeing that the Carthaginians were carrying on a war of destruction, had at length begun to stir." The Himeraeans made a very valiant sally, but their garrison consisted of Dorians and Chalcidians, and although the existence of Syracuse depended upon their acting in concert, yet their national jealousy prevailed. The Himeraeans were Chalcidians, and had been on terms of friendship with the Athenians, although they had not sent them any succour; the difference between the Chalcidians and Dorians, moreover, was in reality very small, but the seed of enmity and bitterness sown by Satan was in them, and the exasperation was so great

that the Dorians quitted the city, leaving the Chalcidians without any support. The Himeracans were unsuccessful in their sally, and Diocles now found that the danger was too great; he accordingly embarked his troops and carried them, together with a part of the inhabitants of Himera, to Messina; the others were to remain behind until they could be fetched. But when the fleet on its return appeared in the roads, the Carthaginians had already scaled the walls and massacred the inhabitants, or led them into slavery.

The two foremost cities were thus taken. Under these circumstances, Hermocrates returned to his country, which refused to receive him; but he collected a band of bandits, and with them carried on the war against the Carthaginians in behalf of Syracuse; being the only able man, he effected more with his band than the regular armies. Some time now passed away, during which the Carthaginians, awkward and lazy as at all other times, did not prosecute the war. But then they rallied again, and appeared with a still larger army before Agrigentum. That city did not contain the fabulous population commonly assigned to it, but in point of circumference, it certainly was not inferior to Athens, and in wealth probably equalled it. It was rich in consequence of its agriculture; but it also had many manufactures, and the cultivation of olives was the principal source of its wealth. As the Carthaginians had not yet introduced the cultivation of the olive-tree into their country—which, unless I am greatly mistaken, they did in consequence of this war—the Agrigentines provided Carthage with oil. The accounts of the wealth of Agrigentum in Diodorus (from Timaeus) seem fabulous, but certainly are not so; there are indeed stories in them which I do not believe, but I have no doubt as to the splendour and wealth of the city. It was now nearly three years since the first landing of the Carthaginians and the destruction of Selinus, and if the Siceliots had not been blind, they ought to have done everything to prevent a second campaign. But nothing was done. The Agrigentines had not even supplied their city with provisions in case it should be besieged; though it is extremely easy to do so in Sicily, because the corn is there kept in what are called Silos, or large holes in the ground, where, in the dry soil, it can be kept for fifty years, as is still the custom there. At Syracuse no precautions had been taken either.

There the thoroughly worthless Daphnaeus had been elected strategus, who now went to the assistance of the Agrigentines with a Syracusan army. The Agrigentines, unfortunately, had appointed Dexippus, an exiled Spartan (perhaps because they remembered Gylippus), who lived at Gela and had great influence, commander along with their own strategi. The city could not prevent Hannibal from blockading it. You must not imagine this Hannibal to have been like the great son of Hamilcar: he was an ordinary barbarian general, a man who, with great masses, accomplished great things. The motley composition of the Carthaginian army was a source of great weakness: every nation served in it according to its own fashion, the Iberians, Libyans, etc., all having their own armour. They formed different armies drawn up together, and were mutinous when they did not receive their pay regularly. There was no kind of union among them; every nation had its own commander, and the Carthaginian generals were only commanders-in-chief. An able general like Agathocles or the excellent Timoleon, therefore, did not find it difficult to conquer the Carthaginian armies. Agrigentum, as I said before, was besieged; "it was extremely strong, being situated, like the Italian towns, upon a rock, which had been made precipitous by art, and the wall rose on the edge of the precipice: such a city could only be blockaded and forced to surrender by famine." One part of the Carthaginians was encamped before the city, and another was engaged against the Syracusans. The latter corps was defeated by the Syracusans without much difficulty; and if that victory had been followed up, and if, at that moment, the Syracusans had attacked the other army, and the besieged had simultaneously made a sally, the whole Carthaginian army would have been defeated and routed. But the general opinion is, that Daphnaeus was bribed; Dexippus was certainly bribed, and the Agrigentine generals, too, were not free from blame. Dexippus prevented the sally, and the defeat of the Carthaginians was not decisive; Daphnaeus was indeed able to join the Agrigentines, but an attempt which was now made to take the camp of the Carthaginians, failed. After this, the Carthaginians for a time were in great distress from want of provisions, and they were on the point of raising the siege, when they intercepted a large convoy of supplies which had been sent from

Syracuse to Agrigentum. The Carthaginians thus had abundance of provisions, while the city began to suffer from want. The Agrigentines now formed the determination to quit the city, and the population of that immense place, dreading the fate of Selinus, marched out. "It is inconceivable how they could, with their army and the whole population, pass by the Carthaginians and not defeat them." Hermocrates had in the mean time lost his life in an attempt to force his way to Syracuse.

LECTURE XCIV.

It was about that time that Dionysius first came forward at Syracuse. He was a son of one Hermocrates, who, however, must be distinguished from the great patriot of the same name; the two are the more easily confounded, because Dionysius afterwards married the forsaken daughter of the celebrated Hermocrates; but there was otherwise no relationship between them. As far as rank is concerned, Dionysius was an obscure person: he served as an unknown young man in the militia, and his position in the state was, according to Roman notions, that of a notary: *apparebat magistratibus, γραμματεὺς*. In ancient times the drawing up of decrees was left by those who had the management of affairs, to their servants; in many countries the system of bureaux is carried a great deal too far, but in antiquity, this branch of the administration was held in too low an estimation; and hence laws and treaties were generally drawn up with great carelessness. Now, although Dionysius lived in such humble circumstances, and moved in the lowest sphere of social life, yet he gained distinction by his intelligence and his personal qualities; and it cannot be denied that he was a remarkable man. When we read the philosophical writings of Cicero, and other works, we find him mentioned as an example of a suspicious tyrant, who afterwards received the punishment due to him; he was proverbial in antiquity as a tyrant, and in this light he has come down to us. If we compare him with others who, in antiquity, rose to a high station in an unlawful manner, as, for example, with

Agathocles, we shall find that in point of ability and power, he was inferior to them, and as a general he was not above mediocrity. "But he showed great talent in devising resources, and in reuniting his lost and scattered forces; he did everything which appeared to him useful, because he scrupled at nothing; but he was unable to make the right use of his resources, and it was only during the second war against Carthage, at the conquest of Motye, that he shewed himself a little better in this respect. If he had known how to make the right use of the forces of Syracuse, he would have produced very different effects." While, therefore, on the one hand he was not a great general, he strove, on the other, after literary fame, which he was unable to attain, and this circumstance made him ridiculous. In addition to this, it must be observed, that his personal character has nothing to make up for these defects, for there is nothing attractive and nothing noble in it. He was cruel from the beginning; afterwards he became indeed milder, but he never had a friend in all his life; and I do not know a single noble feature in his character. But still the condition of Syracuse was so sad, that we quite understand, why men like Philistus saw in him the only safety for Syracuse,¹ why his accusations were listened to, and why people intrusted themselves to him, and gave him the supreme command. When, however, he had obtained all this, circumstances did not become much better.

"Dionysius came forward against the generals with the greatest insolence, and accused them, without, perhaps, knowing himself anything of what he said; the people declared him to have forfeited all his rights and fined him. Philistus then

¹ "When a civil society has reached perfect freedom, reforms are impossible; the end of the republic is at hand, and the downward career cannot be checked. An able and clear-sighted citizen, in such circumstances, is in a fearful situation; such was the case with Cicero, who saw that the Roman republic could no longer exist, and that there was no possibility of saving it. The remedy that was afforded by Caesar's usurpation, had much that was against it; men foresaw its evil consequences, and the fear of a bad reputation with posterity was so great, that a man of a pure conscience could not take any part in it. At the time of the French revolution, men who saw that the Directory could not last, offered the supreme power to Bonaparte, and it is very possible, that history may not recognise them as good men. In like manner, Philistus saw that the republic could no longer be maintained, and therefore had no hesitation to apply the only remedy. He saw how the lawful leaders brought ruin upon the state, and therefore supported the usurpation of Dionysius."—1826.

came forward saying, that they might fine the young man as long as they pleased, for that he would defend him and pay for him. This changed the mind of the Syracusans." Dionysius first succeeded by cunning in inducing the Syracusans to elect him one of their strategi (Olymp. 93, 3), and then to give him alone the supreme command over the other strategi, and allow him to protect himself by a body guard. The consequence was that he soon threw off the mask, and openly declared himself tyrant. His object now was to subdue his native city. If this had been subordinate to the war against Carthage, it might be excused; but he was no longer concerned about delivering Sicily from the Carthaginians; he was perfectly indifferent towards the rest of the island; if he could but make himself master of Syracuse, and rule over it as a vassal prince of Carthage, he would have been quite satisfied. At Gela, where the Siceliots had concentrated their forces against the Carthaginians, he was already commander-in-chief. The fact of the battle being lost was owing partly to misfortune, and partly to his wretched mode of managing it; and we certainly have good reason for believing that he was glad at the issue of the contest. The battle was lost, and although it was not a real defeat, yet it was lost in such a manner, that there was no prospect of better success. Dionysius, as had been done at Agrigentum, led the inhabitants of Gela and Camarina to Leontini, and the whole of the western coast was left to the Carthaginians.

He was then already the declared *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*, and was openly called tyrant. The Syracusans now revolted against him, looking upon him as a manifest traitor. During this insurrection they committed extreme cruelties upon his family, and we cannot wonder that he took fearful vengeance when he became master of the city.

The Carthaginian generals followed immediately after him, and commenced the siege of Syracuse. We here meet with a great gap in Diodorus, which has not yet been observed by any of his editors, for in the manuscripts it is intentionally concealed. The copyist has missed out the whole account, how the Carthaginians besieged Syracuse, how the plague broke out in their camp, and how, in this distress, they concluded peace, being satisfied with the immense advantages conceded to them by Dionysius. They recognised him as ruler of Syracuse and he obtained a district of land around the city, under the

supremacy of Carthage; Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians; Gela and Camarina were to remain Greek, but were to break down their walls and pay tribute to Carthage; and Dionysius was to renounce all claims to the dominion over the island. If it had not been for the peculiar indolence of the Carthaginians, Syracuse, after such a peace, would have been unable to recover. But the Carthaginians disbanded the mercenary armies, which were a great burden to them, and allowed things to go on as they might, without any concern about Dionysius. Thus it happened that Dionysius, without their observing it, restored the power of Syracuse, and that in a short time they lost their dominion over Sicily.

Dionysius carried on four wars against Carthage: the first was the one I have just spoken of; the second was carried on by him on the offensive, and began about six years after the first. During that interval Syracuse recovered in a wonderful manner: commerce was flourishing, and a great many exiles from decayed towns probably settled at Syracuse. Notwithstanding the peace, Dionysius, relying on the indolence of the Carthaginians, undertook to re-conquer several places in Sicily, which he had given up in the peace; among them were even Gela and Camarina. "He now displayed real skill, and brought together a force such as might have been thought impossible." The immense preparations he now made are remarkable, because they form an epoch in ancient military history, and are at the same time connected with an epoch in intellectual culture. For centuries no mechanical invention had been made, and the old things had continued to be used without any change. The triremes were as they had been for the last three centuries, except that they were more frequent; some few quadriremes, however, are mentioned somewhat earlier. The art of besieging was still in the same condition as that represented on Egyptian monuments, which were one thousand years older. The whole tendency of the Greek mind had before been poetical and intellectual; but it now changed, and became industrial and mechanical. Engines of every description were invented, especially besieging engines for throwing missiles, and catapulta, of which before this time we find only the feeble beginnings. These catapulta, invented at Syracuse, produced enormous effects, and may really be called

artillery. Dionysius, despising the ancient art of ship-building, constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes, instead of triremes: this change was as great as if at present steam-boats of eighty horse power were introduced instead of others of forty or fifty horse power. Hence the triremes disappear in those parts where quadriremes and quinqueremes were built; in the Greek seas, however, they still continued to be used until the time of Alexander. The Carthaginians soon followed the example of Dionysius, and remodelled their fleet.

Dionysius undertook the war as a very popular enterprise. His government had become milder, and he no longer was the detested tyrant. With due exertion he assembled a large army, which he led against Motye, the ancient seat of the Carthaginian dominion, and conquered it. The beginning was brilliant, and the subject towns cast off their yoke; but the end did not correspond with the beginning. The Carthaginian fleet now appeared, and Himilco and Mago carried on the war with great skill. They succeeded in defeating the fleet of Dionysius, and then sailed along the northern coast to Messina, for the purpose of cutting off the connection with Italy, and conquered that town, which was fearfully ravaged. As a hundred and twenty years ago Persia was ravaged under the Afghans, which under the Sophis had been so flourishing, and at present, perhaps, has not one-eighth of the population which it had at the time of Chardin, such, also, was the devastation of Sicily. The Carthaginians, after having overpowered Messina, and afterwards Catana, laid siege to Syracuse. The situation of that city was now for the third time its safety; the pestilential exhalations of the marsh Syraco may have done most. The plague which then broke out in the camp of the Carthaginians, seems to me, from all the symptoms, to have been measles. They appear there, and then vanish; and it is remarkable that afterwards, too, they do not occur again. In like manner, we find in Dionysius the description of a Roman malady, which has all the appearance of small-pox. It was a fearful pestilence, and the infection was so great, that nearly the whole army was lost. At the same time the Syracusans made a successful sally, and the entire Carthaginian army might have been destroyed, had not Dionysius thought it advantageous, for strengthening his own power, to grant to Himilco with his army, for a sum of money, a free

departure. The mercenaries were taken into pay by the Syracusans. After a few years a peace was concluded, which was not, as might be inferred from the expression of Diodorus, a renewal of the previous one; but the old restrictions in regard to Gela and Camarina must have been done away with, and Dionysius was evidently recognised as sovereign of that part of the island, over which he ruled.

In a third war, fortune was at first very favorable to him; but there, too, he showed himself as a very inferior general. The Carthaginians were far superior to him in the management of the war, and Dionysius came into great straits, in which he had to pay one thousand talents as a war contribution. Still the Halycus became the boundary, so that by this peace Agrigentum came under his dominion. "That city was now rebuilt; but it was no longer the ancient Agrigentum, any more than Magdeburg was the same city after the thirty years' war."

A fourth war, during his latter years, is still more obscure; it was probably not followed by any important consequences; and after some devastations, seems only to have brought about a renewal of the previous peace on the same terms.

In the intervals between these wars, he became involved in hostilities with the Italiots, by his attempts to extend his dominion over southern Italy, or, at least, over the Greek cities in that part of the peninsula. The intrigues against the Italiots were occasioned by the connections which the Rhegines and the Chalcidian towns of Italy maintained with Messana and other Chalcidian towns of Sicily. He demanded of the Rhegines and Locrians a citizen's daughter for his wife; the Rhegines rejected him, giving him an answer which, considering the circumstances, was senseless, and by which, without any necessity, they made the powerful prince their implacable enemy. The Locrians, on the other hand, gladly accepted the connection with him. Afterwards, in the time of the younger Dionysius, this compliance brought misfortunes upon them, but in a manner which no one could have foreseen.

Trogus here took occasion to go back to the origin of the Greek towns in Italy, but in a very uncritical manner he confounded the Tyrrhenian and Pelasgian settlements with the Hellenic ones. I shall not be able to go so fully into the detail as Trogus did.

The greatest and most ancient settlements on that coast,

Metapontum, Sybaris, and Croton, were Achæan colonies. The establishment of Locri was, indeed, more ancient; but it belongs to an entirely mythical period, and it may therefore be doubted, whether we must not consider it as a national identity rather than as a colony.² "Rhegium was the only Chalcidian settlement on that coast; Tarentum, which was the metropolis of Callipolis, was Doric; Heraclea was not pure Doric."

We shall dwell more particularly upon Croton and Sybaris, as the most powerful among those cities. Both were Achæan. It is inconceivable that they should have been colonies of the twelve Achæan towns in Peloponnesus; it must have a different meaning, and we have here a reference to the ancient Achæan times: when the Dorians subdued Peloponnesus, a great number of Achæans must have crossed over into Italy. "They seem at first to have gone to Zacynthus, and thence to have proceeded further; for Zacynthus was Achæan, and as an intermediate point between Greece and Italy it seems to have had an importance of which our history knows nothing.

Those settlements obtained a degree of prosperity which appears to us almost inconceivable, and it seems that for a time their power obscured that of Hellas itself. They found the Oenotrians in possession of those districts, but gradually confined them to a smaller territory, and admitted many into their cities, which thus became immensely populous." The dominion of Sybaris must have extended over all Lucania, for it

² "Cuma in Campania is not likely to have been the oldest settlement, because it was the most distant. It seems that Cuma lost its era during its conquest by the Oscans; and as the chronology of those cities was fixed only by their eras, which were not reduced to Olympiads until a late period, it became quite obscured whenever a city lost its Greek character; the calculation was then made backwards, according to the genealogies of the *oecistæ*. In this manner, the foundation of Cuma was calculated to have taken place in *n.c.* 1000. Locri is said to have been founded by a colony of Locrian slaves; but they must have been Locrian clients, and not domestic slaves. Here too we often hear of the common cause of emigration—the feuds between the burgesses and the subjects of cities respecting the *connubium*. This was the origin of Tarentum, about the foundation of which the ancients relate the stupid story of Phalanthus, which is generally believed. The truth is, that, at Sparta, the distinction between the citizens and subjects became more and more rigorous, as at Venice the rights of the *nobili* became more and more distinctly marked; and this was the origin of the Parthenii. The Spartan women, who, during the first Messenian war, had married perioeci and Messenians, were regarded as unmarried, and their children as illegitimate; the latter, who had no more rights than illegitimate children, were for this reason called Parthenii."—1826.

had colonies on the opposite coast, whose inhabitants had certainly not come there across the sea, and with which it was unquestionably connected through the intermediate country. Croton was equally powerful in the south, the country afterwards called Bruttium: "it was the direct mother-city of Metapontum. Croton was twelve miles in circumference, being as large as modern Rome; this statement cannot be regarded as fabulous, though all its inhabitants were not Greeks; there must have been among them many hellenised Italians. Their country was the most fertile in the world: the celebrated Siris surpassed in fertility even Campania, without having the extent of Campania. It is the most beautiful hilly country on earth, and quite equal to Ionia. It was through agriculture that those cities became so great, the Greek states requiring to be supplied with foreign grain, and they were supplied by them during the period before commerce was carried on with the coasts of the Euxine, which afterwards furnished them with corn. The wealth of those cities belongs to the tranquil and happy times of Greece, which are anterior to our history. The first which acquired extraordinary wealth was Sybaris, and it may be quite true that it became luxurious through its wealth; but the numerous tales about the effeminacy of the Sybarites are false, and originated in later times. Theopompus and Timaeus, from whom Athenaeus compiled his collection of ridiculous stories, related incredible absurdities.³

In all these towns, the government was exercised by the gentes over the demos, which had been formed of the numerous Greeks and Italians who had been admitted into the community; and there as in the states of ancient Greece feuds soon broke out between the burgesses and the commonalty. In Sybaris these feuds led to tyrannies, after which it became a democracy, which form of government then remained until its destruction." An internecine war arose between Sybaris and Croton, which ended in the downfall of the former; "this happened about the time of the expulsion of the kings at Rome (Olymp. 67, 3). This is attested by the coins of Sybaris, the coinage of which evidently belongs to a very remote

³ "The story of the carpet of Alcidas shows, that, at that time, not only embroidery was known, but also the difficult art of weaving figures like paintings into the carpets."—1825.

period, for the inscriptions are made from right to left: they are more ancient than any Greek coins extant.⁴ All the details of this war between the two powerful cities—its cause, its progress, and the numbers of the armies—are mythical; and this only is certain, that Sybaris was taken by the Crotoniats and razed to the ground. Croton then became the ruling city.” The Crotoniats, however, do not appear on that occasion to have obtained possession of the whole of the Sybarite territory, and that victory of Croton was a death-blow to all the Greeks in southern Italy; for there now was no power able to resist the Sabellians who were advancing from the north. For a long time, however, Posidonia and Elea still remained free and independent, though limited in the extent of their power.

The history of Croton is very obscure. It is remarkable in ancient history on account of the extremely mysterious affairs of the Pythagoreans. Little can be said of them with historical certainty, for our authorities belong to too late a period, and are uncritical, being derived for the most part from works which were thoroughly apocryphal and interpolated: the Pythagorean books were a peculiar species of imposition. No man can say who Pythagoras was, at what time he lived, or whence he came. All the statements respecting him are extremely contradictory: sometimes he is described as a son of Mnesarchus of Samos; sometimes he is identified with L. Tarquinius, the son of Demaratus, and sometimes he appears as a Tyrrhenian of Lemnos or Samothrace, so that his wisdom would be of Pelasgian origin. The orientals also knew him; he is mentioned even in Assyrian history, where he appears as a Greek. In short, he is quite as vague a personage as Buddha in the East, and perhaps somebody may some day prove to us that he was the same as Buddha. But to speak seriously, Pythagoras is a mere name which vanishes before every historical inquiry. The fact that in the Roman legends he appears as the instructor of Numa, only indicates the connection subsisting between the Sabellians and Greeks, which from early times was of a friendly nature: “the manifest connection between the Pythagorean sayings and doctrines,

⁴ “The fact, that we have no ancient coins of Athens, probably arises from the circumstance, that Solon reduced the coinage, and that the old coins were melted down.”—1826.

and the pontifical law of the Romans, is remarkable." But whoever Pythagoras may have been, the existence of Pythagoreans and of a Pythagorean school is historically certain. These Pythagoreans may have existed under this name, especially at Croton, and from their existence, a definite Pythagoras may have been invented for Croton and assigned to a definite period. The Pythagoreans evidently were somehow or other connected with the ancient γένη (as we must infer from Iamblichus, who probably derived his information from Aristoxenus), and their sect is identical with the body of the burgesses. Those cities had the same constitution which I have shown to have existed at Rome and in other places: the ancient colonists formed the aristocracy or the γένη, around which an innumerable demos had gathered, which was governed by them, but soon vindicated its independence. "The burning of the Pythagorean houses of meeting would be an act of unaccountable fanaticism, if some political exasperation were not at the bottom of it; and we find, in fact, in Iamblichus traces of a feud between the aristocracy and democracy. The burning of those houses was the burning of the curiae of the senate." It is said that the number of the Pythagoreans was 300 at the time when the insurrection against them broke out: it is obvious that the senate of Croton consisted of 300 members, and that there were 300 gentes. The cause of this insurrection was the circumstance that after the taking of Sybaris the γένη wanted to keep the conquered country for themselves, just as was the case at Rome, while the demos demanded that it should be divided. This cannot be an invention of ancient authors.

It is an undeniable fact, that those cities were torn to pieces by civil commotions, and by unbridled party spirit. It was a real misfortune for them, strange as it may sound, that no tyrant rose up, for example at Croton, to maintain order.

"The battle on the Sagra must be conceived to have taken place after the fall of Sybaris, but before the destruction of the Pythagorean meeting-houses. Croton had wished to subdue the other towns also;" but its plans were frustrated by the small but desperate forces of the Locrians in the battle on the Sagra. Justin rightly places it after the capture of Sybaris. "The ancients say nothing about the time of the battle, and modern writers generally place it before the conquest of

Sybaris; but the succession of the events in Trogus is correct. It falls between Olymp. 67, 3, and Olymp. 75. Trogus assigns the burning of the Pythagorean houses to too early a date. The battle cannot have been fought after Olymp. 75, for if so, it would be mentioned in Diodorus, whose eleventh book begins with Olymp. 75.

In consequence of this battle Locri rose in importance; the power of Croton was broken, and it was unable to maintain its sovereignty over the Sybarite territory. In actual history Croton appears as a small state;" but it was flourishing even in after-times. Thurii, a colony of all Greece, under the management of Athens, rose upon the ruins of Sybaris; "it was not indeed as great as Sybaris, but still great and prosperous. It was a foreign element in Magna Græcia, whence much intellectual culture, which had before been of little influence, emanated in various directions. At the beginning of our history Rhegium appears particularly powerful," Metapontum immensely wealthy, in consequence of its rich harvests, and Heraclea also is very flourishing; "it was not till after the fall of the other cities that Tarentum rose." The Lacinian temple, in the territory of Croton, like the Latin temple on the Alban mount, was the common sanctuary and the rallying point of the Pelasgian tribes south of the Oenotrians. Lacini is the same as Latini, being only a dialectical variety of the same name. The worship in the temple of Juno Lacinia was the same as that at Lavinium and on the Alban mount. Those places continued their hostilities among themselves.

After Olymp. 80, the prosperity of those districts was destroyed by the invasion of the Lucanians, a people descended from the Samnites, which during the general migration of the Sabine tribes, first turned towards Posidonia and the western coast, and then established itself there. The Greeks on that coast were oppressive rulers, who had reduced the ancient Pelasgian inhabitants to a state of helotism and servitude. The Sabellians were milder masters, as we see in Samnium, where the Oscans united with the Sabellians into one nation, and where the Oscan language prevailed. The Greeks still had completely the upper hand at the time when Thurii was founded, but the Lucanians soon established themselves in the mountains, and constantly advanced as conquerors. About Olymp. 90, Thurii carried on a serious war with the Lucanians.

The Greek towns sank one after another, several were conquered, and the population of those who still maintained themselves became more and more reduced.

Such was the condition of southern Italy at the time when Dionysius turned his arms in that direction, and first of all against Rhegium. The Locrians were allied with him, and they had in him a gracious ruler; but upon Rhegium he made war with inexorable fury and faithlessness. He first disarmed them by a peace, and in the next year attacked them again. After a siege of from nine to ten months, the city was compelled by famine to surrender (Olymp. 98, 2). Its brave commander, Phyton, was by his command put to an ignominious death. After this account, owing to Diodorus' inability and folly, everything is full of gaps, and after that victory we have nothing but fragments. Diodorus is so incapable of making even extracts, that he always delights in rambling excursions, if then he feels weary, he abruptly relinquishes his subject, and passes over some events altogether, in order that his books may not extend beyond the limits he has fixed for them. One important part of the history of Dionysius is thus very scantily known to us. His settlements on the Adriatic are as little known to us as his relation to Sparta.



LECTURE XCV.

THE plan of our historian now leads us to quite different regions. In relating the attempts made by Dionysius to establish himself on the Adriatic, he enters into the *origines* of the Veneti, and the settlement of the Galatians in Italy. We have little certain information about the attempts of Dionysius to establish fortresses on the Adriatic. This much, however, we can say with certainty, that in Lissa and Paros, he either was the first to establish Greek colonies—in the island of Lissa with a splendid harbour, and in Paros with fortified places—or if they existed before his time, he fortified them. He is further reported to have founded the colony of Hadria; this

must have been the Hadria in the Venetian territory, in the neighbourhood of Rovigo, and not in the Praetutian territory; for it is the former that leads Trogus to speak of the origines of the Veneti. The foundation of Ancona, which preserved its Greek character so remarkably long, belongs to the same epoch; Marseilles, too, remained a Greek city down to the time of the Roman emperors, nay, even in the middle ages a knowledge of the Greek language existed there, as is clear from the Greek MSS. of the New Testament, which were written there at a time when the knowledge of Greek had become extinct elsewhere. In like manner Ancona preserved its Greek character even under the emperors. In the middle ages Ancona seems to stand in a relation to the Greek emperors, very similar to that of Neapolis and Amalfi; and this connection may be an indication of a remnant of a Grecian stock, which had maintained itself there. Its foundation is ascribed to fugitives from Syracuse under Dionysius; this is indeed possible, but it may at the same time be a misunderstanding. Pisaurum on the same coast, is likewise a Greek town, and I have no doubt but that it too was a colony of Dionysius. These settlements were intended to destroy piracy, and attract the commerce of the Adriatic, which Corinth, after having lost Coreyra, was unable to maintain.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess Trogus' account of the origines of the Veneti; we only know from the prologues that he spoke of them; Justin has omitted them altogether. The people of the Veneti is quite mysterious (see the first vol. of my *History of Rome*). I positively assert that they cannot possibly have been an Illyrian people; but it is highly probable that they may have belonged to the vast race of the Pelasgians. Among all the Pelasgian nations, we find a notion that they were connected with Troy, just as the Greeks in Hellas Proper connected themselves with Argos and Mycenae; and wherever there are Pelasgian settlements, we always find some relation to Arcadia, Peloponnesus, or Troy: Cyrene, too, must have been a Pelasgian settlement. Such also is the case with the Veneti. The story of Antenor founding Padua is a proof that they were acquainted with the Trojan legend. The Veneti, moreover, inhabited towns at an early period; they were a peaceful people, and had nothing of the Illyrian character. Politically they were the most insig-

nificant people in all Italy; and we afterwards find them as subjects of the Romans, without knowing how they came into that condition.

The appearance of the fleet of Dionysius in those parts was very welcome to the Veneti, because they were hard pressed by the Galatians, who had just invaded their territory, In other circumstances he would have been unable to establish a settlement at Hadria.

About Olymp. 98, great numbers of Galatians crossed the Alps; they were pressed forward from Spain and southern France, by great national movements of the Iberians from the south, who from Andalusia spread over the Sierra Morena as far as the river Rhodanus (where they were seen by Scylax); and the Galatians being pushed eastward, caused a real migration of nations.¹ In the south, in Languedoc and Dauphiné, they partly expelled the Ligurians who were settled there, and partly subdued them as far as the frontiers of Provence; and thence they advanced eastward. Of the two kindred nations, the Gael and Cymri, it was more particularly the latter that were pressed onward by the Gael; the Gael joined the Cymri in the same manner as we afterwards find the Teutones united with the Cimbri. At that time German tribes seem to have extended in the south as far as the Alps, and even to have inhabited a part of modern Switzerland: Livy states that the *vallis Penina* was inhabited by *gentes Semigermanae*. They were called *Semigermani* because the Celtic population had conquered the country, subdued the Germans, and amalgamated with them. The Gauls then occupied Switzerland and southern Germany, as far as the river Main and Thuringia; in these countries we afterwards find them, but they were unable to conquer the Tyrol, the southern part of Bavaria and Suabia, that is, the country of the Vindelicians, who inhabited the district from the northern slope of Mount Jura, the source of the river Lech, and Mount Brenner, down to the plains of Bavaria and Suabia. The Raetians extended from the south up Mount Brenner, and next to them came the Vindelicians, a Liburnian people, who maintained themselves there; but all around them, and along the valley of the Danube, the Gauls

¹ The detailed account of the Gallic migration from the Lectures of 1825 and 26 has here been omitted, as the subject is more fully discussed in the Lectures on Roman History, vol. i. p. 319, etc.—ED.

advanced into Hungary and Servia. "Twelve years after the conquest of Rome, the Triballians were driven by them into Thrace, and in the time of Alexander, Gauls occur already in Slavonia."

Trogus related, on this occasion, how the Gauls invaded Lombardy, and subdued that country—this is called the invasion of Bellovesus. All Greek authors assign that event, without hesitation, to Olymp. 98, that is, shortly before the expedition against Rome. Such is the case with the strict inquirer, Polybius, while Livy places their appearance in northern Italy in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus. But this is evidently a misunderstanding; and, in Livy himself, the connexion with the siege of Veii is manifest, for there the Etruscans are made to say to the Veientines, that they could not afford them any assistance, because the terrible nation of the Gauls had invaded their country. Cornelius Nepos² informs us, that Melpum, the capital of the Etruscans in Lombardy, was conquered on the same day as Veii, and although we do not attach any importance to the expression, "on the same day," and do not even mean to assume, that it happened in the same year, yet the general coincidence of the time is well attested. It is utterly impossible, that a nation, whether it crossed the Alps by the Simplon, or, as is more probable, by the little St. Bernard,³ should not at once have entered Lombardy. When they had crossed the little St. Bernard, they were only three marches from Melpum, and is it likely, that, from the time of the elder Tarquin, for upwards of one hundred and eighty years, they should have dwelt hemmed in by the mountains, before they attacked the Etruscans? This observation of mine has been controverted, though it is so simple and clear; the opposition arose from the same spirit of contradiction with which Melville has been opposed. Livy alone mentions the tradition, that the migration of the Gauls took place under Tarquinius Priscus, and that they did not advance till one hundred and eighty years later. The fact, however,

² In Pliny, *N. H.*, iii. 17, fin.

³ "For this is the easiest road pointed out by nature itself; and Hannibal, who no doubt took the same road, was not the first to discover it, as Melville has shown very admirably. Letronne, a very excellent and truthful man, is thoroughly opposed to Melville, a circumstance which I cannot understand. The Gauls probably took the same road."

is, that the Gauls must have crossed the Alps for the first time about Olymp. 98.

The Celts then, for the first time, came in contact with the rest of the world. The Carthaginians had mercenaries from many nations, as, from the Iberians, Ligurians, Volscians, and others, but, before this time, they had no Celts. The latter do not occur as mercenaries till after the time when Dionysius appeared on the Adriatic, and it is not till somewhat later, that we find them in the armies of Carthage. Dionysius, at this time, had Gauls in his service, and the succour he sent to Sparta consisted of Iberians, who had deserted to him from the Carthaginians, and of Gauls. I think I have said enough about the Gauls in this place; I shall say more about them, when I have to speak of their inroad into Macedonia.

By his settlements on the Adriatic, Dionysius seems to have considerably increased his wealth and revenues, and to have greatly strengthened his power. These, however, are, at the same time, his last great undertakings, and henceforth he disappears from history. In Greek history, he still acts some important part, through his connexion with the Spartans, who everywhere supported oligarchies and tyrants, if they afforded them assistance. Dionysius several times supplied them with auxiliaries; and, as he was universally detested in Greece, the Spartans drew upon themselves the hatred of all their countrymen. Once, when the Syracusan people were on the point of overthrowing Dionysius, a Spartan ambassador sustained him, and this fact brought universal censure upon the Spartans.

Literature was a singular passion with Dionysius; he was passionately fond of writing lyric poetry and tragedies. *Ἐχέει νόσον* was the truest remark that could be made to him in this respect. Hence the many ludicrous anecdotes about Philoxenus, and the like, which I need not repeat here.

His reign lasted thirty-eight years; and, during the latter period it had become milder than it had been before. In point of fact, it was most suited to the actual circumstances of Syracuse; the period of a lawfully free constitution was gone by; the people were no longer able to govern themselves with republican institutions. That time was past, and it is doubtful whether our own age is not one of the same kind. There are times when nations, with simple manners

and simple relation, live on as their ancestors did before them, and are capable of a high degree of freedom; but there are others, when liberty is only understood as a license to do mischief, to interfere with violence in public affairs, and to attain personal ends; when power and laws disappear; when magistrates are regarded only as men possessed of compulsory means for carrying out their own will—and our own age is, perhaps, one of this kind. In such times, and especially in large states, real freedom and real self-government are impossibilities, and lead at once to dissolution. The best thing then is a conventional delusion, when forms exist under which the people still enjoy, to some extent, the advantages of real freedom, but when wiser persons own that it is only a delusion. Such was the situation of Syracuse, just as that of the rude nations in Spanish America, where freedom is a senseless and and detestable thing. The Syracusans had completely gone beyond the limits which ought to have been strictly observed, and they were so thoroughly unbridled, and incapable of governing themselves, that a lord and master was necessary for them; but, in the circumstances, he, unfortunately, could be nothing else but a tyrant. The republic was as great an impossibility at Syracuse under Dionysius as it was at Rome under Caesar. A good watch goes without our concerning ourselves about it; but, if it does not go well, it can be made serviceable only by one man keeping its machinery in order, otherwise the evil only increases. If Dionysius had in any degree been a man of honour, and had ruled like Pisistratus—though his times were different, and Athens, under him, rose to the age of maturity—he might have employed his reign in giving the Syracusans forms and institutions which were suited to them. But of this he never thought. He allowed the appearance of democratic forms to exist in all their impotent absurdity; they merely existed for the purpose of enabling him to carry out his will. Hence, at his death, the evil was far worse than it had been before. After the thirty-eight years of his reign, there did not exist a man possessed of sufficient ability to get above the existing forms, which had become utterly useless. So long as the tyrant had the power, their absurdity could not manifest itself so glaringly.

Dionysius at last lived in constant fear of being assassinated, and yet it is probable, that at the instigation of his son by his

first marriage, Dionysius, who wished to prevent his making a will, his physician during his illness gave him an opiate.

Dionysius the elder left behind him an immense force, said to have consisted of four hundred ships of war and 100,000 soldiers. This may be greatly exaggerated, but he possessed a truly kingly empire without having the title. The Greek towns in southern Italy also were under his supremacy. "His successor squandered the power which his father had acquired in the most contemptible manner, and a more wretched person than he does not exist in all ancient history."

The elder Dionysius was succeeded by his son (Olymp. 103. 1). He had several sons, but, at an early period, he had destined this Dionysius, his son by the Locrian Doris, to be his successor. At first a great difficulty arose from the circumstance, that his sons, by his second marriage with Aristomache, whom he had married as an old man, belonged to a great Syracusan family, and that they were supported by a great party of the citizens. Dio, the brother of Aristomache, wanted to raise his nephews to the supreme power; independently of the political part which he played, he has acquired celebrity through Plato, "whose passionate friendship for him has surrounded him with a halo, which makes him appear to all the ancients, and especially to Plutarch, as the beau ideal of a man. I am convinced that any one who emancipates himself from the opinion of Plato, and uses his own judgment, must be at a loss to discover wherein the virtue of Dio consisted, and what title he has to be regarded as a patriot."

Plato had been in Syracuse even in the reign of the elder Dionysius, and on that occasion Dio had become attached to him. There can be no doubt that Dio was capable of appreciating the greatness of the philosopher, but this attachment, which in his youth may have been ardent, does not justify the inference that he was a genuine and true disciple of Plato, or that he was worthy of being Plato's friend. Plato, whose heart required ardent attachment, and who was very easily mistaken in his judgment of persons, and more especially of his friends, took him for what he wished him to be; and what he wished was that Dio should be the benefactor of his country. Hence his early connection with him. In the reign of the second Dionysius, Plato, through the influence of Dio, was invited a second time to come to Syracuse, for at first Dio

possessed the confidence of the younger Dionysius. It is a pity that Plato accepted that invitation.

It is possible that at first Dionysius himself may have been labouring under a delusion; but he was so thoroughly false, that it is after all doubtful, whether he did not deceive Plato from the first. He seems, however, to have been pleased with Plato, and to have relished his works; and it was gratifying to his vanity to confer favours upon the philosopher. It is related that Plato suggested an improvement of the constitution, and he is said to have advised, that the family possessing the sovereignty, should not restore it to the people, but introduce a mixed constitution, similar to that of Sparta, in which there should indeed be a democratic element, but the ruling family reserving to itself the kingly power, should form a college of princes, so that the *ἄκρατος δημοκρατία* would have been at an end, "and the usurpation of the family of Dionysius would have been legalised. But at the same time the kingdom would have been divided between the younger Dionysius and the sons of Aristomache." The account is apocryphal; but the advice seems really to have been given by Plato, and it was the best and most rational that could be given. But there are times in which the best human advice is not listened to, and when followed produces absolutely no results, and such was the case then. An improvement could scarcely be looked for at that time from a mere change of form. Some years ago very eminent men were deceived by their belief, that, by a combination of forms, the incapacity of the persons who were to act under them might be neutralised. There are, it is true, corporative forms which exercise such an influence as to raise a man of inferior ability, as was the case, for example, in the parliament of Paris before the revolution, in which there was such an *esprit de corps*, that whoever entered it, found himself under the control of the sentiments prevailing in it. Such, also, was the case in Germany, in certain courts of justice, and it is, perhaps, so still in those instances in which it is a matter of pride to belong to a certain court. This has been the case with the *Kammergericht* at Berlin, and I have no doubt that it is so still. It is certainly not the income derived from such posts that forms the attraction. Aeschines (?) says, that when an ordinary man became a member of the Areopagus at Athens, he was overpowered by the spirit of the corporation.

Such a state of things is excellent, and wherever it exists, the nation is still in a healthy condition; its cessation is a symptom of a deeply-rooted moral disease. If the entrance into a corporation no longer stamps its character upon a man, his frail individuality may be affected by all kinds of influences. If the spirit is bad, forms cannot effect any improvement, and no kind of freedom is beneficial. There are times in which forms can do much, and others in which they can do little. The canton of Tessin has just now adopted a new constitution, which will probably be of little avail. The old government was disgraceful, and the people now believe that they have something better; but it will last only for a time, and soon men will again be at the head of affairs who will act as wretchedly as those who have just been deprived of power; the country has no republican spirit. In Virginia also a new constitution has been formed; the people felt that they were very bad, but though they did not want to become better themselves, they wished to be able to correct the badness of their neighbours. They have attempted to effect this by a change of the constitution, but matters will remain exactly as they have been. Thus Plato's hopes were visionary, though the state of things might have been a little improved. And so far as we know the scheme, it was really of such a kind, that it could not be reasonably expected, that Dionysius would enter into it, and it is inconceivable how people could believe that he would do so. Plato presupposed that Dionysius was a noble-minded man, that he would share his power with his stepbrothers and with Dio. The latter had, indeed, more ability, but were not more just than Dionysius; in the course of eight days they would have thrown him overboard, and Dionysius was well aware of this. Thus, while Plato was in the belief that all was going on well, he learned, all on a sudden, that Dionysius had sent Dio in a ship out of the country (Olymp. 103, 4), "just as in democracies men were exiled from suspicion." Plato, as a noble-minded man, shewed his indignation. Dio lived in Peloponnesus, where many exiled Syracusans were residing; and Dionysius sent him all his immense property, because he was ashamed to do otherwise on account of Plato; but he kept back his son as a hostage—a great inconsistency of the wretched tyrant, by which he greatly injured himself.

After these events, Dionysius took up his residence at Locri

in southern Italy. "He carried on war with the Lucanians, and led many Sicilians over into Calabria, where the destroyed towns very rapidly rose from their ruins. Hitherto he had been protected by the prestige of his father's power, and every one looked upon him as the greatest prince; but at Locri he gave himself up to the wildest orgies, and behaved altogether like a monster, which he had not dared to do at Syracuse. While he thus drew general contempt upon himself, and while nothing but the indolence of the Carthaginians saved him from war, and left him in the possession of his empire, Dio received innumerable petitions from Sicily to come over and place himself at the head of the malcontents. With the treasures which had been sent after him, he raised a small band, and being joined by all the exiles, he went to Sicily with two merchant vessels, which were laden with arms (Olymp. 105, 4).

"Dionysius was at Locri at the time when Dio, with his ships and fifty exiles appeared in the Carthaginian province, the governor of which was connected with him by ties of hospitality. Thence he rapidly proceeded through the interior of the country, and as he passed through the places which were under the supremacy of Syracuse, he was joined by many thousands, among whom he distributed the arms he had brought with him. The mercenaries of Dionysius marched out to meet him, but were repelled in an insignificant skirmish. They retreated to the *vâσος*, the acropolis of Syracuse, where they were safe against attacks from the city. But while the island or old town remained in the hands of the troops of Dionysius, the new towns, Neapolis, Achradina, and Tycha, opened their gates to Dio. He was now chosen strategus by the Syracusans, but dissensions and feuds again arose in the city, and Dionysius returned from Italy in order to maintain his ground." The history of this period is very interesting; but it is impossible to relate its detail. The following are the only events of historical importance.

Dio, as I have already remarked, very soon began to quarrel with the Syracusans. One part of them deserting him, set up against him a certain Heraclides, likewise an exile, "who had enlisted in Peloponnesus an important squadron, with which he had come to the assistance of the Syracusans after Dio. The Syracusans appointed him the colleague of Dio, for" they

trusted Dio as little as they trusted Dionysius, and it cannot be denied that Dio thought of nothing else but of making himself dictator of Syracuse; and what else should he have thought of? No sensible man could think of anything else at Syracuse. He might, as dictator, have prepared a better state of things, but this could not be expected of him. The disaffection against him rose more and more, and after a short time Dio was as much hated as Dionysius. All those sanguine men who hoped that he would do away with tyranny and restore liberty, united against him. Dio had ordered Heraclides to be put to death, a sign that his reign too would have become bloody; but soon afterwards Dio himself was murdered by an Athenian exile, and no one pitied him (Olymp. 106, 3). These disturbances and struggles in Sicily had lasted for nearly four years.

LECTURE XCVI.

Dio's undertaking brought only misfortunes upon Sicily. If he had lived to carry his plans into effect, a despotism would indeed have been established instead of the wild tyranny of Dionysius, but it would, no doubt, have been of a better kind. His death made things only worse, and his expedition only increased the confusion.

Callippus, his murderer, now set himself up as tyrant, and reigned one year and a half, supported by his mercenaries, until he too was murdered. After Callippus, several others quarrelled about the sovereignty at Syracuse, sometimes under the pretext of restoring freedom, and thus usurpation followed after usurpation. Dionysius was in possession of the fortress of Syracuse: sometimes he was master of the whole city, "and the towns of Sicily, which had before recognised him as their *ἡγεμόν*, were often compelled to return under his dominion." Ten years, I think, thus passed away, during which no one gained the decided ascendancy, and Dionysius spent most of this time in Italy. The most powerful among his rivals was Hicetas, who pretended that he would restore

Syracuse to freedom, and took the title of Sicilian liberty for his device, but whose intentions were no better than those of the rest. Meantime the Carthaginians had interfered in the matter, and declared sometimes in favour of one and sometimes of another. Several Sicilian towns, except Syracuse, all of which were ruled by despots, renounced the supremacy of Dionysius, so that his empire consisted only of remnants, forming a small portion of what it had been; we may compare it with the dominion of Julius Nepos, or some similar ruler, in the western empire. Plutarch, in speaking of the decline of the power of Dionysius, imagines that it was a sudden change, but he forgets that Dionysius remained indeed in the fortress with the remnants of his treasures, but with a rebellious garrison, which he was aware might betray him any day; he was, moreover, not certain whether the rest of Sicily would not revolt, and whether Italy, and especially Locri, where he had raged so monstrously, would not shake off his yoke. Such was the condition of Sicily—rebellion was everywhere.

The Campanian and Oscan mercenaries, mostly Samnites, Lucanians, and the like, serving partly in the armies of the Carthaginians, and partly in those of the Greeks, then formed a peculiar power in Sicily, which had been developing itself ever since the time of the elder Dionysius. They form a remarkable contrast with their countrymen in Italy. In their own country, we find the Samnites struggling for liberty, and that too in a very respectable manner; the Lucanians also do not deserve any particular censure; but, in Sicily, those mercenaries committed the most heinous crimes, and were the most detestable robbers that one can imagine. That such was possible, is proved by other examples, to wit, that of the Swiss in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who, though respectable at home, behaved abroad as the worst possible bands of robbers. No one who knows history will think this judgment too severe; only read the contemporary historians. Those Campanians had already made themselves masters of several Sicilian towns, and more and more of their countrymen came over from Italy, so that it was generally apprehended, lest they should become the lords of all the island; this had, as yet, been done only partially, but the fear was quite natural.

Under these circumstances, and as the Carthaginians were

blockading Syracuse (Olymp. 108, 4), the Syracusans resolved to solicit the assistance of Corinth, their mother-city. It is very surprising how this idea could occur to any one, for Corinth, at that time, was, indeed, wealthy, but was not possessed of any great power at all. The assistance, moreover, was so insignificant, that it is inconceivable how people could expect that such an incredibly small force would be successful, for the whole consisted of ten galleys, seven belonging to the Corinthians and three to the allies, and this force actually saved Syracuse.

“The Corinthians could not think of embarking themselves in a war, in which they would have had to struggle against Carthage, but they allowed volunteers to go to Syracuse, and it was a time—the unfortunate period of the struggle between Greece and Philip—in which many able people liked nothing so much as an undertaking, which diverted their attention from the scene of ruin in their own country.”

We here have the consolation of finding, at length, a truly great and blameless man. Although there are, in the history of Timoleon, some actions which cause us pain, as, for example, the execution of Hicetas, after he had become reconciled to him, we may be assured that there were circumstances which rendered the act excusable, but which history has not recorded.¹ Timoleon is almost the first among the heroes of that period; for he combined uncommon abilities with the purest character and the purest sentiments. He is one of those men who are most generally known for the vicissitudes of their fortune from their early youth. Timophanes, the brother of Timoleon, had risen to the highest power at Corinth, during a period of general distrust; this must belong to the Boeotian period, about Olymp. 103, that is, the time of the expedition of Epaminondas, between the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea. The Corinthians had learned, as early as Olymp. 96, that a great part of their fellow-citizens had united themselves with Argos; and a similar idea now again arose. Some persons again began to think, that Corinth should be united with Argos, while very many were opposed

¹ In 1826, however, Niebuhr said, “The description which we have of Timoleon, has perhaps been too much idealised by Timæus, who otherwise tries to speak ill of everybody, but ascribes to Timoleon everything good, on account of the connection which had existed between Timoleon and his father.”—Ed.

to such a connexion, and Corinth was undeniably too powerful, compared with Argos, to enter into such a relation. Those who demanded that the two states should remain separate, resolved to keep a city guard, like the oligarchs at Solothurn, Freiburg, nay, even at Geneva, during the troublous times of the eighteenth century, especially after the year 1782, in order to keep the citizens in subjection. Thus four hundred armed men were kept at Corinth, and Timophanes, was appointed commander of that body. As its head, he did what might be expected in those times, he acted in a perfectly arbitrary manner; and it is much to be wondered at, that he did not assume the title of tyrant. Timoleon begged and implored him to desist from this usurpation; and when he found that all his earnest requests were despised, he at length consented that his brother should be murdered by conspirators. This resolution, which assuredly he did not come to without a severe struggle with himself, proved, by its result, to have been well calculated. It is, indeed, a childish and foolish undertaking, to attempt to overthrow a firmly-rooted despotism—a republic cannot possibly last in Columbia, nor in all Spanish America—but, at Corinth, despotism had not yet struck root. Timoleon was in a terrible situation; his own mother cursed him, for the murdered Timophanes had been her favourite, and in his innermost soul he began to despair of himself, and to doubt the justice of the act which he had sanctioned after very serious consideration. He fell into a deep melancholy, during which he withdrew from all public business. Under these circumstances, the report about Hicetas reached Corinth; the general opinion was, that the command should be given to Timoleon, and, as if by inspiration, he was unanimously elected to the post. He readily undertook the command, and peace was restored to his soul as soon as he found suitable occupation. All this is beautifully related by Plutarch, who is always beautiful when he has to treat of the affections and the more tender feelings; in such things, Plutarch is completely in his element, and this is exactly the case in his life of Timoleon. There are other biographies, such as those of Solon and Lysurgus, requiring a very accurate knowledge of ancient institutions, and in these Plutarch fails altogether; he does not distinguish between legends and history, and collects anecdotes at random, and

this makes those biographies so vague and indefinite. In others again, the sentimental character is out of place, and Plutarch, as in the case of his life of Dio,² displays it where there is no occasion for it. The last-mentioned biography is a complete failure, because he is anxious to view Dio in a light in which he cannot be viewed, and to represent him as a different person from what he really was. He would stand forth as a striking character, if Plutarch had described him like a *maréchal d'empire*, as a man more fond of orders of knighthood and money than of liberty. I can well imagine Dio as a great man, completely covered with orders from head to foot; but he is not a republican like Timoleon, who was a republican of the old school, similar to De Witt, and other Dutchmen of the seventeenth century.

I must refer you to Plutarch's life of Timoleon, where you may read a detailed account of the skill with which he contrived to get across, and of the favour of heaven which enabled him to accomplish his design, for fortune evidently was on his side. He began his undertaking under the most unfavourable circumstances. The Carthaginians, with a large fleet, attempted to arrest his progress, having concluded peace with Hicetas, and were lying at anchor in the harbour of Syracuse, while Dionysius was shut up in the citadel. While thus an oppressed people without a leader was longing for assistance and protection, he sailed with his small band to Sicily, and with the greatest adroitness succeeded in reaching the island. He was, according to the Scriptural expression, "as wise as a serpent and as harmless as a dove"; he cunningly deceived the Carthaginians at Rhegium, escaped to Sicily, and there landed with his small band. In the strong fortress of Tauromenium he met a friend, Andromachus, a tyrant, who, however, was the benefactor of the place and of those who joined him, and maintained himself as a just and worthy man; he did not by any means wish to set himself up as a despot, but was a tyrant only because he could not save the people without that power. This man received Timoleon and placed all his means at his disposal. In this way Timoleon reached Syracuse, and by a bold stroke made himself master of a part of the city. Heaven favoured him in every respect, and fortune followed him in all he did. Thus it came to pass that

² "Plutarch's lives ought to be read in chronological order."

Dionysius, to whom nothing was left but the citadel of Syracuse, and who was weary of the contest, entered into an arrangement with Timoleon, who sent him, with his private property, in safety to Corinth (Olymp. 109, 2), as has in our days been done with the Dey of Algiers.

Timoleon, having gained a firm footing, "now began the war against Carthage, which had been quietly looking on while he was gathering strength, and against the Sicilian tyrants." He succeeded in one enterprise after another: he expelled the usurper Ilicetas and other rebels from the city, and Mamercus, prince of Catana, declared for him, for his personal character was as imposing as that of his great contemporary Demosthenes; through him Syracuse rose again, and after a struggle of a few years he succeeded in uniting with Syracuse the Greek towns even in the western parts of Sicily, so that two-thirds of the island were united with Syracuse. The conduct of the Carthaginians was wretched during this war also, "while Timoleon conducted it in a most brilliant manner. Observing, on his march against the Carthaginians, that there was a disposition in his army to mutiny, he, like Gideon, allowed every one who was unwilling to fight, to return home, and with the remainder" he gained in the second campaign a great victory over Carthage on the river Crimissus; and he concluded a peace with them, "in which the boundaries were restored which had been fixed upon under the elder Dionysius." The Carthaginians retained Selinus, Himera, and the north-western portion of the island, which Timoleon could not have maintained; the remainder of the country, together with Syracuse, formed a Greek state, at the head of which stood Syracuse. "The fact that the Carthaginians consented to these conditions, was probably owing to their being at the time involved in other wars; it is possible that their first settlements in Spain belong to that time, and Sicily does not seem to have then been the chief object of their anxiety. The difference between Dorians and Chalcidians had entirely disappeared, and the populations were thoroughly mixed; Leontini had changed its population six times, Catana was in a similar condition, and all the towns were inhabited not by Greeks only, but by all kinds of people, and the Greeks, on the other hand, dwelt in all parts of the island. Their union effected by a strong hand, therefore, was not contrary to any existing form; but the fact

was, that there existed no form to keep anything together, so soon as the strong hand was withdrawn."

Timoleon was thoroughly in earnest about liberty. His influence was so great, that as long as he lived, and without any force on his part, the Syracusans, through their respect for his virtue, found peace, and also that rallying point of which nations stand in need, and which was more needful than ever at that time of fearful disorganisation, when union seemed to be hardly possible without despotism. As Demosthenes, by his personal character, counterbalanced the faults of the constitution, so Timoleon's personal character exercised the influence which a truly great man always possesses. If Herodotus had written the dialogue between Croesus and Solon at a later time, he would, no doubt, have said that Timoleon was the happiest man. He died full of years (Olymp. 110, 4) having enjoyed undisturbed happiness till the end; and he died at the right time, for his salutary influence could not have lasted much longer. "His death reminds us of the pious king Hezekiah, whom the Lord took to himself, before the enemy broke loose upon him. Immediately after his death, it became evident, that under the smooth surface, on which everything was apparently prosperous, a strong ferment was going on, and that an abyss was open below. He had not been able to cure the malady, but had only suspended it. The only affliction with which his life had been visited, was that he became blind; but the attachment of the people whom he had saved amply rewarded him for all his sufferings. Many of his measures seem to us unaccountable, unless we conceive that before his time everything at Syracuse was in a state of disorganisation. Thus he invited colonists from all Greece for the purpose of rebuilding the destroyed towns; "the property of the tyrants was confiscated, and a fresh distribution of the territory was made." The continuous wars and disturbances had wasted and depopulated Sicily to such an extent, that there was much unclaimed land everywhere. The invitation of colonists by Timoleon arrived in Greece just at the time of the battle of Chaeronea. Many who were in a state of despair, or had been exiled from the towns which Philip had destroyed, came over, and many thousand Greeks found a resting-place in Sicily. "From Magna Graecia also many came over, who had become homeless during the unfortunate war with the Lucanians, so that the statement

that 40,000 Greeks went thither as colonists, may not be exaggerated."

When Timoleon had closed his eyes, it became at once evident that Syracuse could not exist under any other form of government than that in which one such man was at the head of affairs, and controlled the unruly spirits. Disturbances broke out. The history of those party feuds is very obscure. Several parties sprang up under the name of *ἐταῖρᾱι* or *συστήματα*; they must be regarded as clubs, which had been formed with a view of securing by associations the safety, which the external forms of the constitution could no longer insure; they resembled the *factiones nobilium* at Rome towards the end of the seventh century. One Sosistratus was particularly powerful among them. All the old evils soon reappeared—the exile of the influential citizens, their wars against the city, etc. During that confusion, a senate of six hundred members was appointed to manage the government, or else it was an association assuming the name of the *ἐξακόσιοι*, and wielding the powers of the republic. I believe that it was a senate, which, however, had at the same time something of the character of an association, as was the case at Athens with the *τετρακόσιοι* under Phrynichus. Such things may easily be combined.

The condition of our own times is very similar, for all the foundations of the ancient constitution have disappeared and cannot be restored, so that no other expedient can be devised, except that of making distinctions according to property, taxation, and the like; such also was the case at Syracuse. Even as early as the time of Plato, there existed no other limits against democracy but those afforded by the census; and this was now all that was left. The consequence was, that wherever that limitation was maintained, it became a bad and oppressive oligarchy. But it was difficult to maintain it, because it was an arbitrary division and an arbitrary distribution of rights, in which, after all, diversities of opinion could not be prevented, a large portion of the citizens aiming at other objects. Such an oligarchy cannot last, or else it is a forced and oppressive state of things. The oligarchy at Syracuse rendered it necessary to keep an army of mercenaries, whose main business was to keep the demos in check—"Dogs also bite, and not wolves alone," says Stolberg. They were, how-

ever, destined at the same time to fight against Carthage. Many of the commanders of those mercenaries soon aimed at setting themselves up as tyrants, and establishing a dynasty.

Agathocles, one of the characters that exercised the greatest influence in antiquity, and otherwise, too, a very remarkable person, came forward during those struggles. The cause of the conflict between Rome and Carthage lies, to some extent, in the reign of Agathocles. His character and history are much talked of by the ancients; but whoever at present occupies himself with Greek history, seldom turns his attention to that period and to such persons, however much they deserve it. The history of Agathocles is beyond all doubt; some particular points may indeed be exaggerated, but the two great days of massacre at Syracuse are facts—as certain as that of the night of St. Bartholomew. There are, however, other points in regard to which persons may judge of him in different ways; and it may be asserted, that the charges made against him are exaggerated; Polybius, in fact, remarks, that Timæus, in his account of Agathocles, represented him in too bad a light. Agathocles was one of those men whom we often meet with in the history of the East, and whom we cannot judge of by the ordinary standard of morality: they are hardened souls, in which certain feelings have no existence at all, or have been blighted at an early age; they have no feeling of humanity, no respect for anything, no principle, and no trace of a conscience. We cannot exactly call Agathocles a blood-thirsty tyrant; for although he trod down men wherever they came in his way, yet he was not one of the class to which Apollodorus of Cassandrea belonged, and which revelled in blood: he had something frank and open about him, and manifested a degree of confidence which excites our wonder. The elder Dionysius looked upon every one as a conspirator, and did not trust even the members of his own family; but Agathocles showed confidence, and secured himself by his boldness and resoluteness: hence so few attempts were made against his life, although it is possible that he was poisoned in the end. As it cannot be denied that this was a valuable feature in his character, a comparison with the elder Dionysius shows Agathocles in a more favorable light. Dionysius always began wars, and conducted them badly, notwithstanding his great resources, with which he might have carried them on

brilliantly; and he plunged his country into deeper misery with the very means he had of saving it. Agathocles, on the other hand, was a great general, and found Syracuse far less powerful than it had been under Dionysius; his determination to carry the war into Africa, shows that he was a great man. He always went onwards with great determination, and Polybius is, no doubt, right in blaming Timaeus, for judging of him too harshly. If Timaeus called him a contemptible man, we can regard this only as childish; and if he concealed his good features, we must ascribe it to malicious hatred. But, at the same time, if we consider the captains of robbers on the lower Rhine thirty years ago, we find, *e. g.*, that the personal character of Fetzner, an extraordinary man, was much better than that of Agathocles. It is among such men as Fetzner that we must seek for illustrations of a character like Agathocles; and what a fearful time must that be, when such a man has to decide the fate of millions!

Agathocles rose like such a robber; he was a man of vulgar origin; Dionysius, too, had been of low birth, but he was an educated man, and even an aesthetic dilettante; Agathocles, on the other hand, knew nothing of these things, and was quite an uncultivated person. His father was a potter, and he himself had already commenced the same business. The pottery to be understood here are the beautiful Sicilian vases. Thirty years ago there existed, in a Sicilian collection, a vase with the name *Ἀγαθοκλέος*, though it was certainly not the work of our Agathocles; there may have been very many potters of that name. Nature had endowed him with great personal beauty and unusual courage. He was born at Thermae ("which had been built by the Carthaginians by the side of the ruins of Himera, but still remained a Greek town), where his father, an exile from Rhegium, had settled; he there grew up in such poverty, that his father contemplated putting him to death. When Timoleon invited Greeks from all parts of the world, Agathocles came with his father to Syracuse," and was received there as isoteles. He enlisted as a common soldier; "and as at the time every adventurer had opportunities for developing his powers, it was easy for him to rise." He served among the troops which the Syracusans had sent to assist Croton against the Bruttians; he distinguished himself, and soon rose to the rank of colonel. Even at that time he

entertained the idea of forming a principality for himself by means of his soldiers. His fortune henceforth was very varying: he was more than once condemned and sent into exile, but was recalled, together with other exiles whom he had joined. Damas or Damascon, a Syracusan of rank, received him into his house and afforded him protection; "and through him and the marriage with his daughter, he first attracted public notice." The Syracusans, who had so often found him guilty of high treason, now were foolish enough to appoint him *εἰρηνοφύλαξ*, *i.e.*, keeper of their laws — him, the very man whom they had repeatedly exiled from their city. This was a blow aimed by the democrats at the oligarchs or the six hundred. Now, having the troops under his control, he overthrew the six hundred, "and with the aid of his mercenaries and the factions, caused a fearful massacre, in which he cut them down, together with numberless others, and that, too, without any provocation whatever" (Olymp. 115, 4). But instead of establishing a democracy, he set himself up as a tyrant: "the terror of the massacre stifled for a long time every thought of resistance." He seems to have assumed the title of *δυνάστης* until afterwards he took that of king. For a time he now ruled with mildness, and was a popular dictator. Many towns joined him; but still the period of the supremacy, which Syracuse had enjoyed under Timoleon, was gone.

A war against the Carthaginians, the national enemies of Syracuse, was then carried on by Agathocles, without any calculation of his resources and without success. The first battle was completely lost, and the Carthaginians advanced irresistibly up to the walls of Syracuse. They now made better use of their victory than before, as they were well aware, that it was better for them to preserve Sicily than to change it into a wilderness; and they offered the Greek towns favorable terms. The consequence was that all renounced Syracuse, and each separately concluded peace with Carthage. The victorious army of Hamilcar, together with the allies of the Carthaginians, now encamped before Syracuse, and Agathocles without any allies and blockaded by the Carthaginians, was on the point of being compelled by famine to surrender, when on a sudden he formed the determination, like that of Scipio in later times, to carry the war into Africa (Olymp. 117, 3).

LECTURE XCVII.

As we know from Polybius, that Scipio respected Agathocles as a distinguished general, it is not an arbitrary conjecture to say, that the resolution of Agathocles induced Scipio to imitate it. After his great defeat, Agathocles saw no other way left open for himself.

He took with him on this expedition partly mercenaries, partly faithful followers, and lastly a number of citizens belonging to the most illustrious families, who were to be securities for those who were left behind. He thus tore families asunder, and wherever there were several members of a family, he took one or more of them with him. He entered upon this expedition in the port of Syracuse, while a Carthaginian fleet was lying before it, and knew that he was making preparations. But no one had any idea whither his fleet was intended to sail, which he kept secret from every one. He had spread a report that he intended to sail to Italy, that he meant to give up Syracuse, and proceed to a distant part of Sicily or take Sardinia. Nobody thought of Africa, and nobody imagined that with 7000 men he would venture to attack the Carthaginians in their own country.

He deceived the Carthaginians with the most wonderful skill and cunning; he kept the expedition on board his sixty galleys, waiting with great prudence for a suitable opportunity, and being ready at any moment to sail out into the sea. A lucky accident enabled him to get out of the harbour, and at the same time afforded him another advantage. Syracuse was in the greatest distress, and a large fleet with supplies from Greece was daily expected. That fleet according to a preconcerted plan, appeared off the coast near the harbour in such a manner, that the Carthaginians quitted their station in order to go to meet it; and as soon as this was done, Agathocles gave the signal for setting sail; and supported by a favourable wind and extreme exertions on the part of the rowers he sailed out. The Carthaginians on perceiving this, returned for the purpose of cutting off his return or of driving him back, but lost both their objects, for he escaped, and in the

meantime the convoy reached Syracuse, which was thus saved.

Agathocles sailed straight across towards Africa, unconcerned as to what point he might reach first. The Carthaginians pursued him for six days and six nights, but were unable to overtake him, the Syracusans being excellent sailors. Thus he arrived on the coast of Africa, near the modern town of Sphax, on the frontiers of the north of Byzazene and Zeugitania. When he landed, the Carthaginians were seen approaching, and if the pursuit had lasted half a day longer, he would have been overtaken and his fleet destroyed. He had as narrow an escape as Napoleon, when pursued by Lord Nelson, he effected a landing at Alexandria. Agathocles drew the ships upon the beach, and everything was disembarked. But what was to be done now. It was customary to draw the galleys on shore, and to surround them with fortifications; but if he had done so, he would have been obliged to leave a garrison behind, and his army which was small enough, would thereby have been reduced too much to allow him to proceed with the rest. He represented to the soldiers that it would be foolish to attempt to save their ships which under all circumstances would fall into the hands of the enemy. The soldiers, notwithstanding the exasperation of the Syracusans against him, seem to have been so overawed by the boldness of his enterprise, that they were entirely under his control and applauded him, and in a moment all the ships were in flames.

He now advanced into Africa. The whole of this expedition was well calculated in every respect. The Carthaginians had pulled down the walls of the African towns, just as in later times the Lombards demolished the walls of the Italian towns, to prevent the Italians from rebelling against them. The Lombards did not understand the art of besieging; the Carthaginians did indeed understand it, but still had caused all the towns, with the exception of five or six Phœnician ones, and some colonies of their own, to be reduced to open places, that they might be able to govern them according to their own discretion. All the Libyan towns were thus unprotected, and whoever therefore was master in the field, had at the same time power over the whole country, there being no towns to be besieged; it cannot, moreover, be doubted that

the Carthaginians had disarmed the Libyans in their own country. For the last 120 years, that is, ever since Carthage had ceased to pay tribute to the native princes, the Libyans paid heavy taxes to the Carthaginians, generally the fourth part of the produce of their fields—and often even more. The Carthaginians were hard and avaricious rulers, and individual Carthaginians were sent out as governors avowedly for the purpose of enriching themselves; it may be asserted without hesitation that their government was bad. It was therefore the general desire among the inhabitants to shake off the yoke, and Agathocles accordingly appeared to them as a welcome deliverer; and he might plausibly tell them that he as a stranger, could not think of making them his subjects.

The Carthaginians sent out troops to meet him, but were unsuccessful. "They were not able to raise an army capable of resisting him: their cavalry, consisting of the higher orders, was indeed good, but the great mass of the people was utterly unwarlike, and was called to arms only on very pressing emergencies. Moreover, of their two generals, Hanno and Bomilear, the latter was suspected of aiming at the tyrannis, as he was a grandson of that Hanno¹ who had made an attempt to set himself up as tyrant; and through his treachery, as during the confusion he tried to accomplish his object, Agathocles gained a great victory." Agathocles then continued to advance as far as Tunis, about five English miles from Carthage. "Utica also was taken by him and destroyed in the most cruel manner, in revenge for the Greek towns which had been laid waste." It is difficult to treat of this campaign in a detailed manner, because the geography of Africa previous to the time of the Roman dominion there, is so little known. During the Roman period, we know the geography of Africa from the Itineraries, but we look in vain for the localities mentioned by Diodorus, our only guide for that campaign. In short, after the war had lasted for one year and a half, the Carthaginians were in the greatest straits.

In the mean time, the Syracusans had exerted all their powers, and with excellent success had carried out offensive operations against the besieging army, and had compelled it to raise the siege. "On one occasion Syracuse was almost

¹ "It almost seems that the office of military commander was hereditary in some Carthaginian families."—1826.

lost through a stratagem; for Hamilcar had spread the false report, that Agathocles had been completely defeated in Africa, showing, in proof of his assertion, some planks of his ships; and Syracuse was on the point of surrendering, when a ship which Agathocles had quickly ordered to be built after his victory, arrived in time to bring the news of his success. The Syracusans recovered their spirits, the allies of the Carthaginians began to think that the siege lasted too long, and Hamilcar being obliged to try to bring it to a close, ventured upon storming the city, which completely failed: he himself was taken prisoner, and the siege was raised." Syracuse was thus delivered, but the Carthaginians still maintained a part of the island, and some of the Sicilian towns were opposed to the government of Agathocles.

Agathocles now built a few light ships, and crossed over to Sicily, leaving the command of his army in Africa to his son Archagathus.

But, before I proceed, I have to mention something else. Cyrene was then governed by the Macedonian Ophellas. In the time after Alexander's death, he, as one of the generals of Ptolemy, had driven the Spartan Thimbron² with his mercenaries out of Cyrenaica. Ophellas had done this by the command of Ptolemy, and had been rewarded with the governorship of Cyrenaica, of which he was now the independent ruler. This seems to me a more appropriate place than that taken by Justin for discussing the history of Cyrene. Trogus had spoken of it at a much earlier period.

The foundation of Cyrene is an extremely obscure point. It is stated, that it was a colony of Thera, which was itself a settlement of Spartans and Minyans. The story about the colonisation of Cyrene from Thera is entirely mythical, and requires much consideration. Wherever Minyans are mentioned, as in this instance also the Minyans are said to have come from Lemnos, Pelasgians are meant. Pelasgians, therefore, appear in Thera, whose origin is doubtful even in the current account, for, according to tradition, they would only be half Dorians. If we consider, in addition to this, that Aristaeus and the nymph Cyrene belong to the Thessalians and Arcadians, that Aristaeus occurs also in the Tyrrhenian settlements and traditions, and that, according to Pindar,

² "Thimbron was a man of the same class as Armagnac."

Cyrene was founded by Antenorids, we find ourselves completely on Tyrrheno-Pelasgian ground. And it is a great question whether, as *t* and *k* are convertible in the Doric dialect (as we find *Lakinus* and *Latinus*!) *κοράνα* and *Τυρσηνοὶ* are not words of the same root. If this be so, and I think it very probable, we must suppose that afterwards a real Hellenic colony was added to the old population, I mean at the time of the second Arcesilaus, according to the account of Herodotus. Certain it is, that invitations to come over to Cyrene were sent to all parts of Greece, and that thousands availed themselves of the opportunity. From that time *Κυράνα* was a genuine Hellenic city. The attempt to fix the date of the foundation of Cyrene, a question which has engaged the attention of a man who has now left us, and whom I much esteem, can lead to no results; it cannot be reduced to any chronology at all, for it belongs to a time which lies beyond all chronology.

From the time that Cyrene became hellenised, it prospered greatly and became very powerful. It retained its dynasty down to the time of Pindar; how and when it ceased to reign, is unknown. The princes recognised the supremacy of Amasis, and were on terms of friendship with him. After this and the transitory calamities of a Persian invasion, the Cyreneans did not attempt to effect impossibilities, but were wise enough to enter into an understanding with the Persians; and as long as the latter were masters of Egypt, they maintained good terms with them as powerful neighbours. When Egypt again became independent, Cyrene also recovered its freedom. The Egyptian kings were not very powerful, and Cyrene was separated from them by the desert.

The situation of Cyrene was, on the whole, a very happy one. The country rises from the coast in terraces up to a table-land; and the city of Cyrene itself was situated on one of the terraces between the sea and the hills. The higher of those hills south of Cyrene are barren, but ward off from the city the poisonous winds of the desert and the clouds of sand, while it is exposed to the cooling north wind on the sea-side. It is one of the most splendid countries in the world. Through the influence of a now deceased friend of mine, I have, at least indirectly, induced England to send an exploring expedition into Cyrene. France, under the ministry of Richelieu, also sent out an

expedition to examine the antiquities and the natural history of Cyrenaica. But, unfortunately, neither of these expeditions has answered its purpose, and the French one, more particularly, was intrusted to quite an incompetent person; I must confess that I had expected better results from the English undertaking. The first and best book that was ever written upon that country, is the work of Della Cella, an Italian physician, who visited Cyrene with the army of the Pasha of Tripolis, on his expedition to Derne. He was an ordinary man, without learning, but a very intelligent observer.

At a later time, Ptolemy became connected with the affairs of Cyrene. It had placed itself under his protection against Thimbron, and Ophellas took his place. In consequence of the war with Demetrius and Antigonos, Ptolemy had no time to concern himself much about Cyrene, and was obliged to leave the country to Ophellas, who established for himself a handsome principality there. The Libyans in those parts were anything but barbarians; some Libyans in the territory of Carthage were barbarians, though they were not by any means as uncivilised as they are at the present day. Egypt had exercised a great influence upon them, and the Libyans about Cyrene were as civilised as the Marmarides in the neighbourhood of Egypt; Ophellas formed an army of them.

Agathocles now invited Ophellas to join him, offering him the sovereignty of Africa, if the expedition should be successful, declaring that he himself would be satisfied with the dominion of Sicily. Ophellas took the road round the Syrtes, which afterwards Cato took in the war against Caesar; the march was as fearful as that of Alexander through Gedrosia, as is shewn by Della Cella, who relates everything as it is, without affectation. The worst part of the Syrtes, south of Libida, has not been visited by any other European so far as I know. Ophellas overcame all difficulties and succeeded in joining Agathocles. The latter now ventured upon the dangerous attempt of causing a mutiny among the soldiers of Ophellas against their own master, and he actually induced the army to murder him, and enter his own service. Having now a double army, he was quite able to cope with the Carthaginians; he considered them to be completely beaten, and in these circumstances he determined to return to Sicily.

His appearance there produced a wonderful effect; and the Carthaginians, driven to extremes, lost nearly the whole island. He saw, however, that he could not become master of Lilybæum anywhere else but in Africa, and accordingly returned thither. His sons, Archagathus and Heraclides, who had been left behind in command of the army, had continued the war at first with tolerable success. "But the Carthaginians roused themselves, and with their great wealth drew together mercenaries from all quarters. They then divided their large army into three parts, and if Archagathus had but kept his troops together, he might still have maintained himself. But he, also, foolishly divided his small force; two parts were completely destroyed, and the third, under his own command, would likewise have been defeated, had not Agathocles come to its assistance. With him the soul of the army seemed to have returned; but fortune suddenly turned against him, and he lost a battle. This was certainly a great loss to him in a foreign land; the Libyans were now as ready to fall upon him, as the Carthaginians had been before. He then formed the unworthy resolution, as Napoleon did in 1799 in Egypt, to embark with his sons, and to abandon his soldiers to their fate (Olymp. 118, 2). Their flight was betrayed, and the soldiers overtook them and made them their prisoners. However, they felt a respect for him, and probably thinking that if he perished with them, the advantages in Sicily would be quite lost, they set him free." Thus he himself escaped, but his son Archagathus was kept by the soldiers as a hostage. They seem, however, soon to have repented their generosity towards Agathocles, for not long after they murdered his son. The soldiers then capitulated with the Carthaginians; some entered their service, "and others obtained permission to settle at Solus, in the Carthaginian part of Sicily."

We might have expected that the Carthaginians would now invade Sicily with double forces. "Agathocles could not but consider everything lost; but he did not lose his courage." After his return he again established himself at Syracuse, taking fearful vengeance on the relatives of those who were involved in the murder of his son. "Segesta was destroyed by him with diabolical fury. At length, however, the Carthaginians were tired of the war, and as he was inclined to renew the peace on the terms on which it had existed before,

the Carthaginians consented. Everything accordingly remained as it had been before the commencement of the war." Thus neither had gained one step in advance, after a war of ten years, during which more than 100,000 men had fallen on both sides, and hundreds of towns had experienced the horrors of war. This may be a warning against such wars, if history has any influence in this respect. The Sicilians were always at the same point with the Carthaginians, and the devastation ever began afresh.

Sicily, so far as it was not under Carthage, now fell, with the exception of Agrigentum, into the hands of Agathocles, "after he had for some time continued the war against the soldiers who had revolted in Africa, and against the exiles. Henceforth his dominion in Sicily, was no longer assailed; he bore the title of king, and the potter's son was generally recognised as sovereign." The above-mentioned massacre was the last terrible act committed by Agathocles; and during the remaining period of his reign, being the greater half of it, he was a mild sovereign to his subjects, and did very much to raise the splendour and prosperity of Sicily and of Syracuse. It is difficult to conceive the resources which Sicily must then have had, to enable him and his successors to carry on those incessant wars. Large fleets were destroyed, and we always see new ones formed. Agathocles had destroyed Segesta, and afterwards we find it again rebuilt.

Agathocles gave up the idea of conquering Carthage; he was satisfied with three-quarters of Sicily, while the Carthaginians retained one-fourth, and he now turned his arms against the Bruttians, and the Greek towns in Magna Graecia. "With the view of making conquests there, he again made mighty preparations, and built a fleet of two hundred and fifty large ships of war." I have shown that the Bruttians were descendants of the Oenotrians, or serfs of the Greek towns, who afterwards came under the dominion of the Lucanians. They were a wild people, but afterwards strangely enough came to form a state. They had just destroyed most of the Greek towns on the coast, so that Agathocles appeared as the protector of the latter, and they submitted to him, having already been greatly reduced. "Tarentum concluded a treaty of subsidies with him in order to obtain his support against the Italian nations; and he seems to have strengthened that city

against the Romans, without, however, coming in contact with them, and his authority was in the end recognised throughout southern Italy." He extended his conquests as far as the coasts of Epirus; for a time he even was master of Coreyra, and his sway extended far into the Adriatic. "He gave his daughter, Lanassa, in marriage to Pyrrhus."

His reign lasted twenty-eight years, that is, beyond the beginning of Olymp. 123, and he attained the age of seventy-two. The lot of so many tyrants, domestic Furies, was in store for him also. A son of Archagathus, who bore the same name, had for a time been his favourite, and Agathocles had given him the command of one of his armies. But, afterwards beginning to distrust him, he bestowed his affections upon a younger son of his own, of the name of Agathocles, whom he destined to be his successor, and whom he wanted to appoint to the command of the army which had before been given to Archagathus. He accordingly sent the young man out to undertake the command; but Archagathus, simply acting in the manner in which a son of the pasha of Egypt would act, ordered his uncle to be put to death, for he felt sure, that, if he gave up his post, he himself would be murdered by the uncle. Thus he was a rebel against his grand-father, not, indeed, openly, as would be the case in such despotisms, but he could not trust him any longer, nor could he place any reliance on his own influence over the minds of his soldiers. It was the opinion of his contemporaries, that, in order to save himself, he induced Maenon, of Segesta, whom the aged Agathocles had had about him as a slave ever since the taking of Segesta, to poison his grand-father, just as the page of Ali Pasha was called upon to poison his master. It is, however, very possible, that this story of the poisoning is a mere invention, for the account of his illness renders it at least doubtful. Why did the man not administer a poison which produced death? The disease, as described, may have been a severe attack of a scorbutic nature. His death (Olymp. 123, 1?) was terrible; he suffered intensely, and was under no delusion as to the fate which awaited the members of his family. His wife, Theogena, or Theoxena, according to Justin, an Egyptian woman, probably an Egyptian princess, perhaps a daughter of a son of Berenice, by her first marriage, was sent to Egypt, with his two youngest children. I am convinced that

the Agathocles who occurs in the reign of Ptolemy Epiphanes, was a descendant of the king; we also meet with descendants of Lysimachus in Alexandria.

Maenon had not acted solely in the interest of Archagathus, but now induced the troops to revolt against him also; and Archagathus, with all his race, was butchered in the camp, near mount Aetna. There now followed a complete disorganisation of the Syracusan state; the Syracusans refused to recognise Maenon, because he was a stranger, and appointed one Hicetas commander of the army. A fearful state of anarchy now followed, which would have completed the misery of Syracuse and Sicily, if it had not been completed already. Wretchedness was ever increasing, and a new and terrible misfortune was superadded.

The mercenaries consisted partly of Greeks and partly of Campanians, Oscans, and Sabellians, who were designated by the general name Mamertines. This name is by no means to be derived from a town, an error which has been occasioned by the ancients themselves. There never existed a town of the name of Mamertum, but Mamertines is a generic term for mercenaries similar to that of the great guard at the beginning of the sixteenth century, or that of the Armagnacs in the history of Switzerland; they formed a compact band. "Maenon had, with the help of the army, forced an entrance into Syracuse; but the mercenaries, beginning to quarrel with the natives, were obliged to change their quarters and leave the city." They then entered the unfortunate town of Messana, which had already been taken once by the Carthaginians in the reign of the younger Dionysius; the population of the ancient Zancle also had once been extirpated, and the place had been basely treated by Agathocles. The Mamertines, pretending that they were on their passage to Italy, demanded quarters in the city. The inhabitants, suspecting nothing, opened their gates; and no sooner had the mercenaries entered than they murdered the men, made the women and children their slaves, and took possession of the town (Olymp. 124, 4). Henceforth they maintained themselves at Messana, under the name of the Mamertines, and Messana now ceased to be a Greek town and became Oscan. The language of the Mamertines remained Oscan for a very long time, but afterwards yielded to the Greek, and the chief magistrate of the place was

called *στρατηγός* throughout the middle ages. The same band of Mamertines made themselves masters of the greater part of the Val Demona; Tauromenium and Catana defended themselves, but the mercenaries advanced as far as mount Aetna and even beyond it.

"All the Greek towns had revolted from Syracuse, and those which were not taken by the Mamertines, remained isolated; the commanders of the army everywhere usurped the supreme power, sometimes in war, and sometimes in concert with the Carthaginians. Thus the Mamertines ruled in the north-east, the Carthaginians in the west, and the tyrants, tearing each other to pieces, in the south. The Sicilians at that time were thoroughly hellenised, and sided with the Greeks." At Syracuse, Hicetas had maintained himself for some years as dynast, when two parties, under Thynion and Sosistratus, rose against him and expelled him. But these, also, began to quarrel, and the one maintained himself in the island, and the other in the city on the mainland. The Carthaginians now also interfered; they occupied Agrigentum, where for a time a prince of the name of Phintias had ruled,³ and advanced as far as the gates of Syracuse. It appeared as if that which the pseudo-Plato in Dio's time had said in his seventh epistle was to become true, that the whole island would become Carthaginian or Oscan."

Sicily was thus torn to pieces and plunged into the deepest misery, at the time when Pyrrhus gained the battle of Asculum against the Romans, which, however, was an unfruitful victory. The Siceliots now implored his assistance, as he was the son-in-law of Agathocles, and he accepted their call. The war against Rome had lost its charms for him, because it was so much protracted. His Italian allies were in despair at his departure; but he left a part of his troops behind, and promised them that he would return, which he could do with justice on the supposition that he should be successful in Sicily. He was, moreover, enabled from Sicily to attack the Roman coasts, and thus had the means, which he could not otherwise hope to obtain, of carrying on the war in quite a different way. It was like the campaign of 1792 and 1793; as the campaign of 1793 was a failure, no man expected any good results from that of 1794. In like manner, Pyrrhus might say—"We cannot get on in this way, we must try and find

³ See below, p. 222.

another." Nothing can be said against this, but Pyrrhus ought to have had the means of carrying out this plan.

The beginning of the campaign (Olymp. 125, 3) was excellent, as was the case in all his undertakings. With great boldness and adroitness he made himself master of the city of Syracuse, where he obtained immense resources. He defeated the Carthaginians wherever he encountered them, drove them from one position after another, and took from them Agrigentum and the whole island, with the exception of Lilybaeum. The siege of that town was as difficult as that of Ostend and La Rochelle; it was just such a point on the sea-coast; it was a very strong fortress with all the advantages of such places, which can always be supplied with provisions from the other side, and was strengthened with all the means of defence which the art of fortification could devise. Lilybaeum was thus impregnable. We know its fortifications from the account of its siege by the Romans. It was one of the strongest places in all antiquity. Pyrrhus therefore wished for peace, and the Carthaginians were much delighted at it: they offered not only to remain neutral, but even to furnish him with ships, and to pay the expenses of the war. He was ready to accept these terms, and by his accepting them, the object of his expedition would have been attained; but the Syracusans succeeded in persuading him to continue the war; they demanded that Lilybaeum should be besieged. From this moment fortune turned against him, and he lost Sicily more quickly than he had gained it. The senselessness of the Siceliots, who wanted perfect security, which was indeed desirable, but could not be attained, unless all was risked, destroyed all the advantages which had been gained, and ruined the whole undertaking of Pyrrhus. The siege of Lilybaeum was commenced amid the same difficulties as the celebrated sieges of Ostend and La Rochelle, and could not be carried out with the same perseverance which insured success to the latter. The Carthaginians constantly relieved their garrison, and threw provisions into the town, so that the enemy could not succeed. Pyrrhus, at last becoming impatient, raised the siege, it is true, somewhat sooner than another general would perhaps have done, but for this he cannot be blamed. He was now indignant at the Syracusans for having been the real obstacle to the successful issue of his undertaking; he ought not to have listened to them

at all, but his fate in this respect was that of many a sanguine man, who allows himself to be misguided against his own better judgment, against which such an interference is truly insolent. Under these circumstances, Pyrrhus, having raised the siege and being highly dispirited, returned to Syracuse.

The fickleness of the Siceliots now shewed itself in its true light: as his expedition had failed, they no longer felt any esteem for him. Conspiracies and insurrections were plotted against him. Agrigentum, which had somewhat recovered, revolted and sought the protection of the Carthaginians, who were again spreading from Lilybaeum over Sicily. In Syracuse, Pyrrhus met with nothing but faithlessness and conspiracy, and as his allies in Italy were in distress, he determined to abandon Sicily and return to Italy (Olymp. 126, 1). According to Justin, he had previously resolved to leave one of his sons, by Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles, at Syracuse, and another in Italy as king. If he did form such a plan, it was now abandoned.

LECTURE XCVIII.

PYRRHUS departed from Sicily with a feeling of exasperation, and unjustly took away with him the Syracusan ships, for they had been given to him only in his capacity of king of Sicily. This he ought not to have done; but he took them to Italy, and as they were manned with Siceliots, we cannot wonder that when attacked by the Carthaginians in the straits of Messina, they did not offer any great resistance. During this engagement he lost many of his men and many military implements, which he had collected in Sicily. The remainder of his forces landed between Locri and Rhegium; but before they reached Locri, the Mamertines had come across from Messina, as Rhegium had been taken possession of by a Roman legion in a similar manner—both places were nests of robbers like those in the country of the Berbers—and were lying in ambush on the road to Locri. Pyrrhus, therefore, had to force his way, and sustained great loss.

His allies in Italy conceived fresh hopes when he arrived, for during his absence they had suffered severely through the Romans. He assembled an army which was larger than his former one, and advanced with it as far as Beneventum. He ought not to have ventured upon a battle, and, notwithstanding his superior numbers, he ought to have protracted the war; but he was tired of the undertaking—a feeling which was not worthy of him—he wanted to bring it to a close, and trusted to his superior force. He accordingly resolved to attack the Romans, who were facing him in a fortified camp under the command of the excellent Curius. The latter was already advanced in years: if he had not accomplished such great military feats, and if he had lived a hundred years earlier, he would in the eyes of Livy, have appeared only as a wild demagogue; but he was one of the first Roman generals of that period, he was bold and cautious, as circumstances required. He was opposed to Pyrrhus in a strongly fortified camp. The Romans, it is said, had learned from Pyrrhus the art of fortifying a camp; but this can be correct only in a certain sense, for the *castrametatio* of the Romans being based entirely upon the *disciplina auguralis*, was no doubt of Italian origin. The Roman mode of fortifying a camp is quite peculiar, and its advantages were quite different from that of the Greeks, as is clear from Polybius. What the Romans learned from Pyrrhus can have consisted only in less important things; it was perhaps at that time that they became acquainted with the real value of camp-fortifications, that their attention was directed to the importance of choosing the right place for a camp, and that they became aware of the necessity of selecting a place where they were not far from water, forage, and the like. Hannibal admired Pyrrhus especially for his great skill in pitching his camp; but this has nothing to do with the mode of fortification.

Pyrrhus, as I said, resolving to attack the Romans, entered upon a very dangerous undertaking: his plan was to break through the whole Roman army; and if it was his intention to bring the war to a close, it must be confessed, that he could not have acted otherwise. He wanted to surround the Romans with a part of his army: many battles have been lost by such attempts. The Roman camp was leaning against the side of a hill; during the night he sent part of his army by a round-about

way into the rear of the Romans, were his men were to occupy the heights, and attack the camp from above during the night, while he himself intended to attack their front from below. But the distance and the difficulties of the march had not been well calculated; in like manner, a battle of modern times which was to have commenced before eight o'clock in the morning, could not begin till two o'clock, because the breadth of a bridge had not been calculated, and because a narrow road in a small place, through which the army had to pass, had not been taken into consideration;¹ and during night-marches such things are still more difficult. The detachment sent out by Pyrrhus was to give a signal before daybreak, and the Romans were to be attacked at once from above and from below. But the detachment mistook its road, and the wind-lights with which they marched, having been extinguished, the Epirots did not arrive on the heights until the day was already far advanced. Pyrrhus, who had come forward from his camp in good time, stood at the foot of the hill in battle array. The outposts of the Romans observed this, and their army was soon ready on all sides. The battle commenced in front, and before the detachment in the rear made its appearance and descended from the height, the matter was already decided by an unfortunate accident: the battle was lost because one elephant was thrown into a state of fury. Pyrrhus being completely defeated, retreated to Tarentum, quitted Italy, and returned to Epirus (Olymp. 126, 2). He left a garrison at Tarentum under the command of Milo, who maintained the place so long as Pyrrhus was alive, but after his death sold it to the Romans. This retreat of Pyrrhus reminds one of the retreat of 1792 from the Champagne, the possibility of which is equally mysterious. The retreat from the Champagne was possible only because a convention had been concluded, to confess which the parties were ashamed, as they are even at this day; forgetting the *ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εὐπρεπές*. Such a convention must also have been concluded between the Romans and Pyrrhus, by which the latter was allowed to escape, for otherwise the Romans might have completely annihilated him: he was thoroughly defeated, the Romans took his camp, and Tarentum was too distant for him. I shall afterwards have occasion to relate the history of the last period of his life.

¹ This seems to allude to the battle of Gross-Görschen.—Ed.

“From this time the history of the West is completely absorbed by that of Rome.” But Trogus appended at the close of the book the history of Hiero. His reign is a consolatory period in the history of Syracuse, after the endless unfortunate occurrences ever since Olymp. 92, which I have related to you. We are now in Olymp. 125 (?), and Hiero appears on the stage a little later, at the beginning of Olymp. 126. One hundred and thirty-six years had elapsed since the beginning of the dissolution; during some part of that period the country had, it is true, not suffered from real devastations, but cheerfulness and happiness existed only in the time of Timoleon, and all the rest was sad. It is surprising and almost inconceivable, how Sicily could endure such a state of things, and how, notwithstanding all this, it could still continue to be a populous country with large and wealthy cities, while afterwards, under the Roman emperors, in the midst of a long peace, it was a deserted wilderness. It is difficult to account for this phenomenon: circumstances must have been operating, which have hitherto not been taken into due consideration, or which we perhaps do not clearly see, and through which the country was restored. Livonia, *e. g.*, at present cannot recover itself at all; the country, it is true, is better off now, than it was one hundred years ago, but still it is, as if its soul had disappeared. Germany, after the thirty years’ war, recovered with much greater rapidity than Denmark after the contemporary devastations of the fearful war, which, however, was of much shorter duration. From such comparisons we can understand the gradual decay of Sicily. During the Norman period in the middle ages, Sicily was, comparatively speaking, a flourishing country, and continued to be so until the time of Anjou, when destruction and misery commenced again, and have continued to the present day. The population of Sicily has indeed been doubled since the sixteenth century; but there is no life in it, it is like a corpse. But it is remarkable, that while Sicily is so lifeless, Messina has risen so much. After the earthquakes, that city could not recover at all; even the insurrection against the Spaniards in 1672 had greatly reduced the place; this was increased in 1753 by the plague, which carried off 43,000 men in the city; then came the earthquakes, by which the population was reduced to 25,000; and that calamity was followed by

contagious diseases. But then a new impulse was given to it during the war of the revolution; the English who, in their war against Murat, came to Sicily, took up their head quarters at Messina, and through them the population awoke from its lethargy to activity; and at present Messina has a population of between 70,000 and 80,000, and commerce and trade are flourishing.

Pyrrhus left Syracuse in a deplorable condition, "and he himself took with him a part of their forces." The Syracusans must have concluded a peace with Carthage, about which we have no information; and in that peace Agrigentum must have been permanently ceded to the Carthaginians, for henceforth it is no longer mentioned. Shortly after Agathocles, we find Phintias acting a prominent part at Agrigentum; but it is very difficult to fix his date, just as it is difficult to fix that of the great queen Philistis, whose name appears on coins and in the theatre of Syracuse; my belief, however, is, that she was a wife of Hiero. The Syracusans practically no longer thought of engaging in a war with Carthage; Theocritus, indeed, might dream of such a thing, he might advise them, under the command of Hiero, to drive the Phoenicians beyond the sea; but a poet only could speak thus. The enemy from whom the Syracusans had much to suffer, was a much more ignoble one, the Mamertines, who were masters of nearly the whole of the Val Demona; they advanced beyond Mylae, and Tyndaris and Cephaloedium (Cefalú) were in their hands, "and even at Catana the tyrant Mamercus was an Oscan." The Syracusans employed mercenaries against them; but necessity compelled them again to take up arms themselves also, and this did them good and was beneficial to their state. These are the preparations celebrated by Theocritus in his idyl entitled *Charites*, a beautiful poem, composed by him in early life.

In the camps of those mercenaries there existed a contempt of the authorities at Syracuse, like that which is always felt by the armies of republics, which carry on war against the magistrates who remain at home; the contempt is a very natural one, and the same was entertained, for example, by the French army against the Directory. Hiero was strategus: he was the son of Hierocles, a man of high rank and influence, his mother was a slave or a freed woman; but during the

confusion of those times, no one heeded the distinction between an *ingenuus* and a *libertinus*. The army proclaimed Hiero king (Olymp. 127, 4); he was very young, but generally known and esteemed by the Syracusans, and the feeling that it was quite useless to attempt to preserve the republic was so general, that he was cheerfully recognised as king. His kingdom was very small, extending on the one side as far as Catana, and on the other as far as Gela: it was the southern third of the island. "He got rid of the mutinous mercenaries by stratagem, leading them into an ambush of the Mamertines, where they were all cut to pieces, and he now formed a strong militia of citizens."

With Carthage he was at peace, and he was seeking to establish friendly relations with the Romans. When the latter were besieging Rhegium, he rendered them assistance by preventing the Mamertines conveying reinforcements to Rhegium by sea, and was thus extremely useful to them, as they had no fleet. He also supplied the Roman army with provisions during their long siege against the desperate defence of the mutineers; the Romans were greatly indebted to him. After this Hiero directed his arms against the Mamertines; the Romans had probably consented to his conquering Messina for himself.

The Romans and Carthaginians were still allies, but *il y a des amis qui nous aiment, et il y en a qui nous détestent*; and thus the two nations hated each other, and would have been cordially delighted at each other's misfortune. The publicists of the time (and there did exist persons who discussed the question as to how far the laws of nations, treaties, etc., had been violated) gravely and warmly disputed whether the Romans or the Carthaginians were in the right. The fact is, that there did not exist a formal treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, whereby the latter were prevented from acquiring possessions in Italy; but that such should not be done, was tacitly recognised as a matter of course. No one can doubt, that in ancient times, when the Roman dominion was small, there existed a treaty expressly stipulating that the Carthaginians should not settle in any part of Italy which was occupied by the Romans. Afterwards, as the Romans extended their dominion, the same principle was observed, although it was not renewed in the subsequent treaties, such as that of the year 406, and the one concluded in 474, which, however, was

a defensive alliance against Pyrrhus, and, therefore, of quite a different nature. The general supposition, no doubt, was, that the question was self-evident. The Carthaginians, however, now endeavoured to make themselves masters of Tarentum, while the Romans were negotiating with the Tarentines. A Carthaginian fleet appeared before Tarentum, and an understanding was kept up with persons in the city. But their plan was thwarted by the Romans. Afterwards, the Carthaginians, of course, declared that it had been a misunderstanding, and that their admiral had acted without orders from his government; but the Romans henceforth likewise ceased to consider themselves restrained by any consideration, and both nations felt irritated against each other. The Romans were greatly tempted to cross over into Sicily, but they did not know how this was to be effected without a fleet. For this reason they were anxious to see Hiero powerful in Sicily, in order to weaken the Carthaginians, according to the policy expressed in 1807 by Napoleon: *il faut avoir des petits états entre les grands pour avoir des coups de poing contre les coups de canons*. The Romans thus wished to have Hiero as a middle power between themselves and the Carthaginians, calculating that whatever he should take from the Carthaginians would fall into their own hands. The Mamertines at Messana being Italians, were, indeed, more nearly related to them than the Syracusans; but the cruelties of those Oscans had filled them with horror. During the siege of Rhegium, they had so much offended the Romans by supporting the rebels, that if Hiero had then struck a blow against them, the Romans would have assisted him.

But a long time passed away before Hiero undertook anything against the Mamertines. During this interval circumstances became altered, and it was then in vain that he sought the assistance of the Romans. He now gained a battle against the Mamertines; but in his difficulties, the Mamertines having become too formidable, he had entered into an alliance with Carthage. The Carthaginians were ready to do anything to obtain possession of Messana in order to secure themselves against the Romans, who were already masters of all Italy. Hiero's situation was most painful. It was at this juncture that he gained the victory I just mentioned, and he then advanced with the Carthaginians against Messana. The

Mamertines being hard pressed, for the Carthaginians and Hiero were encamped at their gates, sought the assistance of the Romans, who after a long struggle between shame and their own interest, resolved to receive the Mamertines as their subjects and send them succour (Olymp. 129, 1). This gave rise to the first Punic war.

But after the Romans had taken Messana under their protection, circumstances became as complicated as in a comedy: the Mamertines were divided into two parties, one of which had applied to Rome, while the other, wishing to surrender the town to the Carthaginians, opened their gates to them. The Carthaginians thus were to some extent the protectors of the place, but as they had been invited only by a party, the great body of the people did not trust them. Hiero was pressed on all sides, for while he was deceived by the Carthaginians who took Messana for themselves, he had become involved in a war with Rome on account of that very town of Messana. The knot was thus formed; and the Romans cut it by a bold undertaking. With great audacity they sent some troops over into the island; they were admitted into the town by the Roman party; the other party having neglected to occupy the acropolis; the few Carthaginians who were in the town were easily driven out of it. The Roman army under Ap. Claudius then crossed over, and having first defeated Hiero, before he was able to join the Carthaginians, they overpowered the small Carthaginian force. Tauromenium was taken, and Hiero, being pursued up to the very gates of Syracuse, concluded a peace, which he was entitled to do, because the Carthaginians were faithless and neglected to protect him. "He obtained tolerable terms: Tauromenium and Catana were separated and declared free, and he retained the remainder of his kingdom, which comprised about the extent of the Val di Noto."

Henceforth Hiero remained at peace with the Romans until his death, that is, for the next forty years. His kingdom was small and limited, but it was a rich country; his government was extremely mild, and the country would have completely recovered under it, had not the Punic war broken out, during which Hiero was obliged to make immense efforts to satisfy the demands of the Romans. They utterly drained the country, although it remained free from the devastations of the

war, and from the burden of Roman garrisons. During the siege of Syracuse by Marcellus, a great part of the city was unoccupied, which had been inhabited in the time of Dionysius, just as is the case at Delhi and Ispahan: in the latter place you may ride for an hour over ruins, before you come to the inhabited centre; even without these ruins, however, the central part which is inhabited, would make a large and wealthy city. The government of Hiero, therefore, was not able to raise Syracuse, nevertheless it certainly deserves praise. He was one of those persons, who without exactly doing great things, yet are distinguished, and deserving of great respect. There is one statement respecting him, which I could wish had not been preserved; it is one which has often been overlooked, and occurs in a curious writer, who, it is true, has a number of apocryphal stories, but among them also many which are true. I mean the scholiast on the Ibis, who relates that Theocritus was put to death by Hiero for having offended his son Gelo. I wish his statement were not true, but there is probably some truth in it: in the "*Bibliotheca Græca*" it is not noticed.

Hiero treated his whole kingdom like an immense estate from which he derived his revenues; and they were enormous, as he received the tenth of all its produce. He employed them in adorning the city, and was liberal towards the Greeks. "He also patronised the arts, though not those of the muses, for Theocritus, that extraordinary genius, did not live with him, but at Alexandria. But he was a passionate supporter of the practical arts, as mechanics and everything connected with mathematics; hence Archimedes was treated with such great distinction, and obtained all the means for carrying out his projects. Thus Syracuse, Alexandria, and Pergamus, now rivalled each other in promoting the arts, for poetry did not produce any great things: it was the age of epigrams, anthologies, and the Pseudo-Anacreontics. Among the wonderful things of Archimedes, I may mention the gigantic ship which Hiero sent to Alexandria laden with corn, merely to show what mechanics could do at Syracuse. Hiero was a man of simple habits, and both he and his son appeared in the popular assembly of their fellow-citizens as private persons. He ruled with perfect security, needing no satellites, who would only have oppressed

the citizens. He was regarded as a legitimate king, for the Syracusans had at length become convinced, that the republic was an impossibility in those troublous times."

Hiero died at the advanced age of ninety (Olymp. 141, 2), and was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus, whose folly caused his own ruin and that of his kingdom.

The other towns of Sicily as well as Syracuse, suffered very much during the first Punic war. Tauromenium fared better, and so also did some places in the interior, as Centoripa, which even rose to a certain degree of prosperity; but Agrigentum was completely devastated; it became a mere heap of ruins, and a small place arose upon them as a sad picture of its former greatness; the Mamertines again became powerful.

The condition of the towns in Magna Graecia was almost equally sad. Tarentum was not indeed taken by the sword, Milo having sold it, but it was obliged to surrender at discretion: it had to pay tribute, and many of its inhabitants went into exile. Metapontum was still in a tolerable condition; Thurii was quite poor and wretched, and Croton lay altogether prostrate. Rhegium had been taken by the Romans from the Campanians, and restored to its ancient inhabitants. On the eastern coast Posidonia had completely disappeared (?), and Hipponium had become Bruttian. Velia and Neapolis alone continued to be of some importance as political communities; although the latter being allied with the Samnites had been taken by the Romans.

When Hannibal appeared, the Greek towns, with the exception of Velia, Naples, and Rhegium, joined him, and were punished for it by the Romans. After that time they only retained their Greek names and the Greek language, which extended also to the surrounding people, who either spoke Greek alone, or, like the Bruttians, both Greek and their own vernacular. Those parts remained Greek, until the Normans conquered Italy; and we do not know how the Italian language has become established there. I have had in my own hands Greek documents of Terra de Lecce² as recent as the fifteenth century, and in Calabria, Greek was spoken as late as the sixteenth; divine worship was conducted there according to the Constantinopolitan ritual in the Greek language, and the

² This name has been supplied by conjecture; the only MS. in which the name occurs has Terra di Lagi. Terra di Lavoro can hardly be meant.—ED.

learned monk Barlaam travelled through Italy without understanding Italian or Latin: nay, even now there are some mountain villages in which, owing to their isolation, the Greek language is preserved.

LECTURE XCIX.

“AT the time when Pyrrhus returned from Italy, Antigonus Gonatas had just taken possession of the throne of Macedonia.” He was the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Phila, the daughter of Antipater, so that through his mother he was a grandson of Antipater, and a step-brother of Craterus, the son of Craterus. His surname Gonatas is not to be derived from the Thessalian town of Gonni, as some persons, for example, Porphyrius, strangely imagine; I have shown this in my treatise on Eusebius; he cannot have been born in Thessaly, for his father was in open enmity with Cassander, “and at the time of his birth, Thessaly was in the hands of the latter; and how is it possible to conceive that Demetrius should have left his wife during her pregnancy in such hands”? He was no doubt born in Asia. The word Gonatas still exists in modern Greek, which cannot surprise us, as the modern Greek has altogether a Macedonian basis. As the modern Greeks have the termination *εας* for *ευς*, *e.g.*, βασιλέας, so the Latins also use *Areas* for Ἄρεως. Gonatas in modern Greek signifies *ocreae*, κνεμίδες; and as the emperor Caius, from his shoes, was called Caligula, so Antigonus for some reason or other was surnamed Gonatas. “The quantity of the name also is doubtful; in modern Greek it makes a dactyl.” Antigonus had not recovered Macedonia till after the lapse of ten years.¹ In the interval he had ruled over a very scattered empire, and he seems to have resided at Demetrias in Magnesia. Whether during that period he was still in possession of Corinth and Chalcis, or whether

¹ In a note (apparently belonging to the Lectures of 1825), Niebuhr remarks, that Antigonus in the interval (about Olymp. 124) was in possession of Macedonia, and that he was driven from it by Ptolemy Ceraunus. This statement does not occur in any of the notes taken in the lecture-room. It is, however, added, that he could not have taken possession of Macedonia till after the death of Lysimachus.—ED.

they were already in the hands of Craterus, I cannot say with certainty, but I think that the latter was the case. He was, however, master of a part of Thessaly. It was not till Olymp. 126 that he became king of Macedonia. Chronology here is in the most terrible confusion; but I must refer you to my treatise on Eusebius, where I have endeavoured to make the matter as clear as it can be made.

“Throughout this period, Antigonus was at war with Ptolemy Ceraunus, Antiochus Soter, and Ptolemy Philadelphus, and carried on a petty maritime war with them.” But during the same period a general Greek war was carried on against him “with the aid of Egypt” (Olymp. 124, 4). This war is mentioned only in a chapter of Justin, by means of which we must find our way by a careful interpretation; and for this reason the war has been overlooked by all who have written on the Amphictyons. It had its origin in the Amphictyony. Justin, who mentions its date, however, does not call it an Amphictyonic war. The fact is that the Greeks sought a pretext for uniting their forces, in order to rid themselves of the dominion of Antigonus, and therefore engaged in a war against the Aetolians, who were allied with Antigonus.²

It is not difficult to understand that, under the Amphictyonic pretext, the Spartans again obtained the assistance of the allies, and recovered the supremacy. Sparta had the supreme command of the army.

Areus (or as the Latins call him, Areas), who was then king of Sparta, as well as his son Acrotatus, was very different from the earlier Spartan kings. In his reign Sparta

² In Niebuhr's copy of Tittmann's work, “Ueber den Bund der Amphictyonen,” the following note is written on the fly-leaf, which explains what is said here in the text, and which seems to have been written by Niebuhr before he went to Rome. “To p. 209. In the later history of Greece, there occurs an Amphictyonic war, which has been generally overlooked. The only passage about it is in Justin, xxiv. 1. Almost all the Greek states united, in Olymp. 124, under the command of Sparta against Antigonus Gonatas and his allies, the Aetolians; but in order to avoid the appearance of waging war against the king, they declared war against the Aetolians, on the pretext that they had taken possession of the sacred territory of Cirrha. The war turned out as unfortunately as the preceding sacred wars. Justin, it is true, does not speak of the Amphictyons; but they can be recognised nevertheless, for they alone were entitled to watch that the Cirrhaean plain remained untouched. In like manner they could thus conceal their military preparations, under the pretext of a religious execution. If we concede this, it is clear that Sparta at that time had recovered its vote in the Amphictyonic council.”—Er.

again became a state of some importance, not through his power, but through his name, and perhaps more particularly through his good fortune. The war was carried on with Egyptian money; with it Areus raised the armies which he commanded, and the wars continued for a long time. Egypt assisted with her fleet, but gave no land forces, which were furnished by Areus. His troops flocked to him on account of his name; he was like some of the princes in the thirty years' war, like Francis von Lauenburg, or Count Christian of Mansfeld, or even Duke Bernard of Weimar, whose importance likewise consisted solely in his name and his personal character. According to the extant accounts, Areus does not exactly seem to have been a great general; but we will leave this question undecided. We are told in a fragment from Phylarchus³ in Athenaeus, that Areus lived in great luxury, and quite contrary to the Spartan usage. We possess coins with his name (*Βασιλέως Ἀρέως*), and he is the only Spartan king of whom we have coins; they are tetradrachmae. He imitated the Macedonian kings, playing the part of a king, as Leonidas did afterwards. "He kept troops with Egyptian subsidies, and having a pension from Egypt, he kept a court, at which he imitated the pomp of the Lagidae and Seleucidae, while at Sparta, being controlled by the ephors, he had no regal authority at all, and his country was a country of beggars." Few people at that time heeded the laws of Lycurgus.

This Amphictyonic war, as I said before, was commenced against the Aetolians, who were constantly extending their power, and had even then pushed their boundaries far beyond where they had originally been. The Ozolian Locrians disappear altogether, they had entered the relation of sympathy with the Aetolians, and the latter had incorporated with themselves many a Phocian town. The Aetolians had taken possession of, and cultivated the sacred plain of Cirrha, which was accursed ground. For this they were accused by the Amphictyons, and an expedition was undertaken against them under the command of Areus, which, however, had the

³ "His history with all its faults was no doubt a valuable work, and would throw great light upon this period. It was composed about Olymp. 140, at Alexandria, partly with Alexandrian views and partly with a species of Greek enthusiasm; but those very dreams raised him above the mass of contemporary writers, who were thoroughly servile towards those who employed them."

same unfortunate termination as the Amphictyonic expeditions usually had, just like the executionary troops of the German empire: hostility and insubordination broke out in the Amphictyonic army itself. The allied troops assembled near Delphi; but when they advanced into the districts occupied by the Aetolians, the latter, well acquainted with the localities, fell upon them and defeated them, whereupon they dispersed in a disgraceful manner. Areus did not succeed in reassembling the army, and with Egyptian money he alone continued the war.

During this war Piræus appears already in the hands of the Athenians and their allies, but we do not know how they obtained possession of it. When, after the downfall of Demetrius, Pyrrhus was at Athens, Macedonian garrisons were still in Munychia and Piræus.

The ignorance of Justin places this episode in an entirely false light. It is, however, possible that the Aetolians, as he states, were then allied with Antigonus, although they were enemies of Demetrius. "This war forms the beginning of another interference of Egypt in the affairs of Greece, for since the time when Demetrius Poliorcetes removed the garrisons of Ptolemy Soter from Corinth and Sicyon, the Egyptian kings do not seem to have interfered in the affairs of Greece. This new interference tore Greece to pieces, and owing to the subsidies which Sparta received, the power of that state rose again."

These events cannot be arranged with chronological accuracy; but I believe that they belong to the 124th Olympiad, "that is, the period after the death of Lysimachus, while Ptolemy Ceraunus was at war with Antiochus and Antigonus."

After the Amphictyonic war, Justin passes on to Ptolemy Ceraunus and the affairs of Macedonia. He reigned two years, or one year and a half (Olymp. 124, 4), and during that period he committed crime upon crime. His sister Arsinoë, the widow of Lysimachus, was living with two sons at Cassandrea: the Macedonian princesses had such towns as places in which they resided as widows, and in which, in case of a change of dynasty, they might be safe against any hostile machinations. Cassandrea quickly rose to prosperity, and its possession had an immense charm for her brother. If Arsinoë

had placed herself under the protection of Ptolemy Philadelphus, her step-brother, the latter would have had a very strong place in Macedonia, where his fleet might have been stationed, and her sons might then have placed themselves at the head of the malcontents in Macedonia, and have come forward as pretenders. The simplest way for Ptolemy Ceraunus now was to cause his sister and her sons to be murdered, and the question as to whether this should be done or not could not excite any scruples, according to the principles of that time; the only doubt was, how it should be done. We here see completely the same state of demoralisation as during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Italy. When you read Galuzzi's history of Tuscany under the Medici, you will find there quite the same things in the history of Cosmo I. and his sons; you will see, *e.g.*, how Cosmo caused his own daughter Isabella, the wife of Pedro de Toledo, to be strangled, having got possession of her by treachery; you will see how terribly faithless his sons Francis and Peter were towards each other, and how one tried to ensnare the other: such are all the Italian usurpers during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Viscontis, Carraras, Ludovico Moro at Milan, and others. Such, also, was the morality of the Macedonians at the time; it arose from the usurpation which could not firmly establish itself. Such things always accompany usurpations: the beneficent halo of traditional regal power does not attach to usurpers, and even the best have always been in danger, and have tried to maintain themselves by terror; very few have in their perpetual dangers remained free from cruelty. When such a family of usurpers has reigned for a time, that beneficent prestige of regal power conferred by God attaches itself to it, and the acts of cruelty decrease. Thus the horrors cease in the reign of the grandsons of Cosmo de Medici; and in like manner, the latter period of the Macedonian kings, whatever crimes they may have perpetrated, is no longer so terrible as things had been under the immediate successors of Alexander and their descendants. In order to carry out his plan, Ptolemy sued for the hand of his own sister, according to the notions of the family of the Lagidae, who had adopted the Egyptian views about marriage with a sister. Arsinoë was at first very timid, and her eldest son, though still a child, foresaw what was to come, and warned his mother, saying that the whole was a

treacherous scheme. But Arsinoë was a silly woman, who allowed herself to be deceived by the prospect of becoming a queen, just as afterwards Nicaea allowed herself to be gained over by Antigonos Gonatas. She confided in him, opened the gates of the fortress, and admitted him into the town. But now the clouds vanished from her eyes, and she discovered too late what his intentions were. Ptolemy treacherously took possession of the gates of the town, and the first thing he did was to murder the two boys before the eyes of their mother; Arsinoë herself was stripped of all her ornaments (for the avarice of those men was as great as their other vices), and ignominiously sent to Samothrace. She afterwards returned to Egypt, where she spent the remainder of her life. The history of that period reveals to us an interesting but horrible spectacle; it is by no means as monotonous or as unimportant as we are easily tempted to imagine.

This crime of Ptolemy Ceraunus was soon followed by its punishment—the arrival of the Gauls. They had passed onward through Lombardy towards the south. As during the great migration of nations, there were certain roads, on which one nation followed another, so at that time the great migration was directed towards Italy, and all the Gallic tribes were pressing on towards that country. But their defeat at Sentinum, and the extirpation of the Senones and Boians by the Romans, damped their ardour. Italy, after those events, had lost its charms for them, and the hosts which came after them turned towards Illyricum as far as mount Scardus and Scomius, where several tribes of their race were already settled. There the hosts, being continually pressed on by new comers, accumulated immensely.

As early as Olymp. 101, the Triballi, who in the time of Herodotus (Olymp. 90) occupied the plains of lower Hungary, Slavonia, and the country about the embouchure of the Save into the Danube, almost as far as Vienna, are found as a migrating nation in the neighbourhood of Abdera, on the frontiers of Macedonia. Why had they emigrated? Diodorus foolishly states that they were driven from their country by droughts; the cause was probably the Gauls, who had destroyed Rome as early as Olymp. 98, for the Gallic tribe of the Scordiscans occur in the country of the Triballi, who were, no doubt, pushed by them into Bulgaria, the Roman Moesia, and

towards mount Haemus, where we find them about Olymp. 111. A further mention of this advancement of the Gauls towards the East occurs in Scylax of Caryanda, who wrote about Olymp. 106: he speaks of a *μυχὸς* of the Adriatic, that is, Istria and Trieste, saying that it was inhabited by Gauls, *ἀπολειφθέντες τῆς στρατίας*. These are the Gauls who had remained behind from the swarms that had penetrated farther into Illyricum against the Triballi, and had settled in Hungary. In Olymp. 111, 1, when Alexander crossed mount Haemus, he found the Triballi in Bulgaria, and the Getae, who in the time of Herodotus had dwelt there, were occupying Wallachia, into which the Triballi had pushed them, while the Scythians were driven eastward; he also received an embassy from Celts in Illyricum on the Adriatic.

Considerably later, Olymp. 118, we hear of the emigration of the Autariatae, a great Illyrian people, which Scylax describes as living about the lake of Scutari. In the earlier times, they seem to have been united with the Gauls and involved in a war against the Triballi; but being now overpowered by the Scordiscans, who occupied Bosnia and Slavonia, they were obliged to emigrate, and the whole of them, with their women and children, turned towards Macedonia; but Cassander compelled them to form settlements about mount Orbelus beyond Thrace.⁴ We thus see that, as early as Olymp. 118, the Gauls had advanced as far as the frontiers of Macedonia.

The fact that we know nothing of the further progress of the Gauls from Olymp. 118 until their invasion of Macedonia in the reign of Ptolemy Ceraunus, cannot surprise us, considering the scanty information we have of that period; we have only an isolated allusion of an unsuccessful expedition into Thrace, which was undertaken during that interval under a king Cambaules, and which is spoken of by Pausanias in his account of Phocis.

When afterwards the swarms from Italy arrived, the crowds accumulated about Scomius and Scardus, and continued to be pushed forward by succeeding hosts. Their current then pushed onward over the mountains in three armies: the one

⁴ "The story is that they were driven out of their country by a rain of frogs: and such also is the supposition of Justin (xv. 2), and credulous editors have converted the frogs into Abderites; but the whole is a silly story."

marched towards the Triballi and Thrace, the second towards Paeonia, and the third appearing on the western frontiers of Macedonia, demanded habitations and tribute from Ptolemy. This happened in Olymp. 125, 1.

Now it is said, that Ptolemy answered with defiance and resolution, that they must sue for peace, and that he would grant it, if they would deliver up their arms, and give up their princes as hostages. Such is his answer in Justin; but it is only a sign of the want of judgment of that epitomiser. The truth most probably is, that Ptolemy returned them the same answer, which Valens once gave to the Goths, that he would receive them and assign them habitations, if they would give up their arms and their princes as hostages. For Macedonia was quite desolate, as France was depopulated under Louis XIV. The excellent bishop Massillon, in his matchless funeral oration on Louis XIV., says, that the desolation of the country and of the towns, and afterwards all kinds of humiliation, were the consequence of all the previous splendour; such also was the case in Macedonia, and Ptolemy would certainly not have had any objection to receive such colonists. Subsequently Gallic colonies did establish themselves in Upper Macedonia, as is stated by Livy in his account of the division after the time of Perseus. Such probably was the plan of Ptolemy, as it was that of Valens in after-times, and he hoped also to be able to recruit his army. But the Goths deceived the Romans, and the Gauls despising the offer, declared that they would conquer by force of arms the country they had demanded. And they broke into Macedonia with the same rage as they had attacked Rome, and with the same rapidity in their movements.

Ptolemy drew his forces together, but foolishly declined the auxiliaries offered to him by the Dardanians,⁵ and thoughtlessly ventured upon a battle, the result of which was the same as that of the battle on the Allia. No army could resist the vehemence of the Celts, without having been previously accustomed to their appearance, and their horrid war cries, and without having learned to sustain the shock with which the intoxicated and infuriated Celts rushed to battle.

⁵ “ According to the genealogical synopsis of the Illyric tribes in the *Illyrica* of Appian, which was probably derived from Posidonius, these Dardanians belonged to the Illyrians.”—1826.

Familiarity with these things alone rendered resistance possible. "With their usual vehemence, and with their broad swords, they threw down even the phalanx, as in the time of Prince Gallizin the Janissaries with their sabres threw themselves upon the Russian lines and overcame the bayonets by terror." Ptolemy, with all his crimes, was an able warrior; he fought bravely, until being severely wounded, he fell into the hands of the Gauls (Olymp. 125, 1), who murdered him: the flower of the Macedonian army fell on the field of battle; it was a defeat like that of king Sebastian in Africa.

We know nothing of the consequences of this victory, except that there followed a state of anarchy in Macedonia, which lasted four years. A panic spread over the whole country, and even a number of towns no doubt succumbed to the Gauls; the open country was thoroughly inundated by the Gauls, and all the population was put to the sword or dragged into slavery, as is usually done by the Tartars and Turks, the latter of whom, in 1683, carried away from Austria no less than 200,000 men. "There was no heir to the throne, for Ptolemy had left no issue; the families of Cassander and Lysimachus were extirpated, and Pyrrhus happened to be in Italy;" civil disturbances breaking out among the Macedonians, whom the death of their king had left to themselves, completed the misfortune. One Meleager, a brother of Ptolemy Ceraunus, came forward as king, and then Antipater, a son of Philip, the brother of Cassander; but neither was able to maintain himself on account of the divisions among the Macedonians. What became of Meleager is uncertain, but Antipater afterwards appears again.

In these circumstances, Sosthenes, a noble Macedonian, assembled an army, and successfully resisted the enemy. His exploits attracted so much attention, that the Macedonians proclaimed him their king. But he did not accept the royal title for himself, but only demanded that they should take their oath of allegiance to him as a strategus; he is, however, enumerated among the kings of Macedonia. His modesty does him honour. When the barbarians had murdered and plundered to their hearts' content, they gradually retreated, and Sosthenes restored a portion of Macedonia. But two years later, there followed a fresh invasion of the barbarians on their expedition to Delphi; he met them with all his forces,

but the battle was lost, and the brave and worthy man died in consequence of illness (Olymp. 125, 2).

There now followed again a state of anarchy. Several pretenders arose against one another, who are mentioned in the fragments of Porphyrius on Macedonian history: Antipater came forward again, then Ptolemy, a son of Lysimachus, Arrhidaeus, and Antigonus. Antipater appears for a time to have had the upper hand, at least he was in possession of Macedonia at the time when Antigonus Gonatas gained the sovereignty. Among the pretenders we also find Eurydice, the daughter of Lysimachus, and widow of Antipater the son of Cassander; she being in possession of Cassandrea, restored its inhabitants to freedom. This must have happened after Olymp. 125, 1, when it was yet in the hands of Ptolemy Ceraunus, and before Olymp. 126, 1, in which year Antigonus Gonatas overpowered his competitors. We should scarcely know anything about that period, had not fortunately a kind Providence preserved some isolated statements here and there, and in Eusebius the excerpts from Porphyrius on the chronology of the Macedonian kings.

Four years of perfect misery thus passed away, until Antigonus Gonatas, after having concluded peace with Antiochus Soter, proceeded from Greece and Thessaly to the coast of Macedonia, and was readily recognised by the Macedonians (Olymp. 126, 1). He restored the kingdom of Macedonia. From a Greek point of view, as well as from that of common humanity, we can only detest him; but, as far as the Macedonian nation is concerned, he was a benefactor, a real Camillus, and he was even more to Macedonia than Camillus was to Rome. Still, however, Camillus was the second Romulus because of the character he gave to the nation, and I am surprised that Plutarch did not choose the parallel between Camillus and Antigonus Gonatas, but compared Camillus with Pericles; the other would have formed a true parallel, and Pericles is altogether different from Camillus. How Antigonus restored the kingdom, and how many vicissitudes of fortune he had to pass through before his power was firmly established, I shall relate to you afterwards; for the present I must direct your attention to the expedition of the Gauls against Delphi.

This expedition occurred in Olymp. 125, 2; Justin places it

somewhat too late. The great defeat of Ceraunus happened in the second year after Pyrrhus' departure to Italy, and while Pyrrhus followed the Romans as far as Praeneste; the news of these occurrences, no doubt, contributed to incline Pyrrhus to make peace, for Epirus was quite defenceless, and he would have lost his basis if the Gauls had directed their arms against Epirus.

The treasures of Delphi were at that time, perhaps, just as much an empty name, as the treasures of Loretto in the year 1797. The French were quite impatient to plunder the place, and calculated how many millions it contained; but for a long time previous, little thieves had been at work, and instead of jewels, the treasury contained glass, and common metal instead of gold: "there was no more than was sufficient to provide a few mistresses of French generals with trinkets." The treasures of the Delphic temple were originally like those of the Capitol of Rome, where masses of solid gold were deposited and consecrated. Such consecration of masses of gold and silver in temples is an ancient practice, and occurs even in Homer: it is the *λαῖνος οὐδός*, and the bricks of Croesus were nothing but such an ancient kind of donaria of gold and silver. Works of art in beautiful forms did not become customary till later times, and afterwards, when barbarism broke in upon Rome, and when art disappeared, the Romans returned to the ancient rude way: masses were melted down, and deposited in the temple. This we find noticed in Petronius, about the middle of the third century, who in general describes the disappearance of the arts. He relates, that annually a new year's gift was presented to Jupiter, consisting of solid gold: the senate consecrated to the god about one thousand pounds, which were deposited in the Capitol. In the time of Gallienus, when the barbarians broke in upon Rome, that gold was no doubt taken away. In the same way the Phocians had acted in Delphi. When they plundered the temple, Delphi was rich in the most precious things; but all the gold and silver that was there, the Phocians had converted into coin. Gilt bronzes were still very numerous. In order to make up for their robberies, the Phocians were indeed ordered every year to pay sixty talents as a tribute to the temple; but we may easily imagine how the money was applied under the dominion of the Macedonians. There existed

no doubt a Macedonian officer to receive the money, who sent it to Pella; and thither undoubtedly all that money was sent. Nevertheless, the reports of immense treasures attracted the Gauls to Delphi; it is possible that these reports had arisen from the large gilt bronze statues which adorned the roof of the temple, and which the country people may have taken for solid gold. Hence they marched to Delphi, as they went wherever there was anything to plunder.

Their approach united the Greeks for their last common undertaking. In the account of the rhetorician Pausanias, this looks very grand and heroic; but unfortunately it is something very different, something very trifling, as the account itself will show. Many of the Greeks assembled in the expectation that the Gauls would not advance so far; and when they nevertheless forced their way across the mountains, all retreated and dispersed. The Athenians obtained the greatest credit from the fact that they received so many fugitives in their fleet, and conveyed them to Euboea, where they could not be reached by the Gauls, who had no ships.

LECTURE C.

IN regard to the expedition against Delphi, we have only two accounts, and in reality only one of them, I mean the one contained in the tenth book of Pausanias, deserves serious attention; for the other which is given by Justin, is quite fabulous, and it is surprising, that in a dry and sober historical period, resembling that of Germany about one hundred years ago, such mythical accounts could become current. It is just the same as if the wars which were carried on one hundred years ago, as, *e.g.*, the siege of Gibraltar in 1729, or the Polish war of 1735 and the like, were adorned with marvellous occurrences. "I think I can explain this singular phenomenon by the supposition that ancient heroic poems were applied to recent occurrences; the ancient songs about the Persian invasion were transferred to that of the Gauls, as is the case with the popular songs of the modern Greeks and the Servians.

Such an explanation is surely more reasonable than to reject the whole as a fabrication, as was done fifty years ago. The higher feeling, moreover, of the divine interference when a man is saved, is so natural, that we ought to rejoice to find such a feeling at that period of moral degradation. And the Gauls actually did experience that which happened to the French army in Russia." The account in Pausanias is probably derived from Phylarchus, who together with Duris, were the authorities for this period; it is possible also that the work of Diyllus may have extended thus far.

According to these accounts, Brennus and Acichorius assembled an army of 150,000 foot and 60,000 horse, 20,000 of whom were knights, each of whom was accompanied by two servants on horseback; but these are only indefinite numbers, meaning that the Gauls came in great multitudes; they did not carry their women and children with them, it being only a predatory expedition. They took their road through Macedonia, defeated Sosthenes, and overran Thessaly, perpetrating all the horrors common during a migration of nations; for wherever they appeared, everything was ravaged, and the people took refuge in their fortified towns. In Thessaly many places capitulated with them, and it is clear that Thessalians and also Aenianians served in the Gallic armies, as they had served under Xerxes. We must not imagine that their expedition was like those of the Huns and Mongoles, under whom all life was destroyed; but it resembled that of other barbarians, like the migration, *e. g.*, of the Goths, under whom the countries were fearfully ravaged, but yet the inhabitants were not extirpated. Wherever they met with resistance, they raged like the Huns and Mongoles; but where the people submitted, their lives were spared.

The Greeks had assembled at Thermopylae. All the Greeks between Thessaly and Peloponnesus were united against the enemy: the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, withdrew from the common cause, because they relied on the fact that the Gauls had no ships; they, accordingly, confined themselves to defending the Isthmus of Corinth; the inhabitants of Patrae alone assisted the Aetolians. The Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians, Megarians, Athenians, and Aetolians, joined their forces; the Athenians sent 1,000 hoplites and 500 horse, so low had that city sunk; the number of the Aetolians (7,000 hoplites) is

corrupt in Pausanias; the Megarians amounted to only 400; but it is an incorrect statement that the Boeotians furnished 10,000 foot and 500 horse. There were also a few hundred auxiliaries from Antiochus in Asia, and from Antigonus Gonatas. The Athenians, moreover, sent all their triremes which were seaworthy, under Callippus, the son of Moerocles, probably the same Moerocles, who was one of those whose surrender had been demanded by Alexander. This army, then, consisting of about 21,000 foot and a few thousand horse, assembled at Thermopylae. They first disputed the passage of the river Sperchius; they had broken down all the bridges, and intended gradually to retreat to the inaccessible positions on the Sperchius.¹ But the Gauls forced their way across the river; for as all the Thessalian rivers carry down a great quantity of mud, and thus raise their beds, the Gauls waded through the mud at the mouth of the Sperchius, where the water is most shallow, and thus they arrived in the rear of the Greeks. The Attic triremes, indeed, tried to oppose them as much as possible, but the Greeks being afraid of meeting the Gauls in the open field, retreated into the narrow pass of Thermopylae. The Gauls then encamped near Heraclea, and ravaged the country, but in vain tried to attack the Greeks in front, and to take the town; the Greeks repulsed them, and the Athenians distinguished themselves above all others on that occasion. Seven days later the Gauls made another attempt; they wanted to march round the Greeks by a footpath over Mount Oeta; but there also they were driven back.

The Aetolians were at Thermopylae with a large force, but the numbers of their hoplites are incredible and exaggerated. After the two armies had thus harassed each other for some time, a part of the Gauls forced their way across the western range of mount Oeta into Upper Aetolia, conquered Callion, extirpated its whole population, and altogether raged in the country with the most inhuman brutality, so that the Aetolians quitted Thermopylae and proceeded to meet them. The success of the Gauls in Aetolia seems to have been limited to Callion; in all the other parts of that mountainous country they were attacked by, and suffered great loss at the hands of

¹ "It is stated on this occasion, that Heraclea on the Sperchius was in the relation of sympolity with the Aetolians, a fact which is not mentioned in the earlier accounts."—1826.

the infuriated Aetolians. The Gauls then returned to the Sperchius, having gained their object, the withdrawal of the Aetolians from Thermopylae.

The other Gauls, under Brennus, now went round the heights of Thermopylae by the same footpaths on the Trachinian mountains, by which the Persians, in former times, had been led by Ephialtes. The Phocians who were stationed there, were overpowered, notwithstanding their brave defence, and retreated to the other Greeks. Pausanias here imitates the style of Herodotus, describing in the old fashioned way how all took to flight, and how the country was deserted. The allies would have been completely lost, had not the Athenian galleys, which were anchoring as near as possible to the coast, received the fugitives, and kept the Gauls away from the coast by means of their catapulta. The Athenians conveyed the fugitives to Euboea; the Boeotians returned to their own country, and the whole Greek army disappears. Heraclea still defended itself.

Brennus now marched towards Delphi, leaving a corps at Heraclea under the command of his captain, Acichorius, to protect the camp and baggage, though Acichorius was to follow soon after. Brennus himself proceeded towards Delphi, whither a part of the Phocians had retreated—for one part had taken refuge in their towns—the Amphissaeans and a detachment of 1,500 Aetolians likewise marched towards Delphi. The town was not fortified, but extremely strong by its situation; it was built below the temple, in the form of a theatre, on the slope of a hill, which was quite precipitous both above and below the town, only a few difficult and narrow footpaths leading into the town. Brennus did not advance so rapidly as he might have done; it is true, that the Gauls, even if they advanced slowly, ought to have arrived before Delphi on the second day, but the accounts now begin to be fabulous.

When the attack upon Delphi was approaching, the oracle bade the Delphians be of good cheer, for that the god himself would defend his city; it also advised them not to accumulate provisions in the town, but to leave them in the villages. When Brennus appeared before Delphi, he surveyed from mount Parnassus the city and its magnificence: he assembled a council of war, to deliberate whether he should make the attack at once or wait, and it was determined to rest for one

night. This resolution saved Delphi, for in the interval the Aetolians entered the town. On the following day the attack commenced. Our accounts do not agree in their descriptions of the miraculous manner in which Delphi was saved. According to some, Apollo was seen leaping from the *ὑπερφῶν* into the temple; and, stepping out of it accompanied by Artemis, both divinities discharged arrows at the enemies; the brilliant suits of armour which had been preserved in the temples of Apollo and Athena, disappeared. According to others, three Delphic heroes were seen fighting against the Gauls in the most dangerous places. This reminds me of a story related in one of the most charming books on the conquest of Mexico, by Bernal Diaz, a companion of Cortez, and an uncultivated soldier, but an attentive observer. He says that Oviedo, the chaplain, related how the apostle, St. Iago, appeared in a battle, mounted on a white charger, and fought for the Spaniards; and in relating this story, Bernal is in great perplexity at being obliged to contradict the chaplain, and thinks that perhaps his own sinfulness was the cause of his not having seen the apostle on the white charger. Such, also, may have been the case with the heroes at Delphi. It is further said, that during the attack upon Delphi, the ground on which the Gauls stood shook, that a tempest arose, and lightnings were hurled against the army of the enemy, and that a large piece of rock rolled down from Parnassus and crushed many. This is very possible, for there were at that time violent earthquakes and volcanic phenomena, as at the battle of lake Trasimenus, "the earth shook, and volcanic eruptions appeared in mountains which were not volcanoes;" and it has happened more than once that such extraordinary phenomena occurred in such decisive moments. Without the aid of man, it is said, pieces of rock were torn loose, and rolling down upon the Gauls killed them by hundreds.

In the following night, there was, it is said, a violent snow-storm and a severe frost, such as often occur in those mountainous districts after an earthquake. The wounds of the Gauls, as they lay on the bare ground without protection and shelter, were supernaturally painful and burning, and the cold was so severe that many perished during the night. When the Gauls were thus already downcast in the extreme, the Greeks, sallying from Delphi, broke the confused masses of the

Gauls, and their small numbers thoroughly defeated the barbarians. The survivors commenced their retreat in the greatest distress, more especially because Acichorius had not yet arrived. For the Aetolians, and this is their glory, had thrown themselves with all their forces between him and Brennus, and had made him purchase every inch of ground very dearly, a circumstance of which Brennus knew nothing.²

During the second night after the withdrawal of Brennus from Delphi, a panic is said to have broken out among the Gauls; they fancied they saw the Greeks among them, the gods having confounded their senses; and thus they slew one another because they believed each other to be Greeks. This mythus may possibly contain the truth, that some Greeks had during the night broken into the camp of the barbarians, who, surrounded by darkness and confusion, destroyed one another, just as Marcos Bozzaris, in the Turkish camp, massacred a great number of the enemies, whereupon the Turks, falling upon one another, slew many of their own men. Brennus then succeeded in joining Acichorius; but both were so much weakened and discouraged by the defeat that they thought of nothing but of their retreat. They were pursued by the Phocians and Aetolians as far as the Sperchius. The Athenians, on receiving intelligence of the danger of Delphi, are said to have marched out again, and also to have stirred up the Boeotians; and the latter to have fallen upon the Gauls even before they had reached Thermopylae, and to have utterly annihilated them. This cannot possibly have happened in this manner; the Athenians and Boeotians had perhaps remained together in the camp, or it must be supposed that the Gallic army was encamped at Delphi a considerable time. The statement, that none of the barbarians escaped, is likewise an exaggeration; for one part of them proceeded to Illyricum; and the Gallic army, which the year after crossed over into Asia, probably consisted, in a great measure, of those who had escaped on that occasion.

It is clear, that here we have a complete tissue of fables. While, according to some, the Gauls on that expedition were so completely annihilated, that not a man reached the Macedonian hills; others describe them as arriving in Macedonia, but add, that afterwards they were destroyed by the Scor-

² "Compare the speech of Chlaeneas in Polyb. ix. 30."

discans. And here we find at the same time a trace of another account; I mean, in the story, that the Scordiscans took the gold from the Gauls, which they had brought from Delphi, that then the Scordiscans themselves were accursed on account of the sacrilegious plunder, and that their destruction was the consequence of that curse. According to others, the Gauls sent the plundered gold as an offering to the temple at Tolosa, where it was afterwards taken by Caepio. In this tradition also the gold proved ruinous to any one who touched it, and so it did to Caepio. From these statements we must infer that there existed a tradition, according to which the Gauls did plunder Delphi; but how this is, it is impossible to ascertain. The manner in which Delphi is said to have been protected cannot be believed by any serious person.

After this expedition the remaining Gauls turned eastward. They did not repeat their invasion of Greece, for they did not form a state, but only a complex of hosts that had accidentally met, and they had encountered too many difficulties, the Aetolians being too powerful. Before the expedition to Delphi, they had divided themselves into three armies, one of which had marched into Greece, and another into Macedonia against Sosthenes. The third host, under Leonnorius and Lutarius, had gone eastward and ravaged Thrace. Ptolemy, a son of Lysimachus, seems to have still possessed a remnant of the empire in Thrace; this the Gauls seem to have destroyed, and a portion of them remained in Thrace. For full seventy years after this time, there existed a Gallic empire in Thrace, of which our history takes no notice, though its existence is undoubted; it was not till the time of the Hannibalian war that it was destroyed under Cauarus. The Gauls advanced as far as the Propontis, besieged Byzantium, and inflicted sufferings upon the Greek colonies. Byzantium being very strongly fortified both by nature and by art, and being very wealthy, contrived to make use of the advantages of its situation, and its citizens resisted with courage and perseverance; but still they were for some time obliged to pay to the Gauls an annual tribute of eight talents. The Gauls now exerted themselves to get across the Hellespont into Asia; and just as in the fourteenth century the Turks tried to cross from Asia into Europe, and as the latter succeeded through the disputes among the Byzantine princes, a pretender surrendering to them Callipolis, and

the Genoese opening them a road by means of their ships, so Asia now had the misfortune, that Nicomedes of Bithynia, needing their assistance against Antiochus, fetched over the Gauls.

The Bithynians were a Thracian people on the coast of Asia, occupying the country as far down as Nicomedia. The Thyni and Bithyni had maintained themselves during the period of the Persian dominion under native princes; they also remained in the same condition under Alexander, but afterwards they had been obliged to submit to Lysimachus. After the dissolution of the empire of Lysimachus, their dynasty came forward again under Zipoetes, who, during the ensuing confusion, made himself independent, like the petty princes in India. His son Nicomedes was the first who assumed the title of king of Bithynia, and was the ancestor of the Bithynian kings who, in the time of the Romans, formed an extensive and wealthy state, though politically they were very weak. Their state was soon hellenised, and became Macedonian; but otherwise they were barbarians like the Thracians, though their kings were regarded by the Romans as Greeks.

This Nicomedes took the Gauls into his service against Antiochus; they wanted to conquer habitations for themselves; and it was agreed that all the booty and the slaves should belong to them, while they were to conquer the land for king Nicomedes. Through them Nicomedes became formidable, and extended his dominion in Asia, as far as the Scamburus (?) and the neighbourhood of Prusa.

The Gauls, however, afterwards established themselves in Upper Phrygia, in the neighbourhood of Ancyra, "in a condition resembling that of the Goths in the Roman empire under Theodosius, they sometimes being enemies, and sometimes apparently subjects." They consisted of the three tribes of the Troemi, Tolistobogii, and Tectosagae. The Galatians, to whom the Epistle of St. Paul is addressed, were their descendants. They retained their manners and the Gallic language for a long time, and even St. Jerome found many Gallic customs among them. They constituted a very strong population, and this enabled them to maintain their language and their customs against the Hellenic influence longer than they could otherwise have done; in the course of time, however, their peculiarities were lost.³ These Galatians were constituted

³ Comp. *Lectures on Rom. Hist.*, vol. ii. p. 189.

according to a species of cantons: each of the three tribes was divided into four parts, each of which had its own governor, and a senate of three hundred.

From the district in which they were settled, the Gauls for a long time made plundering excursions over the country. Ancyra and the Phrygian mountains were the *arx* of the Gallic ravages, just as Sinope had been to the Cimmerians in their ravages of Asia Minor. From those strongholds they made excursions as far as Lydia and Ionia, and not a year passed without their making predatory expeditions, spreading misery and terror far and wide. The natives of Asia Minor were unable to resist them; "with the exception of some few in Pamphylia, the towns of Asia Minor were quite unwarlike, and they were unable to offer the slightest resistance against a vigorous attack." Antiochus Soter, the son of Seleucus, was the first that successfully opposed them at the time when the loss of a battle on the part of the Asiatics would have made the Gauls masters of Asia; and to this success he owed his surname of Soter. In consequence of the victory he gained over them, they were humbled, and remained quiet for a considerable time. But during the wretched reign of Antiochus Theos, they again became formidable, and in the civil wars between Seleucus Callinicus and Antiochus Hierax they sold their services to one or other of them; "faithless as those hordes were, their armies were indispensable; for the nations were in the same condition in which we find the degenerate Romans of the fifth and sixth centuries, and had sunk to that state of degradation, that they were unable to carry on war even with mercenaries, but were obliged to take barbarians into their service." Thus they again became the terror of those countries, until in the latter period of the reign of Callinicus, Attalus, the petty but prudent prince of Pergamus, contrived to form a small but efficient army, and gained a great victory over them, by which their power was broken. In consequence of this victory, Attalus assumed the title of king, having previously been styled *δυνάστης* only. They also came under the influence which all northern people experience when settling in southern countries. Even the Goths in Italy under Vitiges, forty years after Theodoric had come across the Alps, showed themselves altogether unwarlike and miserable, although they were the sons of the heroes that

fought under Theodoric; and the same has been observed in other settlements formed by people from the north of Europe, and the children of the crusaders exhibit a particularly deplorable spectacle. The crusaders themselves who conquered Palestine, were real heroes; but their children and grand-children called Pullans, were cowardly, and combined all the vices of the East with those of the West, and hence the unfortunate loss of Palestine, which cannot be sufficiently deplored. In like manner the Gauls also soon degenerated. When they ceased to be robbers, they became effeminate; in their own mountains alone they still continued to be resolute, and the expedition of Manlius against them, after the time of the war against Antiochus, required great exertion in those mountains. They were then almost annihilated by the Romans; for wherever the Romans came in conflict with them, they fought desperately, remembering with implacable fury the capture of their city by the Senones.

Some of the Gallic hosts which had remained in Europe, had founded the Gallic empire in Thrace; and others had settled in Upper Macedonia. The Triballi were now completely annihilated, and only a few of them are said to have escaped to an island in the Ister. But the Gauls did not remain south of the Danube, but being generally partial to level and low countries, the Scordiscans had settled in Lower Hungary, and other Gauls crossing the Danube had thrown themselves into the plains of Moldavia and Wallachia, "which were occupied by the Getae, who had been driven from Bulgaria by the Triballi. They were now expelled by the Gauls from the country between the Dniestr and Aluta. The fact that at this time the Getae were involved in great wars, is clear from the circumstance, that henceforth we find the names Davus and Geta very generally as names of slaves, whereas in Aristophanes and in other authors of ancient comedies, the slaves are always Phrygians and Carians: the Gauls must have captured and sold whole hosts of Dacians and Getae."

On the north of the Ister, the Gauls appear as a great nation under the name of Bastarnae; they marched southward across the Danube at the time when Philip and Perseus invited them to enter their service. They may have been driven back again by the Getae, and the march of the Bastarnae to join Perseus was an attempt of some of them to migrate to another country.

They came directly from the Ister, and when repelled by the Dardanians, they again crossed the river, and returned to their former homes.

Other Gallic tribes, however, spread still further, even as far as the Borysthenes. A few years ago a *στήλη*⁴ was dug out not far from Odessa (Olbia) the inscription of which records the heroic exploits of a distinguished citizen of Olbia, mentioning how, in the extreme distress of his native city, he aided it with both his purse and his person. This inscription, "which according to all appearances, belongs to the period from B.C. 150 to B.C. 200," mentions the Galatians and Sciri (perhaps the same as those who afterwards are found united with the Heruli and Rugii) as the worst enemies of Olbia; and it is clear that in those times the Galatians ruled as far as the Borysthenes.

In this inscription nations are mentioned on the right bank of the Borysthenes, of which it is uncertain whether they belonged to the Scythians or to the Sarmatians. At the time when the Gauls were pressing eastward, the Sarmatians were moving westward. They appear in Scylax about Olymp. 107, on both sides of the Tanais, while in Herodotus they are seen only on the left bank. In the time of Scylax, Scythians also still existed on the Tanais, but afterwards they disappear, being pressed in the South by the Galatians, and in the East by the Sarmatians. "The movement of the Sarmatians overpowered the Gauls, and" when Mithridates was carrying on war in those parts, we no longer find any mention of the Gauls, who until then were met with in Moldavia, Wallachia, and the Ukraine, as far as the river Dniepr. The Cimbri, who appear in Noricum, are no others than Gauls, who had been driven from their homes by the impetuosity of the Sarmatians pressing onwards from the East. "Posidonius, the ablest of all geographers, places the Cimbri on the Euxine." The fact that the Cimbri were not a Germanic people, is clear even from the name Bojorix. "They were no other than the Cymri or Belgae, who had constituted the main body of the emigrating Gauls; and Appian (following Posidonius) expressly calls the Gauls who appeared before Delphi, Cimbri." The Teutones, on the other hand, who had joined the Cimbri, were certainly Germans, and both came from the same countries. The Bastarnae,

⁴ Boeckh, *Corp. Inscript.*, vol. ii., No. 2058.

who are still mentioned by Strabo as a nation inhabiting the country north of the Dniestr and in the Carpathian mountains, had maintained themselves during that emigration in their mountains, and remained behind there, until afterwards they also disappeared.

The last migration of the Sarmatians as far as the Danube must be assigned to a somewhat later period than their progress to the river Dniepr. This expedition is mentioned by Dion Chrysostomus,⁵ who says, that Olbia and the Greek towns, as far as the coast of Thrace, were already laid waste by the Sarmatians in the manner in which he saw them. In the time of Ovid, they were already on the lower Ister. The Roxolani, under the first Roman emperors, inhabited the whole plain of Wallachia as far as the eastern frontier of Servia, while at the time of Mithridates they had resided in Tauria on the Macotis. This accounts for the mention in Tacitus, of their crossing the Ister at a different time. The fact of Slavonic names occurring in those countries, does not prove that the Getae were a Slavonic race, but the places bearing those names had been previously occupied by the Sarmatians. Sarmizegethusa was the capital of the country inhabited by Sarmatians and Getae. The latter remained in those parts, and soon after the reduction of the Gauls, rose again to fresh power under the name of Dacians, until they were subdued by the Romans; and even at a later time, when they were hard pressed by the Goths, they remained behind as subjects, forming the main body of the inhabitants.

Such were the consequences of the Gallic migration on the lower Danube.⁶

From that time the whole of southern Germany, on the Upper Danube as far as the river Main, and perhaps as far as the Teutoburg forest, was Gaelic and Cymric; the Vindelicians and Noricans alone maintained themselves partly in their mountains and partly in the plain, and the Raetians in the Alps, who were surrounded on all sides by Gauls. In the high Alps also some German tribes, partly Gallicised, seem to have maintained themselves,⁷ whereas the great mass of the

⁵ *Orat.* xxxvi. p. ii. p. 75, foll., ed. Reiske.

⁶ Compare with what has been said here, Niebuhr's dissertation on the Scythians, Getae, and Sarmatians, in his *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. i. p. 374, foll.—ED.

⁷ "Dr. Schulz, of Hamm, has very correctly observed, that the Germans were pushed northwards, and quoted the passage of Livy (xxi. 38), who says, that

Germans had been driven by the Gauls from the country between the Main and Savoy, where they bordered upon the Ligurians, to the north, and extended far east into Poland and Russia.

On the Adriatic, the Veneti and Illyrians maintained themselves among Gallic tribes which had invaded the country.

In Gaul the Celts pushed the Cymri or Belgæ from their seats on the Garonne to the north-west of the Loire; and we also meet with these Belgæ in Britain, whither, as we know from Caesar, they proceeded from Gaul, whereas the Celts in Ireland, whence they crossed over into Scotland, appear to have come from Spain. In Scylax we still find Ligurians on the Rhone in the south of France, and Iberians in Languedoc and Aquitania, where they separate the Celts who had proceeded to the Garonne and Loire from those who had remained in the interior of Spain, and in Portugal.

The expedition of the Gauls against Delphi, was contemporary with the second campaign of Pyrrhus against the Romans, and for years he did not allow himself to be induced by these dangers to return across the Adriatic, although he became more inclined to make peace. During that period Antigonus made himself master of the vacant throne of Macedonia (Olymp. 126, 1).

The reign of Antigonus Gonatas is quite obscure, and there

the country about the Great St. Bernard was *obsepta gentibus Semigermanis*. But Dr. Schulz is wrong in referring this to a small German tribe still existing about Monte Rosa; it must be referred to tribes in Wallis. Among these *Germani* we may very properly include those who are mentioned in the Roman *Fasti triumphales*, on the occasion of the victory of M. Claudius Marcellus at Clastidium (u.c. 531). We there read *de Gallis, Insubribus et Germanis*, the word *Germanis* having, as I am convinced, originally been on the stone. The *Fasti triumphales* were drawn up during the first period of Augustus, previously to the battle of Actium. This seems indeed to be opposed to the statement of Tacitus, that the name *Germani* was of recent origin; but I am not bound on this point to follow Tacitus, who, in general, does not possess a very critical knowledge and experience in the earlier history of Rome. The Romans could at that time know the name, and enter it in their *Fasti*, when Germans had joined the migrations of the Gauls; but, as subsequently, and down to the time of Ariovistus, all relations between them and the Germans had ceased; their name also did not occur in the Roman annals until the time of the wars of J. Caesar. That first notice of the Germans may easily have escaped Tacitus, as he probably did not examine the *Fasti* with the same care which we bestow upon them. Our authors, in speaking of the war of Claudius Marcellus, mention Gauls and Transalpinæ; we may, therefore, well assume that forty Olympiads after the capture of Rome by the Gauls, Germans still dwelt in those parts."—1825.

is scarcely any other period in history which is equally so. I am the first that has tried to investigate it, and have arrived at a tolerably clear survey of that history. It is a remarkable period, and the long reign of Antigonus (it lasted thirty-six years, from Olymp. 126, 1 to Olymp. 135, 2) was not without great events.

Even his conquest of Macedonia has not come down to us in any connected narrative, and we can only guess the connection. Macedonia was overcome by Gauls, and had no legitimate ruler, Antipater being only a usurper. Antigonus must have come by sea, and have offered himself as king to the Macedonians. After he was landed and was encamped near Lysimachia, he came in contact with the Gauls, who were in possession of the open country. While still encamped on the coast, he tried to conclude peace with them; but they were as faithless as they were uncivilised, and at the most critical moment he learned that they were treacherously marching against him. Abandoning his camp, he withdrew to his ships, while a part of his army remained concealed in a forest; they then fell upon his camp, intoxicated themselves, and when they, engaged in plunder, had fallen into disorder, and were overladen with food and drink, Antigonus attacked and defeated them. This victory at once raised him very high in public estimation, and gained for him great repute. He then conquered Antipater, and established himself as king of Macedonia, though assuredly not of Macedonia in its whole extent. The interior at first did not belong to him, "and was no doubt still occupied by the Gauls. Thrace, which may previously have been in the hands of Ptolemy Ceraunus, had been lost during the Gallic confusion; only the part as far as the river Nestus remained united with Macedonia; the interior was occupied by the Gallic empire, the coast towns were under the dominion of Antiochus, and Byzantium and Perinthus, which had been under the protectorate of Lysimachus, made themselves entirely independent. Byzantium now became a very important maritime city, and again entered into its natural relations with Chios and Rhodes. Towards Illyricum also, Antigonus was unable to extend his empire."

But the Macedonian kingdom was at that time in every respect as weak as Rome after the Gallic conquest. Antigonus had not obtained Macedonia through the attachment of the

Macedonians, but through Gallic mercenaries, and a dominion thus acquired was very insecure. He had paid every man a Macedonian gold coin ($\chiρυσοῦς$ =twenty-eight francs), but afterwards they refused to serve unless he gave them three times that pay, and it was only by a stratagem that he recovered his hostages. He established his government only very gradually. But in the course of time, Macedonia recovered so much and gained so much strength under him, that it was able to defend itself against the Gauls; and during the greater part of his reign Antigonus himself had no more Gauls in his service. To Macedonia he was a very beneficial ruler, and he shewed himself to be an extremely prudent, thoughtful, and resolute character.

At the very beginning of his reign, probably as early as Olymp. 126, 2, there occurred a war, which Antigonus, for the recovery of Macedonia, carried on against Apollodorus, the tyrant of Cassandrea, a man whose name is interesting at a time when Greek history cannot point to any other person of importance. I have already mentioned the rapidly increasing prosperity of Cassandrea; it was a city like Alexandria and Antioch. All these places had Greek municipal constitutions.⁸ Cassandrea was a republic under the dominion of Macedonia, but Cassander's will was its law as long as he lived. After the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus, it became a regular republic, since, as I have already remarked, Eurydice, the widow of Antipater, established liberty in the place at the time of the anarchy, by withdrawing the garrison and declaring the city independent. The magistrates gave the soldiers the franchise and assigned lands to them. At that time a demagogue, Apollodorus, came forward, and by a conspiracy similar to that of Catiline, usurped the supreme power. He began by shewing the greatest zeal for the liberty of the city, gave splendid festivals in honour of Eurydice, and outlawed the tyrant, Lachares, of Athens. He then obtained from the city the office of $\epsilonπιμελητής$, that is, dictatorial power as superintendent of the city, and with the aid of Gallic mercenaries he then took possession of the city as tyrant. But in order to connect his associates still more closely with himself, he arranged a banquet with a common sacrifice, at which, instead of an animal, he caused a boy to be sacrificed, whose blood, mixed

⁸ See below, the latter part of Lecture CIII. and Lecture CIV.

with wine he gave them to drink, and whose flesh they ate; he then revealed to them what they had done, and again put them to their oath. This monster became proverbial, and later Greek authors put him together with Phalaris, with whom he is compared in about twenty passages. He kept the city in submission by means of mercenaries, especially Gauls. Many details are related, shewing what horrors he perpetrated against the inhabitants, and how he extorted from them what they possessed. One story which is related of him is worthy of notice: he dreamt that he had fallen into the hands of the Scythians, that he was flayed, cut into pieces, and cooked by them, and that his heart called out to the other members: "It is my fault!" while his burning daughters danced around him. How long his inhuman government lasted is unknown.

With this tyrant Antigonus became involved in a war, for it was to him a matter of importance to obtain possession of Casandrea, and the sympathies of all men who knew the monster, were with Antigonus. But Apollodorus was not by any means without abilities, and carried on the war against a whole kingdom for a long time with great perseverance and success, as the city was fortified and received provisions by sea from the Aetolian pirates. The Spartans, also, concluded an alliance with him, as a common enemy of Antigonus. It was only by treachery that Antigonus became master of the city, availing himself of the services of a commander of the Aetolian pirates, who promised to Apollodorus to negotiate a treaty between him and Antigonus; this man conveyed provisions into the city, and having lulled Apollodorus into security, let down the scaling ladders, introduced soldiers into the city, and took Apollodorus prisoner (Olymp. 126, $\frac{2}{3}$). We have mention of *Κασσανδρέων παθήματα*, and the elder Lycophron under Ptolemy Philadelphus wrote a tragedy, called *Κασσανδρείς*, which can have been nothing else but the sufferings of the Cassandreans under Apollodorus.

This was the first success of Antigonus, and he also extended his dominion in Greece; but the Athenians maintained themselves against him. They had got rid of the Macedonian garrison, but I am unable to say in what manner.

Pyrrhus then returned from Italy, Olymp. 126, 2, or at the beginning of Olymp. 126, 3, after an absence of seven years; he was highly indignant at Antigonus, of whom he had

demanded assistance against Italy, and who had imprudently refused it. If his grandsons and great grandsons did remember this refusal, they must have very much blamed his short-sightedness. He would have acted wisely, if he had enabled Pyrrhus to continue the war against Rome, and had kept him engaged in Italy. In his indignation, Pyrrhus now turned against Macedonia. Mercenaries were at that time engaged from all parts of the world, but especially Gauls were employed. Both kings had Gallic mercenaries, just as in the fourth and fifth centuries the Romans had German mercenaries, whom they called *foederati*. Antigonus went to meet Pyrrhus as far as the passes of the Aous—where afterwards Antigonea was founded—Pyrrhus defeated him in a battle of some importance; during his retreat, the Gauls who were to protect Antigonus were nearly all cut to pieces, and the Macedonian phalanx deserting Antigonus, proclaimed Pyrrhus king. Pyrrhus was thus, for a time, king of Macedonia, and Antigonus was confined to a few places on the sea-coast, Thessalonica, Cassandrea, and Thessaly. If Pyrrhus had gradually strengthened his empire, and expelled Antigonus from the maritime towns, he might have founded a Macedonico-Epirot empire, more especially as the Greeks were favourable to him; but he was too fantastic, being unable to attempt a gradual consolidation of his kingdom. The minds of the Macedonians became alienated from him, because he did not punish the crime which his Gallic soldiers had committed at Aegae, where they had broken open the tombs of the ancient Macedonian kings; and he soon left Macedonia to embark in a new enterprise.

Pyrrhus now marched into Greece, being invited by the adventurer Cleonymus, who was still unable to renounce his claims to the throne of Sparta, and had now quitted Sparta in anger, because Acrotatus, the son of Areus, had seduced his young wife Chelidonis. Pyrrhus interfered in the matter from mere love of activity; he was of a restless disposition, and in the end he acted solely under the influence of this disposition. This circumstance spoils his character: his latter years are no longer like his earlier ones, and his noble soul no longer shows itself in the manner in which it had done before. He was, perhaps, not very sincere in his intention to place Cleonymus on the throne. He deserves especially to be blamed for having marched maliciously and treacherously against Sparta, without

a declaration of war, in the hope of taking it by surprise. But his plan failed; his march was so slow, that after all he arrived too late. The Greeks, in general, marched very slowly, partly because their roads were so bad. Italy had high-roads, and good ones too, even before the time of the Romans; but such was not the case in Greece, where the roads were always bad. You may read a detailed account of this expedition in Plutarch, according to whom we ought to believe, that the whole affair was settled in three days; but the expedition must have occupied several weeks.

Pyrrhus appeared in Greece as its liberator. The Athenians, Messenians, and Achaeans (the last had at that time got rid of the Macedonian garrison and of the tyrants, and formed a small independent state) welcomed him through ambassadors. He thus arrived in the heart of Peloponnesus, when at Megalopolis an embassy of the Spartans met him to congratulate him, for the Spartans, seeing that he was accompanied by Cleonymus, suspected his expedition. He assured them of his friendly intentions, spoke in ambiguous terms to deceive them, saying that he wanted to have his children educated at Sparta, and then suddenly invaded the territory of Laconia. King Areus happened to be absent in Crete, whither the Gortynians had invited him; he must, however, have left Crete before Pyrrhus entered Laconia. The Spartans, however, even old men, women and children, were busily engaged day and night in working at the lines of fortification, and at the ditches. It was intended to send the women and children to Crete, but the women, headed by Archidamia, the grandmother of Agis, requested to be permitted to remain in the city and take part in the defence, because the number of men was too small. The work of fortification probably lasted longer than is stated by Plutarch. The Spartans protected themselves against the elephants of Pyrrhus by drawing carts from the city to the loose earthen mound, and allowing them to stand there up to their axles in the earth, so that it was difficult to remove them, and they might take a safe position behind them. When Pyrrhus arrived, the fortifications were so far completed that the Spartans were enabled to repel the attack. The city defended itself for a whole day, and in the following night succour arrived from Argos; even Messene, notwithstanding its perpetual enmity against Sparta, sent assistance without being asked,

and thus Areus, even in the second night, was able to throw himself into the city with 2,000 auxiliaries, who had been sent to him by Ptolemy. The second attack was promptly repelled, although the Gauls were already on the ramparts attempting to remove the carts; but Areus made a successful sally, and Pyrrhus, whose weakness commenced as soon as his plan was not perfectly successful, gave up the attack.

After these two useless attempts, Pyrrhus commenced his retreat, laying waste the whole of the Laconian territory. In one of the engagements during this retreat, Pyrrhus having lost Ptolemy, his favourite son and an excellent young man, turned round, and being fired by anger, repelled the Spartans, who were incautiously advancing too far. He then continued his march towards Argos.

There the ancient party feuds still continued. The leaders of one party applied to Antigonus Gonatas, who, after a fruitless attempt to recover Macedonia, had followed Pyrrhus with a large army, and was now likewise encamped in Peloponnesus. Both kings arrived at the gates of Argos at the same time. A large majority of the citizens implored both kings to leave the city neutral, declaring that neither should be admitted within the gates. Antigonus was ready to comply, but Pyrrhus refused and suddenly appeared at the gates. One of them was thrown open to him by night; but as he wanted to introduce his elephants also, and as this caused some delay, the treachery was discovered, and the partisans of Antigonus, as well as the neutral party, quickly assembled to defend the city, and took possession of the strong points (*arces*). In the meantime, Antigonus also had been let into the city by an opposite gate, and Pyrrhus, after having already occupied the agora, was obliged to retreat. A sharp conflict took place even within the city, in which the greater part of the inhabitants sided with Antigonus. Pyrrhus, with the courage of a lion, endeavoured to fight his way to the gate, but being struck in a street by a stone thrown at him by a woman from a roof, he fell down and died in an unworthy manner (Olymp. 127, 1). The stone had stunned him, a Macedonian mercenary gave him the death-blow, and his army was annihilated.

“Although Pyrrhus had sunk during his latter years, still he is the only man during that time whom we can look upon with pleasure. During a period of the greatest degeneracy he

stands forth, not indeed as a man of strict principles, but as a man of honour. He did not become wicked and immoral even in the society of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Whenever he did anything evil, he did not do it from bad motives or for the sake of gain, but was led to do it only by the vehemence of his temperament, which shows him to have been a man very different from the other Macedonian kings. He felt in his heart the need of friendship, and was frank and true. The ancients generally honour him nearly as much as he deserves. His great fault was his want of perseverance: he had no definite object, and lived only for action. He neglected his duties as a ruler, and acted like a private man who will not be bound down, but interferes in the most active manner wherever there is need of it, so that his youth was full of enjoyment and noble traits of character, but for his old age he had nothing left. Such a life is even much less pardonable in a prince than in a private person. Like Charles XII., Pyrrhus lived less for his kingdom than for himself. He and Alcibiades are, properly speaking, the only men in antiquity that have a really chivalrous character. Pyrrhus conducted his war against the Romans in a spirit like that of the knights, who, in their tournaments, fought for life and death, in order to be honoured with the prize from fair hands. He very soon forgot that he had been victorious, saw the Romans in the most favourable light, and conceived such an attachment for them, that he acted unjustly towards his own allies. It would be desirable, if such *δορυξενίαι*, as then arose between Pyrrhus and the Romans, existed oftener between political parties and also in literary disputes.

That noble man also possessed high intellectual culture: he wrote his own memoirs, and even if he was not a poet himself, he furnished the subjects for epigrams, which show a truly poetical genius, and are free from the characteristics of the age. They are ascribed to Leonidas of Tarentum, with whose epigrams, however, they are not to be compared."

He was succeeded in Epirus by his son Alexander, whose reign is more interesting than is commonly supposed. He was a very remarkable man, and well worthy of being the son of Pyrrhus. The latter had exhausted his kingdom like Charles XII.: in this condition it was found by Alexander, who made of it all that could be made of it. But the people

could not recover, and hence their weakness and their exasperation against the royal house of Pyrrhus.

The date of the death of Pyrrhus cannot be accurately ascertained, but it must have been about Olymp. 127, 1 (A.U.C. 481), an opinion which cannot be very far from the truth; yet it is possible that his death may have taken place a year earlier or later.

LECTURE CI.

ANTIGONUS was then stationed in the heart of Peloponnesus with an armed force. He availed himself of the opportunity of making himself master of the peninsula and of constituting it anew according to his own mind. Not being able to place garrisons everywhere, he gave the government in all the towns which surrendered to him, to his partisans, and established tyrants who were ready to exert their power for his interests. Antigonos did this systematically in all parts of Peloponnesus. Tyrants under his influence occur in Argos (where his partisan Aristetas was probably raised to power), Arcadia, Achaia, Elis, Troezen, Hermione, and Phlius; at Sicyon tyrants were already existing, who maintained themselves independent of him. The tyrants consisting of his partisans were men of very different characters: some were moderate and bearable persons, while others were extremely cruel. The monarchy at Sicyon, which had already been established for some time, was endurable, but the tyrants of Elis were men reminding us of Apollodorus of Cassandrea. Hence rebellions sometimes occurred when Antigonos was absent. I may mention particularly the overthrow of Aristotimus of Elis, which was brought about by a heroic conspiracy headed by a childless old man: this is one of the noble occurrences in dying Greece.¹

¹ "Aristotimus is known in history only on account of his infamy; for when he made himself tyrant, he expelled all the wealthy and respectable citizens, and to some extent confiscated their property, so that there were 800 exiles from Elis alone. They fled into Aetolia, which had for a long time been in friendly relations with Elis, because Elis was an Aetolian colony. The Aetolians, therefore, applied to the tyrant in behalf of the exiles, and backed their mediation by threats in such a manner that the tyrant issued a proclamation,

In the other parts of Greece, however, Antigonus does not appear to have carried out this system.

Athens, and Sparta under its king, Areus, were apparently allied with the Aetolians and with king Ptolemy against Antigonus. The friendship which the war of Pyrrhus had brought about between Antigonus and the Spartans, was of short duration: the Antigonids and Ptolemies were and remained mortal enemies, and thus the Spartans, being the allies of Ptolemy, became again involved in a war against Antigonus. We do not know how Athens was drawn into this war, whether they had imprudently formed an alliance with Ptolemy, or whether Antigonus had sought a quarrel with them. But an alliance did exist between Athens and Ptolemy, and an Egyptian fleet was stationed near Attica to support Athens by sea. Craterus, a stepbrother of the king, who had a firm footing in Corinth and Euboea, sided with the Greeks. Corinth was at that time the seat of the war in Greece. Its whole history is wrapped in deep obscurity; we have information only about isolated occurrences. Unfortunate Athens suffered most severely; for the allies do not appear to have been in possession of the country north of Athens; the Boeotians had even before been in the power of Antigonus, and seem to have always been in connexion with him. Attica was cruelly ravaged by incursions from Boeotia, and Athens itself was besieged and often blockaded. This war lasted for many years, and completed the misery of Athens, as much as the siege and conquest of Totilas completed the destruction of Rome. Athens was like a wealthy merchant who has laid out his capital and cannot

allowing the wives and children of the exiles to emigrate to their husbands and fathers with their moveable property. They accordingly assembled, but Aristotimus let his mercenaries loose upon them: the wives were seized and thrown into prisons, the virgins were maltreated in the most shameful manner, and the children were murdered. When afterwards the exiles landed in Elis, he commanded the wives to desire their husbands to depart, as they were responsible for them. On that occasion a spark of the ancient heroism appeared. Megisto, a noble lady, answered that they were subject to their husbands, who would avenge their death. His fury led the aged Hellanicus to the determination to deliver his country, and the tyrant, in the midst of his hirelings, was murdered in the middle of the market-place by Hellanicus, his associates in the conspiracy, and his own officers. Megisto obtained as a favour for the tyrant's daughters the permission to make away with themselves, and they thanked her for it, for they would assuredly have been cruelly used and torn to pieces."—1825.

realise it without great loss; calamities then occur whereby his property is quite consumed. This war in Attica is called the Chremonidean war, because Chremonides, an Athenian, was the soul of it. It is mentioned by this name only in one passage in Athenaeus, and I must refer to my dissertation on the subject.² There did not exist at that time an Athenian policy, we hear only of an Egyptian and a Macedonian policy, and the only alternative which Athens had, unless it consented to become Macedonian, was to be Alexandrian. The Alexandrian party was bent upon maintaining the local freedom of Athens.

We know, as I have already said, only very little about this war. Ptolemy sent a fleet under the admiral Patroclus to the assistance of the Athenians; and while he was to land and relieve Athens from the sea-side, Areus, with the Spartans and his allies, was to attack the Macedonians and oblige them to raise the siege on the land side. But Areus was too slow, and allowed the right moment to pass away, demanding that the troops of Ptolemy should commence the fight. This, however, was not done, as Ptolemy wanted the war only for the purpose of weakening Antigonus, and the Egyptians refused to serve in any other way than as auxiliaries. The two parties thus being unable to come to an understanding, returned home without having effected anything. The Alexandrian fleet, however, must have been tarrying for a long time off the coast of Attica, seeing that one of the islands which was fortified by them retained the name of Patroclus. Afterwards, Areus once more advanced with an army to relieve Athens; but he was defeated near Corinth and lost his life (Olymp. 128,4),³ The conquest of Megara by Antigonus belongs to an earlier period of this war; it probably preceded the battle of Corinth, but this is not historically certain. Athens was thus cut off from Peloponnesus also. There now followed an episode, which shows matters in a strong light: Antigonus

² *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. i. p. 451. The Lectures of 1825 already contained the substance of the dissertation, which was written in 1826; but the passage has not been given here, because it would only be an abridged repetition of the published dissertation.—ED.

³ "Comp. Plut. *Agis*, 3; and the prologue xxvi. of Trogu. Diodorus, xx. 29, says, that Areus reigned forty-four years, from the fourth year of Olymp. 117, so that he died in Olymp. 128, 4, and not as Scaliger in his *Historiarum Synagoge* has it, in Olymp. 127, 4."—1825.

carried on his war for the most part with Gallic mercenaries, and the Gauls forming the garrison of Megara revolted; he had to make immense efforts to subdue them, after they had, in their despair, murdered their wives and children, whom they always carried with them, as they afterwards did in the war against Marius. They were completely annihilated, and this circumstance firmly established his dominion.*

After a very long siege, during which Ptolemy Philadelphus, with all his good intentions, effected nothing, Athens being completely exhausted and helpless, was obliged to capitulate (Olymp. 129, 2 or 3). Attica had been most fearfully ravaged; the temple of Poseidon, and the grove of the Eumenides at Colonus, were destroyed: Antigonus had laid waste the fields, and when the work of destruction was accomplished he withdrew, but when the fields were cultivated again, he returned to recommence his devastations. The result of the war was, that Macedonian garrisons again occupied Piræus, Munychia, Salamis, Sunium, and even the Museum in the city itself. We cannot say that Antigonus made a cruel use of his victory; his adversaries seem to have had time enough to escape into Egypt. Antigonus, on the whole, was not of a cruel disposition, but he was heartless, except in regard to his natural son Halcýoneus. For a man who was not thoroughly hostile to Athens, that city had something venerable, and the Stoic philosophers of the time, as Zeno and Cleanthes, made as imposing an impression upon the barbarians, as many of the Christian teachers in the first centuries of Christianity made upon the pagans. "Stoic philosophy, as it appears to us, is nothing; but at that time its moral doctrines were as much in their place as the monkish severity during the middle ages; and if we enter more deeply into it, we find a great spirit pervading it. Zeno's mediation led Antigonus to treat Athens with mildness, and he was induced after a few years to relieve the city from the garrison in the Museum (Olymp. 131, 1);⁵ it is stated in the Chronicle of Eusebius under Olymp. 131, 1, that Antigonus restored freedom to the Athenians; but at Munychia and Piræus the garrisons remained till after the

* "This siege of Megara is referred to in the account of the singular defence of the Megarians, who sent out swine besmeared with tar against the elephants (Polyæn. iv. 6. 3)."—1825.

⁵ Pausan. iii. 6, § 6.

death of Antigonus; and whether he had a garrison in the Museum or not, he still remained master of Athens, which henceforth was deprived of all independence. It must, however, be observed, that he lived on terms of friendship with the Athenians; he often visited the city, and had much intercourse especially with its philosophers and poets. The poet Aratus lived at his court, just as Callimachus lived at that of the Ptolemies. Antagoras of Rhodes, a pleasing poet, of whom we possess indeed only a few little poems, which however are very neat, and are not to be despised, also lived at his court. The poetical productions of that age are on the whole excellent, but they have no substance. Antagoras was an epic poet, and Antigonus wished to be immortalised by him; but his life was not a fit subject for poetry. Whenever Antigonus went to Athens he visited the philosophers, and did not take it ill that Arcesilaus never came to him to pay him homage. He took particular pleasure in a peripatetic, Lycon, who spoke better than he wrote; and Antigonus said of him, that his works were like fruit, which one must enjoy fresh from the tree, and which, when gathered, immediately lost its flavour. His great respect for Zeno does him honour; he wished to take him to Macedonia, but Zeno, declining the residence at court, sent him Persaeus, who, however, soon became a voluptuary and a venal poet, completely devoid of the spirit of Zeno. Antigonus was also fond of the ingenious Bion, from the Borysthenes, and of Timon of Phlius. The latter was even allowed, in his Silli, to ridicule persons whom Antigonus loved; Timon was altogether a man of fresh and vigorous character. Antigonus used to send his friends many presents, especially on the birthday of his son Halcioneus, who had died young, in order that they might celebrate that day in a solemn manner. But with all this, the character of Antigonus was no better than that of the other Macedonian kings, and his reign was a terrible period for Greece.

LECTURE CII.

As regards the condition of Athens during that period, I refer you to the fragments of Teles, which show how little comfortable it was. I have been the first to draw attention to this.¹ Teles is not mentioned in the *Bibliotheca* of Fabricius: he wrote about sixty years after Theophrastus, and is important to grammarians, because his language, though an imitation of Theophrastus, already forms a marked contrast to that of his model.

“From this time, Athens is completely sunk in poverty and wretchedness: twenty beggars might be seen for one man in tolerable circumstances, as is the case at present in Venice, and it never recovered, just as Venice will never rise again. The cultivation of the exact sciences had been transferred to Alexandria, and what remained consisted of philosophical speculation and a meagre kind of poetry, an off-shoot of the second comedy. Not only was everything exhausted in the highest degree through the fearful wars, but Greece must also have been ravaged at that time by a pestilence, as we may infer from Pausanias,² before Olymp. 124, 4, when Pyrrhus went to Italy. Such epidemics always form epochs both in literature and art; and so we now see in Greece the extinction not only of the ancient literature, but also of the arts.³ Still, however, even in the garb of beggars, the Athenians remained graceful; and as the purest Greek was still spoken at Athens, every one desirous to acquire Greek culture resorted thither.”

Among the various changes of that period, I may mention the transitory conquest of Macedonia by Alexander II., of Epirus, during the Chremonidean war. This Alexander was

¹ First in the Lectures of 1825, and afterwards in the dissertation on the Chremonidean war.—ED.

² vii. 7, § 1.

³ “This pestilence is certainly no other than the one which raged in Rome about Olymp. 121, 4, or 122, 1, (A. U. C. 460) and against which the Romans fetched Aesculapius from Epidaurus. As to the effects of such epidemics, see my dissertation in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy (*Klein. Schrift.*, vol. ii. p. 64).”—1825.

the only one of the three sons of Pyrrhus that survived his father, of whom he was not unworthy. After his father's death, he remained in the undisturbed possession of the country. He greatly resembled his father, and was, in fact, almost a copy of him, although with feebler features. He also possessed the intellectual culture of his father, and was, like him, an author. The memoirs of Pyrrhus were assuredly not inferior to those of Caesar; he also wrote on tactics, on which subject he was one of the earliest authors: would that we still possessed those works! His son Alexander also wrote on tactics, and most of the accounts in Arrian, who gives us such perfect notions of Macedonian tactics, were derived from his work. The scheme which he gives was not a law of the Macedonian phalanx, but it contains the fundamental principles. Alexander had the same restlessness as his father, but he was not a gambler in the same degree as his father, who staked everything on one throw. While Antigonus was deeply involved in the war with Greece, Alexander invaded Macedonia, which was then still so weak (and it was not yet so much attached to the new dynasty as it was afterwards under Philip, the grandson of Antigonus), that the Macedonian troops deserted to him, and Alexander was recognised as king without difficulty. But he did not maintain the new acquisition. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, who was then still very young, assembled a fresh army, attacked him, and recovered Macedonia from him, just as Charles XII., in his youth, so brilliantly repelled a similar attack. Demetrius pursued Alexander himself into Epirus, so that the latter was obliged to take refuge in Acarnania, and returned to his kingdom only with the assistance of the Aetolian towns. Afterwards, Alexander of Epirus observed, indeed, a hostile policy towards Macedonia, but took care not to become involved in a war with it. His kingdom in Epirus was consolidated, and had the same extent in which Pyrrhus had left it to him, and he was allied with the Aetolians.

After these occurrences, there follows, in the Epitome of Trogus, an event which Justin has altogether omitted—the war of Alexander against the Illyrians, who, ever since the time of Bardylis, down to the latest period of Macedonia, formed a kingdom. All we know about it is confined to this simple notice; we do not even know whether the king of the Illyrians, against whom the war was carried on, is the

Monunius,⁴ who occurs on coins, or Mytilus, who is mentioned by others.

Trogus says, that after the subjugation of Athens, about Olymp. 129, and after the death of Areus, Antigonus had to carry on a war with Alexander, the son of his brother.⁵ This Alexander was the son of Craterus, a half-brother of Antigonus, by Phila; Craterus was distinguished above his countrymen by his intellectual culture, being the first diplomatic historian we know (Demetrius Phalereus, however, is earlier): his work, for which he made use of the Athenian psephismata, must have been invaluable. Craterus enjoyed so much respect and influence among the Greeks, that after his death an additional paean was sung at the Pythian games in honour of him. Whether he himself was already a prince in Greece, is doubtful; I believe that he always lived at Corinth. His son, the above-named Alexander, is mentioned in a passage which I have accidentally discovered, as king of Euboea; and he must have possessed Corinth also, for his widow Nicaea was afterwards in possession of that city. In another passage it is said, that the Chalcidians and Corinthians revolted, but were subdued and obliged to receive Macedonian garrisons. This war, however, is probably the same as the one mentioned in the epitome of Trogus. Euboea appears during that war to have come into the hands of Antigonus, but Corinth still remained in those of Alexander; we find it so not only until his death, but even afterwards in the possession of his widow Nicaea.

We will not decide whether the statement that Antigonus poisoned Alexander, is true or not; but there can be no doubt that he gained possession of Corinth by treachery. Nicaea, like the Macedonian women in general, was light-minded. Antigonus was married to one Phila, who, I believe, was a daughter of Ceraunus, for his marriage belongs to the time, when he had not yet fallen out with Craterus. Nicaea was princess of Corinth: the idea of a prince without that of tyrant being superadded, had already become quite common; such a person reigned as *δυναστεύων ἐν τινὶ πόλει*, which is quite equivalent to our prince; the title had come into use among the Greeks during the Sicilian period, and at this time people were quite accustomed to it. Antigonus made

⁴ In Trogus, *Prolog.* xxiv, he is called Monius.—ED.

⁵ Comp. *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. i. p. 225, note 39.—ED.

Nicaea believe, that he wished her hand for his son Demetrius; and she, though advanced in years, allowed herself to be cajoled; she received him at Corinth, but refused to give up the Acropolis, the possession of which she claimed for herself. But being altogether a faithless man, he took the Acropolis by surprise through his Macedonian troops. During the celebration of the marriage, when Nicaea was proceeding to the theatre, he quitted the assembly, and accompanied by a few soldiers, marched up the hill to Acrocorinthus, where he made so imposing an impression, that all submitted to him. Nicaea was contumeliously sent away.

In this manner he gained a firm footing in Peloponnesus. Besides Demetrias, he now possessed Chalcis and Corinth, and his dominion in Greece was established in those three points. We cannot accurately define the time when these things happened, though it may have been about Olymp. 130 or 131.⁶ But he did not long remain master of Corinth; he lost it in a revolution which unexpectedly broke out.

In what manner Athens had been subdued, has been already stated; Bocotia was dependent on Antigonus at both ends, for he controlled the country from Chalcis and from Corinth; and most of the cities in Peloponnesus were powerless.

Lacedaemon "was in a condition of perfect dependence on Alexandria; its young men, rich and poor, were serving in Egypt or Syria." It continued to be governed by its ancient dynasties, but was quite feeble and in a state of dissolution; the ancient laws continued to exist along with the causes which had rendered them inefficient. The ancient inhabitants, who had been very numerous and all equally rich, being all small landed proprietors, had in their simple mode of life, preserved the ancient customs; but the population had decreased, and the equal distribution of landed property had disappeared. The oligarchy was constantly becoming more exclusive and injurious: the number of 9000 citizens had become so much reduced, that only a few hundreds were left. Although the lands could not be transferred by sale, yet they had become accumulated in the hands of a few, by inheritance and by marriage. After the battle of Leuctra, the 9000 lots of the Spartan territory were in the hands of from fifty to a hundred

⁶ In 1825. Niebuhr supposed that they occurred two years after the liberation of Sicyon by Aratus, which is probably more correct.—ED.

families, while six hundred Spartan families lived in the greatest poverty. The ancients say, that the weakness of the constitution of Lycurgus consisted in the fact that women were beyond the reach of the law. If this opinion is referred to ordinary life, it is understood to mean, that the *Λακωνικὴ ἀγωγή* was intended for men only; and in general it could not comprise the women: but even the laws forbidding the Lacedaemonians to sell their property had no influence upon the women. According to the decemviral law a *pater familias* alone could dispose of property, and women had no right whatever of disposing of property, but at Sparta the case was reversed. A Lacedaemonian could not dispose of his property according to his own discretion, but the women could do so. This gave a handle to the system of pettifoggery, which necessarily develops itself wherever the laws are unreasonable; and in later times we find the Spartan women possessing enormous properties. Even as early as the time of Aristotle, nearly all property was in the hands of women, and afterwards the dominion of the Spartan women is constantly increasing. Sparta was thus in a condition of complete degeneracy. The population consisted for the most part of beggars and strangers: a small number of oligarchs were at the head of affairs, and they stood in the same relation to the inhabitants as the nobili at Venice did to the other citizens, but with this difference, that at Venice, with a population of 200,000, the great council still consisted of 2,000 members, while Sparta at that time had only five hundred or at the utmost seven hundred Spartans. In the place of the ancient equality and poverty, those oligarchs now were wealthier than any other Greeks. Gold and silver had been used ever since the Peloponnesian war, and the respect for the ancient customs and laws had completely vanished during the period of Philip; the kings now lived in Asiatic luxury, especially Arcus and his son Acrotatus, as we know from the description of Phylarchus. The circumstances were similar to those which in Germany after the thirty years' war brought about the luxurious life of the princes: all national pride was gone, and there are splendid medals of Arcus with the coinage of the Syro-Macedonian kings. The helots in the country remained in their ancient wretched state, and the subject towns had received no improvement of their condition notwithstanding their fidelity during the Theban war. One

portion of the former territory of Sparta had fallen into the hands of the Argives, and another into those of the Messenians and Arcadians.

In Achaia there had existed from early times the confederacy of the twelve towns; the Macedonian kings had broken it up; "after the time of the Gauls it had been formed again, but the towns were so poor and small, that they could have no other policy but to remain as quiet as possible." Antigonus had instituted tyrants in nearly all the towns of Peloponnesus; Boeotia, on the other hand, had no tyrants. The different parts of Greece present quite different features; north of the Isthmus tyrants do not occur anywhere, but they existed in all parts of Peloponnesus, except in those places which had Macedonian garrisons, such as Messene, Elis, and others. Those towns sometimes cast off the yoke, and having murdered the tyrants, maintained themselves for a time, but then fell again into the hands of some other tyrant.

The Aetolians acquired great importance in the reign of Antigonus Gonatas; they had risen ever since the Lamian war and their successful opposition to Antipater; they became particularly powerful during the conflict between Pyrrhus and Demetrius, "and as early as that time they obtained possession of Heraclea and other places." There existed at that period an instinctive or magnetic power of attraction among the smaller places, for the sake of their own safety, whence the boundaries of the various nations were then very different, and not as they are marked in the maps of D'Anville and Bocage. Thus portions of Phocis and Thessaly belonged to Aetolia; but how far the Aetolians extended during that period, and how they acquired such power, these are questions to which the answers are lost, as the regular history of the period has not come down to us in a connected form.

"One of the causes of their rise is, that they united with the neighbouring nations into one state, with the latter entering in reality into the relation of *perioeci*." The first traces of a confederacy of the Aetolians occur at the time of the Lamian war, and in the reign of Demetrius their constitution was in all probability already completely developed. A strategus chosen annually had the supreme command, assisted by the small council of the *apocleti*, respecting the

election and composition of which from the small states we have no certain information. They carried on the government without much participation of the popular assembly, which was convened only on extraordinary emergencies. Many places entered into the relation of sympolity with that state, a relation which is not mentioned in the states of Greece before the Peloponnesian war, and which resembled that of the Roman municipia. Small states attach themselves to greater ones, binding themselves to furnish them troops in time of war, and to pay taxes, without being subjects or tributary. But these beautiful elements were not developed into a real constitution.

"In consequence of the Gallic invasion, their influence increased very considerably, and thenceforward they continued to rise in importance without being particularly scrupulous about the means, provided they served to extend their power. They always remained rude soldiers, unlike the Arcadians, who latterly rose to a high degree of cultivation. The Aetolians were wanting in everything which ennobles the Greek character; they were worse than the ancient Spartans."⁷

⁷ "Thucydides, in speaking of the Aetolians, says, that they ate raw flesh, and, according to this it would appear, that they were not even above the savage state; but the passage has been misunderstood. They did no more than what the tribes in that country still do, that is, they cut the meat into small strips and dried it; and the meat thus dried was eaten, but not the bleeding flesh, as is the case in Abyssinia. This makes all the difference between rude and civilised men; and for this reason the Jewish tradition describes the command not to eat flesh with blood in it as a law of Noah, thus recognising the conviction, that man eating the bleeding flesh is not raised above the beasts of prey. It is impossible to conceive a stronger contrast than that existing between the Aetolians and the Athenians with their appreciation of everything noble and free, which, in the midst of their misfortunes, their better nature still preserved. The Aetolians, on the other hand, were not at all sensitive to vulgarity, insolent where their private advantage seemed to require it, lavish, and extravagant. The insolence with which Scopas entered the service of other nations, and levied troops at the time when his country was in the greatest distress, and its inhabitants in the greatest poverty, is highly characteristic. When I shall have discharged the great duty of my life, that is, when I shall have finished my history of Rome, and am enabled to carry out my plan of writing a history of Greece from the battle of Mantinea, I shall have to describe sad events, but I hope at the same time to show that no people has been so unfairly dealt with as the Athenians. If we compare them with the debauched Aetolians, we find that the wants and desires of the Athenians were of the noblest kind: the people were dissatisfied unless they could see every year a new tragedy, while in other respects they were as contented as any nation on earth with their frugal meal of salad, bread, olives, and water; they were *κρείττονες ἡδονῶν* in all coarse pleasures, while the Aetolians and Boetians knew nothing more delightful

It is difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding the Aetolians; that is, it is impossible to express oneself concerning them in few words. They were in the same circumstances on a large scale under the Macedonians, as the Klephts were on a small scale under the dominion of the Turks. For the latter, to some extent, likewise maintained their independence, but by themselves were an unprincipled set of men, and a curse to the peaceful inhabitants, just like the Pandurs in Servia and the Slavonian countries; and in our own days the Montenegrines on the frontiers of Albania, and the Mardites in Albania, are by themselves able and independent people, but a curse to their neighbours. Such, or nearly such, was the case with the Aetolians in Greece at that time. Those who do not draw this distinction, judge unfairly of them, like the excellent Polybius, otherwise a man of clear judgment, and truthful; but even the most truthful is not safe against error in his judgment of those with whom he is in conflict, and who are troublesome and oppressive to him: we are too apt to judge of other nations according to the feelings they call forth in ourselves. The judgment of Polybius is altogether the judgment of a hatred which, it must be owned, is justifiable in an Achæan, and which was altogether deserved by the Aetolians on account of their conduct towards other Greek nations. For they did not scruple at anything, and acted towards those who did not join them, in a manner as if they had been perpetually at war with all nations.

They did not in their policy follow any definite plans and principles: the case of the Aetolians was like that of the Roman senate from the time when a political system began to establish itself, that is, from the time of the decemvirs; they went on instinctively, affording assistance to all nations that joined them, and not to their neighbours only. Thus in the sixth century of Rome, Lysimachia in Thrace belonged to the Aetolian sympathy; we know, moreover, from inscriptions that, *e.g.*, the island of Ceos was in the relation of sympathy with the

than a well stocked table. The Athenians down to the latest times retained their fondness for intellectual pleasures: during the times of the greatest poverty, every common Athenian would make an effort to hear an ingenious man talk on the promenade, while the absence of physical comforts did not affect him. Rhodes, which shone particularly by its honesty, forms a parallel to Athens: Athens and Rhodes are the glory of Greece."—1826.

Aetolians, and so also were the Cretan towns; even the cities on the coast of Asia Minor, notwithstanding their distance, belonged to them. In their decrees the expression is, that no one should presume to injure those places *ὡς Αἰτωλῶν ὄντων*. Owing to this Aetolian sympolity, the Amphictyony ceased; they were the only Amphictyons, and formed a new confederation for purposes of mutual protection. It is probable that even in the reign of Antigonus they usurped the prostasia of the temple of Delphi, which is mentioned by Polybius and alluded to in a Delphian inscription.⁸ The Aetolians were not members of the Amphictyonic league, and as formerly the Phocians had excluded the presidents of the Amphictyony from the prostasia of the temple, in order to have a legal means of annulling their verdicts, so the Aetolians probably did the same. One of the events by which the Aetolian confederacy was extended, is the treaty which the Aetolians concluded with Alexander of Epirus, with the view of dividing Acarnania—a treaty which is often mentioned by the enemies of the Aetolians and especially by Polybius. The part which they took for themselves they retained, a circumstance which has been overlooked even by the excellent Palmerius, who otherwise cannot be sufficiently praised. The Aetolians remained in possession of it as long as their confederacy existed. The Arcanians, the ancient enemies of the Aetolians were thus reduced to the condition of perioeci of the Aetolians, and had no share in the council of the apocleti. In these sympolite states the ancient Aetolians in reality predominated, the *Αἰτωλία ἐπικτήτος* being in the relation of subordinate states. “But whether this ruling race comprised only those who bore the name of Aetolians as early as the Peloponnesian war, or whether other tribes had been incorporated with those real Aetolians, cannot be decided, though a passage of Polybius is in favour of the latter supposition.” Two years ago there was published a very valuable work on Aetolia, though it does not embrace everything.⁹

The Aetolians were the terror of their neighbours, and made ravaging excursions, which, however, are mentioned only in a few obscure passages, where all the terror is expressed in

⁸ Comp. Polyb. iv. 25; *Corpus Inscript. Graec.*, No. 1694.

⁹ This no doubt alludes to the work of Lucas, *Ueber Polybius' Darstellung des Aetolischen Bundes*, which, if we are not mistaken, was written at the suggestion of Niebuhr.—ED.

few words. This must be known in order to understand how far Aratus and the Achaean state were beneficial to Greece. In one of these expeditions under their strategus, Timaeus, they advanced as far as Taenarus, and on that occasion they carried off 10,000 men from Laconia as slaves. At another time, they fell upon the ἀγορὰ τῶν Παμβοιωτίων, where, during the σπονδαὶ or religious truce, they suddenly invaded Boeotia, and plundered the whole of the splendid fair. These are tricks like those of the Montenegrines. The importance of the Aetolians was the consequence of the unfortunate condition of Greece, which was the result of Macedonian tyranny. Hence many of the Greeks felt a sort of enthusiasm for the Aetolians, but this was, of course, the case only with those Greeks who learned, as it were, from newspapers what was going on, without having opportunities of observing the real state of things. This was very natural; for, at all events, the Greeks gained something. The Athenians were not in a situation to feel the ravages of the Aetolians, but had reason to be pleased when they heard that a Macedonian garrison was cut to pieces.

During this miserable state of affairs, it happened, through the carelessness of the aged Antigonus, whose thoughts were turned away from Greece to the restoration of Macedonia, that the league of the Achaean towns was revived and gained fresh strength. Antigonus lived at Pella, and limited his cares for the most part to Macedonia, on which he exercised a beneficial influence: he restored the country, and became the second founder of the kingdom. But the more he strengthened his own kingdom, the more was his attention diverted from Greece. In the latter country there was no regular form of government; in Corinth there were indeed Macedonian commanders, but they had no other power save that of interfering where things went wrong. Thus it happened that in Olymp. 125, at first four Achaean towns formed a confederacy and maintained themselves during the worst period of Antigonus. Afterwards, several others expelled their tyrants, and joined the other four (Olymp. 126). The number of Achaean towns was then ten, for two had perished by earthquakes. In this manner, the Achaean state arose quite unobserved, the little powerless country being quite overlooked. The depopulation of Greece had been completed by the great pestilence before the time of

Antigonus;¹⁰ and the Achaeans thus formed a small depopulated state which was overlooked and allowed to exist, because it was considered so insignificant. Such, also, was the case with the Christian state of Pelayo in Asturia; if the Moorish princes could have foreseen what Pelayo and the Christians in Asturia and Gallicia would undertake against them, they would have subdued the country; but war was troublesome, and so they were satisfied with a sorry tribute, consisting of boys and girls as slaves, together with some money. It is my conviction, that in such circumstances the direct interference of Providence is manifest, and God shuts the eyes of the haughty. It would have required only a resolution on the part of the Macedonian king, and Achaia would have been broken up, and the restoration of Greece, so far as it was afterwards effected, would have been a matter of impossibility; but the eyes of the proud were blinded, and the Achaean league continued to exist unobserved. A change in its constitution took place in Olymp. 131, when the Achaeans resolved to elect only one strategus, for at first they had had a general secretary and two strategi.

It now happened, that about Olymp. 132, in the later part of the reign of Antigonus, young Aratus, the son of an exile from Sicyon, formed the plan of delivering his country. Sicyon had been under tyrants for the last three generations, and even before the time when Demetrius Poliorcetes induced the inhabitants to quit the city; its tyrants were on the whole not very bad; they had fortified themselves, and ruled quietly, but the condition of Sicyon was nevertheless sad. The liberation of such a city would at any other time have been an unimportant event, but in this instance its consequences extended over the whole of Peloponnesus, and lasted nearly one hundred years. The life of Aratus is very beautifully described by Plutarch, so far as it can be described with feeling, as Plutarch is always beautiful where his feelings have free play. When afterwards Aratus is led into error by his policy, his selfishness and littleness, Plutarch is involved in difficulties, and appears altogether in conflict with himself.

¹⁰ "For the history of this period all authors must be thoroughly searched the statements being scattered in a hundred different passages."

LECTURE CIII.

OUR history here leads us to speak of a man who is one of the most remarkable that ever lived, and whom we must both praise and blame: he did great things, and much that was useful, beneficial, and noble in his varied life; but he also did things which were not great; his beneficial acts, however, outweighed the others, whence his memory was always blessed by his countrymen. But with all this we cannot call him a great man, and in his later years he even entered upon a perverse and dishonorable career. He was no more a great man than those who shone, indeed, in Italy at the beginning of the fifteenth century, but who were altogether deficient in valour and greatness of mind. One of his peculiarities is, that he possessed scarcely any personal courage; it was not only in individual actions that his courage failed, as was seen even in Frederick the Great, who lost his presence of mind in his first battle of Molwitz, but he was really and physically deficient in courage: this was not an invention of his enemies, as Plutarch would have it. He often withdrew from dangers in a manner actually disgraceful, and yet the same man often accomplished things which show great personal boldness, and which we should not ascribe to any one who is not possessed of considerable courage, and these things were accomplished by him in person. He was cunning and enterprising, and daring undertakings had a great charm for him, but he was incapable of managing a battle, or of meeting an enemy in the open field; and while he was the first when an enemy was to be surprised, his cowardice in an open battle became proverbial. Instances of such a mixture occur among the Spaniards, who, in cunning surprise display a superiority, a calmness, and lion-like courage which are unequalled, but who in the open field would not hold out one hour and a half, and would flee like deer. Intellectual culture is the second point in which Aratus was entirely deficient. He was indeed an author, and wrote memoirs, but the time at which he lived alone enabled him to do so, for it was then no longer necessary for a history to be written in a noble style, or to be

conceived in an artistic spirit; and his memoirs cannot have excelled even the productions of that age, which were by no means distinguished: they were trivial in diction and style. His deficiency in appreciating what was really great, shows itself particularly in his inability to constitute the Achæan league when it was becoming great: the confederacy always remained something isolated; it did indeed become a little more consolidated, but was never firmly established.

Aratus grew up in exile at Argos, in the same rude way in which many young men destined for the army grow up, and in which, during the time of our grandfathers, young noblemen spent their youth, in debauchery and licentiousness. He lived in exile without the superintendence of a father; for Clinias, his father, about the commencement of the reign of Antigonus Gonatas, had been appointed with another citizen preserver of the peace, during an interval when Sicyon was free from tyrants; but afterwards he had been slain by the tyrant Abantidas. His son Aratus, who was then seven years old, was saved by a fortunate accident; and that escape was an important event to Greece. If he had died before he invited Antigonus Doson to return to Peloponnesus, we should not be able to look upon him in any other light than that of an extraordinary benefactor of Greece; few men would then have deserved so well of any country as he deserved of Peloponnesus.

Although in exile, he yet remained in possession of a large property, which may be very easily accounted for; and this circumstance afforded him the means of effecting his return to Sicyon, and delivering his country. Great numbers of exiles existed in all the towns of Greece; and all Greece, though more particularly Peloponnesus, was full of bands of robbers, which had been formed in consequence of the general distress of the country; the same thing has occurred in Italy, for after the states had destroyed one another, and after the French had completed the work thus begun, bands of robbers were formed, and increased by being joined by the children of the exiles. In the sixteenth century, under Cosmo de Medici, such banditti existed on the frontiers of the papal state to the number of five thousand, who sold their services to any one who wished to take revenge for any thing. The captains of those bands in Greece were called ἀρχικλῶπες or ἀρχιπειραταί; they

looked upon themselves as petty princes, and were treated even by the towns with great respect; they were alternately soldiers and robbers. Aratus collected a band of such men (Olymp. 132, 2), and, owing to the carelessness of Nicocles, he succeeded in an almost inconceivable manner in leading them unobserved from Argos, and scaling the walls of Sicyon at a point where they were unguarded and the town deserted: it was New Sicyon, founded by Demetrius Poliorcetes. This undertaking was so skilfully managed, that Aratus was master of the town before the tyrant Nicocles discovered it, or could offer any resistance, so that the liberation of the place did not cost a single human life. The tyrant took to flight.

When Aratus was thus master of Sicyon, he shewed himself as a noble-minded and intelligent man. It would have been easy for him to make himself tyrant, but he disdained doing so, his plans being of a higher kind. He felt that, if he set himself up as tyrant, he would place himself in a state of dependence on Antigonos, and that too to obtain the prize of a dishonorable undertaking. He accordingly formed the idea of uniting Sicyon with the Achaeans, who also were glad of such an accession. By thus adding an important town to their confederacy, he had the great advantage that afterwards he was regularly, year after year, elected strategus of the Achaeans. But otherwise the Sicyonians made a great sacrifice in joining the Achaeans, because each of the insignificant Achaean towns had the same rights and the same vote as Sicyon, which was itself as large as several of the Achaean towns put together. Achaia, on the other hand, gained considerably by the accession.

The great task of Aratus now was to restore the internal tranquillity at Sicyon, where the returning exiles, and the children of others, demanded back their property, and the citizens who had purchased it refused to give it up; it could not in fact be taken from them, without violating the rights of property. This gave rise to a ferment in the city, during which it was possible that one of the parties might call in the aid of the Macedonians. Under these circumstances, Aratus first took all the treasures which had belonged to the tyrant, and then borrowed 150 talents from Ptolemy Philadelphus. At his own request fifteen men were appointed his assistants, in conjunction with whom he valued the confiscated property;

with the money he had collected, he now satisfied the claims of the exiles, and settled the disputes between them and the purchasers of their property. By these measures peace and concord were wisely restored in such a manner, that there did not remain the slightest trace of party feuds.

Several years now passed away before he had an opportunity of doing anything of importance. During this interval the Achaean league became more and more consolidated, the consequence of which was that it excited the envy of the Aetolians, who would have liked to extend their power beyond the Corinthian gulf, and draw Peloponnesus into their sympathy. Being threatened by them, the Achaeans contrived to induce the Boeotians to declare against the Aetolians. This is the time at which the Aetolians, contrary to the law of the Greeks,—according to which, during the *πανηγύρεις*, even in case of a war, there was always an armistice of a few days, the travellers to and fro were inviolable, and the *πανήγυρις* itself sacred,—attacked and plundered the *Παμβοιότεια* assembled at a panegyris. This gave rise to a fierce war between Boeotia and Aetolia. Boeotia, in comparison with other states of Greece, had a larger population, and was not so much exhausted as they were, whence, in Olymp. 133, 4., it could meet the Aetolians with a considerable force. But notwithstanding this, the Boeotians suffered a great defeat, the Achaeans not coming to their assistance in time, and the Boeotarchus Amaeocritus fell, together with thousands of his countrymen. This event which is described by Plutarch¹, is further illustrated by a fragment of Polybius², who states that after that defeat the Boeotians completely sank. It is attested by the same author in other passages, that the Boeotians now separated from the Achaeans, and not only concluded peace with the Aetolians, but even entered into an alliance with them, the latter of which, however, was not long adhered to by the Boeotians.

In the year following (Olymp. 134, 1), Aratus again succeeded in one of his characteristic undertakings. Antigonus was getting old and careless, and Aratus availing himself of these circumstances, took Corinth and its Acropolis by

¹ *Vit. Arati*, 16.

² "xx. 4, 2, foll. ed. Schweighaeuser who, as well as Valesius, has overlooked the fact, that the Amaeocritus there mentioned is the same as the Aboeocritus in Plutarch, the difference of the names being only orthographical."

surprise. He effected this in a wonderful manner, and on that occasion he showed not only presence of mind, but being cheered on by the greatness of the exploit itself, even personal courage and boldness, and encountered personal dangers: he had to sustain a very sharp fight. But the undertaking would nevertheless have failed, had not Antigonus foolishly intrusted the command in the city to the Stoic philosopher Persaeus, who had neglected everything. The particulars of the occurrence are as follows:—Aratus made the acquaintance of some Syrians, for strange to say, Antigonus had placed in Acrocorinthus a garrison of Syrian mercenaries; some of these having stolen money from the royal treasury fled to Sicyon, where Aratus promised them sixty talents, if they would show him the way to ascend Acrocorinthus, which was a high rock above the city, and accessible only by a single road from Corinth, the city being completely commanded by the citadel. Those scoundrels had observed that there were other ways up the rock, partly concealed and partly neglected, but which could be passed without difficulty. Erginus, one of the leaders of those Syrians, made himself master of one of the gates of the city by surprise, and Aratus secretly entered it with a small band of 100 men; although he was discovered, yet he contrived to reach the point from which he might get up to the arx; he reached the top, and began the fight with the garrison. Three hundred men followed him, when the garrison, which was for the most part quartered in the city, assembled at the gate leading to the castle, and cut off the auxiliaries of Aratus. The latter, however, attacked the garrison, drove it back into the city, and thus succeeded in joining Aratus, who conquered the Acropolis and the whole city; for on the following morning the whole Achaean army arrived, and the city was unable to offer any further resistance. This capture of Corinth created an immense sensation. Immediately after it, Aratus also undertook the liberation of Megara, from which he expelled the Macedonian garrison. Megara, which had hitherto belonged to the Boeotian confederacy, now joined the Achaeans³.

“The loss of Acrocorinthus was a deathblow to Antigonus,

³ “Polyb. *Exc.* xx. According to Plutarch's life of Aratus, we must believe that Megara was one of the places that had a Macedonian garrison, although the Boeotians had none.”

for through it he lost his dominion over Peloponnesus," and the Achaean league now extended in the peninsula with wonderful rapidity. It was joined by the small towns, Troezen, Epidaurus, Hermione, etc., and perhaps also by Mantinea. Gradually it extended over Arcadia, and in the end all the great towns, such as Megalopolis, Orchomenos, and Tegea, joined the league one after another. Some of the tyrants ruling in those cities laid down their power of their own accord, as *e. g.*, Lydiadas of Megalopolis (Olymp. 136, 3), but others were compelled to do so. Argos, too, where, ever since the time of Pyrrhus, tyrants of the family of Aristippus had ruled — the present tyrant was Aristomachus — afterwards joined the confederacy (Olymp. 138, 1).

All the towns which joined the Achaeans, were admitted to the sympolity of the confederacy with equal rights. This sympolity was nearly the same as the Latin *civitas sine suffragio*, and consisted in this: one country entered into a relation with another, whereby the citizens of the one were entitled to settle in the other, but were at the same time obliged to serve in its wars. Now as those places joined the Achaeans, they had to adopt the Achaean laws instead of their own; but whether this was the case with the civil laws in general, or referred to the political laws only, is not certain, but I believe that it extended to all laws, for they adopted the same measures, weights, etc.

The constitution of the confederacy is rather obscure; it was no doubt frequently changed, which accounts for the contradictions we find concerning it. We only know that the people every year elected a strategus and a grammateus, and besides these two, a small council of *damiurgi*, "which assembled twice in every year." Every town, irrespective of its size, had the same vote in this council. The council held its regular meetings at Aegium, which also contained the archives, and was the seat of the strategus and grammateus. The council, however, could not decide upon all subjects, but in important cases it passed only a *probuleuma*, and referred the decision to the general diet. "As there was a fair at Aegium at the time, the *probuleuma* was laid before the assembled people for decision. In that assembly, the people, according to Livy,⁴ did not vote by heads, but as at Athens every citizen voted

⁴ xxxii. 22, 23.

in his phyle, or, as at Rome the votes were counted according to the tribes, so in the Achaean assembly, the votes were given according to towns, as had been the case in the Amphictyony. The size or importance of a town was not taken into consideration, and the smaller ones made the laws. This regulation deterred the larger states, such as Elis and Messene, from joining the league of the Achaeans, and for the same reason Corinth was always rebellious, so that the league was obliged to keep a garrison in the Acropolis of Corinth to retain the Corinthians as members of the confederacy.

Three of the six ancient countries of Peloponnesus, viz., Argolis, Arcadia, and Achaia, were wholly attached to the league, with the exception of a few small places in Arcadia, which were in the sympolity of the Aetolians. The Lacedaemonians were still governed by their kings and lived under the laws of Lycurgus. Messene and Elis, but especially the latter, were allied with the Aetolians. Peloponnesus was thus divided into two halves; but besides the one half of the peninsula, the Achaeans possessed Megara, and after the death of Antigonus, they and Aratus succeeded in inducing, by a considerable sum of money, the Macedonian phrurarchus in Piraeus and Munychia to evacuate the port-town (Olymp. 137, 3 or 4); Antigonus had evacuated the city before that event (Olymp. 131, 1), but had at the same time ordered the long walls to be demolished, this being probably the condition on which he consented to withdraw his garrison; for after the destruction of those walls, the city could not be supplied with provisions from the sea, if a sufficient land army was stationed in Attica.⁵ Athens, however, did not join the Achaean league. During that time, and even at a later period, the city was a place without any political importance. Eurycleides and Micion are mentioned as strategi.

The Achaean league thus increased in an astonishing manner,

⁵ "This demolition of the walls cannot, apparently, be assigned to any other time. Sixty years later, at the beginning of the first war between Rome and Macedonia, that is, in Olymp. 144, or A. U. C. 552, when Philip made the attempt to take Athens by surprise, and the enemies fought amid the ruins of the walls, the walls must, of course, have been pulled down. In the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes, on the other hand, they were evidently still standing; hence they were probably not destroyed till after the time of the Chremonidean war, and Antigonus, no doubt, made this the condition on which he withdrew his garrison."—1825.

and it is inconceivable why Antigonus did not undertake anything serious to check its progress; he had probably become inflexible and irresolute by old age, and his son Demetrius was too young and insignificant a person to carry on a war.

The Aetolians, thinking themselves endangered by the fact that Acrocorinthus had fallen into the hands of the Achaeans, allied themselves the year after (Olymp. 134, 2) with Antigonus Gonatas. One of the stipulations of this treaty was the division of the Achaean towns. The Boeotians had already concluded a separate peace with the Aetolians, and the situation of the Achaeans seemed not a little dangerous. But the result of the war did not answer the expectations, and the Aetolians seem to have carried it on without spirit. It must not, however, be overlooked, that the Achaeans, at an early period, had turned their eyes to Alexandria, and that they received considerable support from Ptolemy Euergetes.

I am far from wishing to refute the charges brought by Polybius against the Aetolians, but in some points they are too severe, and this treaty with Antigonus in particular must not be imputed to them as a crime against Greece.

In this war the Aetolians once appeared in the Corinthian gulf near the Amistrus(?) but the Achaeans were strong enough to repel their attempts to effect a landing. The Aetolians then showed themselves near the Isthmus with a small fleet. King Agis of Sparta, who was allied with the Achaeans, had come to their assistance with an army; but Aratus, afraid of engaging in a battle in the open field, retreated, and allowed the Aetolians to enter Peloponnesus without opposition; on perceiving this, Agis with his Lacedaemonians likewise withdrew. When the Aetolians thus spread over the country, and conquered and plundered Pellene, Aratus suddenly came forward again, fell upon them while they were engaged in plunder, and compelled them with great loss to quit the town and the peninsula. The war between the Achaeans and Macedonia also was soon brought to a close; but it is uncertain whether peace was concluded immediately after the death of Antigonus, or during the first years of Demetrius.

According to our guide Justin, we shall here interrupt the consideration of the affairs of Greece, and treat of the history of Syria and Egypt.⁶

⁶ The fact which leads Niebuhr to this arrangement, is evidently the enmity

“ Within one Olympiad, the old generals of Alexander, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy Soter had died. In Syria Antiochus Soter had ascended the throne (Olymp. 124, 4) and Ptolemy Philadelphus had become king of Egypt (Olymp. 123, 3) two years before the death of his father, who, as I have already remarked, had resigned, and lived as the first subject of his son.”

Antiochus Soter, the son of Seleucus, who had succeeded his father at the age of forty, received the surname of Soter from his complete victory over the Gauls at the time when they had crossed the Bosphorus, as I have already mentioned. That decisive battle, which does him great honour, is mentioned only by Lucian, by one rhetorician, and by Appian in his book on Syria; the most essential points at any rate may easily be compiled from these sources. He reigned little more (?) than twenty years.

At the beginning of his reign, Antiochus carried on wars with Antigonus and Ptolemy Ceraunus, which, however, were soon brought to a close. The war with Antigonus had commenced as early as the time of Demetrius; it was a maritime war, in which nothing sufficiently important was done; both parties felt that it was only a useless waste of strength, and soon concluded peace. Antiochus was wise enough altogether to abstain from interfering in the affairs of Europe.

In Asia he apparently enlarged the dominion of his father, and his magnificent empire extended from the mountains of Candahar as far as the Hellespont; but many parts of it, which his father had left him in a state of submission, asserted their independence, as *e.g.*, Cappadocia and Pontus under Ariarathes, and so also Armenia and several other countries in the midst of his empire; and he was obliged to be satisfied with maintaining a nominal supremacy in those parts. There can be no doubt that in his reign Bactria also became independent under a Macedonian king. Even Seleucus had no longer ruled over the Indian states, which having separated from the empire, returned to their own national institutions.

between the Ptolemies and the kings of Macedonia. We may here remark, that there exists a slip of paper, in Niebuhr's hand-writing, belonging to the first years of his residence at Bonn, in which the naval victory of Ptolemy Euergetes over one Antigonus is referred to Antigonus Gonatas, whereas, in his dissertation on Eusebius (*Klein. Schrift.* vol. i. p. 297), it is referred to Antigonus Doson.—ED.

With Ptolemy Philadelphus he at first concluded peace, and was on good terms with him; but during the latter years of his reign he was again involved in a war with him, although Ptolemy undoubtedly was far more powerful; and this war was protracted until the reign of his son Antiochus.

“Under the first three Ptolemies, that is, for a period of one hundred years, Egypt was extremely prosperous, and what Theocritus says in his encomium on Ptolemy is not exaggerated. The government of the first three Ptolemies was very moderate and mild, and they stood to the Egyptians in quite the same relation as native princes. Although there were a few insurrections, yet the Egyptian nation, as a body, was faithful, and such insurrections had occurred even under the Pharaohs. The long reigns of Soter and Philadelphus, amounting to seventy-eight years, were extremely beneficial to the country, more especially the reign of Philadelphus, which lasted nearly forty years, and which has rarely been equalled in splendour and prosperity. “These two reigns may be compared to those of David and Solomon. Ptolemy Soter was constantly involved in wars, while Philadelphus reigned in peace; and besides the Syrian war, he had to carry on only that against Antigonus Gonatas, in which, however, he confined himself to sending subsidies in money, and a small fleet to Athens. Afterwards he supported his allies in Greece with money only. The war with Syria did no injury to Egypt at all; not even the Egyptian provinces were touched by the armies.” Under Philadelphus Alexandria rose to very great magnificence, and even in his reign it was the first of all the cities of the time. “All the Indian commerce was in the hands of the Alexandrians; but it was not only through commerce that Alexandria became great, but because it was a refuge for all Greeks who sought a mild government and protection against Macedonian tyranny; and they found there the most varied means of gaining a subsistence and even of acquiring wealth. With the exception of a few traces, that magnificent city has altogether disappeared: it is still remarkable for its subterraneous passages, which, however, at least in their present form, were constructed at a later period.

The revenues of the empire of Philadelphus were immense, as we learn from Appian's Preface. They seem to us incredible, because we have no accurate knowledge of the value of

the Egyptian talent: "if it had been the same as the Euboean talent, as Appian states, the amount would certainly be impossible, for in that case the revenues would have amounted to upwards of ten millions sterling, a sum which no Roman emperor in all antiquity was able to raise." But the Alexandrian talent was of copper, and I can prove that its value was about 1/24 of the Attic silver talent: it probably contained 240 Alexandrian drachmae. The proportion is about the same as that existing between the Swedish ton of money, that is, 100,000 Reichsthalers in copper, and 100,000 Thalers in silver. It is clear from the receipts which we have in some ancient documents written on papyrus, that the Alexandrian was a copper talent and not silver. It is a singular fact, that in the wealthy country of Egypt we so rarely find gold or silver coins of the Ptolemies, whereas copper coins are incredibly common. The gold and silver was exported in the commerce with India, and in the inland traffic their place was supplied by copper, which, owing to the great poverty of the people, was not carried out of the country. Copper was the general metal of Egyptian coins, though foreign coins also may have been current.⁷ Ptolemy Philadelphus, moreover, had a large fleet of several hundred ships of war, the timber for

⁷ Com. *Klein. Schrift.* vol. i. p. 278, note 74, and Niebuhr's *Inscripfen in Nubien und Aegypten* (in Gau, *Neuentdeckte Denkmäler von Nubien*), *Inscripfen* von Gartass, No. 25. As the passage is not printed in the second volume of the *Kleine Schriften*, we shall here give it verbatim, and shall, hereafter, have occasion to quote some other passages from the essay on Nubian inscriptions: "In like manner, both inscriptions (Nos. 25 and 48) agree in stating, that the present consists of *one talent*, and a sum of money. Accordingly, Roman money was not, even then, the only current coin in Egypt: the ancient imaginary coin of the Egyptian copper coin of a talent was still in use, on which I have spoken in my dissertation on the Armenian translation of Eusebius' Chronicle. For that, here too, a talent of much less value than any silver talent is meant, is clear, from the fact, that Macrinus, who boasts of an unparalleled liberality, paid two hundred and forty gold pieces for eight priestly dignities. From his (Nos. 30 and 36), and other inscriptions, it is evident, that fifteen or twenty, or, at the utmost, thirty gold pieces, were given. The value of such a talent, therefore, would be *about* twenty gold pieces. It is to be hoped, that, as more and more Egyptian documents of the imperial period are brought to light, this interesting point will be satisfactorily explained. Twenty zechins are four thousand four hundred bajocchi; and thus the proportion mentioned above is supported by internal probability. If we consider the nature of the imperial coins of Alexandria, it is more than probable, that, under the emperors, as previously under the Ptolemies, copper coin was the currency in Egypt. Even when large sums had to be made up, the coin was not unbearable to the robust Egyptian facchini (Aristoph.)."—ED.

which he derived from mount Lebanon and from Cyprus; he had also a numerous army of mercenaries.

The causes which involved him in war with Antiochus, are obscure; but it was probably a quarrel about the possession of Coelesyria. The Egyptians carried on the war on the offensive against Asia Minor, where they already possessed a few places, and principally at sea. The Syrians conquered Damascus, though otherwise the war was unfavourable to them; they did not carry it on with energy, and the Egyptians at that time conquered Ephesus, the coast of Ionia, Caria, Pamphylia, and probably Cilicia also; the Cyclades likewise fell into their hands about that period. The Rhodians, with an extremely wise policy, went their own way, and were on terms of friendship with Egypt, but remained quiet, and did not allow themselves to be drawn into any disputes. But with all this, they were highly respected far and wide, and their commerce was flourishing in the peaceful relations which they maintained.

On the death of Antiochus Soter (Olymp. 129, 3) the government passed into the hands of his surviving son—of his two other sons, one had been put to death by the father's command—Antiochus Theos, one of the most detestable Asiatic despots. He obtained the surname of the God from the Milesians, because under his auspices they had expelled the tyrant Timarchus. For it must be observed, that in Asia the state of things became changed: a bastard of Ptolemy, bearing the same name, had the command at Ephesus, and in conjunction with one Timarchus of Miletus, he revolted against his own father. The rebel was indeed put down, but during the confusion those districts fell back into the hands of the Syrians, a part of the mercenaries submitting to the king of Syria, and Antiochus made Ephesus, which had been raised to importance by Lysimachus, his chief residence.

Under these circumstances, Ptolemy Philadelphus, who had become old and was now in his dotage, sought peace, which he obtained at the price of giving his daughter Berenice in marriage to Antiochus Theos. This Antiochus, as I said before, was one of the most detestable men, who had sunk so deeply in brutal lusts and debauchery, that he never had a moment for sober reflection, and left all government business in the hands of two Cyprians, who were his favourites in a way disgraceful to human nature, and who tyrannised over

the country in a most fearful manner. "The most notorious of these favorites was Themison, whose great merit was, that owing to his Herculean strength he could go through any amount of licentiousness: he was the Heracles of the god Antiochus, and temples were erected to both." On the other hand, Antiochus was under the control of his wife Laodice, by whom he had several children, "and who overlooked his disgusting vices, merely to be able to tyrannise over the country." Berenice⁸ became the mediator of peace. Egypt gave up its claims to Ephesus and ceded a part of its conquests in Asia Minor; and peace was thus concluded.

Berenice went to Syria with immense treasures and an amount of luxuries which was truly Asiatic, whence she received the surname of *ἡ φερνοφόρος*. In the genuine spirit of Asiatic refinement, she drank no other water but what was brought from the Nile in golden vessels. The water of the Nile is very refreshing and wholesome, and in the greatest heat a person may drink it without danger; even when troubled it is very refreshing; it can be kept very long when the sediment is taken away; the water has no disagreeable taste even when troubled and unpurified. This Berenice, as St. Jerome has very correctly observed in his instructive commentary on Daniel (chap. 11), is "[the daughter of the king of the south" spoken of by the Prophet, and who is sent with great treasures to the king of the north to establish peace. In order to marry her, Antiochus was obliged to divorce and send away Laodice (the same as Laodice, as Laodamia is the same as Laudamia), the daughter of Achæus, a man of high rank. But she did not go far, and when Philadelphus had died (Olymp. 133, 1), she returned, recovered her whole influence, and Berenice, with her child, was sent to Antioch. We must here pass on to another event.

Ophellas of Cyrene, as I have stated before, had been enticed by Agathocles to come to Carthage, where Agathocles afterwards caused his troops to revolt against him, and where Ophellas himself disappeared. After this Cyrene was for a time independent; we do not know how long, but it lasted until the arrival of Magas, a step-brother of Philadelphus, and a son of Berenice by her first husband Philip. Ptolemy Lagi, who was a faithful father to his step-children, and took care of them in every possible way, made him governor of

⁸ "Berenice is the same name as Veronica."—1826.

Cyrene; he was to be a vassal prince of the empire. Hence we find Cyrenean coins bearing on one side the inscription *βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου*, and on the other the name of Magas in a monogram, with the silphium of Cyrene. But even during the reign of his step-father he was not faithful, and in that of his brother, Ptolemy Philadelphus, he made himself independent. Philadelphus left him in peace, apparently from a kind of generosity; when, after a long reign, Magas died, he left a daughter Berenice, through whom he had endeavoured to renew his connection with the royal house of Egypt, for he had betrothed her to a son of Ptolemy Philadelphus, who was then surnamed Tryphon, that is, a man living in luxury and effeminacy, a name which, like that of Tryphaena, occurs frequently during this period; both names are very common in the royal house of Egypt. This Tryphon is better known under the name of Euergetes, which he obtained afterwards, probably from the Egyptian priests.⁹ To this prince, I say, Magas betrothed his daughter; but his widow Arsinoë, a daughter of the rejected Arsinoë, harbouring different plans, turned her eyes to Macedonia. Demetrius Poliorcetes had three sons, Antigonus Gonatas and two others, both called Demetrius, which might cause much confusion, but they were distinguished by surnames—the one being surnamed *ὁ Καλός*, and the other *ὁ Ἰσχνός*. The former is remarkable for the tragic scenes in which he was involved, and for being the father of Antigonus Doson or Epitropos. Although he was married in Macedonia and had children—by a Thessalian woman of Larissa, probably belonging to the Aleuadae—Arsinoë invited him to come to Cyrene, offering him the hand of her daughter and the kingdom of Cyrene. He went thither, and wanted to take

⁹ "All the Egyptian kings have surnames, which were not, as in the case of the Macedonian kings, given them by later historians, for the purpose of distinguishing them from one another. The Ptolemies obtained them partly as compliments, and partly from circumstances which formed the talk of the time; but, besides this, every Egyptian king received a name by a decree of the priestly college of the Egyptians, just as the Pharaohs, besides their real name, had received one from the priests, by which they were designated as gods. In this manner Tryphon was called Euergetes by the priests; the Ptolemy who obtained the surname of Auletes through the talk of the people, was called by the priests *νέος Διόνυσος*. These names the Ptolemies added in their documents, and in their inscriptions. The Persian kings had not received such names, and this circumstance shows in what relation the Egyptians stood to the Macedonian dynasty."—1826.

possession of the government, but the queen-mother refused to surrender it; she was a profligate woman, and sought to gain him for herself, instead of for her daughter. For a time Demetrius was in possession of Cyrene. Berenice was kept as a prisoner, not being allowed to go to Egypt nor to marry Demetrius. She now did *quo non fortius ausit alis*, as Callimachus says in the splendid poem which Catullus has translated into Latin: she undertook to murder the paramour of her mother—a deed like that of Beatrice Cenci. She herself led the assassins into the room, exclaiming, “Spare my mother!” The latter clasped Demetrius in her arms, but he was despatched by the murderers, and Arsinoë after this disappears from history. Berenice married Ptolemy Euergetes. This happened during the latter period of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus.¹⁰

I have recently read a curious anecdote about Ptolemy Philadelphus:¹¹ anecdotes generally do not deserve to be much attended to, but some are exceptions. He was immensely rich, and in fact the wealthiest prince of the time. The Romans had solicited his friendship, and sent an embassy to him; he had just concluded the peace with Syria, and had reached the zenith of his glory, when suddenly he was attacked by a species of insanity, consisting in an indescribable fear of death. Chemical artifices were practised in Egypt from the earliest times; chemistry as a science derives its name from the Egyptians: it is called the Egyptian art, for Egypt was by its own inhabitants called Chemi. Chemical instruments occur in the most ancient bas-reliefs. The art of making gold was attempted in Egypt at an early period, and in like manner the Egyptians tried to discover the philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life. Hence Ptolemy also took every imaginable pains to find the elixir of life; but it was all in vain, his strength was rapidly decreasing. Once, like Louis XI., he was looking from a window of his palace upon the sea coast, and seriously meditated upon the subject of his longing; it must have been in winter time, when the sand, exposed to the rays of the sun, becomes very warm. He saw some poor boys burying themselves in the warm sand and screaming with delight, and the aged king began bitterly to cry, seeing the ragged urchins

¹⁰ In 1826, Niebuhr assumed that these things happened at the beginning of the reign of Euergetes.—Ed.

¹¹ Athen. xii. p. 536, E.

enjoying their life without any apprehension of losing it; for he felt that with all his riches he could not purchase that happiness, and that his end was very near at hand.



LECTURE CIV.

WE have now arrived at the history of gigantic events, though the actors in them are not great, but only men of mediocrity; I allude to the war between Seleucus and Ptolemy Euergetes. It was described in the history of Phylarchus, which extended from the death of Seleucus to the period after the reign of Cleomenes, and perhaps even to the beginning of the reign of Ptolemy Philopator. Polybius judges severely of him, and in some respects perhaps too harshly; but certainly not too severely in regard to his critical skill. Polybius is unfair towards the opinions and sentiments of Phylarchus, but this arises from party spirit, and in saying this I am certainly not unjust towards Polybius: I esteem him greatly, for he is a man of action. The second historian of this period, who undoubtedly far surpasses Phylarchus, and deserves to be ranked very high indeed, is Agatharchides of Cnidus. We have excerpts from his work among those in Photius, where perhaps they are an interpolation; but they furnish little information upon the history of the time; they are, however, extremely important in regard to ancient ethnology. They contain a description of the coasts of the Red Sea and of the south-eastern coast of Africa.¹ This description was made in the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, who made conquests on the coasts of the Red Sea, but not those which have been ascribed to him from a wrong interpretation of the Adulitian monument, as has been shown by Buttmann. Euergetes had established himself in Adulis, near Massaua, and surrounded the whole coast of the Red Sea with fortified places or emporia. Agatharchides gives a very accurate description of

¹ In regard to what here follows, compare the essay, *Ueber das Alter der zweiten Hälfte der Adulitischen Inschrift*, in the *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. i p. 401 foll., and p. 410 foll.—ED.

the nations of that coast, pointing out their manners and customs, their physical constitution and their peculiarities; it is most masterly, and if I except the descriptions of Herodotus, I know of none that can be compared with his. His descriptions are so perfect, that if a person has studied the peculiarities of those nations, he cannot help recognising them at once. He does not name the nations by their barbarous names, but retains those which had been given to them before; thus he calls the inhabitants of the coast *Ichthyophagi*, by which name they had been known before, and he mentions names which are very strange. The loss of his work is very much to be lamented, and we unfortunately do not even know with accuracy the time at which Agatharchides lived. Dodwell's opinion upon this subject is quite wrong: it is founded on the assumption, that Agatharchides was the guardian of a king of Egypt—an assumption based upon nothing but the fact, that among his fragments we have the speech of a guardian addressed to a young king, who was probably Ptolemy Epiphanes. I believe that he lived about Olymp. 150. There is a passage, according to which he was the *famulus* of Heraclides Lembus; if there be no confusion here, he must have lived about that time, in the reign of Ptolemy Epiphanes, towards the end of the seventh century of Rome. Agatharchides, as I said before, wrote the history of that period, and was a most excellent authority.

Before the Armenian translation of Eusebius was made known by Zohrab, we had no information about that period, except in two widely different authorities, the one being the twenty-seventh book of Justin, whose extracts in that part are exceedingly bad, and the other the commentary of St. Jerome on Daniel. The latter was a man of great genius and astonishing erudition and critical tact; he is a real model of historical exegesis of the Scriptures. Unfortunately many books were already lost when he wrote; in his commentary on Daniel, he made use of that of Porphyry, upon whom some silly Christian scholars were in the habit of looking with horror; but St. Jerome, unconcerned about such opinions, made use of his work on account of the varied historical information he found in it. Among the very instructive writings of St. Jerome, the books *adversus Jovinianum* are the richest mine for the historian, though he must also study many other works of his. The sketch of the war between Ptolemy Euergetes and

Seleucus, which we have in St. Jerome, has no chronological data, and cannot be reconciled with the narrative of Justin. But here we are fortunately assisted by the circumstance, that the Armenian translation of the Chronicle of Eusebius gives a minute chronological account. Formerly it was indeed known, from the Greek excerpts of Casaubon from Eusebius, that there existed accurate accounts of the Syrian kings, but the very leaf containing them was wanting, and this deficiency is now supplied from the Armenian Chronicle. I claim the merit of having pointed this out. The Armenian translator did not understand Greek; he translated slavishly and quite literally; when he had to translate a compound word, which he did not understand, he translated the separate parts, and that even in proper names. The Chronicle was taken by Eusebius from the great chronological work of Porphyry, who had incorporated in it the history of the empires that were formed after Alexander; but Eusebius, in making use of this work, often fancied to be wiser than his predecessor, and introduced forgeries in some passages. It was a superficial notion of his, but he imagined that he had formed a more correct opinion upon certain matters. Porphyry, who was also a mathematician, was guided in his chronology by the astronomical observations relating to the years of the kings. He fixed the beginning of the reigns after Alexander; and, with some interpolations, Eusebius incorporated these dates in his Chronicle. All documents were dated according to the years of the several reigns, and Porphyry, therefore, had a practical object in reducing the years of the kings to Olympiads, this being necessary in order to fix the dates of the documents with certainty. This he did with such accuracy, that we may perfectly rely upon him, and thus the succession of events may, to some extent, be fixed with chronological accuracy. Upon these points I beg of you to consult my investigation on the historical information to be derived from the Armenian Chronicle, to which I do not know that I can add anything.

Laudice, the wife of Antiochus Theos, was a daughter of Achæus, a Macedonian of very high rank. The family of Achæus acts a prominent part from the time of Antiochus Soter down to that of Antiochus the Great: we have mention of Achæus I., Andromachus, and Achæus II. Achæus I. was the father of Laudice.

The name Laodice was much liked in that family, and through marriages it was also introduced into that of the Seleucidae. At the time when Ptolemy Philadelphus was either in his weak state of mind or already dead, the Laodice of whom we are here speaking, contrived, by intrigues, to be recalled to the court at Ephesus; and Berenice was either exiled or went away of her own accord. She proceeded with her child to Antioch. The court of this vast empire frequently migrated, as is always the case in the East; and thus, after the marriage, which had been celebrated at Antioch, it was again established at Ephesus. But seeing the fickleness of Antiochus Theos, the sons of Laodice, Seleucus Callinicus (then eighteen years old) and Antiochus Hierax, were afraid lest, in consequence of a threat of Ptolemy, their mother should likewise be rejected, and the son of Berenice should be raised to the throne; and in order to avert this danger, Laodice poisoned Antiochus Theos (Olymp. 133, 2). It is, however, possible, that he may have died a natural death, for he was completely reduced: for years he had been plunged so deeply in vice, that he never rose to a state of human consciousness; he was in a perpetual state of intoxication, and had been ill for a long time. In order to secure the government, she, after his death, made the people believe that the king was ill; she caused a waxen image of him to be placed in a bed, and thus deceived the courtiers, who were obliged to stand at a respectful distance. Meantime she, with her sons, took possession of the government, and adopted measures to rid herself of Berenice.

But the citizens of Antioch sided with Berenice, and after the death of Antiochus she, for a time, remained in possession of Antioch. A number of the maritime towns, which were under Syrian supremacy without being exactly subjects, also declared for her and her child, and got up a fleet to save her. But she was betrayed by the nobles of Antioch; her child was dragged from her arms and murdered before her eyes; she then fled into the temple at Daphne, and was herself murdered there in the asylum. The two brothers, Seleucus Callinicus and Antiochus Hierax, then assumed the crown; but they seem to have divided the empire, and Antiochus obtained Asia Minor. "They were more active than their father had been; they were warlike and able generals, but in other respects

they were worthy of him and their mother, and persons of the same character." Seleucus, the elder, no doubt, had been the principal agent in that horrible deed of blood.

But Ptolemy Euergetes, the third among the Ptolemies, and the last in the series that deserves praise, now rose in just indignation at the fate of his unhappy sister (Olymp. 133, 3). He marched out with all the forces of his empire, and wherever he went the nations declared in his favour. "The crime of the Syrian rulers had roused even those nations, which otherwise bore any act of despotism with sullen indifference. All the Ionian, Cilician, and other towns, which were already in arms to support Berenice," joined Euergetes, and he traversed the whole of the Syrian empire. According to the second half of the Adulitian inscription, he subdued the country as far as Bactria. He himself proceeded as far as Babylon. Media, Persia, and the upper satrapies, southern Chorassan and Sistan as far as Cabul, all of which belonged to Syria, submitted to him. He was equally successful in Asia Minor: the acropolis of Sardes, a part of Lydia, and Phrygia Major alone maintained themselves. Even the countries on the coast of Thrace, which, during the period of the weakness of Macedonia, had been added to Syria, as far as the river Nestus, were conquered by the Egyptians. Imagine what a gigantic war this was! Seleucus Callinicus, in the meantime, probably maintained himself in the mountainous districts of Armenia, in Aderbidjan. "His brother, Antiochus, deserted him, and negotiated with Ptolemy." In the conquered countries, Ptolemy everywhere exercised the rights of a conqueror in the harsh Egyptian manner. All the Egyptian monuments which the Achaemenid kings had carried from Egypt to Ecbatana, Susa, and other places, were brought back by him, and he carried away, besides, a vast number of other works of art. The museums were a passion with the Ptolemies; and they were the first who conceived the idea of museums and galleries. The Asiatics might, indeed, have got over these things, but he levied immense contributions, and is said to have raised 40,000 talents, which is not by any means an impossible sum, and I even believe that we must understand Euboean or Attic talents; a reduction to Egyptian talents, which I was formerly inclined to believe, would after all make the sum too small.

While he was thus levying contributions abroad, an insurrection broke out in Egypt, which obliged him to return. We know no particulars about this insurrection; but he returned and seems to have become convinced that Egypt was too small a basis for such an empire. "If he had wished to retain all his conquests, he would have been obliged to make Antioch his residence, and this would have weakened the ground of his strength. He, moreover, appears to have been well aware that the conquests had been made too quickly." He accordingly divided them, retaining for himself Syria as far as the Euphrates, and the coast districts of Asia Minor and Thrace, so that he had a complete maritime empire. The remaining territories he divided into two states: the country beyond the Euphrates, was given, according to St. Jerome on Daniel (xi. 7 foll.), to one Xanthippus who is otherwise unknown, and western Asia was left to Antiochus Hierax. It would seem that after this he never visited those countries again.

After he had withdrawn, a party hostile to him came forward to oppose him. The Rhodians with their wise policy, who had hitherto given no decided support to either empire, now stepped forward setting to the other maritime cities the example of joining that party. The confederates formed a fleet, with the assistance of which, and supported by a general insurrection of the Asiatics, who were exasperated against the Egyptians on account of their rapacity, Seleucus Callinicus rallied again. He recovered the whole of upper Asia, and for a time he was united with his brother Antiochus Hierax. The insurrection in Egypt must have been of a very serious nature, and Ptolemy being pressed on all sides concluded a truce of ten years with Seleucus on the basis *uti possidetis*. Both parties seem to have retained the places which they possessed at the time, so that all the disadvantage was on the side of the Seleucidae, for the fortified town of Seleucia, *e. g.* remained in the hands of the Egyptians, whereby the capital was placed in a dangerous position. "A part of Cilicia, the whole of Caria, the Ionian cities, the Thracian Chersonesus, and several Macedonian towns likewise continued to belong to Egypt."

During this period, a war broke out between the brothers Seleucus and Antiochus. The latter carried it on with the support of the family of Andromachus and of the Gauls whom

he had taken into his service after they had been defeated by Attalus. Some have imagined, that the surname of Seleucus ought to be written Gallinicus, because he had once defeated the Gauls; but this is ridiculous. He was called *Καλλίνικος* because Heracles bore the same surname, which was now applied to him, and that not with injustice, for being placed in extremely difficult circumstances he accomplished great things, though we may say with Goethe, that "the mighty period produced a wretched race."² The war between the two brothers lasted for years: its seat was Asia Minor. Once Antiochus with his Gallic auxiliaries gained a decided victory over his brother near Ancyra. The Gauls conquered the camp, and Seleucus himself was missing; he would have been lost, if the Gauls had been less faithless and avaricious. But being satisfied with the booty they allowed him to escape, and Seleucus succeeded in recovering his position. The avarice of the Gauls spoiled everything, for they demanded of Antiochus such donatives, that he was glad to escape from their hands. After this struggle had lasted for some years, Antiochus in the end succumbed. We possess a remarkable monument of that war in the treaty of the Magnetes of Mount Sipylus with the Smyrncans, which is preserved in an inscription on marble in the Arundel collection at Oxford, and which reveals to us the state of disorganisation in which every one cared only for himself. "Seleucus established himself in upper Asia, where the Parthians, who during the war between the brothers had subdued Sistan and lower Chorassan, were in the possession of Media, Babylonia and Persia;" when therefore he set out from those quarters with all his forces against his brother, when the country rose against Antiochus and his plundering Gauls, and when Antiochus was unable any longer to pay the Gauls out of the resources of the country, he could not hold out any longer, although in war he was by no means a contemptible general. He was so much reduced, that after a battle in Lydia, in order not to fall into the hands of his brother, he took refuge with Ariamnes in Cappadocia, who was related to him by marriage.

² "Seleucus has been ridiculed for his surname Callinicus, but unjustly. It is true that, at his death, the empire was no longer as large as it had been under his father; but when we consider how much he had been reduced, and what difficulties he had to overcome, and how he contrived to make use of every favourable turn of fortune, we cannot help admiring him."—1826.

But Ariamnes was so treacherous as to be ready to deliver him up for money and a few provinces. Antiochus, however, discovering his plan fled into Thrace. But there he was taken prisoner by a general of Euergetes, "and orders were sent from Alexandria to keep him in safe custody;" for in the mean time a peace had been concluded between Seleucus and Ptolemy, by which the Egyptian empire in its immense extent was strengthened again. Antiochus, who now expected to be delivered up, or to be kept in perpetual imprisonment, made his escape with the assistance of a good-natured woman, and with his war horse reached a band of Gauls in the interior of Thrace, which was then occupied by Gauls. Some precious jewels which he still possessed, and his noble horse, stirred up the avarice of the Gallic chief, who did not scruple to murder him in order to possess himself of these remnants of his greatness. There is a beautiful anecdote in which it is related that this horse avenged the death of his master: during an engagement, it is said, it ran off, carrying the robber into the ranks of the enemy, where he was slain.

After the death of Antiochus Hierax, which happened during the later years of Seleucus, the latter had again united the whole empire, with the exception of a few points, and the countries which had been ceded to Egypt; but these were so extensive, that Seleucia, the port of Antioch, from which it was only thirty miles distant, was in the hands of the Egyptians, just as the Ålands islands not far from Stockholm are in the hands of the Russians. But notwithstanding its successful enterprises, Egypt had been shaken by the war to its foundations and had lost its strength; its military discipline appears to have been even worse than that of the Syrians. Although Euergetes was in himself an estimable prince and of great importance to the empire, and although literature and science flourished under him, and its last autumnal rays adorned his reign (Callimachus), yet the flower was gone. The empire was already in a state of internal decay, and even more so than that of Syria. The death of Euergetes decided its downfall.

"But in Syria too the long wars had loosened the connection among the provinces more than ever, and those of Asia Minor, the jewels of the Syrian crown, were separated from the rest. For while Seleucus was in Upper Asia, Achacus,

his uncle, availed himself of the opportunity of making himself an independent satrap in western Asia." Seleucus did not reign long after this. He was succeeded by his son Seleucus Ceraunus (Olymp. 138, 2) who marched against the younger Achæus, but was murdered by a Gaul named Apaturius, at the instigation of the same Achæus (Olymp. 139, 1). He had reigned only three years, and resided in western Asia.

He was succeeded by his younger brother Antiochus, surnamed the Great, "who marched into Upper Asia, where everything was in a state of ferment and disorganisation, while Achæus was establishing himself more and more in western Asia." Under Antiochus the Syrian empire revived again and acquired a great extent, especially in the south. Although he was not a great man, his courtiers, not without reason, gave him the surname of the Great, because he restored the empire.

"This happened at the time when Antigonus Doson died. Achæus, in Asia Minor, was in a state of insurrection; the satrap of Media was likewise revolting, and the Syrian empire was confined to Syria, Babylonia, and Persia. During this confusion, new sovereigns ascended the thrones everywhere. In Macedonia Philip succeeded; in Egypt, Ptolemy Philopator; in Media, Molon, and in Bactria a consolidated Macedonian dynasty had already established itself.

It is a remarkable phenomenon, which has shown itself among all Asiatic nations, to which the dominion of Europeans has extended, that there existed an imperfect state without assimilation. Alexander founded a number of colonies in Asia, partly to provide for invalids, and partly to form rallying points for Greeks and Macedonians. He called nearly all those towns Alexandria, under which name we find towns all over the Persian empire. But it was especially in the Syrian empire that the number of colonies was immensely increased. Antioch was first founded by Antigonus, but rose more and more under the Seleucidae. The Greek places of this kind in Egypt were Alexandria, which had a completely Greek constitution, and Ptolemais in Upper Egypt, which had a regular *Βουλή*.³ Although those towns were situated in the midst of

³ Comp. *Inscripfien in Nubien und Aegypten*, inscriptions of Gartass, No. 22: "Ptolemais, the capital of Upper Egypt, is said, by Strabo (xvii. p. 813, A.), to have had a *σύστημα πολιτικὸν ἐν τῇ Ἑλληνικῇ τρόπῳ*. The meaning of this

barbarous countries, still they had their Greek institutions. They were real republics with their *φυλαί*, *βουλή*, etc., and such republican towns existed not only on the coast of the

statement is clear; there existed, in that place, a body of citizens, constituted in the form of a Greek municipal town, whereas, in the other Egyptian towns, as in the East, only appointed judges and officers of police had any power. As, with the exception of one, our university library does not possess any of the works containing the Egyptian inscriptions hitherto published, I do not know whether any are already known in which this municipal constitution is mentioned. But in those which we have, and which refer to Antiochus Soter and his son, it cannot be mistaken, and we clearly see, that Ptolemais had not only a *βουλή*, but an *ἔρχων*.

“Spartianus (*Sever.* 17) says, that Severus first granted to Alexandria the right of *bouleutae*, the Alexandrians until then having been under the command of a judge (a *kadi*), as at the time of their kings; that is, that Severus instituted a *βουλή* there, such as existed in all Greek towns. I certainly do not doubt the correctness of this statement; but we must not believe, that the Greeks and Macedonians at Alexandria had always lived in that state of oriental servitude. The Alexandrians, like the Greeks and Italians, and also the Lydians of Sardes, and, no doubt, the real Macedonians also, were divided into tribes, and the tribes into demi, as at Athens. This is clear from the fragment of the historian Satyrus, in Theophilus (*ad Autolyicum*, ii. 7), where the Dionysian phyle is mentioned, together with a number of demi contained in it. Now the phylae were the basis of every municipal as of every other perfectly free constitution; and their institution could have no other object, but to found such a constitution. According to the prevailing customs, the idea of doing such a thing must have spontaneously presented itself to king Ptolemy Soter; the contrary could not occur to his mind at all. The knowledge of what is the general custom, at a given time, supplies, in this instance also, with perfect certainty, that which is lost in express testimonies. And how could it be imagined, that those who constituted a Greek colony in Upper Egypt in the Greek fashion, should have refused to their capital the same privilege? But that which was suited to the Greeks and Macedonians, between whom the diadochi made no distinction in the towns founded by them, nay, was indispensable to them if they were to live in comfort, was not suited to the natives nor to the barbarians of all nations, whom commerce drew to Alexandria and, no doubt, kept there in great numbers, such as Syrians, Arabs, Aethiopians, and even Negroes. The immensely numerous colony of Jews (it was no doubt there that this people acquired their proverbial love of traffic) formed a separate corporation, and the accumulations of individuals of other nations probably gave rise to similar corporations, each by itself. The institution of castes in Egypt alone rendered their union with others into a municipal community impossible. In short, the Greeks and Macedonians at Alexandria were the only *citizens*; the other inhabitants formed different *communities*. The Franks stood in the same relation to the Soriens in the cities of the kingdom of Jerusalem; and, in like manner, the Spanish inhabitants of the towns in America, under their *Cabildo*, to the natives; and the English in Bombay and Calcutta stand in the same relation to the Indians. In all these countries, the freeborn persons on settling in them did not forego their inalienable privileges of municipal liberty; over the former barbarous inhabitants, single judges and police officers were

Mediterranean, but even very far in the interior of Asia. The number of their inhabitants was very small compared with that of the surrounding Asiatics, and yet the numbers of Greek and Macedonian soldiers flocking to those towns, had so much drained Europe, that Greece and Macedonia were in a state of desolation in consequence. Through intermarriage with Asiatic women, there arose a mixed race, like that of the half caste in India, and the Pullans at the time of the crusades. Such a mixed race always has a peculiar character: the Indian half caste, the Mulattoes, and others, even if they were not distinguished by their colour, might very easily be recognised by their character. They are active, lively, and stirring, but they generally cannot be trusted at all on account of their Asiatic education. As children they are pretty, intelligent, and learn easily, but do not advance beyond mediocrity; they nowhere appear superior to, or more respectable than the natives. Such towns, with a degenerate Greek language and the forms of a republic, which often had no real existence, were the resorts not only of Greeks and Macedonians, but in a great measure of Asiatics also, and continued to exist even as late as the time of the Sassanidae, that is, five hundred years after. The influence of the Greeks upon the Sassanidae was greater than is commonly imagined; and if we examine the philosophy of the Indians, we shall find traces of a strong resemblance to that of the Greeks. As the notion, that Greek philosophy was based upon the Indian, has been given up, we cannot account for the resemblance, except by tracing it to the connection of the Indians with the Graeco-Macedonian kings at Bactria.

Those towns were intended to serve as strong points, to secure to some extent the submission of the provinces; but

appointed, to protect their person and property; anything beyond this would have been forced upon them, and would have displeased them.

"The municipal constitution of Alexandria was lost even under the Ptolemies, and the Romans found the city governed according to the oriental fashion. The time when this unfortunate change took place, is probably the reign of the tyrant Ptolemy Physcon, who caused the Alexandrian citizens of Greek origin to be massacred and extirpated (Polyb. in Strabo, xvii. p. 797, D.) *After* this, such a body of citizens no longer existed, while, on the contrary, under the first three Ptolemies, we cannot even conceive how they could have had the will to act contrary to its dignity and its rights."—ED.

they were, on the contrary, the cause of insurrections in which the provinces were torn from the empire.

But what were called Greeks, that is, the Macedonians and Greeks, were not so purely Greek in Asia as they were at Alexandria, where, in consequence of direct communication by sea, Greek was spoken in much greater purity. Alexandria, with its brown Egyptians, must have presented an appearance like that of the great commercial cities in North America, such as New York, where a great number of negroes are seen in the streets, and where we may, nevertheless, fancy ourselves in a European city.

In Egypt, however, everything was firmly established, and the ancient Egyptian nation remained what it had been. It has been discovered, that under the Ptolemies many buildings were erected, which were formerly believed to have been raised at the time of the Pharaohs. The case was just like that of India under the English, for in the latter country too, unless you happen to see an English garrison, you will scarcely believe that the country is under a British government. It was, moreover, very difficult for the Egyptians to become hellenised, whereas the Syrians assimilated themselves very easily. The Syrians, so far as I know them, are excellent men. I have known Roman Catholic priests from Syria, who were not only handsome, but able, clever, and good men; I once made the acquaintance of one from Aleppo, who was passionately fond of the literature of Europe; he had an unquenchable thirst for knowledge, and pitied his poor countrymen who were not permitted in their servitude to enjoy its blessings. Porphyry, Iamblichus, and other eminent writers, were Syrians. The Greek language was spoken all over Syria, as we see from the fact that the New Testament was written in Greek by men who were not born Greeks. I recognise the interference of Providence in the fact that the Christian religion was planted at that time; for under the Persian dominion it would have met with insurmountable obstacles on account of the language.

Egypt, however, was more flourishing than the Syrian empire, which was ruined by war, and where the taxes were unbearable, as we see from the Book of Maccabees. The taxes there amounted to one-third of the produce; the revenue of the kings must, therefore, have been immense; and yet

they often were in such want of money as to be obliged to plunder the temples. This much is clear, that the condition of Syria was deplorable; as far as forms are concerned, it never rose above the ancient rule of the satraps. Egypt never had satraps in its provinces, but only military commanders. The completely Oriental forms of the Syrians, however, do not appear in western Syria, which was not a satrapy, and seems to have been governed under different forms."

The reign of Demetrius, who succeeded his father Antigonus, in Olymp. 135, 1, when the latter had attained the age of seventy-three, was inglorious and unfortunate for Macedonia. We know very little about it. It was the period of the greatest prosperity of the Achæans and Aetolians; and the greatest event of the reign of Demetrius, is his great war with the Aetolians about the possession of Epirus.

LECTURE CV.

ALEXANDER of Epirus, the son of the great Pyrrhus, has been unfairly dealt with by history, which has almost forgotten him. The sequel of his history after the transitory conquest of Macedonia is entirely unknown. His reign lasted long, but it is impossible to fix the year of his death with accuracy. He left behind him five children, two sons, Pyrrhus and Ptolemy, and three daughters. At his death his sons were yet very young, and his widow Olympias, who was at once his sister and his wife, according to the detestable custom of the Ptolemies, acted as guardian of the children. Alexander's kingdom comprised all Epirus to the extent which his father had possessed, and the part of Acarnania which had fallen to his share at the time when the country was divided between him and the Aetolians. But his relation to the Aetolians was insecure, and Olympias was not without apprehensions; it is possible that symptoms may have already been visible in Epirus of the ferment, which afterwards manifested itself in so fearful a manner, and it is not unlikely that the malcontents may have applied to the Aetolians. Olympias alone being unable to

offer any resistance to the Aetolians, sought the protection of the Macedonians by endeavouring to effect a marriage between one of her daughters (whose name is mis-spelt—Ptia, we must no doubt read Phthia) with Demetrius of Macedonia.

Whether Demetrius was already king, or whether Antigonus Gonatas was still alive, is to my mind a doubtful point in consequence of the answer of the Aetolians in Justin, which pre-supposes, that the first Punic war had not yet been brought to a close; but this may be a mistake. Demetrius, at any rate, was no longer a young man, for if he be the same who opposed Pyrrhus, he must have been a youth as early as Olymp. 126. Demetrius accepted the offer, although he was already married to the Syrian princess Stratonice, a sister of Antiochus Theos¹, whom he now divorced in order to marry Phthia.

Stratonice, leaving Demetrius, went to Asia Minor, as Justin, our only authority, relates; the divorce, however, did not lead to a war between Macedonia and Syria, because the latter country was too weak. But in Syria itself that fury of a woman created great mischief. She proceeded to the court at Antioch, offering her hand to Seleucus Callinicus; and when he rejected the offer, she induced the restless Antiochians by her intrigues to recognise her as their queen. Seleucus happened to be engaged in an expedition against the upper satrapies, and when he returned, he conquered Stratonice. Being now deserted by the Antiochians, she was taken prisoner and put to death².

The marriage of Phthia with Demetrius then became the occasion of great confusion and misfortune, by dragging him into the war with the Aetolians. The latter availed themselves of the forlorn state of Epirus for the purpose of attacking the Epirot portion of Acarnania, and making themselves masters of the whole country. Demetrius hastened to support the Epirots, and thus arose a war between the Macedonians and Aetolians, in which the latter joined the Achacans, against whom they otherwise entertained an invincible aversion.

This is the *Δημητριάκτος πόλεμος* mentioned by Polybius, and the most brilliant war that was ever carried on by the

¹ "The Antiochus here mentioned by the hasty Justin is Antiochus Hierax, and not Antiochus Theos"—1825.

² Comp. Joseph. *c. Apion.* i. 2.

Greeks against the Macedonians. I have collected all that has come down to us about this war, but we know nothing of its separate occurrences.

The Macedonians at that time had no longer any possessions in Peloponnesus, but they still had Chalcis, and the Phocians and Bocotians were dependent upon them. The war seems to have been carried on chiefly in Thessaly, and its result was the extension of the Achaean league and of the Aetolian sympolity.

Almost every trace of the battles of the Aetolians and Achaeans against the Macedonians in that war is lost; we have mention of a single battle near Phylacia, wherein Aratus was defeated by a general of Demetrius and severely wounded. But whether the war was brought to a close by the conclusion of a truce or otherwise, is unknown; this only is certain, that the Aetolians were allied with the Achaeans, and that the former greatly extended their territory, which was much facilitated by their constitution, as they admitted all those who joined them into their sympolity.

It must have been in the course of this war, that the Aetolians became masters of Phocis including Delphi, and of the country of the Phthiotian Achaeans, nay even of Pharsalus; this is implied in the fact that the Thessalians in their insurrection against Macedonia, after the death of Demetrius, are mentioned as having entered into sympolity with the Aetolians. Their sympolity also extended to the western sides of mount Oeta and Pindus and far into Epirus, beyond Athamania; Amphilochia was probably likewise conquered by them at that time, for in the reign of Pyrrhus at least, it still belonged to Epirus. Even Lysimachia in the Thracian Chersonesus was a member of their sympolity. An inscription found in the island of Ceos, in the collection of Cockerell (?), shows, that the Carthacans also were probably in the same relation, because they were ready to form an alliance on condition that they should become members of the league; in Crete the Cnossians, and in the interior of Peloponnesus Mantinea, Orchomenos, Tegea, and other Arcadian towns, joined the confederacy at that time, and especially all those which would not form any close connection with the Achaeans. The Eleans were likewise allied with the Aetolians.

The Aetolians were also seeking opportunities for interfering in the affairs of Peloponnesus; and this is the time to which

we must assign the predatory incursion, which, according to Polybius³, they made all over Peloponnesus as far as Taenarus, and during which they destroyed the temple of Poseidon, and laid the country waste, under the pretext that they wanted the exiles to be recalled to Laconia. Plutarch⁴ says that during that inroad they made all the people slaves, and carried away about 50,000. But from the statement in Polybius, in connection with other events belonging to this period, such as the *παρασπονδῇ* in Boeotia which must belong to Olymp. 133, and with the war of Cleomenes, it is evident, that this expedition may be assigned to Olymp. 135. Previously, and as long as Antigonus Gonatas was powerful in Peloponnesus, the Aetolians could not have ventured into the peninsula; the restoration of the exiles probably took place during the period after the death of Agis, when Sparta was in a state of great disorganisation.

During this war Aratus gradually extended the Achaean league. The most important accession at that time was the addition of Megalopolis (Olymp. 136, 3). That city was then separated from the rest of Arcadia, which was divided into several cantons, and consisted of two unequal halves, one large city and many small towns. Epaminondas' plan to concentrate Arcadia in Megalopolis had failed, but ever since the time of Philip, the son of Amyntas, the Megalopolitans had been in possession of a large part of Laconia.⁵ At this time it was governed by the tyrant Lydiadas, who had judgment enough to see this great advantage, that if, like Aratus, he should be elected strategus every other year, he would have sufficient compensation for his usurped power, and that if the strategy should fall into the hands of non-Achaeans, the advantage which the smaller towns would have in voting, would be neutralised. As a reward for this, Lydiadas was thrice elected strategus, but in his last year he fell in battle.

³ iv. 34, ix. 34.

⁴ *Agis et Cleom.* 18, p. 813, A.

⁵ "Ever since the foundation of Megalopolis, that is, for more than one hundred years, the Spartans had kept up an hereditary feud with that city, nor do they seem to have become reconciled with the Messenians. Polybius furnishes the most obvious examples of the immense hatred which animated them: he has such an inveterate hatred against the Spartans and Aetolians, that he is often unjust towards them. About Olymp. 130, Acrotatus, the son of Areus, besieged Megalopolis, which was then governed by the tyrant Aristodemus, surnamed the Honest, and fell during the siege."—1825.

Aratus was less successful at Argos, where tyrants had existed ever since the time of Pyrrhus. The ancient forms had died away, and everything depended upon the personal character of individuals, which, however, might be easily abused and promote tyranny. I have no doubt, that Aristippus, who had formerly sided with the opponents of Pyrrhus, was made tyrant of Argos by Antigonus Gonatas. He was succeeded by Aristomachus, and then by another Aristippus, who in his turn was again succeeded by one Aristomachus; in regard to the last-mentioned, we know that not only he, but his whole family was in possession of the tyrannis. That Aristippus, who fell after the battle of Cleonae, lived much too late to be the same who invited Antigonus Gonatas. The first Aristomachus soon died, and was succeeded by this Aristippus, either his son, or more probably his brother, a hateful and suspicious tyrant, who became proverbial for these qualities. Aratus, who would have liked nothing better than to unite all Peloponnesus, undertook in the midst of peace to make himself master of Argos by assault, but was repelled; and as he saw that the Argives themselves acted the part of mere idle spectators, he entirely lost heart. Aristippus brought an action against Aratus before the Mantineans as arbitrators for the breach of the peace, and Aratus was condemned to pay a fine. After this, Aratus lost an open battle in the field against Aristippus, which shows how powerful the city of Argos must have been, although the great timidity of Aratus was the chief cause of the defeat. But he repaired his loss by taking from Argos the small town of Cleonae, and inducing it to join the Achaean confederacy. When in possession of that town he drew Aristippus, who was staying at Corinth ready to break up, into a snare, by bribing persons to persuade him to take possession of Cleonae. When Aristippus arrived there, Aratus fell upon him by night, and drove him back to the very gates of Argos, whereupon Aristippus was slain. He was succeeded by Aristomachus, who effected a reconciliation with the Achaeans.

There never was a moment since the Lamian war, at which the recovery of the national independence of the Greeks was so near at hand as after the death of Demetrius, in Olymp. 137, 3. The Achaean league at that time all at once extended itself with extraordinary rapidity. Aristomachus resolved, for the sum of fifty talents, to form a reconciliation

with Aratus, and surrendered to him (Olymp. 138, 1), on condition of his being elected strategus for that year, if Aratus himself should not be elected. This example was followed by many other small towns: Phlius and Hermione likewise surrendered to the Achaeans, nay Aratus was even negotiating the ransom of Athens for 150 talents. It would seem that the Macedonian garrison of Munychia and Piraeus, under Diogenes, was entirely abandoned by and cut off from Macedonia. For this sum, of which Aratus himself paid the sixth part, the evacuation of those places as well as of Sunium and Salamis, was purchased (Olymp. 137, 3 or 4); the commander departed with his troops and entered the Egyptian or Syrian service. But still Athens did not join the Achaean league, which then, besides the Achaean towns, comprised Sicyon, Phlius, Corinth, Argos, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Megalopolis.

Boeotia, Sparta, and Messenia, remained neutral, but were free and independent of Macedonia. The Achaeans and Lacedaemonians were allied with Alexandria.

Greece proper, as far as Thessaly, with the exception of Chalcis, was thus for the first time free from the dominion of Macedonia. Something new and solid ought now to have been established, but this could not be done by Aratus, who was quite incapable of concentrating the league; Cleomenes, the young king of Sparta, who had ascended the throne about the time of the death of Demetrius, was the only person that could do anything: he was the last man of importance in the history of Greece.

The war of Demetrius lasted for some time: it was a period of humiliation for Macedonia; and the reign of Demetrius was altogether a time during which Macedonia displayed great weakness. From the Prologues to Trogus Pompeius, we also learn that during his reign there were great commotions among the Bastarnae. It is possible that it was chiefly the Bastarnae who induced the Dardanians, a great Illyrian people, which is never mentioned in the earlier history of Greece, to make war upon Macedonia. This advance of the nations from the high mountainous country disturbed the reign of Demetrius, as much as the southern nations were disturbed by the Aetolians.

Demetrius died during an expedition against the Dardanians, after a reign of ten years (A.U.C. 523, Olymp. 137, 3), leaving

behind him Philip, a boy of between five and six years old, just at the time when the Romans for the first time appeared with their armies on the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

At the very beginning of the war with Demetrius, when the Acarnanians were hard pressed by the Aetolians (soon after Olymp. 135, 1, A. U. C. 513, Cato), the Romans had for the first time interfered in the affairs of Greece. This fact is, indeed, not mentioned by Justin, but is, nevertheless, well established. The statement of Polybius, that after the Illyrian wars the Romans interfered for the first time with an armed force in the affairs of Greece on the coasts of the Adriatic, is quite correct; but there can be no doubt, that by way of negotiations they had interfered before that time, as they had done in Spain, so that the influence of their name preceded them on the coasts of the Adriatic as it did in Spain. The people of Apollonia had thirty years before sent ambassadors to Rome to seek protection, and we must suppose that the same was done by more distant places. The Acarnanians applied to the Romans, endeavouring to obtain their protection against the Aetolians, for reasons which are peculiar to an age when the actual state of things is far from cheering, and when, during the decay of real national life, pedantry takes possession of the minds of men. For the Acarnanians claimed the support of the Romans on the ground, that of all the Greeks⁶ they had been the only ones who took no part in the Trojan war, and that, consequently, they were benefactors of the Romans. The latter, among whom the Trojan legend had been firmly rooted from early times, accepted the plea, and sent an embassy to the Aetolians, to warn them not to take up arms against the Acarnanians.⁷ But it seems that this embassy produced no effect. The Aetolians returned an insulting answer, reminding the Romans of their terror of the Gauls and the Punic war; and it is possible that Polybius may not have taken any notice of that first embassy, because the Romans, after having threatened the Aetolians, remained perfectly quiet, and sent no assistance to the Acarnanians. The Aetolians retained all they possessed in Acarnania. In the end, however, the Acarnanians, perhaps

⁶ "The interior of Aetolia before the Trojan war was not Greek, and became Greek only by adopting Greek manners and language; the Acarnanians also became Greeks only by colonisation."—1825.

⁷ In a MS. note, Niebuhr, without mentioning any reasons, places this embassy in Olymp. 135, 2.—ED.

through the influence of the Romans, recovered to some extent their independence; and at the end of this war, the Acarnanians rose nobly upon the ruins of the Epirot empire.

But even before the death of Demetrius, the Romans with an armed force crossed the Adriatic (Olymp. 137, 1). Illyrian kings occur ever since the time of Philip and Bardylis. A great part of the Illyrians were united under one king, and Scutari was probably their capital as early as that time, a rank to which it is destined by nature; "lower Albania and the adjacent islands belonged to it." The Illyrians had been pirates even before; but in consequence of the incessant wars, they had become a state of pirates, whereas formerly piracy had been carried on only by individuals; pirate squadrons occurred under all possible flags. During this period we frequently hear of commanders of pirates under the name of *ἀρχιπειραταί*, and they belonged not only to Illyricum, but to Aetolia and other maritime countries. This system of piracy was, no doubt, always very annoying to the Roman subjects on the Adriatic, though before this time the pirates may have somewhat respected the Romans; but when the Illyrian king Agron died, and his widow, Teuta, took the reins of government, the pirates carried on their pursuits with an insolence which had before been unknown, and Roman merchants were unmercifully plundered and shockingly maltreated. The Romans accordingly sent an embassy, demanding reparation and safety for their ships, but the ambassadors received an insolent answer; and when they replied with becoming dignity and pride, the queen caused them to be murdered. The Romans then undertook an expedition against the Illyrians; a fleet was fitted out, and the Illyrians were unable to resist. Even in the second campaign, Teuta was scarcely able to purchase peace by the sacrifice of a large portion of her dominions. The result of the war was, that the Romans became masters of a great part of Illyricum. Several Greek towns, such as Epidaurus, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Corcyra, at that time placed themselves under the protection of the Romans, without being obliged to admit Roman garrisons, which was a great advantage to them. In the peace with the Illyrians, the Romans stipulated for the entire suppression of piracy; and it must be owned in general, that the Romans deserved well of the world by endeavouring to do away with piracy as far as their influence

could reach. They always showed a decided hatred of piracy; they first abolished it among the Latin towns, afterwards among the Etruscans, and in the fifth century they secured the safety of the subjects of the Rhodians. Henceforth the Illyrians were not allowed to sail beyond the Adriatic with armed ships.⁸

The abolition of the piracy of the Illyrians was an immense benefit to the Greeks, who received it with enthusiasm. It was in Olymp. 137, 4, that the Romans sent an embassy to the Greeks to inform them of the conclusion of this peace. Athens then testified its gratitude by promising all Romans the rights of isopolity, and by passing honorary decrees; the Romans were admitted to the great Greek games, but not to those of Olympia. Even before this time strangers and barbarians had taken part in the great ἀγῶνες of the Greeks, such as the Epirots, the Macedonians, the Macedonian colonies in the East, the hellenised nations in western Asia, and now the Romans also were admitted. The Romans, no doubt, smiled at the privilege conferred upon them.

But before matters came to this point, a fearful tragedy had occurred in Epirus: the house of Pyrrhus ended as tragically as the son of Achilles, to whom it traced its origin. The children of Olympias had died one after the other; Pyrrhus, the eldest son of Alexander, had died when a boy of fifteen years; soon afterwards, Ptolemy, who was much younger, and under the guardianship of his mother, was assassinated, or, as Polyænus⁹ says, poisoned. Phthia also was dead, so that only two daughters survived. The one, Nereis (so called from Thetis, who was a Nereid; this is a play with the names occurring in the story of Achilles) was married to Gelo of Syracuse, who refused to interfere in the affairs of Epirus; the Romans, in fact, would not have allowed it, and he also was too far distant. The only remaining daughter was Laodamia, or Deidamia (the latter is probably the more correct name on account of the connection with the story of Achilles in Scyros: a sister of the great Pyrrhus had likewise been called Deidamia).

⁸ "The occurrences between the Arcarnanians, Illyrians, and Aetolians belong to the beginning of the war between Demetrius and the Aetolians, the time when the latter conquered the Acarnanian towns which refused to join their sympolity (Polyb. i. 5, foll.); they do not belong to the latter period of the life of Demetrius. By this view of the matter we get rid of the gaps in the chronology of Polybius."—1825.

⁹ viii. 52.

The mother and daughter lived in Ambracia, where an insurrection broke out against them. What can have caused such a revolt under the circumstances, when the royal house was already nearly extinct, is to me a mystery. We can understand that the Epirots, who had always been a very free people, now conceived the idea of a republic, seeing that the royal house was reduced to a single woman; but it is utterly inconceivable, why there now burst forth such a fury against the royal family. Deidamia was obliged to capitulate with the Epirots, who abolished the kingly dignity; she renounced the throne, surrendered Ambracia, and stipulated only for her life and a few of her domains. But the Epirots did not keep their word; Deidamia was obliged to take refuge in a temple, but even there she was not safe: she was dragged down from the altar and murdered by one Milo, probably the author of the rebellion, who afterwards made away with himself. The Epirots at that time were influenced by a blind but terrible frenzy: to this time we must assign the destruction of the sepulchral monument of the great Pyrrhus, to which allusion is made in a distich of the Ibis, the obscure Callimachean poem of Ovid. Let any one, imagining that he understands mythology, try his hand at this poem; I do not believe that there is any man who comprehends the whole of it. But the Pyrrhus mentioned in it, is certainly not the son of Achilles, but the great king Pyrrhus.

From that time the Epirots formed a republic, and ever after these occurrences, which belong to Olymp. 135, 1, they are mentioned by Livy and Polybius as a republican people under a strategus, and although they were Pelasgians, they are reckoned among the Greeks;¹⁰ but the extent of Epirus no longer remained what it had been under Pyrrhus and Alexander, and a great part, as I have already mentioned, fell into the hands of the Aetolians. Ambracia, the capital, was separated from it, and appears as a member of the sympolity of the Aetolians as early as Olymp. 140; Acarnania was torn from it and formed a country by itself; Atintania, too, no longer belonged to it, and all the country east of the

¹⁰ "It is a characteristic sign of that period, that after the destruction of the Epirot dynasty, the republic was recognised without any difficulty. The states of that time took the actual condition of affairs, such as it was; they knew nothing of the strict principles of right which are observed in modern states."—1826.

Arachthus was taken from Epirus, and seems, according to Livy and Polybius, to have formed the kingdom of the Athamanians, a kingdom which is frequently mentioned, and, under the protection of the Aetolians, belonged to their sympolity. Epirus, however, was still tolerably extensive, stretching from the Acroceraunian mountains as far as the heights between the lake of Janina and mount Pindus: it embraced the country of the Molottians, Thesprotians, Chaonians, and Cassopians, which nations, previously to the time of Philip, had been independent of one another, but now formed one state. Passaro was its capital, and the ruins, which still exist between Janina and the Ambracian gulf, attest that it was a brilliant and beautiful city. But although its extent was considerable, and although the population cannot have been small, yet the Epirot republic was extremely weak. Its strength was quite gone, as was the case with Sweden after the times of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII., under whom it had been so great. We have here seen the downfall of a great family; and I shall now proceed to relate the end of the Heracleid dynasty of Sparta.

I have already spoken of the wretched condition of Sparta after the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea; how deplorable its internal condition was; and how thoroughly powerless the state was in its foreign relations, became manifest in all the events which happened during that period. Considering this state of things, it is truly disgusting to see how, throughout that period of complete wretchedness, the farce of the ancient manners continued to be acted out, without there being anything else belonging to the great times that had gone by.¹¹ Most of the Spartans are disgusting hypocrites, who endeavour outwardly to continue the part which they have been set to learn. If we look at the period of the first Khalifs among the Mahommedans, we must, in spite of the consequences they produced, regard them as truly great men, as for example, Omar—it is impossible not to be an enthusiastic

¹¹ “The Spartan attachment to what had been handed down to them is purely ridiculous. While preserving the dead outward forms, they fancied that they were preserving the golden age. When the lyre received an increase of two strings, the Ephors cut off the two strings; no new melody was to be played. The cut of the dress and the shoes was not allowed to be altered; and they imagined that thereby they were preserving the spirit of Lycurgus, while luxuries and avarice were allowed free play.”—1826.

admirer of men like him—and in the same manner there are also, among the ancient Spartans, men whom we cannot help esteeming, however much we may detest the Spartan character in general. Who, for example, would not admire a Leonidas, a Brasidas, and many others? But when the form remains and the spirit is dead, the consequences are fearful; that outward form, fatalism, and all that is connected with it, entwines and suffocates that which is peculiarly good and virtuous in man, and keeps down all intellectual greatness in a manner that is really deplorable. Thus Islamism decayed, and the faithfulness and honesty of the first Khalifs perished in the intellectual torpor; and such, also, was the case with the Spartan character ever since the Peloponnesian war: it had altogether lost its soul. We scarcely see any individuals in whom we find a spark of life, most of them are disgusting hypocrites who act a given part, and it is inconceivable how Plutarch, with his fine taste (I can compare him only with Addison and the authors of the *Spectator*, who are classical in their way, but yet do not contain anything great) can seriously relate such farces.


Only about the end of the Spartan period men came forward in whom the ancient flame blazes up once more; one of them penetrates through the outward form into the better inner character of Sparta, such as it was in better times, but yet he does not go beyond the actual state of things; and the other takes the actual state of things as the basis of his operations—I allude to Agis and Cleomenes. Plutarch places them by the side of the Gracchi. Agis was a young man full of spirit, heart, and love, and Plutarch understands him well; but Cleomenes is a character which is foreign to his sphere, and he ascribes to him a sentimentality which belongs to him as little as it does to Mirabeau; in like manner, Plutarch has given a more correct image of Tiberius Gracchus than of Caius; but he has described the lives of both with extraordinary fondness of his subject.

Agis was the sixth king from Agesilaus, called the Great, whose son, Archidamus, had fought in southern Italy against the Messapians, and had fallen there; the latter had a son, Agis, who fell in the battle against the Macedonians near Megalopolis. This Agis had a younger brother, Eudamidas, who was the father of several sons, one of whom was Archidamus, who carried on the war against Demetrius Poliorcetes, and was

defeated near Mantinea. His son, also, was called Eudamidas, whose sons were Archidamus and the Agis of whom I am now going to speak.¹²

Agis was very young when he ascended the throne. His accession fell in a time of perfect disorganisation; the royal government was scarcely more than a mere name, like that of the doge of Venice in later times, and the ephors had usurped nearly all the powers of the king. We can trace the progress of the influence of the ephors with tolerable certainty; even as late as the Peloponnesian war the kings of Sparta had far greater powers. They were hereditary, while the twenty-eight *gerontes* were, when vacancies occurred, elected for life; the ephors were elected every year and by the whole people, that is, by the genuine ancient Spartiatae, exclusive of the Neadamodeis, and from among the Spartiatae themselves; the

¹² In the Lectures of 1825 there occurs the following genealogical table of the house of Agis:—



twenty-eight *gerontes* and the two kings, on the other hand, represented the thirty *gentes*. It seems that the ancient *ἀλιά* or *ἐκκλησία* which had formerly decided upon war and peace, had ceased to be convened, and that the *ephors*, with tyrannical consistency, had usurped all the powers. The state, moreover, was in a condition of internal decay.

The number of *Spartiates* in the large city was reduced to seven hundred: they stood like the nobili of Venice among the great multitude of free Lacedæmonians, and of *Helots*. The number of *Spartiates*, however, must have been supplemented in some way or other, or else their number would not have amounted even to this, as we find the same number at an earlier time mentioned by Aristotle.¹³ Of these seven hundred, only about one hundred families were possessed of property; these latter were in the exclusive possession of the nine thousand ancient lots of *Lycurgus*, because the women were exempt from the laws, and some of them accordingly were immensely rich. The rest had no property, being extremely poor and overwhelmed with debts. In this condition, Sparta had sunk very low; and the boundaries of the country were very much reduced, a large part of it having fallen into the hands of the *Arcadians* and *Argives*. The members of the royal family and other nobles went abroad to engage in foreign service, and assembled bands of *condottieri*, whose services they sold. Among such *condottieri*, the name Spartan was still considered to be worth something. In this manner they amassed treasures, and some returned home as wealthy men, while others fell in the battles.

In this condition the state was found by *Agis*, who was not yet twenty years old; when he ascended the throne, and when he died, is not accurately known. The accounts of the ancient greatness of Sparta made a deep impression upon him, when he contemplated its actual condition; and there arose in him the desire to free himself from the trammels of the *ephors*, and to see the ancient laws restored. This desire became the stronger in him, because *Achaia* showed him an example of the manner in which a country might recover; and as *Macedonia* was sinking, the idea of recovering their former position almost naturally suggested itself to the mind of the Spartans.

¹³ *Polit. ii. 2, 11.*

LECTURE CVI.

AGIS entered upon an undertaking at Sparta, the account of which in Plutarch, if read as a novel, does one's heart good; this has been felt even by men who are by no means revolutionary, such as F. H. Jacobi, who speaks of it with an enthusiasm which is startling to those who have formed a clear notion of the real state of things. When a man realises to his own mind the history of the past as if it were the history of his own time, it presents itself to him in a very different light from what it does when viewed with poetical eyes. No man knows how to make a right use of geographical maps, who does not translate a small map into the detail of large plans, and these again into the real aspect of localities. While we may do justice to the intentions of Agis, we must at the same time bear in mind their consequences and the fearful cruelties, and then we cannot wonder at the end of Agis being what it was. It must have been clear to every one, that at Sparta only a gigantic reform could lead to anything great; but could such a reform be carried into effect without producing great evils? No one could believe this, unless he was an enthusiast, like Agis, and ignorant of the fearful reality; when the shock was once given, things assumed a very different position from what had been anticipated.

Agis, in conjunction with Lysander, a descendant of the ancient celebrated general of the same name, wished to restore the ancient laws. He first of all endeavoured to secure the election of a college of ephors, that should be favourable to his schemes and undertakings. When this end was gained, Agis with his friend and grand-uncle Agesilaus, proposed to the new ephors to divide the whole landed property which had become accumulated in the hands of one hundred families, into 19,500 lots: the property of individual Spartans must have been enormous. Of these 19,500 lots, 4,500 were to be for the Spartiatae, whose number he made up to that amount by admitting many citizens, Neodamodeis and the like;¹ and

¹ "It must have been very common at that time to send boys to Sparta to be educated there, as we may infer from a passage of Teles in Stobaeus

the rest was destined to be distributed among the perioeci. Finally, the *phiditia*, which had been entirely neglected, were to be restored. Nothing can be said against this method of supplementing the number of Spartiatae; but such a distribution of property is enough to turn a man's head giddy. All those accumulations of property were indeed illegal and contrary to the laws of Lysurgus, though not against their letter, for those laws only forbade the sale of landed property, but not arbitrary legacies and gifts, and under this pretext sales had been effected; but still it was a serious violation of the rights of property. Agis, however, not only divided the land, but as there existed a great many debts, he cancelled them all.

We have no reason to doubt the good will and honest intentions of Agis in this undertaking, for he himself, his mother and grandmother, made immense sacrifices; for his family was the richest in all the country, possessing the largest amount of landed property, especially his grandmother Archidamia. But while he himself could produce evidence of his having acted with the greatest disinterestedness, other persons were not so generous. Revolutions planned by noble minds are always made use of by vulgar men for their own advantage. I had an excellent friend who is now dead, and who on the 4th of August, 1789, with the greatest disinterestedness sacrificed great feudal rights; he and other noble-minded men (it was Count Taxo)² in making these sacrifices, thought that others would imitate their example; but others thought only of benefiting themselves by such disinterestedness. Agis experienced the same thing which is related of Solon, that his friends, knowing his measures beforehand, made debts, and when Solon cancelled all debts, appropriated to themselves the property they had received by disgraceful means. Agis was a man of a pure mind, and he was probably supported by many others like himself, especially among the young men, who with bitter pain felt the degradation and poverty of the

(Tit. xl. 8 [85]), where we read that the Spartans treated such boys like natives. This shows that the want of supplementing the number of the Spartiatae was felt. Such *ξένοι* were to receive at Sparta the full franchise and a *κλῆρος*, together with a number of Helots."—1825.

² It has been impossible to ascertain what name is concealed under the corrupt name Taxo. Perhaps Niebuhr alludes to Count Tessé, or d'Aguesseau.
—ED.

people, and were ready to sacrifice advantages for the common good; but among his followers there also were the very worst of the bad, whose sole object was to derive personal and disgraceful advantages from his reforms.

In the first instance the undertaking of Agis failed. He was opposed above all by Leonidas, his colleague in the kingly dignity, and a son of the adventurer Cleonymus who had led Pyrrhus against Sparta. After his father's death, he had returned to Sparta, having spent a long time at the courts of the Macedonico-Asiatic princes, and having amassed wealth there. He returned home with sentiments and manners altogether anti-Spartan, and became the centre of an opposition which did not spring from good motives, but from selfishness. In such unfortunate circumstances, real virtue is on neither side: it is just as we read in the Scriptures: "When you are told, Lo here he is, and there he is, go not out." But in distressing circumstances a good man must find his way out, and never be the slave of an opinion.

Plutarch very much neglects the political side of these occurrences: the *ρήτρα* had first to be sanctioned by the gerontes (by a *προβούλευμα*) ere it could be brought before the popular assembly and become a *νόμος*. Nor could every person bring forward such a *ρήτρα*; but the ephors alone could propose a legislative measure, and when they were opposed to it, it could not even be brought before the gerontes; in former times, however, the kings probably also had the right to propose laws. Now the gerontes rejected the proposal of Agis by a majority of one vote.

After this defeat, those who supported Agis and his plans, and especially Lysander, endeavoured to take revenge on king Leonidas by bringing an action against him. The laws forbade the marriage of a Heracleid with a foreign woman under penalty of death, and they punished with the same rigour any one who left Sparta with a view of settling in another place. Now Leonidas had transgressed both laws, having lived at the court of Antiochus Theos in western Asia.³ The ephor Lysander and his colleagues in particular, in accusing him

³ "Seleucus Callinicus is mentioned on this occasion, and he certainly was king when these things happened. But Leonidas had returned to Sparta at the very beginning of these occurrences. His residence in Asia, therefore, probably belongs to the reign of Antiochus Theos, who, during the greater part of his reign, resided in western Asia."

made use of an augural power which in Greece was quite foreign and startling. The ephors every nine years during a bright night proceeded to some sacred spot to observe meteoric phenomena in the heavens. If a shooting star or anything of the kind passed through the air, they were entitled to suspend the functions of an accused king, until the Delphic oracle declared him guiltless.⁴ Leonidas accordingly was accused of having during his stay at the Syrian court married an Asiatic woman, by whom he became the father of two children, and of having returned to Sparta only because he had been discontented. The ephors, the friends of Agis, here completely exercised the tyrannical power to which they had raised the ephoralty to the disadvantage of the kings. Leonidas thus overpowered, went as a suppliant into the temple of Athena Chalciaecos. The trial was commenced, and Cleombrotus, his son-in-law, who sued for it, obtained the kingly dignity. It is not known before what court Leonidas was tried, whether it was the Haliaea or the Gerusia. Chilonis, the daughter of Leonidas and wife of Cleombrotus, on that occasion earned immortal fame by her virtue, for she accompanied her father into exile, although her husband became king.

The innovations of Agis and his friends met so little general approval, that immediately afterwards, at the next election of the ephors, quite a different class of men were chosen; the new ephors were opposed to the revolution, and began by recalling Leonidas and undoing everything which had been done. In these difficulties Agis and Cleombrotus made a new revolution, whereby other ephors who were favourable to their plans were elected. Agis, in spite of his aversion to violence, allowed himself to be prevailed upon to arm the young men and to proceed with them to the tribunals of the ephors, whom he deposed, and in whose place he caused others to be chosen from among his followers. One of these new ephors was Agesilaus, a great grandson of Archidamus. This circumstance proves that the statement of Aristotle, that the ephors belonged to the demos,⁵ must either not be taken literally, or that in the course of time the institution was changed. For if we suppose the statement

⁴ "This is the same principle as that of the Roman auguries, without which no magistrate could hold his office."

⁵ *Polit.* ii. 3, 10; 6, 14, and 15.

of Aristotle to be true, a Heracleid could not have been elected ephor, unless the right of becoming ephor was now extended to the γένη also. The Spartan constitution, however much has been written upon it, is obscure, but the supposition of the existence of a plebs, or of something corresponding to it, that is of a body of people not belonging to the φυλαὶ contributes to throw light on many obscure passages.⁶

Some of the plans of Agis were now carried. But Agis, benevolent and mild as he was, wanted to effect a gigantic revolution with pure gentleness and mildness, and allowed the worst individuals to act as they pleased, especially the new ephor Agesilaus; and this easily accounts for his downfall. Agesilaus was an unworthy man and very wealthy, but enormously in debt. This commonly leads to self-deception, and easily makes a man a villain. He endeavoured to carry out the cancelling of debts, but wished to retain his lands. "This, however, was not enough for him, and he availed himself of the time, which elapsed during the negotiations about the cancelling of debts, for the purpose of borrowing money everywhere, and thus most impudently deceived all those who did not anticipate the passing of such a law." After having obtained the cancelling of debts, he found a pretext for preventing the division of the lands, although Agis himself was ready to give up a part of his own property and estates. "Nothing was thus effected except the cancelling of debts, in the place of which, however, fresh ones were contracted immediately."

Plutarch assigns to this period the expedition of Agis with Lacedaemonian auxiliaries to the Isthmus in the war of the Achaeans and Aetolians, which broke out after the capture of Acrocorinthus, between Olymp. 134, 1 and 135, 1 (A. U. C. 509 and 513, according to Cato). As it is not certain, that the

⁶ "The Spartan constitution was so much misunderstood even by the ancients, that a modern inquirer finds himself in a labyrinth, from which he cannot find his way out. Considering its artificial character, the ancients themselves, unless they lived at Sparta, found many points unintelligible; and the later writers, from whom we have our information, understood it still less. I seek the Neodamodeis among the Helots and not among the Perioeci, and the Lochi I find, not among the Spartiatae, but among the Perioeci or Neodamodeis: they are a geographical division. The whole inquiry is extremely difficult. Acuteness is here of no avail; everything depends upon hitting the right point, and if this is not done, all the rest is of no use."—1826.

peace between the Aetolians and Achaeans was concluded immediately after the death of Antigonus, this chronological proof—the only one we have in regard to the reign of Agis—is not satisfactory, and it is possible that the conclusion of the peace may have been protracted till after the first years of the reign of Demetrius.

On his return to Sparta, Agis found the situation and plans of himself and his party destroyed by Agesilaus.⁷ The latter endeavoured illegally to obtain the ephoralty a second time, assumed a body guard, and sold the administration of justice; he indulged in every sort of injustice, and acted altogether in such a manner as to rouse the indignation of every one. The general desire was to recall Leonidas; and on this occasion Agis showed himself very weak, for he was unable any longer to control the events or to avert a fresh revolution. He and Cleombrotus fled into a temple. The life of Agesilaus was protected by the valour of his son, Hippomedon, and he went into exile; Cleombrotus' life was saved through the entreaties of his wife Chilonis, and he was permitted with her to emigrate to Arcadia. Negotiations were now commenced between Agis, who had fled into the temple of Athena Chalcioecos, and Leonidas, who made him all sorts of fair promises, so that Agis, though he did not quite trust him, yet sometimes quitted his place of refuge to take a bath. On one occasion of this kind, he was betrayed by false friends, and dragged from the bath into a prison. The ephors held a mock trial and condemned him to death: he was murdered in his prison. The entreaties of his mother and grandmother to spare his life, were of no avail, and both were strangled with him.⁸

⁷ In 1826, Niebuhr placed the beginning of the whole reform after the campaign of Agis against the Aetolians.—ED.

⁸ "Such is Plutarch's account; he does not inform us what authority he follows. But Pausanias, in three different places (ii. 8, § 5; viii. 7, § 3, 8, § 11, 10, § 5—8, 27, § 13, foll.), relates a very strange story, which we cannot well doubt. Once he relates, that Agis, the son of Eudamidas, besieged Megalopolis, and that the city was saved by a hurricane destroying the besieging engines. In another place he mentions, that Pellene was taken by Agis, but that he was expelled again by Aratus and his followers: the same story is related by Plutarch and Polyænus of the Aetolians. In the third place he states, that the Achaeans, Mantineans, and Arcadians, conquered Agis in a battle near Mantinea under Aratus, and that Agis fell, as was recorded on the trophies which the Arcadians had erected after that victory. This is very strange, and irreconcilable with the account of Pausanias (?), for how can Aratus have been engaged at three different places at the same time? (?) If Pausanias

The death of Agis must belong to the same year, in which he had assisted the Achaeans on the Isthmus against the Aetolians, that is Olymp. 135, 1, the same year in which the aged Antigonus died, and in which the war of the Aetolians and Achaeans against Demetrius broke out, or shortly afterwards.

Hippomedon, a member of the royal family, the son of the ephor Agesilaus who was saved by him, distinguished himself at Sparta at this time. He acted in the manner in which formerly German princes used to act: he was a general in the service of the Egyptians, and governor of their conquests in Thrace. I have collected his history, and I find mention of him at a very advanced age, even after the death of Cleomenes; but he then disappears⁹. It is possible that a son of his, at least for a time, was nominal king at Sparta¹⁰.

After the death of Agis, Sparta was entirely in the hands of Leonidas. According to Plutarch we might be inclined to believe, that after Agis no other king was elected; but there is a passage of Polybius, from which we must infer that the double kingship was maintained during that period also. It is there said, that after the death of Agis, Archidamus was elected king, but that Cleomenes afterwards expelled him¹¹. The revolution in which Agis was overthrown, was by no means of such a nature as to make the ephors think it necessary to abolish the shadow of royalty.

Leonidas seems to have died about the same time as Demetrius, and he was succeeded by his son Cleomenes. (Olymp. 137, 3). The latter was yet very young at the time of Agis'

did not mention the circumstances too accurately, or did not mention Aratus, I should be inclined to believe that he confounded Machanidas with Agis; but there is the express reference to the trophies. Pausanias expresses himself in three passages in a similar manner, and he is otherwise very accurate in his statements."—1825. [There occurs, in addition to this, in the MS. notes the following utterly corrupt and inexplicable passage: "Lastly, Cicero, *De Off.* ii. 23, says, that Agis was put to death by the Spartans on account of the trophies which he had erected over them, where Heusinger and Chapman cannot solve the mystery any more than I."—Ed.]

⁹ Klein. *Schrift.*, vol. i, p. 461.

¹⁰ Comp. *Lectures on Rom. Hist.*, vol. ii. p. 156, where Eudamidas is probably a slip for Hippomedon. The Pelops there alluded to, however, is called a son of Lyeurgus.—Ed.

¹¹ Polyb. v. 37, 1, viii. 1, 3.

death. His father married him to Agiatis, the widow of Agis, the wealthiest heiress of Lacedaemon; she was endowed with all the graces of body and mind, and endeavoured to avenge the memory of her former husband whom she intensely loved, by striving to lead the mind of Cleomenes, who had been much distinguished from his childhood, in the direction which had been followed by Agis.

Cleomenes is one of those highly remarkable men, whose character was the subject of much dispute even among the ancients, and who had passionate admirers as well as bitter enemies. Polybius being an Achæan and Megalopolitan, entertained a bitter hatred of him: he calls him a tyrant, an expression which may indeed be justified, for bloodshed did not deter him in his endeavours to accomplish his end; others who were not affected by his actions, regarded him as the last of the great Greeks. He was unquestionably a great man, and that in a different way from Philopoemen; he was indeed the man who might have restored Greece. Among his contemporaries Phylarchus was an ardent admirer of his; among the later writers we also find many enthusiastic in his praise, but especially Plutarch, who decidedly admires him and is sometimes not a little embarrassed because he equally admires Aratus, though the two are as opposed to each other as fire and water. Polybius, although he does not conceal his hatred of Cleomenes, yet recognises in him a very exalted man, a great general, and a man of prodigious strength of character, who carried away and ruled over every one who came in contact with him. It is impossible not to see that Cleomenes was a rare man, of immense talent, and distinguished for his keen eye as well as for the strength of his will; but the justice and fairness of his actions is a different question, and here we must carefully distinguish: when a good and amiable man like Agis attempts dangerous things, or seeks to lift down a burden which he afterwards cannot sustain, we call it a childish enterprise; but when a giant like Cleomenes moves such a mass from its state of repose, which might crush everything in its way, and when he has strength to check it and direct it in its right course, such an enterprise must be judged of in a very different manner.

Cleomenes entered upon his undertaking with caution and a full consciousness of its importance; he attempted to some extent things exactly similar to the schemes of Agis, for which

the latter had been ridiculed, and which had benefited nobody except bankrupt debtors; but he went to work in quite a different way, with a view to regenerate Laconia. Henceforth we can no longer speak of the ancient Spartiatae, but only of Laconians. Cleomenes did away with this distinction, and gave new property to the inhabitants. He undertook a progressive division, the execution of which produced advantages which may make us forget the injustice involved in it. In the undertaking of Agis there had been no such positive advantage. The plan made such an imposing impression, that every one submitted to it. The notions of the Greeks in these matters were very different from ours: Plato certainly would have made no objection, if he had been a contemporary of Cleomenes.

Cleomenes was distinguished among his contemporaries for his cultivated mind; he had been well trained in philosophy and in literature. The great influence of the Stoic philosophy had been extended to him also: he surrounded himself with illustrious men of talent and of cultivated and philosophical minds; Sphaerus of Olbia, in particular, was about his person from his youth, and appears to have had great influence upon him. He was altogether a very different man from what might have been expected from his Spartan education and from the age in which he lived. There is a statement concerning his domestic life¹², which is certainly true, and makes him appear in a very amiable light. He understood his position, and comparing the nullity of a Spartan prince with the greatness of the Macedonian sovereigns, he saw that the character of Sparta could be restored by nothing but the abandonment of all pomp and splendour, and by personal qualities. He was a refined man, though not without the severity of a Spartan. His intercourse and conversation are described as very graceful; he had personally not many wants and lived in the greatest frugality, but when strangers visited him, he treated each according to his own customs. He won the hearts of all the Greeks by his wit, the cheerfulness of his conversation, and by his personal character.

Two actions of his life are fearful, and show how terrible it is to come forward at a time when the straight path of justice presents insurmountable obstacles. The first is the murder of

¹² Phylarch. *ap. Athen.* iv. c. 21.

the ephors, and the second the murder of Archidamus. The ephors, it is true, were an excrescence: they had made the whole constitution of Sparta monstrous, they had destroyed the power of the kings, and stood forth as tyrants instead of a legitimate power; but this solution of the knotty question was terrible, and it was, moreover, not even necessary, for he had unlimited influence over the nation, and public opinion was in his favour, so that bloodshed was altogether superfluous. The unanimity with which he amalgamated the Spartiatae and Lacedaemonians, and changed them into a great nation of free landed proprietors, the faithful attachment with which they clung to him, the perseverance with which they held out in the greatest dangers, and the ardour with which they would have commenced again, if he had returned—all these things show that he was an extraordinary man. He was not, indeed, a man like the younger Brutus or the Gracchi, but he must be judged of according to the demoralised age in which he lived; and if viewed in this way, he will neither appear as the hero described by Phylarchus, nor as a monster. “The disorganisation of that time was such as to render morals altogether Hobbesian, a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, where the able man alone was worth anything, and where everything depended upon effecting something great, justice and duty having no place left to them. Such circumstances furnish the standard of judging of Machiavelli and also of Cleomenes.”

Aratus was very unequal to him; Cleomenes stood much higher: Aratus was a native of Sicyon, a small and insignificant town; he was indeed the son of a wealthy man, but what was that compared with a Spartan king and a Heracleid? Cleomenes being much younger was fresh and enterprising, while Aratus was growing old. The former was a hero and a great general, the other a man who had been successful in a few undertakings, but was notoriously deficient in courage. Aratus knew nothing but the ancient forms from which he expected salvation; Cleomenes aimed at a new creation and at what was suitable to his objects and to the actual state of things. We see both characterised in their tactics: Aratus had no idea of abolishing the ancient system of a militia among the Achaeans; he did not adopt the Macedonian phalanx, but retained the ancient Greek phalanx with short lances instead of the immense sarissae, although the Achaeans had no ancient

military associations which might have created a partiality for them.¹³ Sparta, on the other hand, had such associations, and in spite of the superstitious partiality for the ancient armour, Cleomenes reformed the whole Lacedaemonian tactics and introduced the Macedonian. Cleomenes, moreover, surrounded himself with men of education, genius and knowledge quite contrary to the ancient custom of the Spartans. The Spartan *ξενελασία* did not exist for him, he was free from all Spartan rudeness and affectation, and was cheerful and witty. Aratus, on the other hand, was a man of an uncultivated mind; he possessed good common sense in a narrow sphere, but that was all.

Such were the two men who stood opposed to each other, and this coincidence was unfortunate for Greece. Had not Aratus come forward at an earlier period, or had Cleomenes lived twenty years before, at the time of the weakness of Antigonos Gonatas, the whole of Peloponnesus would have been in his hands. He would have taken Acrocorinthus as easily as Aratus, and Peloponnesus would have become a compact state under him. But as it was, the two states, the Achæan and the Spartan, were opposed to each other in Peloponnesus. Italian writers say, that it was the misfortune of Italy at the end of the 15th century, that Florence and Venice were opposed to each other in such a manner that neither could become master in Italy; they were in a natural antagonism which, however, was not necessary, but arose out of the perverse attempt of each to gain the supremacy for itself, instead of sharing it with the other, and directing their arms against foreign enemies—if they had formed a reasonable supremacy, they would have been safe against the barbarians beyond the Alps. Such, also, was the case in Peloponnesus.

¹³ "The experience of the Macedonian period might have been a lesson to the Achæans, to adopt a different system of arms for their militia; for they had only a small corps of mercenaries, not possessing the means of hiring more. They had no choice but either to appear in the heavy armour of the phalangites, or, if that pressed too heavily on them, to adopt the armour of the pel-tasts of Iphierates, which the Aetolians had employed with great success; but this would have obliged them to be, like the Aetolians, incessantly drilled in arms. We cannot expect that they should have looked across the sea, and perceived the advantages of the Roman armour; but every reasonable being must look about him, and every occurrence showed them, that in small undertakings indeed they fought with advantage, but that in regular battles they were always worsted."—1826.

Two states were opposed to each other, and neither of them was in a condition to rule over the whole country. The Spartans and Achaeans might very well have existed side by side; but it was too much to expect that Sparta should allow itself to be confined in the manner in which Aratus wished. This gave rise to the first disputes. At first there were no hostilities; but soon quarrels arose, and Cleomenes offered the Achaeans a treaty, by which the two states were to be united, so that each in alternate years should have the supremacy, a relation like that subsisting between Rome and Latium. This certainly was a state of things which could not have lasted for any length of time, for the Achaeans would necessarily have been overpowered; but they ought, nevertheless, to have accepted the offer; for the only thing of which at that time they ought to have thought, was to close Peloponnesus. But Aratus was afraid—even Polybius, who shews much veneration for him, does not deny this—he was mean and thought of himself only. War thus broke out about the end of Olymp. 138.

The Achaeans were in possession of the whole of Achaia, Argolis, and nearly all Arcadia, while Cleomenes was master only of Laconia, in a narrow sense of the term; the Messenians were neutral, and the Eleans were allied with the Aetolians, who were friendly towards Cleomenes, though they took no part in the war. It is assuredly no false supposition of Polybius, that the Aetolians were inclined to unite with Cleomenes, as they did not wish to see too great an extension of the Achaean confederacy, but a real alliance probably did not exist.

Cleomenes had previously made himself master of Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and other towns of Arcadia (Olymp. 138, 1), and they are said to have entered the relation of sympolity with Sparta. This is something unprecedented, as no nation had ever stood to Sparta in any other relation than that of perioeci. Aratus could make no objection to this extension of the Lacedaemonian dominion; but when Cleomenes, with a Spartan corps, was stationed in Arcadia, calling upon the towns to join him, Aratus marched out to meet him, with a corps of observation. Cleomenes took possession of a place which unquestionably belonged to the ancient Laconian territory, but which was claimed by the Megalopolitans, and

in this manner the two armies were facing each other, though no hostilities were yet committed.

Aratus undertook to make himself master of Mantinea and Orchomenos by treachery; but the attempt failed, and Cleomenes wrote to him a mocking letter, in which he asked him whither he had intended to proceed during the night. Nothing, however, took place beyond these and similar acts of provocation.¹⁴ Aristomachus, who was appointed strategus as a reward for his native city having joined the confederacy (Olymp. 138, 2), led the corps of observation into Arcadia, intending to invade Laconia, but was kept back by Aratus.

But now open hostilities broke out, and as soon as the war commenced, the extreme weakness of the Achaean state became manifest. Cleomenes defeated the Achaeans again and again, and conquered a great number of their most important towns.

For in Olymp. 138, 3, the Achaeans made war upon the Eleans, who were allied with the Aetolians, and as they had repeatedly joined the Lacedaemonians, Cleomenes marched to their assistance. Aratus, therefore, retreated, but being attacked by the Lacedaemonians on mount Lycæon, he sustained a serious defeat. The Achaeans who carried on their wars with mercenaries, and still retained their bad armour and tactics, until Philopoemen made their militia and cavalry available, went out, under the command of Aratus, to meet Cleomenes, who carried on the war with his Lacedaemonians and a body of good mercenaries, and the Achaeans were, of course, beaten. Now, although his corps seems to have been routed, yet Aratus again contrived to gain a great advantage. For he

¹⁴ "These events must have occurred before the battle of Lycæon. Schweighäuser places the beginning of the war of Cleomenes in Olymp. 139, but overlooks the fact, that Polybius places the taking of Mantinea by Aratus four years before Antigonos' march into Peloponnesus, which, considering that the battle of Sellasia did not take place till the year after, and that then followed the Nemean games, cannot have occurred in any other year but Olymp. 139, 2 (A. U. C. 527, according to Cato). The provocations in Arcadia, where Aratus was, no, doubt, protector, must, therefore, have occurred in Olymp. 138, 1; but the real beginning of the war of Cleomenes falls in Olymp. 138, 2, and the year 138, 1, must be supposed to be the year in which Aristomachus gave up Argos, and in the year following he was again elected strategus by the Achaeans. Lydiadas accordingly gave up Megalopolis in Olymp. 136, 3, and the surrender of Piræus and Munychia belongs either to Olymp. 137, 3, or 4."—1825.

had secured a party at Mantinea, who, as soon as he appeared at its gates with a small force, threw the town open to him, so that he could enter it with a few hundred men. On that occasion, perhaps, on account of his scattered and routed army, he shewed an extremely humane conduct; he ordered his troops to abstain from all plunder, and proclaimed that he would be satisfied if the Mantineans would join the Achæan sympolity, which in fact they did. But an expression in Plutarch justifies the inference, that after all the Mantineans had no great reason to be quite satisfied with their fate under Aratus. They were not only ranked in the same class with the smallest towns, and obliged to adopt the Achæan laws, but their metoeci were raised to the rank of citizens, and entrusted with the management of public affairs. Thus there arose in the city two parties, that of the old and that of the new citizens, the latter of whom demanded Achæan assistance against Cleomenes, which was granted to them.¹⁵

Aratus had assembled an army to defend Megalopolis. Cleomenes again appeared before it, and with increased forces; and as Aratus had taken up a strong position behind a deep ravine, which, however, was not close to the camp, an engagement soon arose between the light armed troops. Those of the Achæans drove those of the Spartans across the ravine, and Lydiadas, the Megalopolitan, asked permission to follow up the advantage he had gained, but Aratus would not allow it. Lydiadas then, in spite of Aratus, proceeded with his right wing beyond the ravine, and fought at first, indeed, with success, but as Aratus did not support him, he and many Achæans fell unavenged; they suffered a severe defeat (near the Ladoceia or Laodiceia), which roused general hatred and exasperation against Aratus, for it was said that he had acted from enmity against Lydiadas.¹⁶

At the beginning of the war Cleomenes was not possessed

¹⁵ "The chronological succession of these occurrences is exceedingly confused in Plutarch, for both the battles, that of Lycaeon and that near the Ladoceia, were fought in Olymp. 138, 3."

¹⁶ "Plutarch calls the strategia of Aratus during this war his twelfth; as, however, he had been elected every other year, and is said to have been strategus for the second time in the year when Acrocorinthus was taken (Olymp. 134, 1), it ought to be his eleventh. But by this supposition, the year of the battle of Ladoceia would be thrown into confusion, and hence Schweighäuser's mistake in his remark on Polybius."—1825.

of more power than that which had been left to the kings by the ephors, who tried to reduce it to nothing, and were so domineering, that the kings were obstructed and checked in all their undertakings. But it was probably soon after the battle of Leuctra (Ladoceia) that he undertook at Sparta the revolution to which he owes his equivocal celebrity. He began it with a horrible deed, whence he is unjustly compared with the Gracchi; for the mode of action on the part of the latter was quite in accordance with the laws. Cleomenes, on the other hand, perhaps compelled by circumstances, but much more probably carried away by impatience, and urged on by a haughty spirit, aimed at restoring by blood the Spartan constitution, such as he conceived it, and at raising the royal prerogatives to a dictatorial power, such as the circumstances of the time required. Respecting the time of this revolution, we have two contradictory statements in Plutarch—the one in the life of Aratus, and the other in his *Agis and Cleomenes*; but if we examine the internal evidence, we must place it after the victory of Leuctra (Ladoceia), in Olymp. 138, 3.

Cleomenes was at that time in Arcadia with a considerable army; he left his Lacedaemonians there, placing them in quarters, that they might have rest; but with the mercenaries, after having performed several marches, he suddenly returned to Sparta, where no one expected him, and where the ephors happened to be assembled at dinner. He sent Eurycleidas to them with proposals, and while Eurycleidas was detaining them with discussions, the friends of Cleomenes with the mercenaries entered the city, surrounded the place where the ephors were assembled, and cut down four of them, Agesilaus, the fifth, having escaped, severely wounded.

After this Cleomenes himself entered the city, assembled the people, and excused the bloody deed as well as he could, saying, that the kingly power was the original one at Sparta, that the ephors had been added at a later time as superintendants, that they had abused their power, and become tyrants of the people no less than of the kings; this, he said, was the cause of the sinking power of Sparta. His intention was, he added, to restore the constitution of Lycurgus in all its purity. This change he actually effected with dictatorial power, “without much concern as to which were real laws of Lycurgus and which were not. His task was to recall to life a perfectly

dead mummy, and this task he accomplished." Eighty of his opponents were sent into exile, after which he not only proclaimed a distribution of property, which might, perhaps, have been justified by the laws of Lycurgus, but also the formation of a new body of Lacedaemonian citizens, composed of Spartiatae, Lacedaemonians, and perioeci, the emancipation of many helots, and the cancelling of debts, this last measure having probably been repealed after the fall of Agis. It is not known into how many lots he divided the Spartan country; this much only is certain, that he constituted four thousand hoplites, and admitted many strangers and perioeci to the franchise. In the distribution of the land, the property of his political opponents was not dealt with more severely than that of any other persons; κληῖροι were set apart even for the exiles, who were to be allowed to return as soon as everything was settled. A change was probably made, also, in the relation between the Spartiatae and perioeci, for henceforth the Spartans are always called Lacedaemonians; but no particulars respecting this are known.

Even before this revolution, Archidamus, the other king, a brother of Agis, who had fled to Messenia, had returned to Sparta on the invitation of Cleomenes, but had been murdered soon after. Polybius accuses Cleomenes of this murder, while Plutarch, who cannot acquit him of complicity, endeavours to justify him, but does not succeed. Cleomenes now, contrary to law, made his own brother Eucleidas second king, for he would not tolerate a king belonging to the other royal house.

"Cleomenes was thus in possession of absolute power, and formed a phalanx of the new citizens, for there was now no want of men."

After having established his power very rapidly, he returned to Arcadia, whither the Mantineans had invited him. The new citizens there had taken an Achaean garrison into the town, and as the old citizens, anxious to get rid of it, massacred the men, the revolution was commenced. Plutarch, indeed, relates that the Achaeans were dismissed unhurt, but the circumstances render the statement of Polybius about their massacre probable. After the capture of Mantinea, Cleomenes invaded western Achaia, where he was met by the Achaeans, in Olymp. 138, 4, who had risen in a body to oppose him. He marched to Dyme and besieged it; but still with the greatest

boldness he accepted a battle against the Achaeans, in which he gained a complete victory. After this battle the Achaeans fled in all directions, and then commenced negotiations about peace with Cleomenes; but the latter, whose power was far superior to that of the Achaeans (for though the number of his troops was smaller, yet the strength of his newly-reformed army was good), received the proposals with pride and dignity, and refused to enter into any negotiations.

In this distress, after a threefold defeat, when the Achaeans saw no help except in an alliance with Sparta, when they wished for peace and reconciliation, and when Cleomenes by his victory had become so popular, that the Achaeans themselves wished to have him for their commander—at this moment an evil genius seized upon Aratus and led him to commit an enormous crime against Greece. He had afterwards to pay dearly for it, and his punishment was as great as his sin. He entered into a connection with Antigonus, the guardian of the Macedonian king Philip.

This Antigonus is surnamed *ὁ Ἐπίτροπος*, *ὁ Φοῦσκος*, and *ὁ Δῶσων*. *Φοῦσκος* is a Macedonian word, and probably the Latin *fuscus*, but the Greeks called him *ὁ Δῶσων*, on account of his readiness to make promises. He was a cousin of king Demetrius, a nephew of Antigonus Gonatas, and a son of Demetrius the Beautiful¹⁷. The last Demetrius whose reign had been so unhappy, had left a son Philip, who was yet a very young child; Antigonus was his guardian, whence he is called *ὁ Ἐπίτροπος* or *tutor*, and did his duty in that capacity in an admirable and conscientious manner; he himself had children, but never thought of depriving his ward of his crown, although it would have been better if he had done so. "He did indeed assume the kingly dignity, but evidently because he was compelled by the wishes of the Macedonians: for his great glory was his conscientiousness towards his ward, and his sons and his family remained in a private station under Philip and Perseus, who ill requited them for the kind acts of their guardian." Unfortunately he did not educate Philip for his station as king: one of his own sons appears in the reign of Philip as a noble, able, and excellent man; and Philip too had talent and abilities, but he was a terrible king.

¹⁷ Compare my Dissertation on the Armenian Eusebius, *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. i. p. 233, foll.

Antigonus Doson was an enterprising and great prince. He was the first Macedonian king after the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes, who again directed his attention to maritime undertakings; he had before carried on a maritime war against Ptolemy Euergetes, of which I have found mention in only three passages.¹⁸ At the same time he again subdued the Thessalians who had revolted after the death of Demetrius, and conquered the Dardanians. He raised the Macedonian empire from the state of weakness into which it had sunk.

Even before this time Aratus had availed himself of the peculiar clientship in which the Megalopolitans stood to Macedonia, for the purpose of requesting them to solicit the assistance of Antigonus for himself. But Antigonus had refused to enter into any negotiations, unless the supremacy of the Achaeans was ceded to him, and Acrocorinthus evacuated. The latter demand must have cost Aratus a most severe struggle with himself, for the liberation of Corinth was his most brilliant feat; but yet he offered to comply with it. Antigonus eagerly accepted the offer. It was no doubt an act of high treason, for the negotiation took place without the knowledge of the Achaeans, and without the consent of the Corinthians: Corinth by law was a free member of the confederacy, and notwithstanding this it was now delivered up to the Macedonians without knowing anything about it. Aratus destroyed the fairest feat of his military career, and thoroughly dishonoured himself; he would be the servant of Antigonus, rather than yield in his own country to a young prince, who was in every respect far superior to him, and by whom he felt himself eclipsed. "It is better to clean the shoes of one's own countryman, than to kiss the feet of a foreigner," is the honest old German proverb, which may be applied here; but in divided countries the contrary has nearly always happened. Thus the Italian states betrayed one another; the same as happened in Germany; and the Greeks have done so a hundred times. It is of practical importance to know this disgraceful act of Aratus, and the manner in which he had to do penance for it. During this period he showed himself little in everything, but more especially after the battle near Hecatombaeon (or Dyme), by refusing to

¹⁸ *Klein. Schrift.*, vol. i. p. 295, foll.

accept the strategia, and endeavouring to keep himself at a distance at a time, when every one ought to have shown his patriotism.

While these negotiations were going on in secret, Cleomenes, soon after the Achæan embassy had been dismissed, had himself sent an embassy to the Achæans, once more commencing negotiations of peace, and making proposals to them. He offered of his own accord to set free all prisoners and to restore the towns, if they would acknowledge the hegemonia of Sparta, and himself as their hegemon. Cleomenes could not demand less; but he offered to do even more. We are easily inclined to form too lofty a notion of Aratus, and to compare him with such men as Demosthenes, but this is taking a wrong view of him. The patriots under Charles II., who received pensions from foreign powers, are often spoken of; but there are only a few instances in which the charge is true. Aratus, on the other hand, had a regular annual pension of six talents from the court of Egypt (the Greek term is *σύνταξις*, but its meaning is quite that of a pension); now Cleomenes not only secured him this pension, but promised even to double it; he further offered to allow the garrison of Acrocorinthus to consist half of Achæans and half of Lacedæmonians: in short he did everything to unite Peloponnesus under the supremacy of Sparta; and if he had succeeded in this, the evening of Greece would have been brighter than that which was now setting in upon it. Cleomenes would probably have succeeded in bringing about a junction with the Actolians. Northern Greece would then have come under Aetolia, and Greece would have been divided into two parts, which might have prospered by the side of each other, and resisted Macedonia. Matters might then have taken a fortunate turn, and the negotiations would have been brought to a close, if Aratus had not already gone too far with Macedonia, so that he was obliged to go on or to flee from his country.

But even as it was, the Achæans in their first fright would no doubt have accepted the terms; but all of a sudden Cleomenes, on his way to Lerna, was taken ill; he was seized with an attack of blood-spitting, and obliged to send ambassadors to the general diet, at which everything was to be settled, with the request to postpone the final settlement of

the treaty until his recovery. While thus Cleomenes was confined to his bed at Sparta, Aratus hastened his treacherous negotiations with Antigonus.

A new meeting with Cleomenes was then agreed upon, and even now the Achaeans proposed to send three hundred hostages into the Spartan camp, after which he was to come among them, or only as far as the gates of the city. But as it was clear that the negotiations were not seriously meant, Cleomenes broke them off, and the personal exasperation between him and Aratus was greater than ever.

Cleomenes now again advanced from Argos into Achaia Proper (Olymp. 139, 1), where Pellene, the only Achaean town of any importance, opened its gates to him.¹⁹ He then made himself master of the most powerful towns of Arcadia, with the exception of Megalopolis and Clitor, which remained faithful to the Achaeans; he took Argos by surprise at the time of the Nemean games,²⁰ and that city also declared for him. Phlius, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Cleonae all joined him; the garrisons were everywhere driven from the towns, and the gates thrown open to him. Achaia was confined almost to its ancient boundaries.

¹⁹ "The Achaean constitution was so bad, that Pellene, even in the time of the Peloponnesian war, had a constitution of its own."—1825.

²⁰ This statement is not contradictory to the one, that the Nemean games took place shortly after the battle of Sellasia, as the Nemean games were celebrated in the first and third year of every Olympiad."—1825. [The whole chronology of the Lectures of 1825 on the war of Cleomenes is connected with this passage. If the Nemea were celebrated in the first and third year of every Olympiad (the winter Nemea in the first, and the summer Nemea in the third), the taking of Argos must be assigned to the beginning of the first year of Olymp. 139, and the battle of Sellasia at the end of the second year, for the summer Nemea took place immediately after. All the intermediate occurrences, therefore, are compressed within the period between the second half of the first year of Olymp. 139, and the first ten or eleven months of the second year of the same Olympiad. According to this calculation, Antigonus, whether he came to the Isthmus at the end of Olymp. 139, 1, or at the beginning of Olymp. 139, 2, can have made only *one* summer or autumn campaign and *one* spring campaign against Cleomenes; hence Niebuhr, in 1825 as well as in 1826 and 1830, assumed only two campaigns, contrary to the testimony of Polybius, according to whom Antigonus took his winter quarters twice and made three campaigns against Cleomenes; and in 1825 Niebuhr expressly placed the battle at the end of Olymp. 139, 2, whereas in 1826 and 1830 he did not mention the date of the battle at all. The difficulty, however, remains the same, if, according to the opinion now prevalent, the winter Nemea, are placed in the middle of the second and the summer Nemea at the beginning of the fourth year of every Olympiad.—ED.]

The cause of the revolt of these towns, and more especially of the Arcadian ones, was the absurdity of the federative constitution, and the unnatural equalisation of the great cities with the small Achæan towns; for a city like Mantinea, *e.g.*, had no more votes than an Achæan town of a few hundred inhabitants, such as Rhypes and Leontium, and was thus restricted in an unnatural manner. Megalopolis remained in the confederacy, because it could not be otherwise than opposed to Sparta. "If a change in the irrational federal constitution could have been effected, the league might have lasted; but the interests of the ancient Achæans were opposed to reforms, and Aratus was unwilling to give up the influence which he possessed through that constitution."

Cleomenes advanced as far as Corinth, the gates of which were likewise opened to him, after Aratus had been obliged to flee from the city. He had been engaged there as a commissioner to inquire as to who was favourable to Cleomenes,²¹ but he had been watched, and it was intended to arrest him. Acrocorinthus had an Achæan garrison, without which that fortress too would no doubt have been opened to Cleomenes. From the fact that there was a garrison, we see that it was the larger towns which could not be trusted just on account of the disadvantage under which they were labouring by the federal constitution.

After this, the negotiations of Aratus with Macedonia were brought to light, and under these circumstances it was a relief to Aratus in his difficulties, to see Corinth of its own accord surrendering to Cleomenes. The latter still tried every opportunity to recommence the negotiations; for he protected the house and property which Aratus possessed at Corinth, and forbade the confiscation of it. But as Aratus, refusing to negotiate, answered that he had no longer the power to do anything, Cleomenes advanced towards Sicyon and blockaded it. Aratus, who was in the town escaped, with the aid of the sentinels, to Aegium, where it was formally decreed to accept the terms of Antigonus, and to surrender Acrocorinthus to him.

²¹ "Even at Sicyon Aratus caused many persons to be executed who belonged to the party opposed to himself and the Achæans; this gave rise to the horrors which show the character of that period in all its fearfulness, and make Cleomenes appear more excuseable, if we compare him with his contemporaries."—1825.

Cleomenes, now giving up every attempt at reconciliation, allowed the Corinthians to confiscate the property of Aratus and surrender it to him.

Meantime Antigonus had already assembled an army in Thessaly ready to march into Peloponnesus. The Aetolians declared that they would not allow a Macedonian army to pass Thermopylae, but he had no difficulty in sending his troops by sea to Euboea and Chalcis. The Aetolians, in fact, took no part in the war. Antigonus, after being joined by the Boeotians, Phocians, Acarnanians, and Epirots, appeared at the Isthmus.

Cleomenes had pitched his camp on the part of the Isthmus which is scarcely six Roman miles in breadth, so that Antigonus did not know how to get across it. Cleomenes did not indeed think it advisable to maintain the fortifications of the Isthmus, but he made a circumvallation round Acrocorinthus, and took himself a fortified position between Corinth and the Oneian heights on the Isthmus. This position is not quite clear, but this much is evident, that Cleomenes did not indeed form a line right across the Isthmus, but still occupied such a position that Antigonus did not venture to pass by or to attempt to force his way. Cleomenes was well supplied with provisions, while Antigonus, in the poor country of Megaris, soon began to suffer from want, and could not have maintained himself long, had not an insurrection which broke out against Cleomenes, changed everything. It was at Argos that the friends of the Achaeans and Macedonians rose in open rebellion against Cleomenes. He had to do everything by himself and single-handed—he received indeed a few subsidies from Egypt, but old Ptolemy Euergetes acted without any spirit;—he broke up to march to Argos, but arrived too late. In the meantime the Macedonians, under the direction of Aratus, who was with Antigonus, had landed at Epidaurus, and the position on the Isthmus was thus evaded. Aratus led the Macedonians after their landing to Argos. He arrived there while the fighting was going on in the city; he reinforced the insurgents, and as many others were approaching, Cleomenes, though he was already in the city, thought it advisable to give up the contest, as Antigonus was following close behind him. Thus abandoning Argos, he was obliged to retreat with his army into Arcadia, and to draw together his garrisons from

the newly conquered towns, merely that he might not be crushed by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

Aratus and the Achaeans now surrendered Acrocorinthus to Antigonus; the Achacan garrison evacuated the arx, and the Macedonians entered. At the same time the Achaeans, by a formal decree, transferred the hegemonia to Antigonus, and Aratus sent his own son as a hostage to Macedonia.

Antigonus with his allies immediately pursued Cleomenes.²² He took Tegea, Orchomenos, and Mantinea. How fearfully these towns were ransacked, may be seen from the fact, that Mantinea was obliged to surrender at discretion, and that its inhabitants were sold by the Macedonians as slaves. Antigonus with his mercenaries then took up his winter-quarters in the conquered districts, and on the coast of Achaia, and the Macedonians were sent home.²³

Cleomenes in the meantime employed his leisure during the winter in making fresh preparations and plans, and there now followed the last winter campaign, in which Cleomenes distinguished himself as much as Napoleon did in a similar situation, in February and March, 1814, when in the midst of his difficulties he appeared as a truly great general. His exploits were brilliant; he first took Megalopolis by surprise. In the unfortunate summer campaign he had been unsuccessful in his attack upon that city; but now some Messenians residing at Megalopolis offered to let him and his army into it. It was a very extensive place, but had suffered much, and only a small part of it was inhabited. Cleomenes had come from Sparta: without being observed he appeared at the gates of Megalopolis, and by treachery made himself master of some towers, and afterwards of a few strong places in the city. When the inhabitants had recovered from the first fright, they assembled in arms, saved their wives and children, and after a manly resistance quitted the city, bravely protecting the flight of their friends. Two-thirds of the inhabitants are said to have been saved.

²² According to Polybius, Antigonus first took up his winter quarters, and the taking of the Arcadian towns belongs to the following summer; and after this there follow the winter quarters here mentioned by Niebuhr; and the taking of Megalopolis and the battle of Sellasia belong to the following spring. Compare above, note 20.—Ed.

²³ In 1825, Niebuhr accounted for the sending back of the phalanx by a diversion; but on other occasions he repeatedly refers to the impossibility of keeping the militia away from home for a whole year.—Ed.

Cleomenes standing in need of friends, did not at first allow the city to be laid waste, but sent after the fugitives, promising to restore to them everything, if they would return and become his allies. But the fugitive Megalopolitans, who had assembled at Messene, in their blind rage against Sparta, received the herald with showers of stones. "You may do," they said, "with our city whatever you please, we will not be under your dominion." Cleomenes now ordered the city to be plundered, set fire to some parts, destroyed everything that could not be carried away, and sold the prisoners. Antigonus, on hearing of the taking of Megalopolis, hastily advanced from Aegium, but found nothing except the smoking ruins of the city. Enraged, he withdrew into Argolis, it being impossible at this season of the year to invade Laconia, and disbanded the Achaeans. Cleomenes now made his way across the difficult frontier mountains, and broke in upon the Macedonians and Achaeans in their winter-quarters, and dispersed them. He even appeared before Argos for the purpose of drawing Antigonus into an engagement; but as the latter was cautious, and did not venture outside the walls, Cleomenes took revenge in the open country for the revolt of the Argives.

These expeditions caused great sensation: it is almost incredible to find how much he did with the small forces he had at his command. But they were not sufficient: the Egyptian court was too stingy with its subsidies, and Euergetes now even advised him to make peace. If Cleomenes had had the means at his disposal, he would have completely routed his enemy; when Ptolemy Euergetes saw the fault he had committed, it was too late.

In these circumstances, Cleomenes was obliged to accept the battle of Sellasia in the spring of Olymp. 139, 2. He was under the necessity of giving up the offensive and confining himself to the defence of Laconia. Every entrance was obstructed by an abattis; he himself with the main body of the army established himself near Sellasia, in a valley on the most frequented road between Arcadia and Sparta. Polybius himself owns that he could not have done better. Sellasia is one of those places which possess great military renown in history, and I have requested the French expedition to examine its site. On that spot the power of Macedonia might have been broken.

If the matter had been protracted a few days, Antigonos would have been obliged to return to Macedonia, because the Illyrian and Paeonian Dardanians had invaded Macedonia from Scornus and Scardus, and the generals left behind by Antigonos were scarcely able to resist the invaders. Cleomenes, in fact, wished to delay the battle; but he wanted money, his mercenaries became rebellious, and already began to desert. With the sad conviction that a battle ought not to be ventured upon, Cleomenes was forced to accept it, and was completely defeated by the Macedonians.

Cleomenes, with the right wing, had stationed himself on Olympus, and the left, under his brother, was drawn up on the opposite hill, Euas. His army was smaller than that of Antigonos, who had no less than 28,000 men; "yet he still had a force of 20,000, a proof of the astonishing resources of Lacedaemon."²⁴ The Achaeans, in consequence of their bad armour, were defeated by the light armed troops of Cleomenes—Philopoemen was the first to introduce the sarissae—but the Macedonians routed the Lacedaemonians. The battle was decided on the left wing by the want of skill on the part of Eucleidas, the brother of Cleomenes, who was in a most excellent position on mount Euas; but instead of going to meet the Macedonians, he retreated to the very top in the hope of throwing them down from the inaccessible height. The Macedonians now overcame the difficulties without any opposition, and drove the Spartans from the top of the hill, where they could not expand, down the other side. Eucleidas and his whole corps were routed, and he himself fell. When Cleomenes saw that his left wing was defeated, he was obliged to contend with masses against the phalanx, which usually turned out unsuccessful. His whole infantry was destroyed. Meantime a hot contest of the cavalry had taken place in the valley, in which Philopoemen gained his first laurels. Six thousand Spartans are said to have remained dead on the field of battle; Cleomenes himself escaped to Sparta with only two hundred men, declaring that Sparta was lost and that every one must think of his own safety.

He himself went to Egypt. Ships lay in readiness at

²⁴ "What could Archidamus and Agesilaus not have accomplished in that fresh and vigorous country if they had broken through the old conventional routine! Lysander saw this, and probably paid for it with his life."—1826.

Gythium to convey him to Alexandria, whither his mother, Cratesicleia, and his children had preceded him. He fled in the hope of seeing better days: a friend, Therycion, censuring him for his clinging to life, Cleomenes said, that he would live as long as he had any hope for his country. But he did not live to see those better days.

Antigonus proceeded to Sparta, which submitted to him without hesitation. He put an end to the ancient kingdom of the Heracleids—one of the kings had fallen in the battle, and the other had left the country—and instituted a government of ephors who were favourable to his interests; but this did not last long. This is the restoration of the *πολιτεία πατριος* to the Spartans, for which he is sometimes praised. Antigonus is extolled for not having destroyed Sparta; but his *φιλανθρωπία* was nothing but a desire quickly to return on account of the invasion of the Dardanians. In addition to this it must be observed that he might easily have become involved in a war with the Romans, who had already gained a firm footing in Illyricum. After having attended the celebration of the Nemean games (in the month of July of Olymp. 139, 3, for the battle had taken place at the end of Olymp. 139, 2), Antigonus hastily returned to Macedonia.

There he, indeed, soon gained a victory over the Illyrians; but the exertions he had to make accelerated the outbreak of pulmonary consumption, of which he died, according to Porphyrius, at the beginning of Olymp. 139, 4, and not in Olymp. 139, 3, as Schweighäuser thinks.

This was the first opportunity, after the battle of Plataeae, on which Sparta might have conferred a blessing upon Greece; but henceforth its influence is scarcely worth mentioning.

LECTURE CVII.

PTOLEMY EUERGETES received Cleomenes with kindness, and regretted having given him so little support. Now, on becoming acquainted with Cleomenes, it was clear to him

what an important ally he might have been to him against Macedonia; he was now anxious to make good what had been neglected, and was seized with the Oriental notion, that the matter might still be remedied, and that the Greeks had only wasted their strength. But the care about settling the succession in his own kingdom engrossed his attention too much, and made him politically inactive, otherwise he would unquestionably have given Cleomenes a fleet to re-conquer his country. But he treated him with great distinction, gave him a pension of twenty-four talents (Greek or Egyptian ones?), and availed himself of his counsel in state matters.

Ptolemy Euergetes died soon after (Olymp. 139, 4), and with him the glory of the Alexandrian empire disappeared at once, having been maintained for nearly one hundred years after the death of Alexander, and that is a long time! Euergetes was the last of the good and beneficial Ptolemies. After him, Ptolemy Philometor is the only one of whom any good can be said; otherwise, there is nothing deserving of praise, and, generally speaking, the Ptolemies who now follow are the most abject mortals.

The life of Euergetes himself is obscure to us, if we except a few detached statements; we see, for example, from the monument of Adulis, that he had established his government over the coast of Abyssinia and Arabia on the Red Sea, with the view of obtaining the products of those countries, as ivory and the like, and probably, also, for the sake of the commerce with India. His reign is the most brilliant among the Ptolemies, on account of his victories and the extension of his empire on the coast of Asia Minor, in Thrace, on the Red Sea, and in Arabia; but his empire was already shaken by the insurrections which had obliged him to give up the greater part of his Asiatic conquests; the manner, however, in which he gave them up somewhat resembles the unconcern with which Pyrrhus abandoned such things. He had inherited a fondness for literature, for which his father had been distinguished; and his reign, together with the latter period of that of Philadelphus, forms the culminating point of Alexandrian learning: he was the patron of Eratosthenes.

“Even Soter had attracted to his court all the Greeks that were distinguished for their talent and industry, and there was now formed a state of savans, all of whom obtained there

an honourable subsistence, enabling them to live in leisure; hence all the branches of human knowledge were extended from that centre. The exact sciences were flourishing at Alexandria, and the reign of Euergetes, in particular, was their golden age." Poetry continued to flourish, forming, as it were, a second summer of Greek poetry, for Callimachus was still alive, as a very old man, under Euergetes; but during this period it became extinct, for after Callimachus there is no poet deserving of the name. "It is very difficult to form a right estimate of the Alexandrian poets; there was no lack of poetical genius and talent, and a man like Theocritus would have been a great poet at any time: I say this, because I foresee, not without apprehension, that he will be undervalued, as has been the case with Horace. Callimachus is not like Theocritus; he is more of a rhetorician, and his muse has no heart. Apollonius of Rhodes is more of an artificial and learned poet. The tragedies of Seneca give us an idea of the tragic poets of that period, but Seneca had no talent nor the power to handle his subjects; his tragedies have no substance; whereas the Alexandrians were not without their peculiar value. Poetry at that time was in a condition similar to that in which we now see English poetry. The age is not to be despised, but the poetry of the heart is dead; passion and art supplying the place of the heart. The number of prose writers was small, and they were of no importance at all; but the exact sciences were rising all the more." Mechanics and the mathematical sciences proceeded from Alexandria, and became very important; Alexandria was the centre of mathematical studies, and there is no doubt that Archimedes, too, proceeded from that school. "Astronomy, which, in Greece, had scarcely existed at all, now rose; the eastern results of mathematical speculation were traced to their sources. Grammar was developed in the school of Aristophanes of Byzantium and several others. The example of Eratosthenes, a man of the most varied acquirements, shows that those men were well aware that literature had ceased, whence they occupied themselves with the productions of bygone times: they selected with great taste the best works for their *kanóves*, and made the selection in order to save the whole from the neglect of the multitude. The words and idiomatic phrases of the Greek language were collected; very many Greek grammarians

delivered lectures upon their *κανόνες*; and out of their commentaries have arisen our scholia."

We like to dwell upon the period of the Ptolemies, because it is the period of the development of grammar and of the sciences, and because the arts were improved at Alexandria; and although this period cannot be compared with that of the epic and lyric poets of the Greeks, any more than the present state of English literature can be compared with the age of Milton and Shakespere, yet, considering the general state of barren devastation, we cannot help rejoicing in witnessing what was done at Alexandria. "That city was in a happy condition, for it was new and did not know of any better times; it was fortunate enough to be under a mild government, and to see wealth and splendour diffused." But all this died away with Ptolemy Euergetes.

He had two sons, the elder called Ptolemy, and the younger Magas. The latter was preferred by Berenice, the beloved wife of Euergetes, and daughter of Magas of Cyrene, whose hair was placed among the stars. Ptolemy may have shown his unspeakable viciousness even as early as that time, so that his parents resolved to exclude him from the succession. He is suspected by the general opinion of antiquity of having poisoned his father; and it has been thought that the surname of Philopator was given to him in derision. The latter point, however, is foolish, for in the official lists of the kings, his name appears as *θεὸς φιλοπάτωρ*. It seems much more probable that he assumed that name for the purpose of opposing and defying that suspicion. In the inscription of Rosetta, in which the Ptolemies are enumerated with their surnames, Ptolemy V. is called *θεὸς ἐπιφανής*, etc.; but the unfounded belief as to the origin of that name occurs even among the ancients, and modern writers have repeated it. But whether he poisoned his father, or whether his father's death was only welcome to him, he took possession of the throne, and caused his mother Berenice and his brother Magas to be murdered, and along with them the most distinguished Alexandrians who were attached to the queen, "but more especially the unfortunate descendants of Lysimachus, who were relations of Berenice, for her mother Arsinoë was a daughter of Lysimachus. Such horrors had never yet been seen at Alexandria."

During these tumults Cleomenes remained neutral; the new

king treated him with great respect so long as he feared lest with his numerous retinue of Spartans he might declare himself in favour of Berenice and Magas; but when they were no more, the king, and still more his favorite Sosibius, dreaded him, and endeavoured to get rid of him and his friends. An opportunity of disarming him was soon found. A Messenian of the name of Nicagoras, an old enemy of Cleomenes, who had been outwardly reconciled to him, having heard him freely expressing his contempt of the king and his court, reported the words to Sosibius. Hereupon, Cleomenes and his Spartan companions were conveyed into a large building (Olymp. 140, 1), and its gates were guarded until an opportunity should occur of killing them all. Cleomenes could not be ignorant that he was reserved for such a fate, and in his despair he formed the determination to break out of his prison, and to see whether the great number of Greek mercenaries who had always shown much attachment to him, would join him. This was an attempt of despair, and ended as might have been anticipated, for the mercenaries in their calculations found that they could not expect much benefit from him: they had their bread and pay from their master, and had no faith in the success of Cleomenes. He made use of the absence of the king, who had gone to Canopus, and spread a report that he was to be restored to liberty: he feasted his guards, and having made them drunk he fell upon them and disarmed them, and, armed with their weapons he burst into the streets. The governor of the city was killed, but neither the mercenaries nor any one else joined him; an attempt to possess himself of the acropolis also failed, and Cleomenes with his few followers being overpowered, threw themselves upon their own swords. Every one of them perished. Even the women, the aged mother of Cleomenes, and his children were murdered; his eldest son threw himself from a roof, and as he was not yet dead, he was strangled with the rest, and the body of Cleomenes was nailed on a cross. Thus ended the family of Cleomenes: the race of the Heracleids, however, did not become quite extinct with him; at a later time a trace of it still occurs, but only in name. At Sparta there was no king so long as Cleomenes lived, and a new one was not elected till information reached Sparta that Cleomenes was dead. So faithfully did the Spartans cling to their unfortunate king; but of Sparta I shall say more hereafter.

The death of Euergetes took place shortly after that of Antigonus Doson in Macedonia, and shortly before that of Seleucus Ceraunus in Syria, so that three young princes ascended the thrones in the three kingdoms about the same time.

Ptolemy IV., surnamed Philopator, is one of the most abject creatures known in history: he was always from his youth what Louis XV. was in his old age, and began as the French king ended, being in the same degree the most contemptible of men. His father must have given him some education, for he was partial to what are called the fine arts, especially music; and he composed tragedies and poetry, as was then the fashion at the court of Alexandria. A drama by him, in which an echo occurred, is mentioned in the Scholia on the Thesmothiazusae, which were discovered by I. Bekker at Ravenna. But his reign was one of the most abject and wretched in all history. It had not been expected that it would be quite so bad; it is true, he was from the first surrounded by the Sonntags and Paganinis of the time, who were the principal personages of his empire; but when Cleomenes rose, he assumed a more imposing demeanour, or at least gave his name as a rallying point, and so astonished the world.

Antiochus, who is undeservedly called the Great,—the times, however, were so low, that after all he was a man of some mark—found the Syrian empire, which Callinicus with difficulty had somewhat raised, though only in appearance, in a condition of as great weakness as that of the Sultan, and all authority was gone. In distant countries, as, *e.g.*, at Bactria, the authority of the Syrian kings was as little respected as that of the Sultan is at Bagdad or in Egypt; but after the death of Seleucus Ceraunus the satraps completely renounced their allegiance. In western Asia there rose Achaeus, a brother-in-law of Seleucus Callinicus, belonging to a very illustrious Macedonian family, who, after the death of Antiochus Hierax, ruled as a royal governor in Lydia, Ionia, Mysia, and Phrygia, so far as it was not in the hands of the Gauls, and in a small portion of Pisidia. Caria and a part of southern Ionia belonged to Egypt. In these countries, Achaeus assumed the royal diadem, taking Sardes for his capital. The small kingdom of Pergamus in Asia Minor, governed by a dynast, was at war with Achaeus, who extended his dominion at the

expense of that kingdom. In Media, one Molon had assumed the title of king; the upper provinces and all that belonged to Chorassan, may have been under the supremacy of the Greek dynasty of the Bactrian princes, "so far as they were not already governed by the Parthians." A large part of the Syrian empire indeed still remained, and according to our notions, it was a vast empire; but it was weak in consequence of the division into satrapies, and this brought about the same state of dissolution as that of the Turkish empire through its pashalics, for every satrap had the power of making himself independent.

Antiochus was still very young; he received the surname of the Great, because he not only re-united the whole empire as far as the frontier of Bactria, but because he even succeeded in taking from the Egyptian empire Phoenicia, Coelesyria, and a part of its possessions in Asia Minor. If he had not undertaken the war against the Romans, his reign would be very illustrious in history; but his power was great only against Asiatics.

At first he left Achæus alone in western Asia, and even entered into friendly relations with him without renouncing anything which thereafter he might be able to recover. His first expedition was undertaken against Media, and he carried it out successfully. "The usurper had no authority, and Antiochus, with his mercenaries from Europe, was enabled to oppose him with a superior force. Antiochus defeated Molon," recovered the large and fertile country of Media, "and conquered the country as far as the frontiers of the desert of Irak." But even now he did not yet march against Achæus, but availing himself of the wretchedness of Ptolemy Philopator he directed his arms against Egypt, "to conquer Coelesyria. This was in truth a war, which he was obliged to carry on in self-preservation, for the Egyptians were in possession of the port of Antioch, and the city had thereby become so unsafe, that when the court celebrated any festival at Daphne, a bold adventurer, with some cavalry, would have been able to take possession of the city and capture the court at Daphne."

It now became evident, how completely everything had been disorganised in Egypt even under the estimable Euergetes, for the conquest was a very easy matter. Antiochus first took Seleucia, and thus secured the possession of Antioch, next

Coelesyria, the Phoenician cities, and Palestine, and after two campaigns penetrated into Egypt. There at length, in dire necessity, an army was formed, which, however, was not formidable, for the Egyptians had long been unwarlike, and more so than the Syrians as yet were; "but Ptolemy had trained Greek mercenaries as a phalanx." At Rhaphia a decisive battle was fought (Olymp. 140, $\frac{2}{3}$), which was decided by the Greek soldiers of Ptolemy, and by the advantages of the locality." The Syrians lost it, and so completely, that Antiochus was obliged to be satisfied with a peace, by which he had to give up all his conquests, except Seleucia and a few other places. "But Antiochus had nevertheless gained the coast, and the conquest of Coelesyria was only deferred for a time."

Antiochus, however, employed his time in subduing the revolted provinces one after another. In the field, Achæus was unable to resist him, but shut up in his castle at Sardes he entered upon a foolish undertaking. Sardes was a kind of Gibraltar, on account of its lofty and steep rocky sides, and no one could do anything to Achæus there; with a handful of soldiers he might have held out for years. Antiochus ended the siege by treachery, as Churshid Pasha entrapped Ali Pasha of Janina, which he was unable to take. An officer of Antiochus promised Achæus for a large sum of money to allow him to pass through the sentinels, after which he might go to Egypt. Achæus entered into the snare, but the traitor, having received the money, seized him, and Antiochus, without any regard to his being a kinsman, ordered him to be put to death. The Syrian empire was thus restored as far as the Hellespont. Antiochus then carried on a war against Bactria, endeavoured to extend his dominions towards Armenia and Aderbidjan, and made some conquests about the sources of the Euphrates and Tigris, in the neighbourhood of Babak (?); but all these wars are very obscure. He also carried on war on the Arabic side of the Persian gulf, an inhospitable coast, with a bold seafaring population, who rendered the sea unsafe by their piracy.

Let us once more cast a glance at the Syrian empire: it comprised Asia Minor, with the exception of the kingdom of Pergamus, Bithynia, the boundaries of which between the Hellespont and the Sangarius were not defined, Galatia and the whole coast of the Euxine; here Cappadocia and Pontus

constituted a kingdom within fixed boundaries, which was governed by the descendants of the Mithridates, who had made himself independent in the reign of Ochus; but it paid tribute to Syria. Paphlagonia formed a state which had only a transitory existence. Armenia, which had been independent since the time of Alexander, was divided into several large and small principalities. All Upper Asia, as far as Sistan and Khorassan and the north of Syria, belonged to the Syrian empire. The north of Phoenicia also seems to have fallen under the Syrian dominion as early as the first war of Antiochus.

"Egypt, on the other hand, was still in possession of Cyprus, a part of Ionia, Caria, Chersonesus, and several towns on the coast of Thrace; it still had the supremacy of the Cyclades; and the south of Phoenicia and Coelesyria, were still Egyptian."

After the battle of Rhaphia was gained, Ptolemy abandoned himself to the most disgusting licentiousness. He spent his time in the company of the most abject persons, and was either drunk, or revelled with them in Bacchic mysteries; and being well skilled in all kinds of hypocrisy, he indulged in the most hideous vices. One Agathoclea¹ and her brother Agathocles, the children of the courtesan Oenanthe, governed the whole state. Agathoclea was a singer, and everything was subservient to those persons; the scum of the nation formed their retinue, and all honorable people were to them objects of scorn and detestation.

In this condition Egypt vegetated, *stabat mole sua*, because no one meddled with it, and because Antiochus directed his arms against Achæus in Asia Minor, and perhaps dreaded a renewal of the attempt; and this state of things continued for about fourteen or fifteen years, until towards the end of the Hannibalian war. During the great and stirring period of that war, when all the world was in a state of excitement, when Philip of Macedonia was engaged in mighty enterprises, and when Antiochus was consolidating and extending his empire, the government of Alexandria was as bad and disgraceful as that of the countess Dubarry under Louis XV.

Ptolemy Philopator died towards the end of the Hanni-

¹ "The ancients said Πτολεμαῖος ὁ τῆς Ἀγαθοκλείας, which occurs in Strabo (xvii. p. 795, D.). Most modern writers have misunderstood this by supplying *vids*; for we must supply *δοῦλος*."—1826.

balian war (Olymp. 144, 2). His queen had been murdered by the desire of his unworthy favorites, in order that she might not become regent as guardian of her child. The favorites thus usurped the government. By the king's will (though it is not certain that it was not a forgery), the detestable Agathocles, and others of the same calibre (*οἱ ψευδεπίτροποι*) were appointed guardians of the prince Ptolemy Epiphanes, who was still a very young boy. All the Ptolemies are not equally debased, and you must not imagine that they all were like Ptolemy Philopater, Ptolemy Auletes,² and Ptolemy Alexander. Epiphanes, *e. g.*, even in his more advanced age was not wicked in the same degree as Philopater, but in reality he never ceased to be an imbecile prince; and the kingdom decayed under him. Ptolemy Physcon, a blood-thirsty and cruel monster, was in his own way, after all, a man of some parts, though an *ἀλιτήριος* and a curse to his nation.

The better men in Egypt rose against the government of Agathocles, and even the mercenaries, though otherwise composed of the lowest characters and robbers, were too good to allow themselves to be governed by such miscreants. An insurrection broke out; the royal infant was rescued from their hands, and his guardians were put to death. The Alexandrians then applied to the Roman senate to appoint a guardian. But before this could be done, the war against Antiochus and Philip, who wanted to share the dominions of the young prince between themselves, broke out.

Antigonus Doson had died soon after his return from Peloponnesus (Olymp. 139, 3). The war had procured him greater advantages than he had expected from the treaty. It seems that he had pledged himself to give up to the Achaeans all the places he had conquered in Peloponnesus except Corinth; but he retained not only Corinth, but, contrary to the treaty, Orchomenos also, which remained in the hands of the Macedonians, until in the time of the Romans it was restored to the Achaeans. By this means the passes of Arcadia were perfectly in the hands of Antigonus; it was indeed a complete breach of faith on his part, but Aratus and the Achaeans had no means to oppose it. Nay, after having transferred to Antigonus

² Auletes is here inserted from conjecture, the MS. notes having Lathurus.—Ed.

the hegemonia, they declared him a god, and constituted an annual festival, the Antigoneia, in his honour, at which the aged Aratus himself, as his priest, sang paeans on Antigonus as the σωτήρ. The Achaeans showed their complete servility by restoring the unfortunate city of Mantinea under the name of Antigonea, after they had taken and cruelly treated it for having shown a decided antipathy against the confederacy, just because the large towns had no more rights than the smallest; this was a piece of homage such as the Greeks had never yet paid to the Macedonians. The city retained that name until the time of Hadrian, and its citizens are called on coins Ἀντιγονεῖς. Aratus had once taken the unfortunate step, which could not be retrieved, and there was now no boundary. He could find no safety except in the dependence upon Macedonia, and he could not help sinking more and more deeply into it.

Antigonus Doson was succeeded by his ward Philip, the son of Demetrius, who was then a boy of fourteen or fifteen years old, and for whom Antigonus, during a period of nine years, had faithfully managed the government. In his will he had bestowed the great dignities of the kingdom in a manner so as to form a board of guardians for the young king until he should be grown up, and Philip was recognised as king all over the country. The selection of persons, however, to whom Antigonus intrusted the government, is a remarkable instance of the general demoralisation of Macedonia; for some of them, even during the life-time of Antigonus—they were commanders of guards, courtiers, and secretaries—had shown themselves as the worst and most detestable tyrants, whereas Antigonus cared for his ward with the greatest fidelity.

This Philip is a man, who must not by any means be undervalued. According to the trivial notion, that a person is either excellent in all things, and praiseworthy in every respect, or that he is altogether bad, and in every way deserving blame, Philip would appear as a man of whom nothing but evil could be said. But he does not deserve to be dealt with in this way. He was a man of considerable talent and a great ruler, but his heart was thoroughly bad: *nihil veri, nihil sancti*, a person completely like Cosmo I. de Medici. The latter, however, was not equally warlike, and not a general like Philip, who like most Macedonian kings had a

great talent for war. In addition to this, he was in a high degree restless and enterprising, and aimed at great political things; he wanted to restore the Macedonian empire and make it as great as it had been, and even turned his eyes to the west. This period is the beginning of great relations; the diplomatic life of history, treaties and negotiations, are beginning to play a prominent part. This is something new which had not existed before in ancient history. In the west, Philip was negotiating with Carthage, and, in the east, with Antiochus. Demosthenes had indeed formed a coalition, but for different purposes, for defence and self-preservation; Philip's object, on the other hand, was to connect other states of equal or even greater power, by treaties or negotiations with his own, in such a manner as to render them subservient to his interests. He is the inventor of this art at that time, and Panzirolli would have done well, if he had assigned to him a place among inventors.

Philip, even at an early age, raised great hopes; he was a handsome man, his abilities soon became manifest, and he was yet at the age which is never entirely without virtue. Great were the expectations among those Greeks who were favourable to Macedonia; and when he first appeared in Peloponnesus, he pretended to be guided by Aratus. "He ascended the throne under the most favourable circumstances. The influence which Antigonus had exercised on the affairs of Greece passed over to him; he was not very far from having the real sovereignty over the Achaeans; he was master of Corinth and Euboea, and Phocis and Locris recognised his supremacy, and though Athens and Boeotia were outwardly and lawfully independent, they lacked both the will and the power to oppose the commands of Macedonia; the Acarnanians sought its protection against the Aetolians. He was the sovereign of Macedonia, including a part of Thrace and Illyricum, and master of Thessaly, where an independent government had no more than a nominal existence. In the north alone he was threatened by the Dardanians and Illyrians, and in Thrace the Gallic empire still existed."

It was in Philip's time that the Romans began to interfere in the affairs of Greece. In the island of Pharos (near Lissa, one of the islands off the coast of Ragusa) there was a Greek town, but its population was so mixed with Illyrians, that they almost equalled them in barbarism. These Greeks who had

become assimilated to the Illyrians were as wild as the modern Albanese, thoroughly faithless, and a people of robbers from the highest to the lowest. Robbery with them was a respectable trade. The ruler of Pharos was a Greek, Demetrius,³ a man of considerable parts, who had assisted the Romans in their first campaign. But as the Romans absolutely demanded of their subjects quiet obedience and order, and permitted no robberies, he was displeased, and eight years after the peace, he headed a revolt of the Illyrians against the Romans. This revolt, which occurred shortly before the Hannibalian war, was soon suppressed. Under the command of Aemilius Paullus, who was afterwards so unfortunate at Cannae, a Roman army was sent out, which speedily overpowered the Illyrians (Olymp. 140, 2). This was the second Illyrian war. Demetrius fled to Philip, who was then in Peloponnesus.

A war had at that time broken out between the Aetolians and Achaeans. Peloponnesus was in the most unfortunate condition: Arcadia, Laconia, Argolis, and a great part of Achaia, were in a state of devastation: Elis alone had, for the most part, remained uninjured, and Messenia had scarcely suffered anything. In Arcadia, where the war had been carried on for four years with great exertions and exasperation, Megalopolis, Mantinea, and other cities, lay completely in ruins. The country enjoyed peace only for so short a period, that it could not recover. Aratus was still alive, but he was old and anxious to transmit his power as an inheritance to his son, quite an insignificant young man, whom he had already raised to the highest dignities. The success of Cleomenes had brought the Achaeans into contempt, while the Aetolians on the other hand, were at the height of their power. The latter had a very extensive though strangely composed state, consisting of Ambracia, one half of Acarnania, Locris, Doris, the Phthiotian Achaia, some places in Peloponnesus, and sundry islands, forming a motley and scattered assemblage of countries. In addition to this, they were in close alliance with other states, such as those of the Eleans and Messenians. They had taken no part in the war of Cleomenes, and their strength was unimpaired. The war against Demetrius was very opportune

³ "I am convinced that the Macedonians at that time pronounced their names in the modern Greek fashion, and that accordingly they pronounced in all probability *Dimitrius*."

for them; Philip was young, and, despising his age, they undertook a predatory inroad into Peloponnesus (Olymp. 139, 4). This expedition gave rise to the war of the Aetolian allies, the first in which the Macedonians, allied with the Achaeans and Messenians, fought against the Aetolians. In this war, the Aetolians were made to feel but too soon the evil consequences of their neutrality in the war of Cleomenes.

During their expedition into Peloponnesus all the wretchedness of the affairs of the Achaeans became manifest in the most glaring manner; for when they marched out to oppose the Aetolians, they were most miserably beaten. Great care must be taken not to judge of the Achaeans in the same manner under all circumstances: we cannot compare the Achaeans of the time of Aratus with those of the period of Philopoemen, when reviving energy urged them onward, even in their outward and wretched condition; but in judging of them we must distinguish three totally different periods. The first was a noble active period of general as well as individual agitation; it was followed by a period of general wretchedness, because the commotion had ceased without having produced durable institutions; and lastly there came a period when by prudent reforms, especially in military affairs, their power was raised; and when, by a wise adaptation to circumstances, the Achaean state acquired real importance, until, in the end, they went beyond their strength, so that after the war of Perseus their condition became really deplorable. The ordinary writers of history are never at a loss to pronounce an opinion upon nations and men, and are satisfied with judgments which are not always correct. Such has been the case with the Hansa, in the fourteenth and in the sixteenth centuries, when it was broken up: if to judge of it at both periods in the same manner, the opinion either applies only to one of them, or, if we modify it, it applies to neither. Such errors are committed more especially in regard to confederate states; and such general opinions upon a nation are the cause of the wretched and lifeless mode of treating ancient history.

That predatory expedition is a specimen of the system of robbery practised by the Aetolians, who considered robbery lawful, wherever they could not sell peace. Thus they took the town of Phigalea on the frontiers of Elis (Triphylia) and Messenia, and appointed Dorimachus strategus in it. They were the

only Greek people, that never employed any mercenaries in their wars, except on one occasion when they availed themselves of Cretans as slingers, who however served rather in the capacity of auxiliaries, because Aetolian troops were stationed at Cnossus to negotiate for their party⁴. Dorimachus now assembled at Phigalia pirates and robbers of every description, with whom he pillaged from that town as his head quarters, all the surrounding country, plundering travellers and strangers and then dividing the booty, in short conducting himself like a robber: indeed the strategi of that period regarded the worst robbers as their equals! The Messenians, who were allied with the Aetolians, vehemently complained of this. Dorimachus himself went to Messene to justify himself, or rather to act the part of a spy; for during the time he stayed there, the robberies increased, and the Messenians lost their patience. As he found that his life was in danger, he purchased his freedom by promises, and returned home brooding on revenge. The apocleti and the local communities had, according to law, the government of the Aetolian republic; but although the democracy was in form unlimited, it seems that the influence of the strategi was so great, that Dorimachus, without consulting either the small or great council of his country, invaded Peloponnesus with his party, landed in Elis, and thence proceeded into Arcadia. There he was met by the Achaeans with a fresh army of mercenaries under Aratus. Dorimachus with the Aetolians retreated, and when Aratus saw this, he childishly dismissed the greater part of his troops, followed the Aetolians with the rest, and near Caphyae, in the very heart

⁴ "From these wars, it is moreover evident, that the phalangites of the Macedonians were a militia as well as the Greeks, for, in order to save their pay, the king allowed them to go home during the winter, and also at the seasons of sowing and reaping, that they might cultivate their lands. This was necessary, as Macedonia was much exhausted at that time: it had scarcely more than half a million of inhabitants. The revenues of the Macedonian kings, however, must have been altogether small, as they were obliged to employ the militia, not being able to keep troops of the line. The latter included the guards (peltasts), who were well-trained soldiers, and better than the rude phalangites. Out of the phalanx two new systems were developed: the Romans and Samnites were more inclined to train the individual soldier, and this they carried to the highest perfection; but at the same time they employed masses, and were ready at any moment to fight both in masses and singly. But among the robust and barbarous nation of the Macedonians there arose the custom of fighting in masses only, which is much inferior to the fighting of troops of the line. Hence we cannot attach such immense importance to the Macedonian tactics."—1826.

of Arcadia, he imprudently allowed himself to be drawn into an engagement, in which the Achaeans were miserably defeated. The Aetolians now traversed the whole of Peloponnesus, plundering like robbers, and under the very eyes of the Macedonian garrison at Corinth, succeeded in returning home by the Isthmus. This happened at the end of Olymp. 139, 4, about one year and a half after the battle of Sellasia. The Achaeans now saw no other safety but in calling in the aid of Philip. After the battle of Caphyae, Aratus was accused by his opponents before the popular assembly, but was acquitted; and on his proposal the Achaeans decreed to continue the war against the Aetolians, and to make it the cause of all Peloponnesus, in conjunction with the Macedonians.

The Achaeans called upon the Messenians and Lacedaemonians to join them; and both obeyed the call. After the expulsion of Cleomenes Sparta was governed by factions, to one of which, though it was small, the reigns of government had been delivered up by Antigonus, and that party now, against the popular opinion, declared itself in favour of the war. The proportion of the forces furnished by the different states, throws light upon their political importance at the time. The Lacedaemonians had sunk so low, that their contingent was not larger than that of the Messenians, each consisting of 2500 men, while the Achaeans sent 5000 men into the field. Envoys were sent to the Boeotians, Phocians, Acarnanians, and to Philip, calling upon them to join the confederates. The Acarnanians being mortal enemies of the Aetolians, took a passionate part in the war; and the Epirots, though they were hesitating, also sent a contingent; the Phocians sent few men, and the Boeotians scarcely any. Delphi was in possession of the Aetolians, who were evidently masters of a considerable number of Phocian towns. In the other parts of Phocis, the fortresses were in the hands of the Macedonian garrisons. "For Philip the call came very opportunely, and he did not hesitate long to avail himself of it." The Aetolians when asked for an explanation, returned an answer which is not as strange as Polybius thinks. They declared that they regarded the Achaeans alone as their enemies, and that they did not mean to carry on war against the Messenians and Lacedaemonians, nay not even against the Arcadians, if they would renounce their alliance with the Achaeans.

Thus arose what is called the *συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος*, in which above all the unfortunate Boeotian allies had to suffer very severely, and in which Philip conquered Triphylia and Heraea in Arcadia for himself, so that now he was in possession not only of Corinth and Orchomenos, but also of places on the opposite side, and thus cut Peloponnesus right through. The Aetolians were highly unfortunate in this war, and they, too, displayed their wretchedness: they nowhere engaged in open battle, not venturing to defend their possessions anywhere, and Philip took from them the whole of Phthiotis. "The war was carried on with unequal forces and without any great occurrences, but Philip, nevertheless, conducted it in a manner which was creditable to himself."⁵

The Aetolians, in the meantime, continued their hostilities. They were in an understanding with the most influential party at Lacedaemon, and were allied with the Eleans; they had entered into a connection with the Illyrians, and with the assistance of an Illyrian arch-pirate, they undertook a landing in Peloponnesus (Olymp. 140, 1). One of the towns drawn by Aratus into the Achaean league was Cynaetha, a mountain canton whose inhabitants are described as the most uncivilised in all Arcadia. In that small territory there were no less than three hundred men, who had been exiled since it had joined the Achaeans. They had availed themselves of the good nature of Aratus for the purpose of obtaining

⁵ "The military art and the system of war had at that time completely fallen into decay, and nothing vigorous and extraordinary was ever heard of. Now, if, in times when wars are altogether carried on in a drowsy manner, and the very idea of vigorous exertion is lost, if, I say, in such times a general comes forward who casts off the drowsy method, and carries on a war in the manner in which it was carried on in better days, he is irresistible. This is sufficiently attested by history, if we look only at the wars of the eighteenth century. In the war of 1734 the great Eugene had sunk down to the level of a common commander, who no longer ventured upon any undertaking; Frederick the Great was victorious by carrying on the war with perseverance and in the manner in which it had been carried on in a vigorous age. The time of the war against the Turks in 1788 was a period of complete decay; great armies were assembled, but nothing was done with them. If the war of the revolution had been carried on with any ability, it would have been decided in three months. This is an observation which explains many historical mysteries, and it is by such observations that history becomes important. Wars had then lost everything that gives them life and spirit. People from their childhood had read the wars of Philip, Alexander, and Pyrrhus, and yet did not see how languid and drowsy they had become. In these circumstances, Philip came forward with a resolute determination."—1826.

permission to return home, nay, they had even acquired the right of being elected, like others, to offices and posts of honour. They made use of these circumstances for entering into an understanding with the Aetolians, to whom they opened the gates of the town. The Aetolians then spared the traitors no more than the others, for they caused a general massacre, and plundered and laid waste the place.

In the meantime, Philip had set out from Macedonia and arrived at Tegea, where he met a Lacedaemonian embassy. For three out of the five ephors at Lacedaemon were in favour of joining the Aetolians, whereas the two others insisted on keeping up the alliance with Macedonia; the latter had been publicly murdered by the Spartan youths, and as the Aetolians were not near enough to save Sparta, an embassy was sent to Philip to justify the Lacedaemonians. Philip accepted their apology, as if the murder were only the consequence of internal discord, and as if the affair had no reference whatever to Macedonia. The Macedonians were now again admitted into an alliance which, besides them and the nations dependent upon them, embraced the whole of Peloponnesus, with the exception of the Eleans. The Macedonian manifesto proclaimed to all liberation from the sympolity of the Aetolians, which had been forced upon them, and the restoration of their ancient laws. But we find no trace of any allies being thereby withdrawn from the Aetolians. It was now the 140th Olympiad, and the autumn had commenced.

After one negotiation had failed, the Aetolians, endeavouring to gain allies in Peloponnesus, sent an ambassador to Sparta. His offers were not accepted. But soon the partisans of the Aetolians created a fresh revolution: they murdered the five ephors, and concluded an alliance with the Aetolians. As Cleomenes had died in the meantime, Agesipolis, who was still a child, was elected king, and a guardian appointed for him. The place of the second king was not filled by a Heracleid, although there were nephews of Agis, and Hippomedon was still alive; but the ephors sold the kingly dignity to any one who wished to have it for the sum of one talent, and it was bought by one Lysurgus, the first tyrant of Sparta. After this election, the Lacedaemonians openly declared in favour of the Aetolians; but the Eleans, who were then powerful, and again in possession of Triphylia, as well as of several Arcadian

towns, such as Halipherræ, Psophis, etc., renewed their alliance with the Aetolians.

Philip had, in the meantime, left Peloponnesus, and now, about the beginning of summer, broke up against Aetolia; he marched through western Macedonia and Epirus, where he gained over the Epirots. While he was still engaged in making his preparations, the Aetolians undertook a bold predatory incursion into Macedonia. From the strong mountain districts of western Thessaly, which they had in their possession, they could invade Macedonia and penetrate as far as Pieria, the most beautiful and excellent country in the world. Thus they appeared before Dium, which was situated there with its temple of the Muses and of Zeus, and where the Olympian games of Macedonia were celebrated. All those towns were open places, but had an acropolis. They took Dium, and acted there like savage robbers, plundering the town with its temples, which they burned with all the porticoes with which they were surrounded.⁶

Philip appeared in Epirus (Olymp. 140, 2). The Epirots cordially hated the Aetolians, because Ambracia was Aetolian, because the eastern part of Epirus was in sympolity with the Aetolians, and because Amphilochia was altogether Aetolian.

⁶ "The moral change which had taken place among the Greeks since the beginning of the Macedonian dominion is very remarkable. Horrors are perpetrated at all times, and the laws cannot always prevent them; but it makes a great difference whether a maxim is recognised, or whether it is unknown. In the time of the Peloponnesian war, the Boeotians took Plataeae, and sold its inhabitants as slaves, and the Athenians did similar things; but such acts were always regarded by the Greeks as crimes. Against barbarians such conduct had nothing revolting; but it was sinful thus to act against Greeks; and Dium was not a barbarous but a Greek town. In the ancient Amphictyonic laws a curse was pronounced upon those who destroyed a Greek place, or committed any act of inhumanity; war was to be carried on without violating the laws of humanity. That was a grand maxim, but at the time we are now speaking of that maxim had quite disappeared, and such acts of inhumanity occur in every war, and this was altogether the result of the intercourse with the Macedonians. In the same ratio in which the nation became demoralised, the intellect also sank. There was no poetry and no eloquence except in the only free city of Greece, that is, in Rhodes, where oratory was flourishing. The details of this war are particularly interesting, because we see how much the people had become demoralised. Bold things are indeed still undertaken, but valour and persevering manliness are gone, and of conscientiousness and generosity not a trace is to be found. In general, the difference between barbarians and Greeks had almost entirely disappeared. Alexandrians, Antiochians, and similar other people, were allowed to take part in the Olympian games."—1825.

They were above all things bent upon recovering Ambracia, and also urged upon Philip to conquer for them Ambracus, a fortified place, situated not far from Ambracia, in the marshes near the gulf of the same name, where the rivers had formed downs⁷. Philip laid siege to the place with great difficulty, and took it; but Ambracia maintained itself. He then crossed the Ambracian gulf, traversed the east of Acarnania, which was then allied with the Aetolians, and remained faithful to them; no town joined him. On the right bank of the Achelous, he advanced as far as Oeniadae (Missolonghi), which he took and fortified.

In the mean time the Achaeans had been hard pressed by the Aetolians in their own country: weak and disunited as they were, their affairs were very badly conducted. They accordingly implored Philip to come to their assistance. But as the Dardaniens were threatening to invade Macedonia, he returned in the autumn through Epirus to Macedonia, and took his autumn and winter quarters in Thessaly. Dorimachus, on the other hand, made another bold inroad into Epirus, during which he destroyed the temple of Dodona by fire. This roused the courage of the Aetolians so much, that they sent an army into Peloponnesus. Immediately after this, Philip, in the midst of a severe winter, suddenly broke up with his peltasts and guards from Larissa, went to Euboea, and appeared at Corinth so unexpectedly, that the Eleans and Aetolians who were plundering in Arcadia, were taken by surprise and defeated. He then executed a bold undertaking against Elis; he conquered all the towns which the Eleans possessed in Arcadia, such as Psophis, and handed them over to the Achaeans. After this, he marched into Elis, the most flourishing country in Peloponnesus, and where most booty was to be made; he did not indeed undertake anything against the town of Elis, but conquered all Triphylia and Phigalea, so that the Aetolians lost their sympolite places in Peloponnesus, and the Eleans were confined to Elis proper. After this was

⁷ "Schweighäuser places this Ambracus on the same spot as Ambracia, but its situation is clear from Meletius, and from Pouqueville's Travels. The latter did not see the locality himself; but he describes it in such a manner that no one can mistake it; for in the marshes on the Ambracian gulf there exists a place, which has evidently sunk; and that place is Ambracus, and not, as Pouqueville thinks, the Amphiloehian Argos. Ambracia, on the other hand, is the modern Arta."—1825.

accomplished, Philip went to Corinth, where he waited until the beginning of spring.

The results of this undertaking were brilliant in a military point of view; but the Achaeans had gained nothing except the fortified town of Psophis on the frontier, Philip retaining Triphylia and, as it would appear, Phigalea, for himself. The Achaeans altogether felt very uncomfortable in their alliance with Macedonia even as early as that time, for they were obliged to pay to Philip every month seventeen talents as subsidies, a sum which they were hardly able to raise; but it was only on this condition that Philip continued the war. In addition to this, the Achaeans were extremely ill used by the Macedonians, and were treated by them with barbarian insolence: all this was the consequence of their having refused to recognise the hegemonia of Sparta.

When Philip had thus, in the autumn of Olymp. 140, 2, taken Psophis and Triphylia from the Eleans, he returned to his winter quarters, with the intention of preparing for next spring (the end of Olymp. 140, 2) an expedition against Cephallenia. He would actually have conquered one of the four Cephallenian towns, if it had not been for a certain Macedonian, who by intrigues endeavoured to involve Philip on all occasions in difficulties, and prevented the conquest. After this unsuccessful expedition, Philip landed just at the season of the Etesiae, that is, in the beginning of Olymp. 140, 3, on the coast of the Ambracian gulf, assembled the contingents of the Epirots and Acarnanians, and availed himself of the favorable circumstances of the moment for attempting a bold enterprise against Aetolia, the Aetolians being at the time with half their forces in Thessaly. This expedition was undertaken in a different direction from that on a former occasion; Philip crossed the Achelous, and the Aetolians, notwithstanding their great forces, continued to retreat before him: "he was the first general that penetrated into Aetolia since Olymp. 104." He advanced into the very heart of the country, to the lake, near which was situated Therinum the capital, which he destroyed. Therinum, situated on an inaccessible hill, was not an important town, as all writers are inclined to believe, but an open unfortified place^s, the defence of which

^s "Therinum was probably nothing but a watering-place, where a fair and a general Aetolian panegyris were held, where the strategi were elected, etc.

depended upon maintaining the defiles, as was the case with nearly all the Aetolian and Epirot towns. As the approaches were scarcely defended at all, Philip, without difficulty, took the place, which was abandoned by its inhabitants, destroyed the double temple, the portico and the statues contained in it: at this place, in the country of the Aetolians, who of all the Greeks probably attached least importance to the luxuries of art, there were no less than 2000 statues!

After Philip had caused these devastations, and punished the Aetolians for their ravages in Macedonia, he returned across the Achelous; and having executed the march with great rapidity and energy, he inflicted a similar blow upon the Lacedaemonians a few days after. He stayed for two days at Lechaem, and on the sixth day afterwards he stood with his army on the Laconian frontier. It was impossible to prevent his crossing it; he went down Taygetus as far as Tacnarum, traversed the plain on the sea coast, and marched up on the other side of the Eurotas by Amyclae, as far as Sparta. Lyncurgus endeavoured to cut off his retreat, and to make him pay dearly for his advantages: he established himself on an eminence on the other side of the Eurotas, opposite to Sparta; the current of the river was stopped, so that the lower parts of the country were inundated, and the enemy could be drawn into the defiles. But Philip drove Lyncurgus from his eminence, and the latter, being completely defeated, took to flight, so that Philip proceeded to Achaia and Corinth with immense booty. Thence he returned to Macedonia, and made his preparations for the third campaign. He might now have crushed the Aetolians, had not the victories of Hannibal in Italy attracted his attention, and turned it away from the Aetolians.

Demetrius of Pharos had, in the meantime, come to Philip as a fugitive, endeavouring to direct his attention to the great events which were taking place in the west. Hannibal had already crossed the Alps, and taken up his winter quarters in Lombardy; he was just marching through the marshes of Tuscany, when Philip broke up again (at the end of Olymp.

But a few wealthy people also dwelt there, and there were some splendid buildings, among which there was, in particular, a large national arsenal, which, when Philip took the place, contained 15,000 suits of armour (Polyb. v. 8, 9)."
—1825.

140, 3). About that time general attention was directed towards the west; people had generally become conscious that the affairs of Greece, when compared with those of the west, were mere child's play, and that the fate of the world was being decided in Italy. It was necessary to take part in the struggle that was going on there; and Macedonia was obliged to seek either the friendship of the Romans or that of Hannibal. The latter was, indeed, looked upon as an adventurer, who could not possibly succeed; but the wishes of all were favourable to Carthage; for although Carthage was great as a maritime power, yet in Greece and Asia its conquests were not dreaded, whereas every one feared the Romans, who had already gained a firm footing on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Philip's whole attention was accordingly directed towards Italy, and he wanted to declare against the Romans, in order to secure to himself a share in the booty of the Roman republic, and to deprive the Romans of their possessions on the east of the Adriatic and gain Illyricum for himself. He was thus inclined to make peace with the Aetolians. Negotiations with them had, in fact, already been commenced especially through the mediation of the Rhodians. The latter, who on this occasion were anxious to save Greece in any way, henceforth act a very worthy part in Greek history. The Achaeans, also, were anxious to make peace. The campaign of this year, therefore, was soon at an end, and among its events we have to notice only the expedition against Phthiotis, which belonged to the Aetolian sympolity. Philip succeeded in taking the Phthiotian Thebes, which surrendered before an assault was made against it; but Philip, nevertheless, sold its inhabitants as slaves, and supplied their place by establishing Macedonians in it as new inhabitants.

In the meantime, the battle of lake Trasimenus had been fought, and this determined Philip to conclude peace (Olymp. 140, $\frac{3}{4}$), which was accordingly done, on condition that he should retain his conquests, all the Aetolian country north of Thermopylae, the Phthiotian Thebes, and, in Peloponnesus, Heraea, Phigalea, and Triphylia, while the Achaeans retained Psophis.

Thus ended the war, either at the end of Olymp. 140, 3, or at the beginning of 140, 4. Ever since Olymp. 138, 2, Peloponnesus had constantly been the scene of the war, which was

no less destructive than the thirty years' war. Peloponnesus was fearfully devastated, and its splendid buildings, in particular, were destroyed; but the country soon rose again, so that unquestionably the population was restored in a few years. But the productive period of everything beautiful had long since passed away for Greece; whenever a town was destroyed, very few of its works of art were restored, and whatever was produced was wretched.

LECTURE CVIII.

ALL Peloponnesus had become the "open house" of the Macedonians, as the ancient German expression is. They could traverse the country in all directions; for the Achaeans had lost all respect, and their strategus Aratus himself felt this. He died in great distress (Olymp. 141, $\frac{3}{4}$), believing that he was poisoned by Philip, with whom his influence had ceased. Demetrius of Pharos had the young king completely under his control, and gave him the most detestable advice. I believe that the story about Aratus having been poisoned is a mere fancy; according to Plutarch he had been spitting blood, and I do not believe that there is any poison producing that symptom.¹ It seems more probable that the younger Aratus may have fallen a victim to the violence of Philip. Philip had even before stained young Aratus' honour by seducing his wife Polycratia; and he is said to have poisoned her husband, in order to obtain complete possession of her and take her to Macedonia. Old Aratus had lived to see this disgrace also. He is reported to have said: "This, then, is the reward I have for my friendship for Philip;" but we must say, that he and all his house paid the just penalty for his unworthy mode of acting. Descendants of Aratus were living as late as the time

¹ "Polybius certainly relates, without expressing a doubt, that Philip caused Taurion to administer a slow poison to Aratus, which caused pulmonary consumption, as, in fact, Philip is said to have poisoned Enryclides and Micion, and to have made an attempt on the life of Philopoemen. At some periods poisoning is very general, while at others we must deny such allegations almost altogether (Ganganelli)." — 1825.

of Plutarch; the Sicyonians regarded him as a hero, and instituted games in honour of him.

The death of Aratus and his son occurred not long after the social war. During this period, and down to the end of the Hannibalian war, it is impossible accurately to know the detail of Philip's history, nor can we fix its chronology. He was extremely fortunate: he was master in all parts of Greece, if we except Aetolia, and his influence extended further than that of any other king of the dynasty of Antigonus. Once only before him an expedition into Asia had been undertaken by Antigonus Doson, but it produced no lasting results.

It must have been soon after the peace with the Aetolians, that Crete submitted to Philip. He was the first prince who acquired authority over that island, which until then had always maintained its independence. Even at the period of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians it had not been dependant on either of the two states, and, until the time of Philip, the Cretans had preserved great outward tranquillity; but this tranquillity disappeared as soon as the mercenaries of Phalaecus landed there, and as soon as, in the time of Alexander, Agesilaus, the brother of king Agis, appeared there with Persian money.² From that time the history of Crete is involved in great obscurity; but many inscriptions composed in a barbarous dialect belong to that period. In the earlier times, the island consisted of a number of independent towns with their *periœci*; but at that time three centres of states had been formed, Cnossus, Gortyn, and Lyctus. Cydonia seems to have no longer existed. The first two had a hegemonia, and were hostile to each other, Cnossus siding with the Aetolians, and Gortyn being against them. In their internal affairs also the towns were full of discord and enmity, just as was the case with the towns in Greece, which was the natural consequence of the fact, that the ancient oligarchy continued to exist without any modification, while numerically it became more and more reduced. Even at the time of the social war, the Lyctians and their followers, when the Cnossians had taken Lyctus by surprise and utterly destroyed it, had applied to Philip and the Achaeans for assistance, while the Cnossians

² On a single leaf we read, "The expedition of Harpalus to Crete with 7,000 men must be the *πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβεβηκὼς εἰς τὴν νῆσον*, which is mentioned by Aristotle." But comp. vol. ii. p. 392, foll.—ED.

obtained support from the Aetolians. Subsequently Philip himself went to Crete as mediator of peace, but what induced the Cretans to invite him in that capacity, is unknown. However he did go to Crete, and for a time he was regarded as a mediator,—like a *médiateur de la confédération Helvétique*, whose command is all-powerful. Polybius³ says, that all Crete recognised him as mediator and *προστάτης*. But this was of no duration, and it would almost seem that the matter was at an end even before the war with the Romans. Crete afforded Philip advantages by being a place where he could enlist mercenaries.

Soon after this, Olymp. 141, 1, Philip began to interfere in the affairs of Messene, which having probably been governed in an oligarchical manner ever since the beginning of the social war, now reformed its constitution after the model of that of Sparta, under ephors, who managed the affairs of the state badly. Philip was now in Peloponnesus, and both the popular and the oligarchical parties applied to him. Whether he went to Messene before any blood was shed, is uncertain; but thus much we know, that he most faithlessly incited the two parties against each other, and that probably on the advice of Demetrius of Pharos. The consequence of this was a fearful massacre, on account of which Philip, in Olymp. 141, 1, was admitted into the town as mediator, and took possession of Ithome by a garrison. Demetrius of Pharos wanted to persuade him to deceive the Messenians, and keep possession of Ithome, whereas old Aratus advised him to abandon such a scheme. Philip adopted the counsel of the latter, but afterwards repented of it. In the following year, however, after the unfortunate expedition to Apollonia, of which I shall say more hereafter, and when Philip was in want of money, he determined to send out Demetrius of Pharos to take Messene by force in order to be able to plunder the town.⁴ Demetrius, with a Macedonian fleet, sailed into a harbour some distance from Messene, landed his troops, and after a few hasty marches arrived in the night before Messene. The acropolis of Messene even now is one of the strongest places in Greece,

³ vii. 12.

⁴ "This occurrence is related by Pausanias, iv. 29, as planned and executed by Demetrius, the son and heir of Philip, who was afterwards put to death by his father. But that Demetrius of Pharos is meant, is clear from Polybius iii. 19, who relates that Demetrius of Pharos lost his life in that attempt."—1825.

and was then connected with the city by a double wall (σκέλη). After having surmounted this on one side, he established himself between the acropolis and the town. Resistance was offered by the former place, and when it was observed in the town that Macedonians were there, the people were at first cast down; but they defended themselves bravely, and succeeded in forcing their way out of the fortifications.

The death of Aratus occurred during the period after this attempt against Messene; but whether it belongs to Olymp. 141, 3 or 4, cannot be determined. What other events belong to these two years, is unknown.

During this period, Philip carried on many successful wars against the neighbouring nations, the Illyrians and Dardanians. But Macedonia remained free from hostile inroads; and in this condition it remained for several years.

Soon after receiving intelligence of the battle of Trasimenus, Philip entered into negotiations with Hannibal. He had from early youth entertained a bitter hatred against the Romans, and was particularly anxious to deprive them of their possessions in Illyricum, which desire was stimulated by Demetrius of Pharos. He had, indeed, the wish, but lacked the courage to undertake anything of importance. Even before concluding a positive alliance with Hannibal, he had made preparations for an expedition against the Roman possessions on the Illyrian coast, Epidamnus, Apollonia, and Oricus; but even a false report of the presence of a Roman fleet was sufficient to induce his ships to take to flight (Olymp. 140, 4). According to Plutarch, Aratus had strongly advised him not to embark in the undertaking. After the battle of Cannae, Philip concluded a formal alliance with Hannibal, the object of which was the destruction of the Roman state; in it he recognised the dominion of Carthage over Italy, demanding for himself only the Roman possessions in Illyricum on the east of the Adriatic. This alliance unquestionably was quite correct and suited to the circumstances of Macedonia, and might even be justified. For the Romans had not indeed directly attacked him; but they wished to advance further into Greece, to make themselves masters of the western coast, and to establish themselves there. We cannot, therefore, blame him for concluding the alliance; but it is disgraceful that having concluded it, he did nothing of importance to

carry it into effect. His ambassadors with their documents fell into the hands of the Romans, and the latter in a very dignified manner declared war against him, though they were hard pressed by Hannibal. Notwithstanding the reverses they had sustained, they wisely carried on the war on the offensive with great boldness and great exertions, and thus prevented Philip from coming to the assistance of Hannibal.

The hostilities commenced with a second expedition of Philip against the Roman possessions on the Illyrian coast. In Olymp. 141, 2 (A.U.C. 538), he had collected 120 brigantines, with which he sailed to the mouth of the Aous; a land army marched from Macedonia towards Apollonia, but an attempt to take the town by storm failed, and Philip was obliged to blockade it. Oricus was easily taken. Although the Romans were hard pressed in their own country, they kept a fleet off the coast of Brundisium to prevent Philip uniting with Hannibal; and Apollonia requested the assistance of the praetor M. Valerius Laevinus. The latter embarked with all the troops he could collect, went to the assistance of the allies, recovered Oricus without difficulty, and sailed into the mouth of the Aous. Having entered Apollonia he made a sally, in which he caused considerable loss to the forces of Philip, by obliging him to burn his ships which were shut in on the Aous. Philip, greatly humbled and despised, led his troops back to Macedonia by land.

The Romans now found in Greece several nations which were inclined to join them against Philip, and above all the Aetolians, who were longing for revenge, and unable any longer to bear the tranquillity of peace. Ever since the peace of Olymp. 140, 3 or 4, they had been for full six years without war with the Macedonians; and that long period was oppressive to them, they felt the want of war in order to be able to plunder. Their leaders lived in great luxury, like the captains in the thirty years' war, and they urged their countrymen on to war, because they were ignorant of the arts of peace; for the only means to make a nation happy in time of peace is a great and active cultivation of the mind. Under these circumstances the Aetolians applied to the Romans, who being now more successful in their own country and able to send succour, concluded an alliance with them through M. Valerius Laevinus, which, however, in reality was an alliance of robbers (Olymp.

141, 4, or 142, 1). The Romans ceded to the Aetolians all places in Greece south of Corcyra, which might be conquered by them, but in such a manner that the inhabitants and all their moveable property should be the booty of the Romans, whereas the towns and the soil were to belong to the Aetolians. The Romans, moreover, promised the Aetolians to subdue Acarnania for them: the Eleans, Laconians, Attalus, and many towns, were to be allowed to join the confederacy, and, after submitting to the Aetolians, to become allies of the Romans.⁵

This alliance was joined by Elis and Lacedaemon, under its nominal king Pelops, and by Attalus, the dynast of Pergamus. The war lasted eight years and was a misfortune to poor Greece, while Philip's empire was scarcely touched by it: many of the places dependent upon Philip were destroyed, and their inhabitants led into slavery (*ἐξανδραποδίζεσθαι*)—a calamity inflicted upon Dyme in Achaia, Aegina, and Oreus, during the latter years of the war. This mode of acting, which did Philip no injury, excited among all the Greeks who were not allied with the Aetolians, a deep exasperation against the Romans. In like manner, the sufferings of unhappy Spain during the war of the English against it, when, under Charles IV., it was still quite in the power of Napoleon, excited a vehement indignation in all Europe against England, because the nation, against its own will, was compelled by a miserable government to persevere in its oppressive system. This feeling among the Greeks was very injurious to the Romans at the beginning of the second war against the Macedonian king. Philip carried on the war as an able man, and was present wherever there was danger. He was in difficulties inasmuch as he had no fleet; the Romans, on the other hand, possessed a small one themselves, and were also supported by that of Attalus. The Aetolians, aided by Laevinus, immediately attacked Oeniadae and Naxos and conquered them. The Acarnanians, however, would in no way submit to the Aetolians, but sending their women and children into Epirus, the men armed themselves, determined to defend the town to the very last; any one who should take

⁵ "Livy xxvi. 24, relates this under the year 542, but his words leave no doubt, that this treaty must be assigned at least to the year before, and perhaps even to Olymp. 141, 4."—1825.

to flight, was declared infamous. The Aetolians therefore did not attack them, and Philip came to their assistance. In the spring of Olymp. 142, 2, the Aetolians conquered Anticyra in *l'hocis* with the aid of the Romans, the latter carrying away the booty, and the inhabitants as slaves, while the Aetolians retained the town. As in the mean time the war in Spain had taken an unfavorable turn, the Roman senate recalled the legion, and P. Sulpicius remained behind with the fleet only to support the Aetolians.

Among the fragments of the ninth book of Polybius, referring to the period shortly after the taking of Anticyra, we have interesting speeches of an Aetolian named Chlaeneas, and of an Acarnanian, which were delivered in the popular assembly of Sparta, and in one of which it is stated, that at the time there was no tyrant at Sparta. Soon afterwards, however, though still in the same Olympiad, we find Machanidas as tyrant of Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians no longer in alliance with the Romans, without our knowing how these things had come to pass, and whether Machanidas had put the ephors to death or not, etc.; certain however it is, that scenes of blood must have taken place, for from this time forward all traces of Spartan ephors disappear. Machanidas, a resolute and regular soldier, is always called a tyrant, and we are inclined to compare him with Nabis, who was a second Apollodorus; but there is no foundation for such an opinion, and he used no more violence than he was obliged to do. Under him the Lacedaemonians re-appear in history. Machanidas was a dangerous enemy of the Achaeans; he carried on the war with great energy, levied taxes, and had an excellent phalanx of Lacedaemonians and well paid mercenaries. But Philopoemen, who was strategus of the Achaeans, gained a great victory over him in a bloody contest near Mantinea,⁶ in

⁶ "The details of this battle are known from Polybius and Pausanias. Machanidas had invaded Arcadia with a strong Laconian phalanx, and a large number of mercenaries; but Philopoemen had taken up an excellent position behind a trench. Machanidas, with his mercenaries, quickly routed the Achaeans, pursued them incautiously a great distance, and thereby offered to Philopoemen an opportunity, by a diversion to the left, to establish himself between the detachment which had advanced too far in the pursuit, and the remaining part of the Lacedaemonians. The latter, trusting in the victory of Machanidas, passed through the ravine, but Philopoemen drove them back beyond the trench, and then advanced against Machanidas himself, whom he completely defeated, and slew with his own hand."—1825.

which Machanidas was killed. This happened probably in Olymp. 142, 4. The occasion of this war is unknown, nor are we informed about the consequences of the battle, any more than about the manner in which Nabis obtained the tyrannis, for a few years later we find him as tyrant of Lacedaemon.

At the end of the year in which Anticyra was taken, or in the beginning of the following, Philip conquered Echinus in Phthiotis, which was defended by a Roman fleet and by the Aetolians. Negotiations of peace, which were undertaken by the Rhodians and Ptolemy, appear to have led to no results.⁷ Sulpicius, with his fleet, remained in the Greek seas, while Philip had no maritime power; Attalus of Pergamus joined Sulpicius with his fleet, and the allies transferred the war into the Aegean sea. Through the treachery of an Illyrian, the Romans took Oreus at the north-eastern point of Euboea; an attempt upon Chalcis failed, but Opus was taken, though Philip soon drove the Romans from it. But the hostilities were carried on everywhere like a complete internecine war, as if the belligerents had been animated by the most intense hatred. Attalus was then obliged to return to Asia, and Sulpicius proceeded to Aegina. Philip repaid them for this expedition by a ravaging incursion into the country of the Aetolians (Olymp. 143, 1); this was the second time that he penetrated into the heart of their country, and the second time that he destroyed their capital of Thermum.⁸ "Whatever had been spared during his first inroad eight or ten years before, was now demolished."

The Aetolians suffered altogether very severely in this war, and as the Romans did not assist them at all in their distress, the alliance not being based on mutual good will, their connection could not remain unshaken for any length of time: the Aetolians therefore renounced the alliance with Rome, and concluded an unfortunate peace for themselves⁹ (Olymp. 143, 2). The

⁷ "What Livy relates under the year 544, belongs to 543, for he there speaks of the celebration of the Nemean games, at which Philip was present."

⁸ "Finding that the state of things was after all dangerous, he restored about this time Heraea and Triphylia to the Achaeans."—1825.

⁹ "The war of the Aetolians lasted about six years, for their peace was probably concluded in Olymp. 143, 2. The expedition of Philip, during which he destroyed Thermum a second time, belongs to the end of Olymp. 143, 1."—1825.

Romans now also got into difficulties, and soon regretted their conduct towards the Aetolians the more, because at this time a portion of the Illyrian tribes revolted. They had a difficult position in Illyricum against Macedonia, and were accordingly induced to conclude a peace through the consul Sempronius. (Olymp. 143, 3, A.U.C. 547), who had been sent out to carry on the war against the Illyrians. In consequence of this peace, they had to withdraw their army from the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and to cede a part of their Illyrian possessions, the country of the Atentanians, to Philip. Livy has smoothed down this peace very much; but by it Macedonia gained brilliant advantages. The Romans, however, inwardly resolved to wipe off this disgrace, and only waited for an opportunity.

The Romans concluded this peace in their own name and in that of their allies, the list of whom throws light upon events which are otherwise unknown. Besides Attalus are mentioned the Ilienses, as the ancestors of the Romans; then the Eleans and Messenians, who had joined the Romans through the influence of the Aetolians; also Nabis, the tyrant of Lacedaemon, and lastly the Athenians, whose name is mentioned after all the other Greeks, and who at that time were more powerless than the Eleans and Messenians, upon whom, in the time of Pericles, they had proudly looked down.¹⁰

Greece was now in the enjoyment of a general peace, and remained so until Olymp. 144, 3. "Philip's dominion had become only more firmly established by this war, and his influence was greatly increased in all countries east of the Adriatic." But the Romans soon found an opportunity of taking revenge.

After the peace, Philip was the undisputed master of Greece, and he now turned his attention to the East. Even about

¹⁰ "Cephisodorus, a man of small celebrity, had perhaps succeeded Euricles and Micion as demagogue at Athens (Paus. i. 36, § 5). What is related by Pausanias i. 29, § 14, may possibly refer to the second Punic war. The assistance with five triremes, quite in accordance with the power of Athens at that time, appears to me to be historical; for there existed in Attica the tombs of some Athenians who had fallen at the time when the Athenians allied with the Romans had fought against Carthage. The Athenians greatly dreaded Philip, and being anxious to secure the protection of the Romans, they sent them galleys. This cannot have occurred in the first Punic war, as no alliance existed at that time; it must have happened at the time of the Hannibalian war."—1825.

the end of the Hannibalian war, a treaty was concluded between him and Antiochus the Great against young Ptolemy Epiphanes, who was still a minor. Being anxious to avail themselves of his minority for the purpose of dividing his empire between themselves, they concluded a formal treaty, by which all the possessions of Egypt out of Egypt itself, were to be divided between them. Antiochus was to have Coelesyria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, and Philip was to receive the Egyptian towns on the coast of Thrace and Caria, Samos, Ephesus, and other towns. This treaty roused the Rhodians and Attalus.

Attalus had a small state, which had been formed under his dynasty at the time of the breaking up of the empire of Lysimachus; its first nucleus was a fortified castle, in which the treasures of Lysimachus were kept. "We cannot, in a strict sense, regard Pergamus as one of the Macedonian kingdoms, for it was not established by native Macedonians, nor with the assistance of Macedonian troops. Lysimachus, who, at a division, had obtained possession of the Macedonian treasures, kept them in an impregnable fortress in Aeolis, called Pergamus, under the care of Philetaerus, a faithful eunuch. This man was not a common greedy slave; he served at the court, and his mutilation was accidental; his brothers served in the army of Lysimachus. So long as Lysimachus maintained his power, they remained faithful; but when he fell in the war against Seleucus, Philetaerus did not surrender the castle, but kept it for himself. This at first had the appearance of fidelity, as the grandsons of Lysimachus, the sons of Agathocles, had fled to Alexandria, and Philetaerus seemed to keep possession of the castle and the treasures for them; but the complete devastation of Thrace by the Gauls, destroyed every thought of restoring the empire," and they made themselves masters of the castle with its treasures. "Against the king of Syria, Pergamus perhaps maintained itself by the aid of Egypt; Antiochus I., moreover, was too much involved in wars with the Gauls, and afterwards with Egypt. The history of these times is very obscure, but this much is certain, that a government of dynasts was established, forming a small principality of not very many square miles, and not differing from other principalities in Asia Minor. For a period of fifty years the country remained quiet, and the princes employed the time of

the feuds between Syria and Egypt in extending their dominion; but it was more especially during the war between Antiochus Hierax and Seleucus, that Attalus made great additions to his territory. Attalus was not only an able, but at the same time a humane prince, who won the hearts of many. He had no warlike subjects, but carried on the war with mercenaries, who, like those of most other princes, were Gauls. Through their victory over Seleucus, they had acquired such a reputation, that no one ventured to offer them any resistance; they had already put to death the prince of Bithynia, and were now threatening Attalus also; but he determined to defend himself to the last, made every effort, and with a proportionately small force, defeated the invincible Gauls. The treasures, which were husbanded by the princes in a very economical way, afforded them a great assistance; whatever was spent upon mercenaries, seems to have been made up immediately, and hence they were so immensely wealthy. They acted like the government of Holland, which maintained itself against the Spaniards by means of mercenaries from all parts of Germany. The unexpected victory over the Gauls raised the authority of Attalus in Asia, the strength of the Gauls was broken," and he now assumed the diadem and the title of king. His kingdom at that time embraced on the whole ancient Mysia, a part of Aeolis and of Lydia, and the northern cities of Ionia. The existence of Pergamus depended upon there being a balance of power in those countries: it was necessary that the power of the Egyptians should form a counterpoise to that of the Syrians, and it was also necessary that Macedonia should have some influence, and that none of them should be master of the whole coast. The danger of Egypt being crushed by Syria and Macedonia, therefore, led Attalus to join Egypt. He had already been involved in the war of the Romans against Philip.

The Rhodians had possessions on the coast of Caria, which they were in danger of losing, if one of the powers should predominate, and their whole existence, likewise, depended on the balance of powers. Here, then, we already meet with ideas of modern policy. Egypt was now to be excluded from its dominions in those countries, and the Syrians and Macedonians were bent upon dividing its territories between them-

selves. The Rhodians and Attalus therefore united, and were joined by Chios, and probably, also, by Mitylene, both of which were then at their highest prosperity, for the purpose of protecting the Egyptian possessions; but the decay of the Egyptian empire was so great, that this protection depended solely upon Attalus and his allies. For this reason, Philip had even before tried to ruin the Rhodians; he had stirred up the Cretans against them, because they had been kept in check by the Rhodians with great difficulty as, in fact, they had always waged war against piracy; and Philip had by fraud set the naval arsenal of the Rhodians on fire.¹¹ The Rhodians, however, had restored their ships: they had, indeed, only few, but they were very large and strongly built, and were almost all quinqueremes. Nor had they any ground for keeping up a large fleet, as that of the Egyptians had lost all its importance, and the Macedonians fitted out their ships generally only for one war, while Attalus was only beginning to keep a fleet, and Chios and Byzantium, also, had but few ships.

But the allies were too weak to afford real protection to the Egyptian possessions. The more distant provinces on the Thracian coast were lost without any resistance being offered, and we cease to wonder at it, when we learn who were the governors and commanders there: "they were slaves and eunuchs—the lowest dregs of an Oriental despotism, and we here see the same causes as those which brought about the downfall of the Byzantine empire." Antiochus attacked the Syrian possessions, while the Rhodians and Attalus had to oppose Philip, who was carrying on the war with all his energy. He first directed his arms against the coasts of the Propontis, where he took by treachery the town

" "He had done this through a Tarentine of the name of Heraclides, a traitor in various ways. This miscreant pretended that Philip, whose service he had entered, had treated him cruelly (in Polyæn. v. 17, 2, we must read *σημεῖα αἰκίας προφέρων* instead of *σημεῖα ἀδικίας ἔχων*); in this manner he went to Rhodes, there produced forged letters, which, he said, had been given him by Philip, and which revealed his treacherous schemes. By this means, he at last gained such confidence, that he was received and allowed to live at Rhodes unguarded. During a high wind he set fire to the arsenal. Every ship there had its name, and was under cover in a separate compartment, containing everything necessary to equip it. Seventeen of these *νεώσοικοι* were consumed by the flames; and during the conflagration Heraclides fled to Philip, who was not ashamed of making a boast of the disgraceful act."—1825.

of Ceos, which was a member of the Aetolian sympolity. It was at war with Prusias, his brother-in-law; he plundered the place and sold its inhabitants, but gave up the buildings to Prusias, who afterwards built Prusa on the site. The places on the Thracian coast, which were under the supremacy of Egypt, or, like Lysimachia, belonged to the Aetolian sympolity, did not fare better; and Lysimachia soon became a wilderness. The country about Pergamus, which he was unable to take, was laid waste, and he then besieged Chios with his fleet. The result was, in Olymp. 144, 1 or 2, the bloody naval battle of Chios, in which each party gained a partial victory. The battle is remarkable on account of the greatness of the ships: hexeres, hepteres, and octeres already fighting against one another; and we also see how strongly the ships were manned in comparison with former times, and how even the mode of fighting had assumed quite a different character.¹² An immense expenditure of money and men was now required for a comparatively moderate success. The Rhodians and Attalus, with the ships of the Greek cities subject to or allied with them, such as Smyrna, Phocaea, and others, were in point of numbers much superior; for while they had about seventy ships of the line, Philip had only some fifty, though he had besides a large number of light brigantines or lembi. The Rhodians gained the victory in the battle, although the number of small ships, which Philip had inserted among the others, gave them much trouble, and they displayed acts of the most splendid heroism; their commander, Theophiliscus, died on the third day, in consequence of his wounds. The victory of the allies would have been altogether brilliant, had not Attalus been defeated. He had gained a glorious victory with his wing, but pursued the vanquished too far; Philip, with his reserves, hastened to meet him, and Attalus was obliged to throw himself upon the coast, where he stranded, and several ships fell into the hands of Philip. But on the whole, the victory on the part of the

¹² "The smallest ships of the Rhodians were quinqueremes. Triemiolia (also called trieremiolia, but which of these names is the correct one cannot be said) also occur; they are ships between the quadriremes and quinqueremes, and possessing half a bench of rowers more than the quadriremes. In the Peloponnesian war every trireme had 230 men, but a ship of the line now had 600 men and upwards. The mode of fighting had assumed the same character, which will probably be adopted by the Americans also; they no longer fought line against line, but rather ship against ship."—1825.

allies was more complete: Philip lost nine thousand men, who fell in the battle, and two thousand were taken prisoners. But Philip was soon again master at sea, everywhere injuring the allies, and gained a victory off Lade: Attalus had probably withdrawn. He then carried the war into Caria, took Stratonicea, and deprived the Rhodians of their towns on the coast of Caria. Hereupon Philip, after having attacked Chios, and, perhaps, also landed in Samos, but without being successful in either attempt, returned to the north, and laid siege to Abydos, which belonged to the king of Egypt. There were on the spot only a few auxiliary troops of Attalus and one Rhodian galley; but the Abydenians were resolved to defend themselves to the last, like the towns of the Netherlands in the war against Philip II., and would perish rather than submit to Philip, as it had been seen that even those towns which had opened their gates to him had to suffer the greatest horrors. Philip obtained possession of the place, but it was reduced to a heap of ruins.¹³

In this manner, all the possessions of Egypt beyond the sea were lost, and Antiochus the Great had in the mean time conquered Coelesyria a second time, and had on that occasion also taken Jerusalem. "He had without difficulty advanced as far as Pelusium, and there a vigorous resistance was for the first time offered to him."

In the meantime, the revolution of Alexandria had broken out; the detestable guardians had been overpowered, and the city of Alexandria applied to the Roman senate, soliciting its protection and guardianship. M. Lepidus was soon sent as guardian, and presided over the kingdom in that capacity. It is inconceivable how Livy could so completely forget to mention

¹³ "When the Abydenians saw that they should not be able to hold out against an approaching general storm, or at least against a second, they vowed not to survive one another: they conveyed their treasures to their ships to burn them, and their women and children into the temple; and the aged swore, that if the men were unable to stand the storm, they would set fire to the temple and destroy them. All men capable of bearing arms fought all day long in the breach so bravely, that Philip gave the signal to retreat. Nearly all lay dead on the field of battle, or wounded in the city. During the night some old men opened the gates to Philip, but now every one who was able offered such a resistance in the streets, that Philip was obliged to retreat, and gave the Abydenians a term of three days to consider. All persons within the city then made away with themselves, and in this manner Philip became master of the place."—1825.

this interesting circumstance: he overlooked many things, for he wrote too hastily. We know of this guardianship only from a few passages¹⁴ and from some coins of the family of Lepidus, on one side of which we read: M. Lepidus Tutor: and on the other, Alexandria. The Romans then stepped forward, demanding of both kings to keep the peace: this happened in A.U.C. 551, or Olymp. 144, 3, the last year of the second Punic war. Peace was concluded with Antiochus; it was brought about by the marriage of the Egyptian princess Cleopatra with the heir of Antiochus:¹⁵ that is, the daughter of the king of the South is married to the king of the North, as we read in Daniel.¹⁶ I pass over the detail. The empire of Antiochus was thus enlarged, as he desired, by the addition of Coelesyria.¹⁷

Philip, on the other hand, before whom the Roman embassy appeared while he was besieging Abydos, and who had already conquered all that had been promised to him, did not accept the mediation of the Romans. It was in vain that they demanded of him to give up his conquests; he treated with scorn the embassy, which admonished him to desist from the siege of Abydos, and bade them return. Although the Roman senate wished for war, yet it would not have been undertaken, if Philip had avoided every act of provocation, for the Roman people, exhausted by the Hannibalian war, were wearied, and longed for peace. But one imprudent act on the part of Philip decided the question.

Philip entertained a bitter hatred of Athens, and tried to gain possession of it. Athens was in a state of mere vegetation, without vital energy, resembling a thoroughly broken-down person, who does not indeed die, but cannot make any use of his powers of life. With its strong walls and the great forti-

¹⁴ Justin, xxx. 3, 4; Val. Max. vi. 6, 1.

¹⁵ This is evidently a slip, for Cleopatra was a daughter of Antiochus.—Ed.

¹⁶ These words are from Dan. x. 6, which passage refers to Berenice; the passage referring to Cleopatra occurs in x. 17.—Ed.

¹⁷ "At the marriage of Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus the Great, Coelesyria had no doubt been promised as a dowry. But whether Coelesyria was actually given up, would not be clear from want of information, were it not that we find a parenthetical and isolated statement in Josephus (*Antiq.* vii. 4, comp. 5 in fin.) who has not filled up the gap in his archæology as he ought to have done. From this statement it is manifest, that in the interval, Jerusalem and southern Phœnicia were subject to the Egyptians."—1826. (Comp. also *Antiq.* xii. 6; and, on the other hand, Polyb. xxviii. 1, and 17 ed. Schweigh.—Ed.)

fications of Piræeus, it had long been tempting to Philip, who saw its importance to Macedonia, and he had been for some time endeavouring to find a pretext for making himself master of it. The Athenians themselves now furnished it, by the superstition which, unfortunately, was sometimes connected with the mysteries; one might almost wish that these mysteries had never existed, for too much has been, and still is written about them; these same unfortunate mysteries had been the cause of Alcibiades becoming an enemy to his country. A few young Acarnanians, who, without being initiated, had intruded into the building where they were celebrated, were put to death as persons guilty of a violation of the laws of religion. As the Arcanianians were Philip's allies, this circumstance furnished him with a pretext, and he accordingly declared war against Athens. His troops entered Attica; they did not indeed succeed in taking the city, but ravaged the country in the most barbarous manner. The Athenians had for some time been allied with the Romans, to whom they had granted the rights of isopolity; hence they now (Olymp. 144, 3) applied to Rome for assistance against the overwhelming power of Philip and the Acarnanians. Their embassy arrived at Rome just at the time when the Hannibalian war had been brought to a close.

Small as the literary culture then was among the Romans, yet the name of Athens possessed a charm like the name of a Muse; every one felt a reverence for it, as the name of Florence is venerable in our time on account of the great associations connected with its earlier history, although at present no place in Italy is less devoted to the Muses, and science and literature have disappeared there more completely than anywhere else in Italy. Such also was the case with Athens. The educated Romans were well acquainted with Greek literature, and wrote in Greek, just as Leibnitz commonly wrote in French or Latin, and wrote in German only when there was any particular occasion for it: Frederick II. did the same. To save Athens, therefore, was a call which no doubt had great charms for many a Roman, even if he did not think that the struggle would be a glorious one. Moreover, the men who had most influence, had grown up in war, and were so accustomed to it, that peace was unbearable to them. The people, however, would hear nothing of a fresh war, their

object being to recover from the sufferings they had already endured. It was therefore not without great difficulty that the consuls prevailed upon the people to decree war; the consuls were anxious for triumphs, and more especially Sulpicius hoped to acquire renown in Greece, because the part he had acted there before had been so unimportant.

Thus began what is called the first Macedonian war (properly, however, the second, for the first was that under P. Sulpicius and M. Laevinus, at the time of the Hannibalian war); the earlier Romans called it *bellum Philippicum*. This war and its details properly belongs to Roman history, and I must therefore refer you to my lectures on that subject. It is also fully described in Livy's fourth decad, though many points are there not touched upon, and many things which are essential are passed over. But on the whole his history is translated from Polybius as well as can be desired. The war is, generally speaking, very satisfactorily described, and there is no need for a fresh narrative; nor is there any necessity for critical discussions, the whole affair being clear before us. The Hannibalian war, on the other hand, requires a critical treatment.

The Romans immediately joined Attalus and the Rhodians; the latter, however, were cautious enough not to conclude a treaty, but remained in the relation of friendship which had existed between them and the Romans from early times. At a period, when according to the common opinion the Romans had no connections with Greece, they had united with the Rhodians against piracy, and had come to an understanding with them about the safety of the seas. I shall say more on this subject in the third volume of my Roman history.¹⁸ The Rhodians, as I said before, took care not to conclude a treaty with Rome, which might have compromised their relations to other states.

¹⁸ "In speaking of the forced alliance between the Rhodians and Romans, Polybius remarks, that at that time the Rhodians had, for nearly one hundred and forty years, been closely connected with the Romans, that they had accomplished great things conjointly with them, but that they never concluded an alliance with them, in order not to tie their hands in regard to other nations. As this statement seemed incredible, it has been supposed that there is an error in the number of the text; but I do not think so. I rather believe that this is one of the lights which shine forth from the dark night of those times. It is very possible that the friendly relation between them may have existed so long, and it may have originated in their common hostility against the Etruscans, who at that time were much addicted to piracy."—1825.

The Eleans, the Messenians and Laconia under Nabis were allied with the Romans. The Aetolians indeed had fared so ill in their alliance with Rome, that at first they showed little inclination to take part in the war, and both the Aetolians and Romans distrusted each other; but still their common interests soon led them to renew their connection.

The Achaeans, on the other hand, were entirely under the control of the king of Macedonia: Philip possessed in Peloponnesus the towns of Corinth, Orchomenos, Heraea, and Triphylia. But the Achaeans had, nevertheless, latterly very much risen in internal strength and importance; and this they owed to a man who is justly called the last of the Greeks, that is, the last Greek statesman through whom Greece acts a part in history—I allude to Philopoemen.

Some men stand forth in history in greater splendour than they deserve, but the case of Philopoemen is the reverse: he is mentioned too little in history. He is called the last of the Greeks, and was regarded and honoured by his countrymen as a great man; and if with these impressions we take up his life in Plutarch, we wonder and ask ourselves, what, after all, did he accomplish? We find him jealous of Rome; he united indeed the Lacedaemonians with the Achaeans, but even this may be censured; and the only exploit which really stands forth in history as something great, is his victory over the Spartan usurper Machanidas, near Mantinea. This victory is the only great deed of Philopoemen, and yet we can say with truth, that he was a great man. At a period of great activity, it was much easier to rouse the nation and to guide it to new paths, as was done by Aratus, than to do what Philopoemen did, who had to move his nation and introduce salutary forms, when the time of excitement had passed away, and when all were in a state of stupor: and this is the glory of Philopoemen.

He was a native of Megalopolis and a son of Craugis. Having lost his father at an early age, he was brought up by a friend at Mantinea, and educated by Ecdemus and Demophanes, two distinguished men, both of whom had experienced many vicissitudes of fortune. The education he received from them was more careful than that commonly received in his country. Philopoemen prepared himself from an early period for military life. When Cleomenes took Megalopolis, Philopoemen was one of those who forced their way through the

enemies and went to Messene; his hatred of Sparta was inextinguishable, and he induced the Megalopolitans to reject the proposals of Cleomenes: he assisted the fallen city in raising itself a little in after times. In the battle of Sellasia, where he commanded the Megalopolitan cavalry, he distinguished himself so much, and made such an admirable evolution, that after the battle Antigonus publicly honoured him. Being then appointed hipparchus of the Achaeans, he found every thing in a state of disorganisation, just as was the case in the Italian republics in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; his predecessors had connived at everything the young cavaliers did, and the service had been regarded as a sort of luxury. He now compelled them all to learn the duties of common horsemen, but he so trained them in everything that was right and good, and contrived to make himself so popular, that all willingly obeyed him. The general esteem he thus earned raised him to the office of strategus, and in that position he went on with his improvements. He disbanded the mercenaries in whom he had little confidence—for in the service of a republic they were always worse than in that of tyrants, by whom they were better kept and better paid, while in republics they were employed only in cases of extreme urgency,—he introduced a new system of tactics, induced the militia to adopt the service of the Macedonian phalanx, which was much harder, and changed the armour. The Arcadians had always been able soldiers, and he being a Megalopolitan, introduced the Arcadian discipline among the Achaeans. And before long, probably in Olymp. 142, 4. Philopoemen, in the battle of Mantinea, showed that the Achaeans might accomplish what hitherto had been considered to be impossible.

From his time, the Achaeans, even though the Macedonians were still occupying the fortresses in their country, became far more important and powerful than they had been before, and when afterwards they got rid of the Macedonians, he raised them altogether, and gave them character and firmness.

Philopoemen therefore was a distinguished man, and really deserves his reputation; we must own with feelings of pain, that the actions of Aratus do not correspond with his reputation; while Philopoemen, is a character, which though not brilliant, accomplished great things. But he, as well

as Aratus, was wanting in the *Χάριτες σὺν Μούσαις*, that intellectual culture which was possessed by all the great Athenians. But it could not be otherwise: a Sicyonian or Megalopolitan could not be like an Athenian. Philopoemen was a man like our active ancestors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but not as barbarous as the Germans in the middle ages. He had a truly patriotic and Greek mind, and we must remember this fact in reading his history: all our historians, with the exception of Polybius, of whose history we have only excerpts, judge him wrongly. Polybius entertains an extraordinary veneration for him, which is enhanced even by the fact that his father Lycortas was a friend and political disciple of Philopoemen. The latter had very distinct and clear political notions; he was neither Roman nor Macedonian, but Achaean; nor was he Megalopolitan or Arcadian, but he rose above all local feelings, as well as above the unfavourable circumstances in which the larger cities of the league were placed. They resembled the state of the rotten boroughs in England: he controlled the votes of the smaller places, and they followed him. It would seem, however, that at this time essential changes were made in the constitution of the Achaean confederacy.

Such was the condition of the Achaeans when Philip demanded of them to remain faithful to their alliance, while the Romans and Attalus called on them to renounce Macedonia and join them. Polybius found that the resolution of the Achaeans was severely censured by their descendants at a time when the Roman yoke was weighing heavily on them, and the Macedonians were no longer able to injure them; but Polybius, with perfectly sound and correct arguments, justifies the resolution of the Achaeans to abandon the alliance with Philip. The miserable sophists of later times charged the Achaeans with treachery and ingratitude towards Philip; but Polybius answers: how can any one speak of treachery or ingratitude, seeing that Philip unjustly and faithlessly kept possession of places which did not belong to him? It was now too late to give them back. The Romans, it is true, were victorious and formidable, and many Achaeans were exasperated against them on account of their cruelty, especially at Dyme; but this was only a transitory consideration, and a military mode of acting which was very common, and showed that

after all the Macedonians could not protect them against the Romans. Philopoemen kept aloof from the negotiations, but his influence was favorable to an alliance with the Romans. Aristaenus, the strategus of the Achaeans, decided the question and prevailed upon the nation to declare in favour of the Romans.

But at the beginning of the war, the Achaeans were allied with Philip, and sunk very low in their state of dependence. The Acarnanians had sold themselves out and out to the Macedonians from fear of the Aetolians. Independently of Macedonia and Thessaly, Philip possessed Euboea, Phocis, and Locris, and in Peloponnesus, Corinth, Orchomenos, Heraclea, Triphylia, and also Paros and Andros, together with all the Greek towns from the Macedonian frontier to the Hellespont, Caria, and other Asiatic towns: his empire, therefore, though not compact, was immense.

The Romans first sent a fleet (Olymp. 144, 4) to assist the Athenians, and protect their country against Philip. This fleet proceeded to Aegina, where they were met by Attalus and the Rhodians with some ships, which, as Polybius correctly observes, if they had made an effort and had acted more vigorously, might have acquired the glory of having liberated Greece. Attalus, accompanied by the Romans, appeared in Piraeus, and he was received with joy and many marks of honour. Both fleets then undertook a predatory expedition to Chalcis, where exiles offered them an opportunity; they plundered and ravaged the city in the most cruel manner, but were soon obliged to evacuate it. Philip, who was stationed at Demetrias, on being informed of this by telegraphs, hastened across with all speed, but found only the smoking ruins of the city. He now went across the Euripus and through Boeotia, in order to avenge Chalcis upon Athens. The Athenians, who heard of the danger by a mere accident, guarded the gates and awaited the attack. Philip, therefore, being unable to take the city by surprise, and being too weak to lay siege to it, after an engagement with Attic mercenaries, laid all the country waste, cut down the trees in the Academy, destroyed all buildings and sepulchral monuments, and then retreated.¹⁹

¹⁹ "How weak Athens then was, may be seen from the contemptibly small number of Athenian soldiers. They had only three ships, and that too *ἄφρακτοι*, and their forces, including foreign mercenaries, amounted to no more

Attalus and the Romans now returned to Piræeus, and all danger was over. But when Attalus was going home, Philip came back, again traversed Attica, and destroyed the temples, of which there was one in every demos, together with other beautiful edifices, in such a manner that no stone was left upon another. This calamity excited in all the Greeks a feeling of pity: Athens could scarcely inspire any other feeling.

In the following year, the Roman fleet made expeditions against those of the Cyclades which were in the hands of Philip, and against several points of Euboea, Philip being in the meantime engaged in the north by the consular army. The inhabitants fled before the conquerors, and the islands, as well as many towns, as Andros, Aegina, and others, were given to Attalus by the Romans, who, while boasting of liberating Greece, gave up Greek islands to a foreign prince. But this was quite in the spirit of Roman liberation. This maritime war was very destructive for Greece. Oreus was laid waste a second time; Eretria, which had till then been flourishing, was taken and completely ransacked, and many of the most excellent works of art were thence carried to Rome.

LECTURE CIX.

MEANTIME the Romans, who had landed at Apollonia, made unsuccessful attempts to enter Macedonia from the west, that is, across the Illyrian frontier or the Candavian mountains, under the command of P. Sulpicius, towards the close of his consulship; and in the following year he continued his operations as proconsul.¹ P. Villius, the consul of this year did not

than a couple of thousand men. In like manner, Venice and Leyden, within a period of from thirty to forty years, lost three-fourths of their population.”—1825.

¹ “This latter campaign of Sulpicius belongs to the year A.C. 553, Olymp. 145, 1. Livy’s chronology is wrong, for he places it in the consulship of Sulpicius, although he himself states, that Sulpicius did not cross over to Coreyra to spend the winter there, until the end of his consulship, that is, in the autumn. He had therefore scarcely arrived there, when his office as consul came to an end; most of what he did, must accordingly belong to the year following, during which he retained the command, but not the consulship.”—1825.

cross the Adriatic to undertake the command until towards the close of his year of office, and he likewise produced no effect. This want of success on the part of the Romans greatly encouraged Philip. He had taken up a central position, and shewed himself in this war as an able general who turned his attention in all directions. His exploits are far superior to those of Alexander:² it was a campaign like that of Napoleon in the Champagne, in February and March, 1814. By marches of incredible difficulty, and by the greatest boldness, he met the enemy at a spot where they imagined themselves to have advantages over him, and he frustrated all the results of the campaign." The Epirotes were allied with him, and so long as he was in possession of Epirus, the Romans were separated from their allies in Greece.

The Aetolians, who had at first refused to listen to the Romans, now began to dread their increasing power, and resolved to enter into an alliance with them.³ They accordingly carried on the war against Philip in conjunction with Amynander, the king of a small Epirot tribe, who, by his personal greatness raised that obscure people, for a time, to eminence. The allies had made inroads into Thessaly and plundered it. The Aetolians, however, were in a different position in regard to Philip, and the garrison of Acrocorinthus made several successful undertakings in Peloponnesus.

But in the following campaign (Olymp. 145, 2) the Romans succeeded in marching round and evading the passes of Argyrocastro or Antigonea⁴ in Epirus, whereby Philip was forced

² "I am partial to Philip on account of his great talents as a general; but still, when one of my friends told me that he was going to write his history, and describe him as the champion of Greek liberty, I told him that I would write against him, but in a friendly spirit, in order that the opposite side of his character also might become known."—1826.

³ "In the history of this period we are unfortunately confined to Livy, who indeed translates or abridges Polybius, but often leaves out that which is most important, and neglects to mention treaties and alliances, whereas Polybius was very accurate in these respects also. My belief is, that the Aetolians concluded a general alliance with the Romans against Philip, without specifying the particular advantages which they meant to claim for themselves, because they had already done it before, and perhaps thought that this was a point requiring no particular stipulation."—1825.

⁴ In 1830 and 1826, and in the lectures on Roman history (vol. ii, p. 163) Niebuhr declared Antigonea to be the same as Argyrocastro; but in 1825, he considered Antigonea to be Clissura (Lock-Castle), which is probably the more correct view.—Ed.

to retreat across mount Pindus. T. Quinctius Flamininus had carried reinforcements, amounting to 8,000 men, who were all picked veterans, over to Corcyra, and led his army into the districts of lower Illyricum. The attempt to enter Macedonia by crossing the western mountains, had failed the year before, principally on account of the roughness of the mountains. T. Quinctius Flamininus therefore now formed a different plan, and marched up the river Aous in order to penetrate into Epirus. Philip was stationed there at a spot where the Aous flows between two high precipitous rocks, near which was situated Antigonea, a town and fortress, which had received its name from Antigone, the wife of Pyrrhus, a daughter of Berenice. It was a hopeless undertaking to storm the pass, and it was equally impossible to enter Epirus by the Ceraunian mountains. But Flamininus fell in with a noble Epirot, who undertook to conduct the Roman army by a roundabout way, so as to arrive in the rear of the Macedonians. He accomplished this plan with one legion, and so successfully, that the Macedonian army being seized by a panic, abandoned the invincible pass, and fled in all directions; but the Romans entered Thessaly, whither Philip had retreated by way of Tricca and mount Pindus. On his march he had laid waste everything, and then went to Macedonia, in order that the Romans might not follow him.

The Romans now joined the Aetolians; Philip lost all his positions in Greece, with the exception of Acrocorinthus. At the same time Amynander and the Aetolians had entered Thessaly, and taken possession of the important pass of Gomphi. The Romans ordered their transports to sail to Ambracia, whence the army received its supplies, and pursued Philip, though not farther than Thessaly, which country Flamininus wanted to conquer completely; but he did not succeed, as he had to give up an attack upon the mountain fortress of Atrax with considerable loss. Yet this disadvantage was compensated by negotiations which were commenced with the Achaeans.

Philip had a great number of partisans among them; they had already become accustomed to regarding themselves as subjects of Philip and of a Macedonian king, and to bear every humiliation patiently. The strategus of the preceding

year had absolutely rejected the proposals of the Romans,⁵ but Aristaenus, the new strategus, was well disposed towards them; he had seen through Philip's plan, that it was his scheme to subdue the Achaeans, and that the restoration of Corinth could be expected from the Romans alone. But Aristaenus had also many enemies, partly personal enemies, and partly those who thought that they were akin to the Macedonians even in language, and saw in them half Greeks, or even real Greeks.⁶ "The fact of the Romans being allied with the detestable tyrant Nabis of Sparta, who was at war with the Achaeans, was another impediment to the negotiations." The deputies could not agree; the demiurgi were quite divided, five being for and five against the proposal. At length the father of one of the opponents compelled his son to vote for the Romans. A long silence then ensued, when suddenly Aristaenus roused them from their fear and consternation, and put the question to the vote. But before the business commenced, the Argives and Dymeans withdrew; the latter, because Philip had shown them kindness and restored their city, which had been destroyed by the Romans and Aetolians. The motive of the former is uncertain; it was perhaps their fear of Nabis which induced them to join the Macedonians; but it is also possible that they were opposed to the Romans as the descendants of the Trojans, and in favour of the Macedonians, on account of the story about the origin of the Macedonian kings from Argos. The other nations decreed the alliance with the Romans, who had promised them the restoration of Corinth, Heraea, Orchomenos, and Triphylia, which Philip had already promised them twice, but without keeping his word. "If Philip had at that time sacrificed a small portion of what he afterwards lost altogether, he would have preserved his alliance with the Achaeans." The Achaeans now formed a corps, with which, being supported by the Romans and by Eumenes, they blockaded Corinth.

The inhabitants of Corinth, however, remained quiet, being

⁵ "The proposals were made to the magistrates; the popular assemblies lasted only for three days."—1825.

⁶ "At the Macedonian court Greek only was spoken, just as the noble Russians speak only French. All business and all negotiations were carried on in Greek, and the Macedonian language was used only in the affairs of ordinary life. And such a state was regarded by the Greeks as a Greek state!"—1826.

under the control of a large Macedonian garrison; and Philocles, the Macedonian general, threw himself with reinforcements into the town, and thence promoted an insurrection of the Argives against the Achaeans. This threw the league into difficulties. Philocles was not indeed able to maintain Argos, but he made use of it as a bait, giving it to Nabis to draw him away from the alliance with Rome. But Nabis now broke his word, expelled the Macedonians from Argos, and sent to the Roman commander to renew the alliance. This was done, and the Romans accepted auxiliaries from him; but they stipulated that he should abstain from hostilities against the Achaeans.

As Philip was still in the possession of Demetrias and Chalcis, Flamininus thought it dangerous to take up his winter quarters in Thessaly, especially as the neutral Boeotians were favourably disposed to Philip, and Corinth was still in his hands. Flamininus therefore determined to return by Thermopylae, and take up his winter quarters in Phocis, where he conquered several small towns. The siege of Elatea detained him longer, and during that of Oropus, the jealousy between the Romans and Aetolians already began to show itself. He wished to take up his winter quarters at Anticyra on the Corinthian gulf; he therefore besieged it, and it soon fell into his hands. With the exception of Corinth and Boeotia, Flamininus was now master of all Greece. Soon after, he gained Boeotia also. At the distance of a mile from Thebes, he assembled the Boeotian people to a negotiation, but as he was followed by a strong detachment of troops, he overawed the unarmed Boeotians and frightened them in such a manner, that they concluded an alliance with the Romans and opened their gates to them, though they did so by compulsion and against their will. The Acarnanians, dreading the Aetolians, had not yet allied themselves with the Romans, but had joined Macedonia altogether, for which reason they were hard pressed on the land side by the Aetolians, and from the sea by the Romans.

Negotiations of peace were then commenced, but they produced no results, and the question had to be decided by arms.

In the beginning of the following year, P. Quinctius Flamininus, as proconsul, entered Thessaly. Philip having assembled all the forces he could muster, amounting to 20,000 men,

advanced from Macedonia to meet him. After many marches, the two armies met, about harvest time, in the neighbourhood of Pharsalus, and near the hills of Cynoscephalae Flamininus defeated Philip in a battle which commenced very much like the battle of Salamanca in 1812; for in the latter case, too, the hostile armies were separated by a line of hills, and marched alongside of each other for the purpose of foraging; and it was not till they ascended the hills that they learned how near they were to each other; and the battle thus commenced quite suddenly. The Romans took possession of an eminence, and within a few hours Flamininus gained a decisive victory without much difficulty. The Macedonian phalanx happened to be drawn up against the weakest point of the Romans, but by skilful manoeuvres, Flamininus attacked the phalanx on a weak point, and being once thrown into disorder, it was impossible to keep it together. The Romans gave no quarter, although the Macedonians surrendered by thousands, and (as they had often done before) were ready to desert their king Philip. The Macedonians were so completely beaten, that Philip, after having lost 8000 men, was obliged hastily to retreat by way of Larissa into Macedonia. It was impossible for him to restore his affairs; hence he made offers of peace, which were readily accepted by the Romans (Olymp. 145, 3). As he was completely humbled, the negotiations were carried on very expeditiously, and he was obliged to accept terms which made him altogether powerless.

He was compelled to give up all his possessions in Greece, including even Thessaly, which had never been separated from Macedonia since the days of Philip, the father of Alexander; so that Magnesia was a real province, and the remainder of Thessaly a dependent country. In accordance with this, he had to evacuate the powerful fortresses of Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth, and to renounce all claims to the dominion over the Greeks south of Olympus and Ossa. He further lost all his possessions out of Macedonia proper, within the Cambunian mountains, the Epirot Orestis, and a number of the coast towns which he possessed in Thrace, and which had either been taken from Egypt or had belonged to him before. In addition to all this, he had to pay 1000 talents, one half of which was to be paid down at once, and the other by instalments within ten years; he was not allowed to keep

any standing army, except 5000 as guards, and had to deliver up all his ships of war with the exception of ten; this, however, was not a great loss, as he had not many ships. Finally he was obliged to give hostages, and among them his own son Demetrius.

"In the East, however, Macedonia retained its former frontier, extending as far as the Nestus, and he was not restrained from extending his kingdom on that side. Macedonia, therefore, was a compact monarchy, and still possessed great power."

Immediately after this peace, dissensions broke out between the Romans and Aetolians: the latter had felt hurt even before, because the Romans had wronged them. The Aetolians had taken no part in the previous engagements: at Cynoscephalae the number of their forces was not very great, but they had contributed much to the victory over the Macedonians, especially their cavalry, "and they now attributed all the merit to themselves—just as the Spaniards, in battles in which they had acted a miserable part, imagined that they themselves had done everything which the English had done for them." For this the Aetolians alone had plundered the Macedonian camp, and the Romans had taken no booty at all. There now arose among the Greeks generally their national vanity and jealousy: they ascribed to the Aetolians the honour of the day, and spoke of them as their deliverers, however little they were otherwise popular. Alcaeus of Messene composed a generally-recited and very bold epigram, which wounded the ambitious Flamininus most deeply. In this manner the Romans and Aetolians fell out with each other. The pretensions of the Aetolians were offensive and no concession was made to them. The Aetolians demanded the restoration of the districts which, during the two previous wars, Philip had taken from them, and this demand was perfectly just. But the Romans screened themselves behind the pretext, that they were restoring to the Greeks their autonomy, and that those districts must become free! Flamininus, otherwise a noble-minded man and zealous in the cause of Greek freedom, added the towns of Echinus, Larissa, and others, which had formerly belonged to the Aetolians, to Thessaly, for his weakness consisted in a fondness of making organisations and constitutions, of which we find more traces in his

later history. A personal exasperation also arose between the commanders of the Aetolians and Flaminius. This seems to me to be quite natural so far as the Aetolians were concerned, and not to be deserving of much blame. It was very unfortunate, that they did not rightly estimate their strength: southern vanity was one of the causes of their considering themselves to be more powerful than they actually were. But the Romans were unjust: in many controversies in which the Romans had decided against them, justice was evidently on their side. Flaminius had already adopted the policy of making the Greeks little, and the Aetolians weak. Thus it happened that the Aetolians sought an opportunity for taking revenge; and in this manner fresh misfortunes were preparing for Greece.

After the peace with Philip, Flaminius led his army into winter-quarters.⁷ Some time now passed away before the fate of Greece was decided. Livy draws the events too closely together, but from other authorities we see, that a considerable time elapsed between the peace with Philip and the Isthmian games, at which Flaminius proclaimed the independence of Greece. If the events were so close to one another as Livy relates, the Greeks would not have taken them in the manner they did; but as some years passed away, before Demetrias, Chalcis, etc., were evacuated by the Romans, nothing is more natural than that the Greeks regarded the intentions of the Romans with the highest distrust. It is, moreover, probable

⁷ "In the autumn of this year, sentiments were manifested in Boeotia, which cannot be called by any other name than ingratitude. Ever since the time of Antigonus Doson, that country had thoroughly sided with Macedonia, and the Boeotians now shewed their hatred of the Romans in a very impertinent manner. Flaminius had stipulated that the Boeotians who were in Macedonia, should be dismissed, and that those who had served the Macedonians as mercenaries should receive an amnesty. For this, however, the Boeotians did not thank Flaminius, but Philip, to whom they sent an embassy; they even appointed Brachyllus, the commander of a detachment which had supported Philip, boeotarchus. This man was soon murdered, it was unknown by whom, for the instigators of the deed took to flight, and were declared outlaws at Thebes; but Flaminius was charged with being the guilty person. As they could not think of an insurrection, they murdered the Roman soldiers wherever they found them, and threw them into the marshes. When these things were brought to light, and the Boeotians refused to make reparation, Flaminius took justice into his own hands, ravaged their country, *e.g.*, the territory of Coronea, and demanded a fine of five hundred talents, which, however, through the mediatiou of Athens, was probably reduced to thirty."—1825.

that those fortresses would not have been evacuated at all, had the Romans not been threatened by Antiochus, so that they were under the necessity of procuring friends.

The decision of the fate of Greece was not an easy matter, and at any rate could not satisfy the wishes of the most important states of Greece, and perhaps still less their real wants. It is quite clear that a state of things might have been established in Greece which would have been beneficial, I mean a federative constitution; but this was not the object of the Romans, whose only thought was, how they might reduce those countries to a state of dependence. "But still the Romans did for the Greeks what they did for no other nation, and that out of respect for the Greek nation, the name of which, even in its degradation, inspired respect. All cultivated nations at that time still felt admiration for the Greeks, especially the Italian nations and the Carthaginians, who looked up to the Greeks as a nobler people, and were ambitious of being honoured by them. Flamininus was so completely hellenised, that witty sayings of his in Greek were remembered."

The Romans now resolved to proclaim the autonomy of all the people of Greece. In Olymp. 146, 1, the Greeks assembled near Corinth for the purpose of celebrating the Isthmian games in such numbers as had never before been seen there; for it was expected that on the day of the opening the decrees of the Roman senate would be proclaimed. When the herald announced to all the people over whom Philip had ruled, the exemption from taxes, and from the necessity of keeping garrisons, the joy and enthusiasm of the Greeks knew no bounds; and this all the more so, that even to the last moment they had distrusted the Romans. Corinth was restored to the Achaeans, a point which Flamininus had carried in opposition to the opinion of those who maintained that the Romans, as sovereigns, should keep possession of the fortresses. The citadel was indeed still occupied by a Roman garrison, but Flamininus assured the people, that the garrison should be withdrawn from it as well as from the other fortresses. Orchomenos and Triphylia were already restored to the Achaeans, and the Romans allowed them to form one state with those nations of Peloponnesus which might wish to join them. But Messene, Elis, and Lacedaemon, still remained isolated. The countries

of the main land of Hellas retained the ancient boundaries which they had had before, especially Athens, "from which, however, Salamis was probably separated," Boeotia (the Megarians had joined Boeotia), and the Aetolians extending as far as Ambracia, and beyond Phocis and Locris,⁸ which were restored to them, having previously belonged to Aetolia, if the passage in Livy is correct; and in like manner the Acarnanians retained their ancient boundaries. Every one of these formed a separate state. Euboea and Thessaly were constituted by the Romans each as one state; the Phthiotians, who were not restored to the Aetolians, and probably the Orestians also, who had been severed from Macedonia, were incorporated with Thessaly; I am inclined to believe this of the Orestians, because an Orestian occurs among the Thessalian strategi. The Magnetes, who at the time of the Macedonian ascendancy had been thoroughly united with Macedonia, remained separated from Thessaly, and the Perrhaebians were likewise independent. "In Thessaly the Romans placed an annually elected strategus at the head of affairs with supreme power: these are the strategi of Thessaly, a list of whom exists in the Chronicle of Eusebius. This form of the strategia, which does not occur anywhere before the time of Philip, was now quite general, and was also adopted at Athens; for otherwise the strategi commanded the armies only in time of war, whereas now they were the highest magistrates, a parallel to which we find in the history of Italy and Germany." About the same time the Carian towns, which had been taken from the Rhodians by Philip, as well as the Egyptian towns in Caria, were restored to the Rhodians: the islands were under their influence. "But while the Romans proclaimed the independence of Greece, they did not scruple to give Eretria and Aegina to Attalus; Polybius has forgotten this point in enumerating the charges against the Romans."

All Greece was for the moment satisfied, and the Aetolians alone, not having obtained what they claimed, remained hostile. But this did not last long; fresh quarrels soon began with the Achaeans also.

In Olymp. 146, 2, soon after the proclamation of the independence, Flamininus, in conjunction with the Achaeans,

⁸ "Locris had long since disappeared from the number of independent states; the towns of Cnemus and Opus were united with Phocis."—1826.

carried on a war against Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, "who had hitherto, to the disgrace of the Romans, been in alliance with them." Who and whence that man was, we know not: he had probably usurped the tyrannis immediately after the death of Machanidas. He was a resolute and enterprising man, and personally as a general not contemptible, and very ingenious, but withal he was a robber, and a complete monster; all the horrors which are related of him may be unhesitatingly believed. He seems to have aimed at utterly annihilating the ancient race of Spartans; he partly murdered and partly exiled them, and even the exiles were not safe against his hired assassins, whom he, like the Medici, kept in all the towns. Others he robbed of their property; he connected the wealthy with his own family, gave the wives and daughters of the exiles in marriage partly to his mercenaries, and partly to emancipated slaves, and in this manner he formed a new body of Lacedaemonian citizens, while he changed Lacedaemon into an asylum for the greatest murderers and criminals. His subjects were regularly plundered by him, and when they were unable to satisfy his demands, he tortured them in the most cruel manner. Nabis was still in possession of Argos, which, as I have already stated, had, during the Macedonian war, been surrendered to him by the Macedonian commander. As, however, Argos had been Achaeian, a war broke out between him and the Achaeans. Flaminius assisted them, being induced to do so by the equivocal conduct of Nabis; but his real object was to obtain the supreme command in the war, in order that the destruction of the tyrant might not be the end of the struggle. With a few Romans, but many allied Greeks, he entered Laconia, and passed by Sparta towards the maritime towns, the most important of which, Gythium, contained the principal arsenals of Sparta, and all of them were conquered one after the other. From thence the allies proceeded to Sparta, and Flaminius pitched his camp close to its walls. Very fierce battles ensued, in which Philopoemen, with his Achaeans, distinguished himself particularly. Nabis was compelled to sue for peace, and he was actually left in the possession of Sparta; the maritime towns of Laconia alone were separated and constituted as a distinct state;⁹ he was also obliged to give up Argos and some towns,

⁹ "These are the same who are afterwards mentioned under the name of *Ἐλευθερολάκωνες*. The separation of these towns from Sparta was ancient, and

which, as we see from this peace, he possessed in Crete. Otherwise Flamininus secured to Nabis his possessions, in return for which he had to pay five hundred talents as a war contribution, and give his son as a hostage. This peace excited immense indignation in Greece against Flamininus. "It was indeed a peace such as a conqueror dictates to an enemy. Argos was restored to the Achaeans, and he who treats history lightly, will justify the conduct of the Romans; but a serious historian will not hesitate for a moment to say that Flamininus could and should have entirely overthrown Nabis; this, however, he would not do."

After this (Olymp. 146, 2) Flamininus returned to Rome, but continued his connection with the affairs of Greece; and while he took scarcely any interest in those of Rome, for which he was often severely taunted, he often acted as the protecting genius of Greece. Previously to his departure, he had announced to the Greeks, in an assembly at Corinth, that Greece was now in a condition to be free, if it really wished it; and in order to give them a proof of his attachment, he evacuated Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and Demetrias. This act indeed gained the friendship of the Achaeans for the Romans, but the cordial feeling lasted only a short time. His last act, as he was altogether partial to organising legislation, was the establishment of a new constitution in Thessaly; it was a timocracy according to Roman principles, or the distribution of power according to the census, as had been introduced by the Romans in Sicily, Bithynia (?) and elsewhere.

There was now no Roman soldier in all Greece, and yet owing to the existing distrust, it contained within itself the elements of destruction.

The Aetolians now turned their eyes eastward to Antiochus the Great in Asia. After having subdued Upper Asia and Coelesyria, he resided in Asia Minor, having his court at Ephesus. "During the Macedonian war, he had acted the part of an idle spectator, without considering that he was allowing the opportunity of securing himself against Rome to pass by; but he now began extending his power in Europe." He had shared with Philip the Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor. All the parts of Asia which had been given to Philip in that division,

altogether in accordance with the system of Rome; many erroneously assign it to a later period."—1825.

had been ceded to the Romans, and were to be free; but Antiochus took possession of the Thracian Chersonesus, and several places on the coast of Thrace. About this the Romans began to negotiate with him (Olymp. 146, 1) in the terrible fashion of an overpowerful state, which forms a system for itself, and makes it the basis of its policy, regarding everything resulting from that system as if it were the result of positive justice, as Napoleon did in maintaining the continental system. "Thus the Romans demanded of Antiochus to give up his possessions in Europe, adding that an Asiatic king had no right to have any possessions in Europe; and that he must surrender the Greek towns in Asia Minor, because they had been declared free by the Romans." These demands were indignantly rejected by Antiochus; his answer, recorded by Polybius, may easily be imagined. "If the Romans," he said, "were really so zealous in the cause of the freedom of Greece, they should first set free Magna Græcia, and that then he would take the matter into consideration." He had only just restored Lysimachia, which had been destroyed by Thracians. "From this moment both parties prepared for war."

At this time, Hannibal, a fugitive from his own country, arrived at the court of Antiochus. After the peace he had restored Carthage: being as great in the administration as he was in the field, he had restored order, especially in the financial department of Carthage, so that the city might one day again be in a condition to resume the war with Rome. For this reason the Romans, after the peace with Philip, contrived to effect his expulsion, and hunted him wherever he was. He fled from Africa to Antiochus, "whose court was the only one that was free from Roman influence, Egypt employing its ancient alliance with Rome for the purpose of protecting itself against Syria," and he was at first received in a most honorable manner. This favour however ceased very soon, for Antiochus found in him no flatterer, and Hannibal forming a correct estimate of the king's power, told him the truth about the perverseness of his measures. He made no secret in telling him, that, if under the present circumstances he would undertake a war against the Romans, he would run into his own ruin. He was the only one that spoke thus, and some miserable creatures at the court of Antiochus very soon persuaded the king, that Hannibal was a traitor and a partisan of the Romans, because

he did not sufficiently value the power of the king. While Hannibal dissuaded him from the war, the Aetolians, full of impatience, in a truly childish manner, and with a senselessness which we often find among the modern Greeks, urged him to come over to Europe as soon as possible and commence the war. Antiochus had more faith in them than in the warnings of the great Hannibal; he allowed himself to be persuaded by them, and accelerated the war instead of delaying it.

The distrust of the Aetolians rose to the highest pitch, when they heard that the Roman senate, suspecting that Antiochus would carry the war into Greece, had commenced negotiations with Philip about an alliance (Liv. xxxv.), in which the latter claimed the possession of all the towns, which he might conquer in the war against the Aetolians. This was perhaps not quite certain, but a report was even current in Greece, that the Romans had already promised him Magnesia with Demetrias as a reward for his services in the war. This is very probable, although Livy declares the report to have been false, for afterwards no one disputed the possession of Magnesia with him, whereas his Aetolian conquests were disputed. It is also possible that this may have been a secret treaty, but which Philip intentionally divulged, in order to excite hatred of the Romans and to make those nations more inclined to insurrection, inasmuch as he hoped in a war to recover his former empire.

Antiochus now negotiated with the Greeks, and endeavoured to win them. His success was only partial: the Achaeans remained firm in their determination to side with Rome; but other Greeks, and Demetrias in Magnesia, being stirred up by the Aetolians under Thoas, declared in favour of Antiochus and were ready to receive him. Whether the Greeks in the latter places were burdened with Roman garrisons and suffered under their oppression, is uncertain; but such a supposition is not unreasonable. Chalcis, however, had refused to join the others against Rome, and the Aetolians had therefore made an attempt to take it by storm.

No war was ever undertaken more thoughtlessly than that of Antiochus: he did not even try to win over Philip. The Aetolians had calculated upon the immense forces of Antiochus; he had held out hopes that he would bring with him an

enormous army, and on account of his vast empire he appeared to the Greeks as a mighty prince who was not less powerful than the ancient kings of Persia, with the additional strength of a Macedonian. But the military forces actually at his disposal were very small, not very numerous, and still less trustworthy. It consisted of a phalanx of mercenaries, and the rest were barbarous Asiatics. But while his ambassadors had deceived the Aetolians, the latter too had deceived him in regard to their resources: they too had not many troops, partly in consequence of the reduced population of Greece, and partly because the mercenaries had been engaged by other parties. The Aetolians had imagined that he would come with an army more numerous than that of the Romans; and he fancied that the Aetolians were a set of heroes. These are illusions which often occur in times of revolutionary wars, when one relies upon the other, and the one, either intentionally or unintentionally, deceives the other.

In Olym. 146, 4, Antiochus, by a rapid invasion of Greece, tried to forestall the Romans; but it might have been foreseen that they would not allow him to gain a firm footing. He came across with only 10,000 foot and a few horsemen, landed at Demetrias in Magnesia and took Chalcis. "The capture of Chalcis was not indeed any great exploit: it was a large and deserted city, the inhabitants of which were as little able to protect their walls as the Romans were during the middle ages; but still his taking Chalcis produced a great effect." Hannibal was utterly opposed to this plan of carrying the war into Greece; his scheme being that a sufficient army should be collected, and the war be transferred to Italy; he hoped that then the Carthaginians would again take courage, and at least be strong enough to resist and check Masinissa. Hannibal may have thought in his own mind, that, in that case, Philip of Macedonia would not feel jealous, not being hindered making himself master of Greece, which, he perhaps thought, might be left to him. Hannibal intended to use Antiochus as a mere instrument, and this circumstance to some extent justifies the king.

When Antiochus landed with his few troops, the Aetolians were glad, but were amazed at the smallness of his forces; he seems to have been dismayed at it himself, and was angry because the Aetolians had so much deceived him in regard to

their resources. He promised them to bring more troops into the field next spring. The Magnetes declared in his favour, and in many places there was an inclination to join him; but by far the greater part of Greece was attached to the Romans, and feared the return of the Macedonian rule. The Boeotians, Eleans, and Messenians, were indeed disposed to support him, but the first of these had no courage to undertake anything, and the latter two were unable. If Antiochus without delay had undertaken something, decided advantages might have been gained; but having arrived in the autumn, and having taken Chalcis and Euboea with the aid of the Actolians, he allowed the winter to pass, spending it at Chalcis in pleasure and luxury. "The thousands upon thousands which he had promised to the Aetolians, never arrived."

Meantime the Romans assembled a large army with which they crossed over to Illyricum; they were joined by the Achaeans and Thessalians. When they were spreading over Thessaly, Antiochus occupied Thermopylae, which was still very strong: a strange contrast with the days of Leonidas! The paths by which the pass could be evaded were occupied by troops, the Aetolians being stationed in a fortified camp outside the pass near Heraclea, for only a portion of their troops had joined the army of Antiochus. A battle was thus fought at Thermopylae (Olymp. 147, 1.), which was decided with infinitely less difficulty than that of Cynoscephalae. The pass was evaded, the Syrian phalanx broken to pieces, the Aetolians defeated, and Antiochus fled to Euboea, and then, by sea, like Xerxes, to Asia Minor. His whole army was destroyed, and the places he had conquered were soon lost. The consul, M.'Acilius Grabrio, sent troops to Chalcis and Boeotia, and went himself to Heraclea, which the Romans took from the Aetolians after an obstinate siege; for though the Aetolians were not worth much in the open field, they were very good in the defence of their towns. The siege lasted forty days, during which the Romans did not make much progress, but they were so numerous, that the Aetolians being at length worn out by constant exertion and incessant attacks, were obliged to surrender the town and its acropolis at discretion.

At the same time, Philip, who foresaw the unfortunate issue of the undertaking of Antiochus, and had thrown himself

entirely into the hands of the Romans, had marched into Thessaly, and besieged the strong fortress of Lamia, the possession of which was of great importance to him. As he conducted the siege with all the means that art could supply, the town would have fallen into his hands, had not the Roman consul commanded him to raise the siege, because the Romans wanted to take it themselves; and thus he departed with angry feelings. But as a compensation for this he was permitted to subdue Dolopia, Athamania, and Aperantia, and these, together with several Thessalian towns surrendered to him, and king Amynder took to flight. Philip then took Demetrias by surprise, and kept possession of it.

The Romans now blockaded Lamia, but soon raised the siege again. The Aetolians having lost all hopes, endeavoured to negotiate, and they, when the consul demanded unconditional surrender, offered to submit as subjects; but they were at the same time required to give up their leaders, and when they refused to do so, he referred them to the senate. He then marched with his army against Naupactus (Lepanto), crossed mount Corax, and was on the point of taking the town, although there also the Aetolians defended themselves resolutely. But now Flamininus suddenly appeared as their guardian angel, and brought about a truce, whereupon the Romans raised the siege.¹⁰ The peace, however, for which the Aetolians sued at Rome, was not concluded, and in the year following (Olymp. 147, 2), the campaign was renewed. In this year one Roman army continued the war against the Aetolians, and another under L. Cornelius Scipio, the younger brother of P. Cornelius Scipio the Great,¹¹ was sent into Asia Minor to operate against Antiochus. Lucius was accompanied by his brother Africanus.

The Scipios found Philip most willing to assist them against Antiochus. He had been induced, by personal animosity against Antiochus, to enter into the alliance with Rome, because Antiochus had not supported him in his war against the Romans; and this animosity was kept up by a short-

¹⁰ In one set of notes of the year 1830, we here read "they must have been badly off," without its being clear whether the remark refers to the Romans or to the Aetolians.—ED.

¹¹ "Our Fasti do not mention this surname, but he was so called by his contemporaries; his brother Lucius is in all inscriptions strangely surnamed Asiagenes, and in the Fasti alone Asiaticus."

sighted policy, which made him seize upon anything whereby he hoped to gain momentary advantages, for he expected that he would afterwards be able to make them permanent. He did indeed secure some advantages, but they were not permanent, nor could they become permanent. He did, however, obtain the permanent possession of Demetrias and Magnesia, and for a time made himself master of Aenos, Maronea, Lysimachia, and of the greater part of Chersonesus—places which Antiochus had taken from the Egyptians, and some of which Philip now took from him, while others were snatched from the Aetolians. It had, properly speaking, not been permitted to him by the Romans to seize the latter, but still he retained possession of those places for many years; that of Magnesia and Demetrias was never disputed by any one. It is strange that Livy does not say a word about this, but it is nevertheless clear. In like manner, he remained in possession of the districts he had conquered in Epirus.

The two Scipios led their army through Macedonia and Thrace, and across the Hellespont, where a Roman fleet, under M. Aemilius Regillus, together with some ships of Attalus and a fleet of the Rhodians, were keeping the passage open. Near Myonnesus, and not far from Ephesus, this armament had gained a decisive victory over the Syrian fleet, which was manned with excellent sailors from Phoenicia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia. By this maritime victory the war was in reality decided, for Antiochus' only hope had rested upon the fleet, with which he thought he could keep the Romans away from the Hellespont. But his preparations were below what they might have been: he had such an abundance of means to establish his superiority at sea, that his not having equipped a much larger fleet is quite unpardonable. In all the maritime engagements, the merit was on the side of the Rhodians. The Romans thus gained an easy victory; the Rhodians, however, behaved with uncommon prudence: they did not provoke the vanity and jealousy of the Romans, while, on the other hand, they sacrificed no part of their own dignity. No obstacle was now in the way of the Scipios, and they carried their army across into Asia; "at Ilium they played the comedy of their native place." Their very small army defeated, near Magnesia, the large Syrian masses, which in reality were only a vast host of Asiatics; they contained indeed a phalanx

armed in the Macedonian fashion, but this phalanx, too, consisted of Asiatics, and otherwise those nations were not better armed than the Persians of old. Two battles decided the war against Antiochus, and in that of Magnesia his whole army was routed.

Antiochus had even before negotiated for peace, and to speak the truth, had expected nothing but a defeat, in order to be able to accept the terms of the Romans and to submit to a disgraceful peace without being ashamed of himself. The terms were extremely humiliating: he was obliged to deliver up his ships of war with the exception of a few, to promise not to keep any elephants for the purposes of war, to cede to the Romans all his possessions in western Asia, except Cilicia,—that is, Mysia, Ionia, Lydia, the two Phrygias, and Lycia. He was further obliged to give up his possessions in Caria and Pamphylia,¹² to pay a war contribution of 10,000 talents by instalments, and to give Antiochus, his son and heir, and other noble Syro-Macedonians, as hostages that he would keep the peace.

The Romans were in reality in some difficulty as to what they should do with those distant countries, as Greece was not yet a province; they therefore kept none of their conquests for themselves, but made use of their victory only for the purpose of gaining new allies. The Rhodians, who had contributed very much to the speedy conclusion of the war, received all Lycia and Caria, an exceedingly rich acquisition, yielding a truly royal revenue, which, however, the Romans soon took from them. Some of the Ionian cities became nominally independent, but most of them were given to Eumenes of Pergamus, although at the beginning of the war, the Romans had promised freedom to all the Greek towns in Asia. Phrygia, Lydia, and all the rest, were likewise given to the king of Pergamus, who thus acquired a kingdom under the title of king of Asia, which, in regard to its extent, may be called large, and certainly was large in regard to its wealth and population.

The war against the Aetolians was continued throughout this time, and it was not till a few years after the peace with

¹² "The greater part of Caria belonged to Rhodes. Pisidia, protected by its mountains, formed a separate state, as it does at present under the Turks, to whom it pays a small tribute."—1826.

Antiochus, that matters were brought to a close (Olymp. 147, 3). In the year in which the Scipios crossed over into Asia, the Romans had taken and destroyed Lamia, and conquered Amphissa, but were unable to reach Naupactus, because the Aetolians were in possession of the mountain passes; and although Antiochus was then offering peace, the Aetolians acted on the offensive, expelled the Macedonian garrisons from their towns and from Acarnania, and made conquests in Thessaly. Fresh negotiations of peace at Rome led to no results, because of the great demands of the Romans. In the following year, M. Fulvius Nobilior came over with a great force, and besieged Ambracia, which the Aetolians, having secretly allied themselves with the Acarnanians, defended so bravely and brilliantly, though the Romans attacked it in every possible manner, that at last the Romans could not help respecting them, and empowered the consul to conclude peace on moderate terms. The Aetolians were not required to deliver up their leaders, but Ambracia was to surrender to the Romans before the conclusion of peace;¹³ they had to pay 150 or 200 talents, lost all the places which had been taken from them during the war, and entered the relation of dependent allies of Rome, being obliged to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance which was binding only upon one of the contracting parties. Their pride was gone, and henceforth they were a powerless people, not yet real subjects of Rome, but in such a condition that, without Rome, they were unable to move.

The Aetolians were also obliged to give up Cephallenia. The Romans were already in possession of Corcyra, and now endeavoured to reduce all the islands of the Ionian sea to submission. For this reason, they did not allow the Achaeans to admit Zacynthus into their league; and after the senate had ratified the peace, the consul went to Cephallenia, separated Leucas from Acarnania, took possession of it for Rome, in order to secure that of Cephallenia, and ordered the people to give

¹³ "Ambracia was not laid waste, but only deprived of its works of art. Pyrrhus had accumulated there many of these treasures, and some may have been brought thither from Italy. About fifteen years ago there were found in the orchestra of the theatre of Tusculum the bases of several statues, and among them also the base of a statue of M. Fulvius Nobilior; and as it is clear that the ornaments of that theatre belong to this period, it is possible that those statues may have been part of the booty from Ambracia."—1825.

hostages and to take the oath of allegiance. In consequence of a false report the Samaeans were seized with despair; they rose against Rome and maintained themselves for a long time, but were conquered in the end; their towns were destroyed, and all their inhabitants sold as slaves. The annihilation of the Greek nation went on step by step.

After the peace with Antiochus, the Roman consul Cn. Manlius, still remained for some time with his Roman troops in Asia Minor, making war against the Gallo-Graeci (Galatians) whose power he broke, in the neighbourhood of Ancyra, in such a manner that they could no longer think of continuing their former devastations.

If we possessed the work of Trogus, we should in this place read a minute account, written almost from the point of view of a Greek, of what henceforth occurred in Greece. Those little occurrences are but of small interest to us, notwithstanding the natural *pietas* which every scholar must cherish towards Greece. The first of these occurrences are the undertakings against the tyrant Nabis of Sparta.

The Romans had withdrawn their troops from Greece (Olymp. 146, 2); the countries on the east of the Adriatic, therefore, were free from the direct pressure of the Roman arms; but soon hostilities again broke out between the Achaeans and Nabis (Olymp. 146, 3). Even the very year after his peace with Flamininus, Nabis again took up arms, the Achaeans becoming more and more clamorous; he reconquered most of the maritime towns of Laconia, and defeated the Achaeans at sea. Yet Philopoemen, by advantages he gained on land, made up for this misfortune; he advanced to the gates of Sparta, drove Nabis into unfavourable positions, and annihilated nearly his whole army. Nabis was now no longer strong enough to be dangerous to the Achaeans, and Philopoemen, being unable to resist the temptation, pressed the Lacedaemonians very severely. Soon afterwards, the Aetolians, at the request of Nabis, sent him succour, perhaps in Illyrian ships; but Alexamenus, the commander of the Aetolian auxiliaries, murdered Nabis (Olymp. 146, 4), probably with the view of setting himself up as tyrant at Sparta. We cannot suppose in any way, that this was the intention of the Aetolians, because they themselves could derive no advantage from it, but on the contrary, the issue could only be injurious

to them, as was actually the case. Lacedaemon was thus delivered from the tyranny of Nabis; his partisans, however, came forward with great vigour against Alexamenus and drove him out of Sparta. We need not be surprised at finding that Nabis actually had partisans, for as he had made himself popular with the great mass at Argos, when he conquered that city, by introducing *tabulae novae*, and by a general distribution of land, we may fairly suppose that he adopted similar measures at Sparta. But Philopoemen instantly came from Megalopolis with Achaean troops, and compelled the Lacedaemonians to join the Achaean league. He was admitted during the first tumult, because his terms were very favourable to the Lacedaemonians, and because he recognised the actual state of things, neither changing the constitution, nor recalling the exiles, nor expelling any of the citizens. The Lacedaemonians, therefore, joined the league, but retained their own laws.¹⁴ Yet this step was painful to the feelings of the Lacedaemonians, the old as well as the new ones.

During the war with Antiochus, and in the ninth year after the battle of Cynoscephalae, fresh commotions arose in Peloponnesus. In the peace concluded after that battle, the Achaeans had only one half of Peloponnesus, for Laconia, Messenia, and Elis, did not belong to them. Elis had openly declared in favour of Antiochus, and Messene was undecided. The Romans, therefore, ordered the Eleans to join the Achaean league, and they did so, as is stated by Livy and attested by coins with the inscription *Ἀλείων Ἀχαιών*. The Messenians were commanded to do the same. As Philopoemen had already compelled Sparta to join the Achaeans, they now had all Peloponnesus in their power.

Elis remained in the Achaean confederacy, but Lacedaemon and Messene bore this relation of dependence with great reluctance, especially as both countries had lost much through the Romans, while the Achaeans had been benefited by their loss. According to coins, Corone was separated from Messenia, and probably Asine likewise: the coast of Laconia was in the Achaean confederacy. The population of Lacedaemon was now a strange mixture—perioeci, Helots, and mercenaries

¹⁴ "The Achaean towns perhaps stood in a two-fold relation to one another: some adopted the laws and all the institutions of the Achaeans, and others retained their own."—1825.

having been admitted among the number of citizens, and this population dreaded the return of the exiles, who were staying in the coast-towns, among the Eleutherolacones. Distrustful of these, and greatly vexed at being separated from the sea, the Lacedaemonians (Olymp. 147, 3) tried to make themselves masters of one of those towns, in which many exiles were living, in order to put themselves in communication with the sea. But the undertaking failed, and the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians mutually accused one another at Rome, where equivocal answers were given to them. Philopoemen therefore endeavoured to limit the influence of the Romans as much as possible, by entering Laconia, and encamping close to the walls of Lacedaemon. On this occasion, Philopoemen did not by any means act in a manner which we can approve of. Notwithstanding the praise which is otherwise due to him, it was an act of injustice which he did not scruple to commit, because it was advantageous to his state. The fate of Sparta was exceedingly hard.¹⁵ Philopoemen summoned the leaders of the Lacedaemonians before his court; to this they yielded, having been assured by him that the accused should not be condemned without a fair trial. But when eighty of the most illustrious men appeared in the camp, the exiles fell upon them in a furious manner; some of them were strangled, and others were sentenced to death. Philopoemen then entered the city, demolished the walls, ordered the mercenaries to be dismissed, restored the exiles, abolished the laws of Lycurgus, and established the Achaean constitution. Under the pretext of clearing Sparta from those who had intruded themselves as citizens, all emancipated Helots who had obtained the franchise under the Spartan tyrants, were expelled from the city; nay, all those who, endeavouring to elude the command, remained at Sparta, were made slaves and sold. This was the lot of about 3,000 of them; and the money raised by their sale was employed in restoring a portico at Megalopolis, which was lying in ruins from the destruction of the place by Cleomenes. Sparta was thus stripped of its population and deprived of its ablest soldiers. Lastly, a portion of their territory was taken from the Lacedaemonians. Such was the revenge which Philopoemen

¹⁵ In the MS. notes of 1830 this conduct of Philopoemen is *apparently* connected with his first entrance into Sparta after the death of Nabis, which death is accordingly assigned to a later date.—ED.

took on innocent men; but he had to suffer retribution for this act of injustice.

The recalled exiles united with the Lacedaemonians for the purpose of bringing severe charges against the Achaeans before the Romans. The latter, who had other things to attend to, and dreaded a war with Philip, did not indeed decide anything, but the result was, nevertheless, an interference of the Romans in the disputes between the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians, which was the first act of hostility on the part of the Romans against the Achaeans. It was the policy of the Roman senate to terrify the Greeks, but not to provoke them, from fear lest they should throw themselves into the arms of Philip, between whom and the Romans the irritation was becoming stronger and stronger. The Romans from time to time sent commissioners for the purpose of watching the affairs of Greece, but they decided nothing.

Meantime the Achaeans endeavoured to consolidate the alliance of the Peloponnesians. Such a confederacy must reform itself according to circumstances; and it is clear that this was the case also with the Achaean league in these later times. It must be mentioned in particular, that the preponderating influence of the smaller towns had ceased, the larger ones being divided, and each of these divisions having a separate vote. The increase in the number of the towns is attested by coins, which Eckhel, without being conscious of it, has rightly classified; but it is still more evident from the lately discovered coins, and it is mentioned also in Livy. The diet moreover was now held sometimes at Argos and sometimes at Corinth, instead of at Aegium.

There now followed the punishment of Philopoemen for his injustice towards Sparta. He had forced Messene in the same manner as Sparta to join the league; but the Messenians intrigued in every possible way against the confederacy, and in this they were headed by Dinocrates, a man of rank, and a friend of T. Quinctius Flamininus. He tried at Rome to effect the dissolution of the confederacy, and although the Romans, who had to decide the fate of nations, could not much concern themselves about those small states, yet they fostered those intrigues, and the Messenians actually renounced the confederacy. Philopoemen and the leaders of the Achaeans, paid no regard to the wishes of the nations. The latter ought to have

said—"We have indeed no objection to being Achaeans, but we want to have as many votes as we ought to have, and we will not give up our rational peculiarities;" and thus far they would have been right; but their refusal to enter into any general Peloponnesian confederacy at all was wrong. Philopoemen (Olymp. 149, 1) applied the rights belonging to the league in their widest sense, and was determined to reconquer Messenia by force of arms. He set out against the place with cavalry, probably to relieve Corone, which was besieged by the Messenians; but he was taken aback by an unfortunate accident, so that he saw no way of escaping; yet he manoeuvred so skilfully, that he saved the greater part of his troops from the defile; but he himself was wounded, taken prisoner, and put to death by the Messenians with unpardonable cruelty: he was obliged to drink the hemlock in his seventieth year (Olymp. 149, 2). But the Messenians too did not commit this act of inhumanity with impunity. The Achaeans, commanded by Lycortas, invaded Messenia with a great force, overpowered the enemy, conquered the city, and compelled Messene again to enter the confederacy—the authors of the murder of Philopoemen were punished. Dinocrates made away with himself, and of his principal accomplices, some were put to death, and others sent into exile. The latter applied to the Romans, who commanded the Achaeans to restore the exiles to their country (Olymp. 150, 1). This demand indeed greatly exasperated the Achaeans against the Romans, but under their strategus Callicrates they yielded without further remonstrance.

All Peloponnesus thus formed only the one state of Achaia, and this was the state of things before the outbreak of the war with Perseus. "This was a period of great prosperity for the country, and its relations to foreign powers also were not very unfavourable. The state was on good terms with the Romans; and although the latter often burst in upon them with rude demands, they did not continue to insist upon their being complied with, when they saw that the Achaeans were determined not to give way. But there was now formed among them a treacherous party, which gave up everything to the Romans in order to enrich itself."

LECTURE CX.

AFTER the conclusion of the war with Philip, the Romans had treated him not only with leniency, but with favour. They offered him rewards if he would abstain from the alliance with Antiochus. But Philip, being enraged at Antiochus, had actually rejected his offers, and availed himself of the opportunity offered by the Romans of acting against him. In addition to this, he hated the Aetolians. He had greatly extended his empire in Thrace, Thessaly, and Epirus. The Romans acted with great cunning, allowing him to enlarge his dominions, permitting some conquests, and expressing no opinion in regard to others. Philip thought himself entitled to keep Athamania, the frontier towns of the Dolopians, and his conquests in Thessaly, although this was in reality against the principles of the Romans. Demetrias and Magnesia were conceded to him by the Romans, and remained in his possession. But Philip thought that with the same right he might retain for himself the Greek towns on the Thracian coast, which he had taken from Antiochus. Our historians forget this point. The Romans remained silent until peace was restored everywhere, and until they had settled all the affairs of Greece according to their own mind. But then they came forward, demanding of him to show what title he had to the possession of those places, which they had never ceded to him. Philip might have defended himself, for he had made vigorous preparations during the time of peace: his measures during this period do honour to his judgment. His mode of acting was like that of Austria after the peace of Pressburg down to the year 1809, when the reduced monarchy exerted all its powers. He had collected vast treasures from the mines, with which he now raised an armed force, and not being allowed to keep a standing army, he formed a militia for himself. Years passed away during these preparations; but the more his strength increased, the more the Romans sought for an opportunity to attack him.

His son Demetrius had originally been at Rome as a hostage; during the war of Antiochus he had been sent back to his

father, and he was now again sent to Rome as ambassador. A tragic hatred existed between him and his brother Perseus, who was anything but a noble character; and it is a vulgar paralogism to suppose that, if enmity exists between two persons, one of whom is bad, the other must be good; such a conclusion is erroneous. I believe that Demetrius, without having any evil intention, allowed himself to be gained over by the Romans to act against the interests of his father, and he seems actually to have become faithless in the execution of his commission. It does not seem to me wrong that Perseus accused him, and that the father afterwards regarded him as a traitor (this is a common phenomenon of which there are many instances). Demetrius died, and the general opinion is, that the father caused him to be poisoned.

The Roman republic was at this time in a condition, in which a republic is far more dangerous to its neighbours than a monarchy. It was a period of repose; and at such times a monarch very rarely requires a war to give occupation to his people; he may turn his attention to their comforts, and his neighbours are not so much threatened. A republic, on the other hand, unless like Venice it sinks into an aristocratic and oligarchical torpor, a true republic is doomed to restlessness; it is too easily excited, and seeks some sphere of activity whereby it is led to interfere in foreign affairs. A real government like that of a monarchy did not exist at Rome. Improvements which might give occupation, public buildings and the like, afforded at the best occupation to a censor; the consuls felt that they were doing nothing unless they took the field; hence they were eager for war, for triumphs, and booty also had already become a great object with them: the senate and the people were weary unless there was a war. Had there been great internal commotions, matters might have gone on, but the internal development was completed: the ancient forms and elements had become developed, and the bud was opened. With wisdom new materials might have been provided, and new stages of development might have been prepared, but such thoughts never occur in the history of free constitutions: the Romans never had them. Thus there prevailed at Rome an internal tranquillity, which doomed her to be the destruction of other nations with which she came in

contact. In this want of occupation the Romans directed their attention to the East. They still cherished the ancient and angry hatred of Philip: a republic never lays aside its hatred, and Rome never forgave or forgot. The Roman grandees were exasperated, because in the war with Antiochus they had been obliged to allow him certain advantages, and there was no lack of pretexts for acting against him in a hostile manner.

They accordingly first compelled him to give up the towns of Thrace, which he had tacitly taken possession of during the war, and which the Romans had so long connived at. His plans were vast, but as they were not yet matured, he made up his mind to comply with their demand.

Two of the Gallic tribes on the Ister were at that time particularly powerful; the one was that of the Bastarnae on the lower Ister, who seem to have ruled over the Getae in Dacia, and the other that of the Scordiscans in Servia, Slavonia and lower Hungary, where the ancient Triballians had dwelt. Philip was secretly negotiating with them, and by subsidies and promises he stirred them up to undertake something against Italy: they were to cross the Alps and invade Italy, and there rouse the remnants of the Gallic race in the country south of the Po. The number of the Italian Gauls was indeed small, for the Boians had been almost extirpated, but a considerable portion of the Cenomani and Insubres still existed. With these the invaders were to unite, and Philip's scheme was to excite, by means of a foreign power, a war in Italy, for which he was only to pay the subsidies.

He, on the other hand, intended to place himself at the head of a Greek coalition, and he might actually hope that such a coalition of the most different Greek tribes would gather around him. The Achaeans were then in a very flourishing condition, and the whole of Peloponnesus was Achaean; even the ruling Achaeans, whose power had at first been supported by the Romans, were not well disposed towards Rome. They felt a bitter hatred against the Romans, because it had been seen that the Romans supported them only so long as they could be useful to them, and because it was clear, that the Romans were only waiting for an opportunity of dividing them again. The vanity peculiar to the Greeks

also did its work: a strategus of the Achæan state thought himself equal to a Roman consul; and this was the case even among a people so unusually prosaic as the Achæans.

The Rhodians also were irritated against the Romans, and the latter were vexed at the Rhodians because they kept so cautiously and prudently aloof from Rome. Even at that time the Romans interfered in the disputes which the Rhodian subjects, whom they themselves had given to the Rhodians, had with the ruling island, and stirred them up to come forward with their complaints against Rhodes. The Romans had given the Rhodians a handsome territory and excellent states, which yielded more revenues than the *terra firma* of Venice during its most flourishing period. These subjects now complained of their rulers, and the Romans interfered as judges in matters with which they had no business. The Rhodians were not indeed inclined to take up arms against the Romans, or to embark in undertakings against them, but Philip had reason for believing that they would, and they were at least much exasperated against the Romans. In like manner, king Eumenes of Pergamus, the son of Attalus, whom the Romans had raised to greatness, and to whom they had given a magnificent kingdom, was particularly exasperated against them, and he was ambitious enough to aim at the kingdom of Syria. "King Prusias of Bithynia distrusted the Romans, because Pergamus owed its greatness to them. Carthage, on the other hand, was too weak for Philip to reckon upon it: after Hannibal's removal it had no reformer capable of making use of the circumstances so as to prepare the nation, and all were happy in the thought that the evil day had not yet come. But the Romans laboured in every way to destroy Carthage, so that it became more and more powerless."

In short, Philip might reasonably form extensive schemes for a coalition; but he could rely upon it only on the supposition, that afterwards, at the critical moment, no one would actually stand aloof. The Aetolians, Epirots, and Achæans, no doubt, said to themselves: "If Philip is victorious, we shall be rid of the Romans; we shall then have Philip in place of them, and he is in no way better than they." If Philip had lived longer, the march of the Gauls into Italy would have been the signal for the outbreak of the war. This would have been a grand diversion: the passage of the Gauls across

the Alps would have been as great a terror to the Romans, as the subsequent expedition of the Cimbri. Italy would have been seized with a fearful panic, and matters would probably have turned out differently from what they afterwards did. But Philip did not live to see the execution of his design: he died before the outbreak of the war, at the age of nearly sixty, A. U. C. 573 according to Cato, or Olymp. 150, 1.

He was succeeded on the throne by his son Perseus, who fully entered into the relations of his father¹. In his reign it became manifest, how immense the power of Macedonia was. That country, which 100 years before had been so fearfully ravaged by the Gauls, and had become as powerless as Germany after the thirty years' war, had risen under two very oppressive but native rulers, and during the long period of peace since the battle of Cynoscephalae it had become populous and powerful. If the aged Philip, with his great mental abilities, had continued to rule the kingdom, many things would have turned out differently. But Perseus was deficient in all the qualifications for great actions: he was not a general like his father, though he was not wanting in military talent; he was mean and miserly on occasions when he ought to have despised money. He could not part with his money at a time when he might have set in motion whole nations, the Illyrians and Bastarnae, against the Romans, "and he was so much accustomed to hoarding, as to forget that his treasures were only a means of victory; he wanted to be victorious and yet retain his immense treasures." He provoked the Romans by allowing his hopes to carry him so far as to transgress the terms of the peace. When he had provoked them, and when

¹ "Cicero and Livy decline this name differently. Its common form is not yet satisfactorily established, and K. L. Schneider, in his *Formenlehre*, has overlooked many points. The Greek forms in *evs* terminate in old Latin in *ēs*, as *Ulyssēs*, *Pelēs*, and *Tydēs*. Thus we read in inscriptions and in Plautus. The Roman contemporaries of Perseus, therefore, called him *Perses*. In common life, the ending *ēs* was regarded as originally Greek, and he was accordingly called *Persa*, genit. *Persae*, as *Ἀγχίσης* is called *Anchisa*. Now, according to the rule of the ancient grammarians, and especially Priscian, the old Latin genitive of the forms in *ēs*, which represents *evs*, was *ī*. Even in Cicero's time we find the genitives *Alcibiadi*, *Ari* (from *Ares*) and we still have them in the best MSS. In like manner, the old Latin genitive of *dies* is more correctly *dīi* than *diei*, at least during the time before Cicero. The declension *Perseus*, *Persei*, is a mistake of Livy's, who, however well he writes, is yet not free from occasional faults."—1825.

after having gone a certain length his eyes were opened, and he saw the abyss before him, he was terrified and timidly retraced his steps. He belongs to a class of characters, which we meet with not unfrequently, when men of mere mediocrity are called to high situations where they have to manage the most important things. Such men at last form a determination, when they begin to feel ashamed of themselves, but it is a determination which leads them into destruction. The French ministry which brought about the fall of the king, is an illustration of this truth. Such also was the case of Perseus: he was a man of mediocrity, and doomed to take upon himself greater things than he could bear. After long hesitation he made up his mind, and his determination led to his own ruin. I admire the Romans of the earlier times, and if I did not admire them, I should have been a fool in making their history the task of my life; but at that time they were *ἀλάστορες* of the human race. It cannot be denied, however, that Perseus brought this war upon himself by his own conduct.

Many persons at Rome were oppressed by a feeling of dulness and were ill at ease. The Romans in this respect were a strange people: when one great man was agitated by restlessness, others were immoveable. Old Cato, for example, who entertained a deadly hatred only against Carthage, was in reality averse to war, and very often opposed it, not from a spirit of contradiction, but because he took no pleasure in war, and because he knew the evils which result from it. In this manner no determination was come to. The Roman people, which had to pay its taxes and give its sons for the war, had still to suffer for years in consequence of war; whence many were averse to a renewal of it. There also prevailed great bitterness against the rich, who derived advantages from war, for the grandees had the command of the armies and enriched themselves. The popular opposition was loudly expressed. Perseus, moreover, was in such a condition that the Romans dreaded to attack him; they knew that his treasury and arsenals were well stocked, and that there existed in Macedonia an army of 30,000 men, which ought not to have existed: but they tacitly allowed it, and would not command its dissolution, because they well knew that they would

receive a negative answer, which would necessarily lead to war.

It was, also, known that Perseus was very popular among the Thessalians, Aetolians, and Achaeans, who regarded him as a Greek, for all the Macedonians had for a long time past been treated by the Greeks as their countrymen, and his miserable personal character was overlooked. The Greeks were everywhere divided into three parties; the first consisted of persons who had sold themselves out and out to the Romans, and did anything and everything to please their commanders, merely for the purpose of being able, through them, to tyrannise over their own countrymen; this was the worst of all parties. The second was opposed, though not diametrically, to the first, and consisted of men who, with blind zeal, sought to ally themselves with Macedonia; there were among them many honest people, but all were blind, inconsiderate, and mere enthusiasts. But they, nevertheless, formed a motley assemblage, for besides the enthusiasts there were others who wanted to make use of the Macedonians only as tools; that is, all those who had been offended by the Romans, good and bad men mixed together. The smallest but most honourable party stood between these two: it was that of the wise men, who looked to nothing but the interests of their country; they were superior in talent, but were, of course, decried by the men of the extreme parties as persons without character; this is always the case, especially as certain weaknesses appear at all times among such a party of the centre. But they were men of real respectability, and it matters little whether they are on the right or on the left, as was the case with Polybius, and in the present French chambers with Royer Collard, and Agier; it is a mere accident whether they sit on the right or the left centre. This party prevailed in Achaia, as it was in possession of the government; but it was obliged sometimes to make use of one, and sometimes of the other extreme party, and these two extremes endeavoured to tear it to pieces. It is a terrible thing to belong to such a centre: at the time when my voice was of any weight, I too belonged to it. If Perseus had continued his preparations for some years longer, and (as the Romans, contrary to all expectations, undertook nothing) if he had kept up the system of his father, until the Romans in their imprudence had gone farther against Rhodes and Eumenes of

Pergamus and had provoked them still more, he might have made the attempt without risking his own existence; but then he ought to have been a man capable of leading an army and making every effort as his father would have done. As, however, this was not the case, he ought to have thanked heaven for his being able to temporise.

Perseus from the beginning made preparations against the Romans; "he commenced negotiations with Prusias and Antiochus Epiphanes, nay, even with Eumenes," and endeavoured to gain popularity among the Greeks.² At Athens and in Achaia all intercourse with Macedonia was forbidden even in time of peace; hence all runaway slaves fled to the Macedonians, because the latter, in return, did not allow the Athenians and Achaeans to enter their country. But Perseus ordered the runaway slaves to be collected, and sent them back to the Achaeans with the request that they should become his friends. The leading men were glad of this opportunity of making peace, without any intention of making the Romans their enemies on that account; but Callicrates, a traitor deserving to be branded for ever, in order to flatter the Romans in every way, opposed the plan in the assembly, and represented this alliance with Perseus as an act of treachery against Rome, so that an embassy was indeed sent to the king, but his offer was declined. In other states he was more successful; the Boeotians, being favourable to Macedonia, thoughtlessly concluded a treaty with him. Perseus himself, accompanied by a considerable detachment of troops, went to Delphi (Olymp. 151, 2), offered up sacrifices, and treated the Greeks in a friendly manner, but without doing anything further, returned to Macedonia. "By the manner in which he conducted himself, he deceived the Greeks in regard to his abilities, and many of them were as enthusiastic for him as for a deliverer."

This visit to Greece was a great provocation to the Romans. At this time Eumenes, of Pergamus—who endeavoured to extend his dominion in Thrace for the purpose of giving to his country military strength, who was very distrustful of Perseus who, being connected by marriage with Prusias and

² In 1826, Niebuhr stated, "Perseus received the Greek ambassadors, who congratulated him on his accession, with kindness, and honoured them with small presents which were well received, for the time when extravagant presents came from Alexandria and Antioch was gone by." What is the authority for this account?—Ed.

Antiochus, began to make him uneasy and had already attempted to assassinate him—went to Rome, that he might in person intrigue against Perseus, and charged the Greek towns with being favourably disposed towards Macedonia, while he himself had formerly endeavoured to make himself popular in Greece, and, though in vain, had attempted to induce the Greeks to select him as their protector. The Romans now negotiated with Perseus, though neither of them wanted anything else but war. Perseus, however, though still making preparations, avoided it; but at last, in the ninth year of his reign (Olymp. 152, 1), the war broke out, in consequence of the Romans landing in Epirus: for the last nineteen years no Roman army had been in Greece. The Bocotians were the only Greeks who had really entered into an understanding with Perseus. He had nearly succeeded in gaining over the Aetolians also. A portion of the Epirots were attached to him, but there was much internal discord among them. The Molottians had unreservedly declared in favour of Perseus; the different small tribes often changed their parties, but especially the king of the Athamanians, and they formed only small states, without ever concentrating their strength. Individual partisans of Perseus existed everywhere. But owing to his oriental avarice, he frustrated the expedition of the Bastarnae and Scordiscans, although they were already moving: he refused to give up to them his darling money, and thus stopped their march.

The war with Perseus now broke out. The account of it in Livy is lost, as the last books of Livy in the Lorsch MS. are unfortunately mutilated; but from the fragments of Polybius and Plutarch's life of Aemilius Paullus, we can form some idea of it.

The Roman army proceeded from Epirus to Thessaly, but being too weak it could not attack Perseus, "nor could it place full confidence in the Greeks in its rear." Its commander, the consul Marcius Philippus, therefore, induced Perseus to conclude an armistice, in order to carry on negotiations of peace; "and Perseus, though he had been successful in the first engagement, allowed himself to be duped, instead of following up his advantages under circumstances in which he could lose nothing, but might gain everything." The Romans, on the other hand, employed this time in stirring up the Greeks and

strengthening themselves. The Boeotians, being without a Macedonian garrison, regretted their former steps, because the Romans had removed the most zealous partisans of Macedonia, and demanded that those nations which did not stand by Perseus, should publicly declare against him. In consequence of this, several tribes abandoned the Boeotian alliance. Only the two towns of Coronea and Haliartus clung to Macedonia; the Romans besieged and took them, and Haliartus was so completely destroyed that no trace of it remained. The Romans, throughout this war, showed themselves altogether degenerate and cruel; their generals, the praetor C. Lucretius, and the consul Crassus, furiously ravaged all districts which had declared for Perseus, and even their allied towns were not spared by their licentious soldiers. The allies, suffering terribly, made complaints, but the senate in a cold manner expressed its sympathy, and although one of those most guilty was fined by the tribunes of the people—which Livy records as an unparalleled act of generosity—and although the military discipline was somewhat improved, yet the misfortunes of that time were terrible. The most distinguished persons in the towns were put to death; at Thebes whole families were sold as slaves, and Greece, with the exception of Thessaly and Peloponnesus, was fearfully ravaged, the Greeks themselves often being traitors to their own country. In the second year of the war, Roman commissioners appeared among the Achaeans, Aetolians, and Acarnanians. They were mildest towards the Achaeans, among whom they complained only of the ill-disposed; in the Aetolian towns, on the other hand, they demanded hostages of those whom they did not consider to be faithful, and this evil was averted only with great difficulty. According to Polybius, a fearful civil war had just been brought to a close in Aetolia; Thoas, an enemy of the Romans, had now given himself up to them, and instigated them against his own countrymen, nay, he even demanded the surrender of a man of rank, to whom he was indebted for his own life. The partisans of the Romans among the Acarnanians, and even the anti-Macedonian party, demanded Roman garrisons, which, when admitted, acted in a most dreadful manner.

Meantime the decisive answer of the senate had arrived, that Perseus must surrender at discretion, and thus the war was

recommenced; "but it was carried on by the Romans without energy." The Roman tactics, with all its advantages, was not like the phalanx, in which a raw rustic could be employed, who, without previous training, might be advanced through the hindmost ranks; the further training probably followed afterwards, but any gap could be filled up immediately. In the Roman system, on the other hand, it was necessary for every soldier to know his position and to be carefully trained, and in so far the Roman system was inferior, because no use could be made of the masses. Moreover, when there had been a long peace, as before the war of Perseus, the troops were not trained; the veterans were then engaged in Spain and obliged to remain there, so that untrained regiments had to be sent against Macedonia. This was one of the causes why the war so often went on badly; another reason was, that there never had been such a scarcity of good generals as at that time. Perseus was victorious everywhere; the number of his followers, under these circumstances, was ever increasing, and we cannot say how the war would have ended, if the Romans had not roused themselves from their sluggishness. There was still one man to avenge their disgrace: it was L. Aemilius Paullus.

He made every preparation to carry on the war successfully, and drilled his troops, who had already received some training during the war. He commenced his work in good earnest, and after four years of a doubtful struggle, the war was at last decided (Olymp. 152, 4); for the Romans, after having sustained several serious defeats, penetrated across the mountains behind Olympus into Pieria, where Perseus might easily have defended the passes. But his avarice destroyed him: the Bastarnae, who had offered him their services, were to be got rid of, because his circumstances had improved; he would not pay them the promised money, and they had departed; by the same avarice, he brought ruin on the Illyrian Gentius, who had declared against the Romans. Perseus, as I said before, did not prevent the Romans crossing the mountains, and they now defeated the king near Dium in the plain of Emathia, and this battle decided the fate of Perseus. "His army was destroyed, and Perseus was not the man to face such a misfortune, and thought only of his own safety, although he still had places, in which the commanders and the troops were

ready, for the sake of his and their own honour, to shed their last drop of blood." But the whole kingdom was broken up, Perseus fled to Samothrace, and surrendered himself and his children to the Romans. He was taken prisoner, and, "although the Roman commanders hinted to him that he might make away with himself, he did not do so," but was carried with his family to Rome, led about in triumph, and slowly killed with unworthy cruelty.

"Macedonia now ceased to be a state. Ten legates were appointed to divide the country, with a truly Italian policy, into four parts, in order that the state might have no name, around which the people might rally. Each part received, we might almost say, in mockery, a municipal republican constitution, the legates regulated the senate, etc. The people were required to pay to the Romans only one half of the land-tax which they had paid to the king: this was intended as a bait for the masses, and at the same time all the nobles, who, as the Romans said, had oppressed the people under the king, were carried away."

The subjugation of Macedonia belongs to Roman history, but its consequences are more properly discussed in general history.

During the war with Perseus, the minds of the Greeks had become more and more divided. No one had imagined, that Macedonia would be able to hold out in such a war; and every one was astonished at the resistance and the strength which Macedonia displayed. Many, therefore, attached themselves more closely to it.

Eumenes, though he had been at enmity with Perseus, and had in reality caused the outbreak of the war, gradually came round, and during the latter years, had become reconciled with Perseus, and joined him. "This mode of acting is quite foreign to us western nations, and occurs in the history of European states only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: Perseus intends to cause Eumenes to be murdered, whereupon Eumenes accuses him at Rome of disturbing the good understanding with the Romans, and immediately afterwards Perseus succeeds in making him hesitate about his alliance with Rome." Eumenes was indeed obliged to send succour to the Romans, but his troops evidently had secret instructions. Prusias, king of Bithynia, under whom that small, barbarous state had first

acquired its importance and the extent of a powerful kingdom, such as we see it in the maps of ancient geography, was likewise in the interest of Perseus, and connected with him by marriage.

It was quite natural, that the best among the Greeks, that is, the real patriots, even if they were not exactly hostile to the Romans, nor attached to Perseus, yet could not wish, by any means, that the former should be successful; and this was indeed so natural, that, on calm reflection, the Romans themselves could not disapprove of the feeling; for every one saw, that their existence with a moderate amount of self-government, could last only as long as it pleased the Romans. Prudent men did not expect that Perseus could put an end to the dominion of the Romans on the east of the Adriatic; they considered his resistance to the Romans not only to be impossible, but not even desirable, because he brought misfortune upon them; they only wanted to see a mutual balance of power, and a more modest mode of acting on the part of the Romans. But others believed that the result would be decidedly in favour of the Romans, and that for this reason the contest was so little desirable, that they ought at once, and without hesitation, to yield to the more powerful party. Such was the state of parties among the men who were really able to judge. Others were sold to the Romans, either for money they had received, or from adulation and a servile disposition. The weakest party was in favour of Perseus, partly from folly, entertaining extravagant hopes of him, partly because they were angry with their own countrymen for supporting the Romans, and partly perhaps also because Perseus had had recourse to bribery. From the beginning of the war, the Greeks generally had little hope; hence even the Achaeans, by the command of the Romans, had sent assistance to Chalcis, and taken possession of the place, while Rhodes equipped a fleet and placed it at the disposal of the Romans, their fleet being the only important one at that period.

But afterwards the Rhodians, unfortunately, were tempted to try to act as mediators of peace. I do not believe, however, that this step was as foolish as it is represented in our histories; at least, in the fragments of Polybius, himself a great and contemporary statesman, the occurrence does not look so imprudent. However, among the Rhodians too there were

enthusiasts, who were indescribably exasperated against the Romans on account of their interference, and the unjust decisions, by which they deprived the Rhodians, step by step, of the possessions which they had conceded to them after the war with Antiochus. The Rhodians were still conscious of their freedom and independence. At the time when Perseus married Laodice, they had prudently availed themselves of the opportunity, and conveyed the princess in a most sumptuous manner to a port of Macedonia, where she was received by the Macedonians. With the Romans they were not on good terms, for as their power was increasing, the Romans began to combine cunning with their arbitrary proceedings, and being jealous of the Rhodians, they had even before this time tried to weaken them. The Lycians, refusing to pay their tribute to the Rhodians, applied to the Romans and to Eumenes. The latter, one of the most cunning and malign politicians of the time, thoroughly faithless, and bent only on his personal advantages, was indebted for his great acquisitions to the Romans and Rhodians, and not to himself. He now endeavoured to extend his power at the expense of the Rhodians, and excited the Carians and Lycians against them. For this reason, the Rhodians, even about the time of Philip's death, had received an equivocal answer from the Romans as a reply to their complaints. The senate, it was said, did not regard them as subjects of the Rhodians, but as nations under the protection of Rome. Such an answer naturally offended the Rhodians. A party favourable to the Romans, however, was formed at the very commencement of the war; Dinon and Polyaratus were its active leaders, but it remained a minority. Formerly the Romans had declined making use of the fleet of the Rhodians, but the prætor Lucretius, whose mission it was to irritate and stir up all free people, now sent a letter to the Rhodians by means of an aleiptes, in which, in a coarse and offensive manner, he demanded several ships. The anti-Roman party, and the impartial men sought and found a pretext for refusing to give the ships; but the more prudent men succeeded in inducing their countrymen to obey the command. When the ships arrived, Lucretius added a fresh offence by sending them back without making any use of them.

Soon after this, the consul Marcus Philippus advised the Rhodians to send the unfortunate embassy to him, requesting

him to declare what kind of assistance he wanted from them. He again thanked them, but intimated that he was surprised they did not step in between him and Perseus as mediators. Rhodes suffered not a little in consequence of the war, for their wealth consisted in their ships, and at sea they sustained considerable injury from the numerous pirates. They were accordingly the more zealous in seizing upon the opportunity of acting as mediators, which was offered to them by the consul; and at the same time the partisans of Perseus thus found a way of assisting him, and coming forward against Rome. Eumenes now acted as mediator between Perseus and the Rhodians. He himself desired to be neutral, and endeavoured to form connections with Antiochus Epiphanes. The Rhodians sent at the same time one embassy to Rome and another to Perseus, where their envoys spoke in the proud tone of mediators. Perseus thanked them for their endeavours, but the Roman senate haughtily rejected their offers.

The Achaeans had at this time acquired a character and a dignity which they had never possessed before. At the head of their state was Lycortas, an excellent and distinguished man, a good citizen, and a brave soldier, though without any scientific knowledge of military affairs;³ and beside him stood his son Polybius. Both endeavoured as much as possible to keep the Achaeans free from a disgraceful dependence on Rome, and sought to strengthen the state. The influence of the confederacy had greatly increased; it had received considerable support from other states—advantages for which the Achaeans made no return; they had in particular concluded an alliance with the court of Alexandria. This excited the jealousy of the Romans, and as early as the second year of the war with Perseus, Roman commissioners had been sent to complain of the ill-disposed among them. After this embassy, the most prominent among the Peloponnesians (Achaeans, Argives, and Arcadians) met to deliberate; and according to a fragment of Polybius, they resolved upon a measure which does all honour to their intelligence, their calmness, and their patriotism. They appointed Archon, an Old-Achaean, strategus, and Polybius, hipparchus; the latter of them was less favourable to the Romans than the former. All the Achaean forces were to march to Thessaly to join the Romans, and aid them in decid-

³ "Lycortas seems to have died during the war against Perseus."—1826.

ing the issue of the war. Polybius went as ambassador to the consul Marcius Philippus, who had a terrible propensity to employ cunning and intrigues even where he could decide a question by his power alone, and whose only object was to calumniate and insult the free states of Greece—this was quite worthy of him who boasted of having outwitted Perseus, the most cunning man of the time. Marcius, as already remarked, declined the auxiliaries of the Achaeans. At the same time, however, a message came from Appius Cento, the praetor in Epirus, demanding 5,000 auxiliaries, because the war was protracted. If these auxiliaries had been sent, no reproach could have been made against the Achaeans; but the consul Marcius himself dissuaded them from sending support to Appius, appealing to a decree of the senate which had been passed under different circumstances, and according to which no Roman commander was allowed, without the sanction of the senate, to demand assistance from the allies. The Achaeans accordingly refused to send succour.

They were, as I said before, allied with the Alexandrian court. When, therefore, Ptolemy Philometor was threatened by Antiochus Epiphanes, the ministers of the young king applied simultaneously to Rome and to the Achaeans for assistance, asking leave to raise one thousand mercenaries among the Achaeans. Lycortas and Polybius exerted themselves in support of the request, in order to show to the world that the Achaeans were not so unimportant: but Callicrates opposed them by a letter from Marcius Philippus, in which he called upon the Achaeans to keep peace, and to confine themselves to sending, along with the Romans, ambassadors to Antiochus, to demand of him that he should not disturb the peace of Egypt. This Callicrates was a native of Leontium, one of the twelve Old-Achaean towns—one of those small places, which being naturally enraged against the larger ones, tried to effect everything by calling in foreign powers. The independence and pride of the Achaeans roused the Romans against them, without there being any real cause for complaint.

When Perseus had fallen, the Romans set themselves up in judgment over all, and especially over the Rhodians.

The Illyrian king, Gentius, at Scutari, who was ruined by the avarice of Perseus, fell about the same time as his destroyer. Perseus had promised him considerable subsidies; but when

Gentius had gone so far that he was unable to retrace his steps, Perseus refused to give him the money. Gentius was then unable to offer any resistance, and the avarice of his ally led him to destruction. His kingdom was broken up, and he himself taken prisoner. After this the Romans took fearful vengeance upon the Epirots, evidently meaning to chastise them for what Pyrrhus had done. The Roman troops who had been engaged in Epirus, were quartered there, which alone was a terrible punishment; for when Romans took up their quarters in a town, it was treated like a place taken by storm, except that the inhabitants were not sold as slaves. On an appointed day the Romans satisfied their revenge by a general massacre, like that of Glencoe, the murder of the Irish in 1640, and that of the Huguenots. The Epirots were almost extirpated, but especially the Molottians: 150,000 men are said to have been murdered or sold as slaves. Their property was plundered by the soldiers. All the surviving Epirots were made subjects of the tyrant Charops. It is frightful, that a man like Aemilius Paullus could allow himself to be employed in such a deed of blood. Authors generally say, that the moral greatness of the Romans disappeared after the war with Perseus; but we may say with more justice that this occurred during that war. The Romans had never yet been guilty of such deliberate and terrible cruelty.

Among the Aetolians, Acarnanians, Bocotians, and all the Greek tribes that were under the control of the Romans, they gave unlimited power to those persons who were devoted to them, placing Roman cohorts at their disposal, with which those monsters ruled according to their own discretion, and murdered all those whom they hated. Even when Aemilius Paullus, after the conquest of Perseus, travelled through Greece, he met many fugitive Aetolians, who told him that the friends and partisans of the Romans had murdered many, exiled others, and deprived many of their property. "The Roman party, after persecuting the patriots on the instigation of the Roman commissioners, began to see that they had gone too far; on stating that their lives were not safe, they had received some Roman battalions, and with these troops they had murdered all the most eminent men, amounting to about 2,000. And even Aemilius Paullus granted to all licence to commit any crime, if they were but favourable to Rome; and when the relations

of the murdered brought their pitiable complaints before the Romans, the latter hypocritically declared that they would inquire into the matter, but left the investigation to the murderers themselves." The partisans of the Romans from all parts of Greece had flocked to Pella and the Roman headquarters at Pydna, and at their instigation, all those who had sided with Macedonia were summoned, and most cruelly punished.⁴

In regard to the Achaeans, the Romans stood in a very different relation: they had maintained their dignity, and the Romans did not know how to act towards them, for nothing had been found that could be brought against them, not even in the papers of Perseus. At length, however, the Romans sent commissioners to Achaia, who declared before the assembly, that many Achaeans had received money from Perseus, as was proved by his papers, that they had been engaged with him in a treacherous plot, and with him had intrigued against Rome. The Achaeans suitably replied, that, if the Romans would produce the papers and could prove the charge, the guilty persons would be made to feel the rigour of the law. The Roman commissioners then demanded, that the Achaeans should first pronounce the sentence of death against all, who had intrigued with Perseus, adding that then the Romans would mention the names of the guilty, but furnish no evidence: "it was a demand like those with which Germany had to comply from the time of the Directory until the fall of Napoleon." The Achaeans resolutely and manfully refused to do so. On the advice of Callicrates, the commissioners now declared, that all the strategi of the last years were guilty. Zenon, one of them, and a man far above all reproach, then came forward requesting that his own case should be inquired into. The commissioners taking advantage of this, demanded that those whom they considered to be guilty, should, according to the ancient Italian law of nations, by which the wronged party was judge, be placed before the bar of the Roman senate. As the Achaeans could not protect their best men against the Roman legions, and hoped that after all they

⁴ "In Thessaly the Romans seem to have made no change in the constitution. Magnesia and other states (?) were probably obliged to pay to Rome the same taxes as they had previously paid to Macedonia; otherwise they seem to have suffered little under the policy of the Romans."—1825.

would be found innocent, they replied that, if it could not be otherwise, they would comply, though it was contrary to the existing treaties. The Roman commissioners, in conjunction with the traitors among the Achaeans, as Callicrates and the like, now made out a proscription list of 1000 eminent men in the different Achaean towns⁵—a circumstance from which we may draw an inference as to the population of Peloponnesus at the time. These men, the flower of the nation, and among them Polybius, were dragged to Italy to be there tried by the Romans; this, however, was not done, but they were kept as hostages, and distributed as state prisoners among the municipia of Italy. Some of them who tried to escape, were captured again, and put to death under the pretext that they were guilty of some crime. The others were not tried at all, because there was no evidence of anything; not even a shadow of inquiry was ever instituted against them.

Rhodes was treated with the most implacable spirit of revenge; and years passed away before anything was decided. When the war in Macedonia began to turn out in favour of Rome, the Rhodians sent a fresh embassy to apologise for having attempted to act as mediators, but they were repulsed in the haughtiest manner, and ordered to quit Rome after the conclusion of the war. About the same time a Roman embassy proceeded to Egypt, to declare that Antiochus had no right to claim that country; a member of that embassy went to Rhodes, and gave to the intimidated Rhodians the good advice to make peace with Rome, whereupon they spontaneously delivered up the guilty, and the partizans of Perseus were exiled even before the Romans demanded it. A third embassy of the Rhodians to Rome was at first not listened to at all; the praetor assembled the people and wanted at once to declare war against them; but afterwards the tribunes induced the Romans to listen to the ambassadors, especially as all of them were great friends of the Romans; but all that their Roman friends could obtain was to prevent as yet the declaration of war. But the senate declared Caria and Lycia independent—a loss to Rhodes, but a punishment which might

⁵ “Unless this be a misunderstanding in Pausanias (vii. 10, § 7, foll.), for ‘all the Greeks:’ from a fragment of Polybius, at least, it is clear that Epirotes also were carried away.”—1825. [In 1826, Niebuhr, apparently with justice, seems to suppose, that Epirot and other patriots were carried away independently of the Achaeans.—ED.]

easily be overlooked. However much the Rhodians might desire by the conclusion of a formal alliance with the Romans to get out of the disagreeable situation into which they had fallen by their attempt at mediation, yet even at this critical time they remained faithful to the dignity of their republic, in so far as they did not seek an alliance with the Romans, but decreed, that the navarchus Theaetetus should go as ambassador to Rome, with full powers to conclude any treaty which only required the ratification of the senate. By devising this plan, they saved themselves the humiliation which they had suffered before, even if the result should not be what they wished, especially as the negotiations of Theaetetus were not successful. The citizens of Caunis and Stratonicea, who ruled over several towns, but were themselves subjects of Rhodes, revolted, in the hope that the senate would declare against the Rhodians, but they were soon reduced to submission. The Romans now vented their anger, and deprived the Rhodians not only of what they had given them, but also of what they had not given them. But even this did not discompose the Rhodians. At length, in the fourth year, when they were almost confined to their own island, a peace was concluded and an alliance promised; the alliance was certainly not an equal one, and the Rhodians had to recognise the supremacy of the Romans (Olymp. 153, 4). Among other measures which the Romans adopted to humble the Rhodians, one was a decree declaring Delos a free port: Lemnos and Delos, which had hitherto been in the hands of Perseus, had been given by the Romans, at the conclusion of the war, to the Athenians. Commerce became afterwards actually concentrated at Delos, which was particularly remarkable as a great slave-market. This was an immense blow to the commerce of the Rhodians, and their revenues decreased so much, that the import and export duties were reduced from one million to 150,000 drachmae.

It was owing to the interference of old Cato alone, who throughout those circumstances displayed his noble character, that Rhodes was able to maintain its existence as well as it was possible in those times.

The unfortunate Achaeans, one of whom was Polybius, were kept in Italy for seventeen years. The Achaeans sent one embassy after another to effect their restoration, but in

vain; the senate always gave an evasive answer, and not until Olymp. 157, 2, when out of the one thousand only three hundred were surviving, the latter, on Cato's proposal, were permitted to return, without an attempt having ever been made to convict them. When they returned to their country, they found an immense exasperation prevailing against the Romans. In the meantime the servile creatures of the Romans had held the supreme power in Achaia; and among the young generation especially, which had grown up under the oppression, there existed such a deadly hatred of the Romans, that out of this excitement, which was as inconsiderate as it was vehement, the Achacan war arose. Most of the old men who returned, like the great Polybius, no doubt exerted themselves in advising their countrymen to keep peace.⁶ There prevailed at that time, and all at once, the greatest excitement throughout the world, in Africa, in Spain, in Syria, and in Greece. It was, as Polybius says, like a violent fever, which preceded the destruction of all those countries.

⁶ "The animosity of a party which is exasperated and wild in consequence of oppression, is just as inclined to abuse as that which has practised the oppression. It was the knowledge of this truth that induced Polybius not to avail himself of the permission to return granted by the senate. It is a well known fact, that a long absence from one's country makes one a complete stranger to it, even when things are going on there most prosperously. If we are absent for any length of time, we do not change with and through our own country; we rather become changed through the influence of the nation among which we live, or else we isolate ourselves for ourselves, and acquire a more strongly marked individuality than is desirable. And, although our country may not have been tyrannised over, changes have gone on, and as we have not gone along with them, and as the country has not changed in the same manner as we have, we do not find ourselves at home. This was certainly the case with Polybius. Moreover, he had hitherto seen only the bad side of the Romans; but at Rome he saw their constitution, of which he well knew that it would degenerate; but it was as yet excellent, whereas Greece had nothing at all. The old Roman manners had indeed disappeared, together with the rude age in which they had prevailed, but there still existed honesty and good faith, if not in public, at least in private life; whereas these were things which no one looked for among the Greeks. The latter still had the ceremonies of their ancient religion, but without any moral substance. At Rome, on the other hand, Polybius found a religion with a fundamental principle of morality, which referred everything to the conscience, and which made people conscious that whatever they did, they did in the sight of higher beings. This convinced him, that, however unhappy the world was, the dominion of the Romans was the will of God, to which man must submit."—1826.

LECTURE CXI.

THE condition of Achæia during this period of the Roman dominion, from A.U.C. 582 to 602 (that is, to Olymp. 157, 2), was peculiar and is very obscure.¹ The government was in a very sad condition: Callicrates and Andronidas tyrannised over the Achæians, although they had no followers, and although the people were so enraged against the former, that he was publicly hissed, and everybody shunned him. "He is a man who stands forth branded in every respect with everlasting infamy; he was never invited by a Greek either to dinner or to a wedding;" but still it was impossible to change the direction he gave to the state. "He was regarded as a demon, whose existence could not be controlled." No consideration was shewn towards foreign powers: it was a state of utter inactivity and leisure, but at the same time of material prosperity. Commerce and agriculture were thriving, as is mentioned several times by Polybius; the taxes were not very heavy, the laws were suited to the circumstances, and hence it was a period of general material well-being. But at the same time, it is evident that the number of regular marriages decreased immensely, and consequently that of persons who were born citizens also; it was just the same as towards the end of the Roman republic and under the Roman emperors, when people generally lived in concubinage. It was a deplorable condition. There was not a trace of intellectual life; literature no longer existed, except that a few philosophers still lived at Athens. Poetry was confined to little poems, and was cultivated in Asia more than in Peloponnesus; the new comedy had entirely died away. In spite of the material prosperity, nothing was done for the arts and for monuments. The Achæians preserved the Greek name until the end, but the Romans need not have been jealous of them. There were still some places to be subdued to complete the supremacy of Rome,

¹ "Towards the end of this period, Polybius published the first edition of his History, which he afterwards remodelled. His residence at Rome is fortunate for us, for without it he would never have been able to write his History."—1825.

as Carthage, for example; and so long as that city existed, the Romans turned their eyes towards those who might be an obstacle to their subduing those places.

At the beginning of the seventh century of Rome, Achaia embraced the whole of Peloponnesus; it must have extended its dominion even beyond it, for not to mention Megara, which had belonged to it before, it now also comprised Pleuron and Calydon, which were originally Aetolian towns, but are called both Aetolian and Achæan. In general people had become accustomed to the Achæan league, and it was only at Sparta that the connection was borne with reluctance: "and even this would not have been the case had Philopoemen not abolished the Spartan institutions. This was a religious persecution, for the laws of the Spartans had been confirmed by the oracle, and although no one could at that time speak of ancient Spartans, yet the Helots, their adopted successors, as it were, regarded themselves as the heirs of the laws and institutions of ancient Sparta." With the exception of Achaia, Greece proper consisted of a number of small states without any connection among themselves. The Aetolians were subject to the Romans; Athens, Phocis, Acarnania, and Eubœa, were separate states, and their political condition was the same as that of the Achæans. The case of the states in the islands was different. Rhodes had a morally respectable internal existence; its constitution was still free, and deliberations still took place. Poetry never flourished there, but a prose literature now commenced among the Rhodians, oratory rose, and they cultivated oratorical literature, which afterwards reached a very flourishing condition among them. In addition to this there was an immense activity in commerce and navigation, and they were in possession of a considerable fleet, with which, in many circumstances, they acted a prominent part. Western Asia was hellenised, and was regarded as a Greek country. The people spoke and wrote Greek, and now seemed to be determined to take up and propagate literature, just as if, *e.g.*, the Swiss wanted to propagate French literature; for at Berne and Zürich more French is spoken than German; some persons there actually do seize the spirit of the French language, but afterwards they forget it again; or as if the Netherlands or Italians wished to do the same: these nations would be wanting in the ruling and correcting principle of nationality. This

gave rise to what is called Asiatic oratory, the principal seat of which was at Tralles, but it was cultivated also at Magnesia and other towns of western Asia, and greatly resembles the taste of Mademoiselle de Scuderi, and other authors of the period of Louis XIII.

I cannot here give you a detailed account of the destruction of Achæia, and must refer you to my Lectures on Roman History, in which I have spoken of it at some length. Who will not deplore that last and most cruel blow which was inflicted upon Greece! but we, nevertheless, cannot conceal from ourselves the truth, that its condition was wretched and miserable. The nation was prosperous without having an opportunity of exercising its strength, and this prosperity was the cause of its moral decay. Such a state of things is corrected by small communities connecting themselves with larger states of the same nation; but when they continue to be isolated and independent of one another, without having any moving power in themselves, all that is manly and great in them must die away, while a miserable local vanity is rising up. Such is the case in Italy. What can interest a citizen of Parma or Lucca? His attention is directed towards foreign countries; his life is indeed sometimes excited, but in a wrong way. In like manner, the Tuscan has no longer a political existence, he knows that his state is a small boat fastened to a large ship. In the middle ages, matters were different. In large states there are direct and peculiar passions which nourish our feelings and give us occupation; whereas in small states passion directs itself to foreign interests. Moral baseness displays itself in all things.

The misfortune of Achæia—great as the crime of the Romans is—arose out of the moral degradation of the Achæans themselves, out of the corruptibility of their leaders. A young generation had sprung up, which shewed the greatest indignation against the Romans; but it was a branch broken from the tree, and without roots: it had no strength. “They were enthusiasts and the destroyers of Greece.”

The disputes which, in the end, led to the fatal war, arose out of the intrigues of Menalcidas, a Lacedæmonian, who even rose to the dignity of strategus. This Menalcidas, with a remarkable elasticity in his wickedness, jumped from one party to another. The quarrels between the Achæans and Lacedæ-

monians are said to have arisen from his villany and that of Diaeus of Megalopolis, on the occasion of a quarrel between Athens and Oropus.² They were disputing about the rights of the confederacy, and Menalcidas exerted himself to bring about the separation of Lacedaemon from Achaia. Rome favoured the scheme, because it afforded a pretext for war. When, therefore, the Lacedaemonians requested the Roman senate to decide the question, the Achaeans blamed this, appealing to a former decree, according to which no individual state was to apply to another to act as mediator.

This gave rise to a war, and a wretched war it was. Diaeus, with an army of the Achaean confederates, entered Laconia, demanding the condemnation of the obstreperous. A Spartan senator proposed, that the twenty-four whose condemnation was demanded by Diaeus, should of their own accord go into exile. This was done, and according to a preconcerted plan, all were condemned to death. But these exiles were kindly received by the Roman senate, and Diaeus and Callicrates were sent to Rome to counteract their influence. The latter died on his journey, having apparently somewhat changed his conduct

² "The town of Oropus, of which, ever since the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had wanted to take possession, which was often subdued by them, but each time taken from them again, had, according to Pausanias, been assigned to them by Philip after the Macedonian war, that is, he had made the town tributary to Athens. The Athenians, it is said, plundered the town, because they were suffering from severe poverty—but they had probably imposed too heavy taxes upon the Oropians, and levied them too rigorously, so that the Oropians applied to the Romans for redress. A great quantity of existing Athenian tetradrachmae still attests the poverty prevailing at that time in Athens, for they consist of copper only covered over with a thin coat of silver. The Athenians were then compelled to pay to the Oropians one hundred talents as an indemnification; but they contrived to become reconciled with them, and induced them not to exact the money, to return to their former relation, and admit a garrison into their town. The conduct of this garrison, however, induced the Oropians to demand its withdrawal. As the Athenians refused, the Oropians applied to the Achaeans, and bribed Menalcidas, who happened to be strategus (Olymp. 157, 2), with ten talents; Menalcidas again prevailed upon Callicrates to persuade the popular assembly to compel Athens to pay the one hundred talents. But the Athenians were beforehand with them: they completely plundered Oropus, and Menalcidas also exacted the promised sum with the greatest insolence, while he himself refused to pay to Callicrates the sum he had promised him. The latter charged him with high treason, and Menalcidas retaliated. The former repaired to Rome, and Menalcidas is said to have saved his life only by bribing Diaeus, who was strategus in Olymp. 157, 3. The manner in which out of this quarrel the disputes between the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians arose is not clear."—1825.

during the latter part of his life. Diaeus and Menalcidas vehemently disputed before the senate, which simply commanded them to return and wait, until a Roman embassy should bring over a decisive answer. The Achaeans, however, did not wait, and Damocritus, who had in the meantime succeeded Diaeus as strategus (Olymp. 157, 4) invaded Laconia, before the Roman ambassadors arrived, defeated the enemy, and advanced as far as Sparta. He had no intention to pursue them farther, and the Achaeans accordingly accused and condemned him, thinking that he had been bribed; and he went into exile. This happened probably in A.U.C. 604; and Diaeus now became strategus in the place of Damocritus.

In the meantime the great drama throughout the world came to a crisis (Olymp. 158, 1). The Romans had undertaken the destruction of Carthage, but did not find it so easy as they had imagined. "The war took the same course as all those which the Romans commenced with new troops and unskilful generals." A heroic resistance was offered to them, like that of Saragossa and Gerona, and it was believed, that Rome would break down in its struggle with Carthage, and that the latter would rise again. The illusion was the same as that which was created by the resistance of Saragossa. As in 1808 and 1809, Saragossa held out against the siege so heroically, the reports of the progress of General Lannes were disbelieved even by French officers. I was then in the Netherlands, among men in authority, and did not believe them either; and when on the thirteenth of February, Saragossa capitulated, it came upon me like a thunderbolt from a serene sky. The same illusion was spread by the battle of Aboukir, and by the resistance of the Spaniards in 1808. As the former brought about the war of the coalition, and the latter the war of Austria in 1809, so the resistance of the Carthaginians called forth everywhere a spirit of revolt, and the general opinion was that Rome had become effete, and that the time had arrived for breaking her yoke. We may easily imagine many of the reasons by which this opinion was supported. Rome at that time had not one great man who could be singled out from the rest. Scipio Africanus Paulli³

³ "He ought not to be called Aemilianus, a name which does not occur till the third or fourth century; Cicero writes *Paulli filius*. According to analogy

filius was yet very young: he came forward all on a sudden, and terrified the world at his first appearance, just as Buonaparte did in 1796. In the provinces, the most contemptible side of the character of the Romans was seen; they were beheld as plunderers and oppressors; it was known that they were hated by all the world, and it was expected that a general insurrection would break out, extending from Spain to the extreme East. And it was believed that Rome could not stand against it. It is possible that the nations may have heard of the internal decay of Rome, of the ferment in Italy, and of the discontent of the allies.

* Under these circumstances, an insurrection first broke out in Macedonia. The Romans had torn that country asunder in four parts, as Napoleon wanted to divide Poland into three states, an attempt which proved fatal to him. The Romans in Macedonia had not left the masses together, which in language and origin, as well as geographically, were united; but with a diabolic and calculating policy, they had torn the country to pieces, and it was divided in such a manner, as to have as little connection as possible, one tribe being mixed up with others. All the respectable people of Macedonia, under the pretext of their being hostages, had been carried away with their families into Italy, where they amalgamated with the inhabitants and disappeared. In this manner all persons of mark had been removed. Moreover, the *commercium* and *connubium* among those four provinces had been abolished, so that no Macedonian was allowed to possess land in two different provinces, every one being confined to his own district. But still Macedonia was in a condition of great prosperity, especially in consequence of its mines and commerce, as we must infer from the immense quantity of Macedonian money of that period which has come down to us. The limbs which had been torn asunder, longed to be reunited as one whole. At this time there appeared among them a man of about forty years, calling himself Philip, and declaring himself to be a son of Perseus, and to have escaped from his father's misfortunes. It is possible that he was a pseudo-Philip, that his real name was Andriscus, and that he was a native of Thrace: there were several such impos-

Aemilianus is correct, but it was not in use, and the *usus loquendi* everywhere stands above all analogy."

tors at that time. He may have been an impostor, like most of the pseudo-Sebastians. One of these Sebastians, however, was probably genuine, and at this day it is still disputed as to whether Dimitri, in Russia, was not the genuine one. In like manner, it is by no means certain whether this pseudo-Philip was an impostor or not. He found a great many followers among the Macedonians (Olymp. 157, 4). The Romans had no strong forces in the province, and it may even be questioned whether they had any soldiers at all there; in which case they collected troops from their subjects. Philip defeated them, and in a very short time made himself master of all Macedonia, which recognised him. He even penetrated into Thessaly, where he gained advantages, and successfully maintained himself against the untrained troops of the Romans. All sided with him; but the Achaeans very inconsistently sent auxiliaries to the Romans, although at the time all nations were harbouring designs of revolt, but the Achaeans thought that they were not yet ripe for it. The Achaean auxiliaries came very opportunely to the Romans; it was only through these, who were commanded by a Roman legate, that they succeeded in defending Thessaly, and with their assistance they repelled the Macedonians,⁴ until Metellus came with the Roman legion (Olymp. 158, 1); he defeated this Philip, whom the Romans call Andriscus, in several battles, and led him to Rome in triumph.⁵ "Macedonia now became a Roman province, under the absolute power of an imperator; the imperator did not regularly appear in the provinces, but in Macedonia one was probably required to protect the country against the Scordiscans."

In the meantime misfortune had broken in upon Achaia. The senate did not alter its system, rightly estimating the importance of the insurgents, and clearly foreseeing that the Greeks would perish *σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν*. When, as I have already remarked, the Achaeans had transgressed the command of the Romans to remain quiet, the senate coolly ordered them to dismiss from the confederacy not only Lacedaemon, but all the other places which had not belonged to

⁴ "This accounts for the fact that the Achaeans charge the Romans with ingratitude."—1825.

⁵ This is evidently a mere *lapsus memoriae*, which probably arose from Niebuhr thinking of Perseus.—ED.

Achaia at the time when the Achaeans concluded the treaty with Rome in the first (or more correctly the second) Macedonian war.⁶ C. Aurelius Orestes, together with other ambassadors, brought these orders to Corinth, whither he summoned the allies of the Achaeans.

This very unjust and insolent demand threw the Achaeans into a state of frenzy; even before Orestes had finished his speech, the council hastened to the market-place, calling upon the people to assemble, and it cannot excite wonder, though it is a proof of the utter want of common sense among the Achaeans⁷, that they fell upon the Roman ambassadors, and insultingly drove them out of the theatre (?). All the Lacedaemonians who happened to be in the city were arrested. There is another statement which I cannot believe to be true: it is said that all the Romans and Italians who were at Corinth, or in any part of Achaia, were murdered. This is certainly not true. There was no doubt a tumult, during which a few may have been killed, and many a Roman's house may have been plundered: wherever a man in the toga was seen, we may imagine that he was knocked down. After this the Achaeans again marched into Laconia, where Menalcidas had, in the mean time, made away with himself, because he had broken a truce which he had been ordered to observe by the Romans.

At this time the Macedonian insurrection was not yet quelled, and fortune was still undecided. Metellus had not yet come over. Simultaneously the third Punic war was going on; the Spaniards and Iberians were stirring; Masi-nissa's family was suspected, and in short the Romans were pressed on all sides. Their cunning policy therefore was mildness: they said that they were willing to pardon the Achaeans, if they would but acknowledge their guilt, and apologise. They sent out S. Julius Caesar, who meeting on his road an Achaean embassy, took it back with him, commenced peaceful negotiations at Aegium, and above all things insisted upon their becoming reconciled with Lacedaemon. But almost the whole nation was now in a state of intoxication, "according to the words of Scripture, that God

⁶ Livy, *Epit.* 51, according to which Pausanias, vii. 14, must be corrected, who has Heraclea near Mount Oeta instead of Heraca."—1825.

⁷ "It is said quite truly of the modern Greeks that they are very intelligent, but have no common sense."

makes the nations intoxicated for their own destruction." The mildness of the Romans was interpreted as a sign of timidity or embarrassment, and the embassy produced no effect. Critolaus, the new strategus, induced the Romans to go to Tegea, where a general diet was to be held. Caesar did proceed thither: the Spartan deputies appeared, and after some time Critolaus also came, but no deputy of the Achaeans arrived; the diet could not be held, and the Roman ambassador was highly exasperated, especially as circumstances had now become much more favourable to Rome, Macedonia having been subdued by Metellus.

Metellus could now hope also to settle the affairs of Achaia, and being animated by a desire to arrange matters before a consul and an army should come to Achaia, he was ready to yield to them in many points. He accordingly sent Cn. Papirius, with three others, to Corinth, promising them a full amnesty for all that had happened; but all were inaccessible to reason and thirsting for war, although they were not prepared for it at all. Critolaus played the part of a hero, and inflamed the minds of the people, especially of the populace which was already in commotion at Corinth. When the Roman ambassadors commenced speaking no one listened to them; they were obliged to stop, and as the tumult became too great, they went away. Critolaus, and still more, Diaeus, now goaded the Achaeans into the madness of declaring war against the Romans, and marching towards Thermopylae. The war was decreed nominally against the Lacedaemonians, but in reality against the Romans.

We have only very scanty information about the course of this war; but the Excerpts of Porphyrogenitus from Polybius will throw light upon it. "Posterity can form no conception, says Polybius, of the madness with which the war was carried on: it was as if men rushed into it for the purpose of perishing."

Critolaus assembled a considerable army. The Boeotians, headed by the Thebans under the wretched Pytheas, and the Chalcidians, were the only Greeks that sided with the Achaeans; the Aetolians and the other nations were neutral; the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were hostile towards the Achaeans, for which reason all of the Achaeans could not leave their country. The allied army advanced as far as

Heraclea near Mount Oeta, and laid siege to that town in order to protect Thermopylae. But everything was there managed so senselessly, that when Metellus, who on being informed of this, without waiting for orders, had broken up from Macedonia with the rapidity of lightning, came to its relief, the Achaeans under Diaeus and Critolaus, the ἀλάστορες τῆς Ἑλλάδος, hastily fled back through the pass of Thermopylae. Metellus overtook them near Scarphea, attacked and defeated them so completely, that within a few hours the Achaean army was perfectly annihilated: many were slain, many were taken prisoners, and many dispersed in flight. Diaeus fled, Critolaus was not to be found, having perhaps perished in a marsh. The whole army was scattered. The defeat was like those of 1805 and 1806; when the corps advanced one by one, and were overpowered and routed in a few hours. An Arcadian contingent of 1,000 men, which arrived too late, was carried away by the flight of the others, and a few days later, in the neighbourhood of Chaeronea, it was partly taken and partly cut to pieces by the Romans. The Achaeans fled in disorder into Peloponnesus. In Bocotia all the people quitting the towns took refuge in the mountains: Thebes was deserted; many made away with themselves from despair, and many implored the Romans to kill them, declaring themselves to be the authors of all the misfortunes.

Diaeus succeeded Critolaus in the command of the army; he was a person of the greatest inability, and formidable only to those who obeyed him. He had recourse to the most extreme measures; he decreed, *e.g.*, that all judicial trials for debt should be stopped, all imprisoned debtors should be set free, and that no debt should become due before the close of the war—a sad decree for the wealthy, but it made him popular among the rabble. Twelve thousand slaves were to be manumitted and armed (they are called παράτροφοι, *i.e.* milk-brothers, the children of female slaves or nurses); and heavy war contributions were levied. Four thousand men were sent to Megara to defend that place, and Diaeus himself assembled the army on the Isthmus. When Metellus appeared, those four thousand soon evacuated Megara, and all the forces were concentrated on the Isthmus close to the walls of Corinth.

Metellus now appeared before Corinth. Animated by a feeling of humanity he wished to spare the city; such a mag-

nificent ancient city was indeed something venerable to many a Roman, and the idea of destroying it was terrible to Metellus. It is also possible that he grudged the consul Mummius, who was already advancing in quick marches, the honour of bringing the war to a close. Once more Metellus sent some Greeks to the Achæan army, affording, according to Roman notions, fair terms, if they would but lay down their arms, and requesting them to put confidence in him. What else could he have done? But Diaeus, who knew that his life was forfeited, goaded the poor people to madness. The Achæans, believing that Metellus had offered peace from a feeling of weakness, nearly killed the ambassadors, and Diaeus did not set them free until a ransom of 10,000 drachmæ was paid: this is a characteristic feature of the man, who shewed his avarice to the very last minute. The hypostrategus, who was favourable to the Romans, was tortured.

In the meantime Mummius arrived and took the place of Metellus. He had no such feelings towards the Achæans as his predecessor, who returned to Rome. Mummius now had an army of 23,000 foot and three thousand horse, while the Achæans had only 14,000 foot and a few hundred horse. The Achæans were encamped on the Isthmus in a strong position, but this was of no avail. The Romans had a fleet furnished by their allies, while the Greeks had no ships, and the Roman fleet cruised along the whole coast of Peloponnesus, landing everywhere, and ravaging the country, with the most fearful cruelty. What Themistocles had said to the Peloponnesians, when they wanted to fortify themselves on the Isthmus, now came to pass; the contingents, especially those of the Eleans, dispersed in all directions in order to protect their own towns, without being able to do so. A somewhat favourable engagement, in which they defeated a detachment of the Romans, which had ventured too far and was not duly supported, made the Achæans completely mad, and being thus encouraged they thoughtlessly attacked the Roman army. But their small advantage was immediately neutralised by a fatal blow; for in a great and decisive battle, the Achæans were so completely routed, that they were not even able throw themselves into Corinth. The cavalry fled immediately; the infantry maintained its ground better, but in the end all fled in different directions into the mountains, and Diaeus to Megalopolis,

where he first murdered his wife and then took poison. All the population of Corinth deserted the city and took refuge in the mountains, as the Romans had done on the arrival of the Gauls, and were hunted by the Romans like wild beasts. No attempt was made to defend the city; the Romans entered, systematically plundered the town, and set it on fire, "because no place was to be spared, in which Roman ambassadors had been insulted:" the whole was one pyramid of flames. According to Pausanias nothing remained but the ruins; the acropolis and the walls were demolished. All Peloponnesus was traversed by the conquerors, and of the ravages then made, we still have a description in Dion Chrysostomus of Prusa, who saw the country at the beginning of the first century of our era. "It is impossible to say how many towns of Peloponnesus were destroyed on that occasion." Fallmerayer, in his account of the Morea, has overlooked this.

Thebes and Chalcis experienced a similar fate, but less from political motives than in consequence of the savageness of the soldiers, for afterwards both places re-appear. "The ruin of Greece would have been complete, if Polybius had not had the courage to see the destruction of his country, and to intercede on its behalf with the inhuman enemy. He had been in the army of Scipio at Carthage, and now arrived with a letter of introduction from Scipio; he negotiated with the bloodhounds, and procured a tolerable existence for the towns which were not yet destroyed."

But the Achaean league, all other associations and assemblies, the diets in Euboea, Phocis, and Boeotia, were broken up, as if there had still existed an object of distrust. Every means was taken to separate the nations; the *concilia*, *connubia*, and *commercias*, were taken away with Roman harshness; every Greek was obliged to remain within the boundaries of his canton, and no intermarriages were allowed among them. Several towns were especially punished, and the constitutions were altered everywhere in such a manner that democracy was abolished and a timocracy was established in its place. Achaia became a province, without, however, being a regular and complete province; a proconsul or proprætor appeared there only from time to time. The Greeks became a *populus deditus*, and had to suffer fearfully. Athens and Lacedæmon alone retained their autonomy.

This closes the history of Greece; all that remains consists of mere episodes.

Lacedaemon alone derived advantages from the issue of the war, for it no doubt received back all the conquests of the Achaeans. But notwithstanding this, fifty-eight years later the Achaeans, Lacedaemonians, and Athenians, formed an alliance with Archelaus, the general of Mithridates, against the Romans. Athens had from the first attached itself very closely to the Romans, and had been treated by them with very great consideration. But unfortunately, an Athenian named Athenion, led Archelaus to Athens, for which he was made by him prince of Athens. When Sulla appeared, he besieged the city, the pearl of Greece, for a long time, but at last conquered the famished Athenians, and then Piraeus also. The massacre was terrible. Torrents of blood flowed from the market-place through the gates into the fields: the city was then given up by Sulla to the few survivors; many of the most splendid monuments were destroyed, and the arsenals demolished.

The devastation of the once flourishing country was indescribably fearful, and even continued to increase during the wars which were carried on in Greece without the Greeks themselves taking any part in them. Megara, which, as we see from the consolatory letter of Sulpicius to Cicero,⁸ lay in ruins, had probably been destroyed by Mummius, and all the great cities were humbled to the dust. Caesar sent a colony of *libertini* to Corinth, who founded a small miserable town, in which gladiatorial games were exhibited. "If, in reading Pausanias, we imagine that the towns still existed as he describes them, we form a wrong notion; he was unwilling to say how wretched the towns were in his day. The true picture is given by Dion Chrysostomus.⁹ When we read his description of the desolation, we imagine that we have before us a picture of devastations even far more terrible than the horrors committed by the Albanese. "You may," says Chrysostomus, "travel through Peloponnesus day after day, without meeting with any living being except a solitary goat-herd; and all the towns are in ruins, with the exception of a few buildings which are left standing." Athens alone afterwards somewhat revived as a university town, but always remained small and insignificant; and when the horrors had been forgotten, life there had a

⁸ *Ad Famil.* iv. 5.

⁹ *Venator.* (Orat. 7).

milder character. During the period from Hadrian to Justinian, certain chairs of philosophy and philology were established there, and young men resorted thither for instruction.

Rhodes maintained the honour of the Greek name longest; after the war with Perseus, it had indeed sustained most severe losses, but the Rhodians were not compelled to do anything unworthy of themselves, and within their island they remained what they were, a wise and worthy people. "While ancient Greece sank, Rhodes maintained itself;" it defended itself against Mithridates, but the rude Cassius ill repaid the city for it, "for he plundered it from mere avarice. But with the exception of him, the Romans always felt respect for the Rhodians; and although the period of its grandeur had long since passed away, yet until the great earthquake under Antoninus Pius, Rhodes preserved its ancient dignity. But owing to its situation, it was much exposed to inundations, by which it had already been laid waste twice, when in the end that fearful earthquake destroyed everything." The fate of the islands was terrible, because they had several times changed their party. The cities in Asia Minor were completely ruined.

Some emperors, indeed, lavished their favours upon the country, but it was all to no purpose. Even in the latest times, Greece was fearfully ravaged by the Goths under Alaric. The ancient towns existed under their ancient names, until, in the seventh century, the Slavonic tribes established themselves in Macedonia, and afterwards in Greece, where they oppressed the towns most severely. At the end of the eleventh century, the Bulgarian empire was destroyed by the Mahommedans, and Greece rose again through its manufactures and its commerce. Its misfortunes were renewed during the crusades; Greece was divided, and Peloponnesus was recovered for a time for the Constantinopolitan empire. At that time Greece, to some extent, revived again, but it never attained its former prosperity. The wars between the Turks and Venetians weighed the country down. For twenty years Athens was a completely deserted place; the population assembled again, when a Turkish commander recalled the Athenians, and the city was rebuilt. On these subjects compare Perrhaevos' History of the Suliots.

Even if time permitted it, I would not relate the history of the other states in detail. That of the Seleucidae and the Ptolemies is more important to learned divines than to scholars. The former must know it accurately; and during the seventeenth century these studies were carried on very diligently and successfully, both by Catholic and Protestant theologians; but in our time they are neglected. We can form no clear notion about the period of the appearance of our Saviour, unless that history be accurately known, nor can we properly understand the history of the Maccabees without it. It is indeed an important duty for every one to be perfectly familiar with the historical period where it comes in contact with the sacred books, but it is more particularly incumbent on the student of theology.

In the reign of Perseus, Antiochus Epiphanes succeeded his elder brother, Seleucus IV. Antiochus the Great "had soon got over the unfortunate issue of the war. His empire was still extensive; his treasures were still unexhausted, and he gradually filled his empty coffers again. His authority, however, must have been greatly weakened, especially in the upper satrapies. Thither he then proceeded, according to some, for the purpose of extorting taxes, according to others with the view of plundering a temple; the accounts of that period are so confused, that he and Antiochus Epiphanes are described as having died in the same manner. But according to all appearances Antiochus the Great died of a wound. He" had two sons, Seleucus and Antiochus Epiphanes, by the former of whom he was succeeded. Epiphanes, who was the younger of the two, is, in the dispensation of Providence, a very important personage in Jewish history. He had been given by his father to the Romans as a security for his paying correctly the instalments agreed upon. His elder brother, Seleucus (Olymp. 148, 2), was a good-natured man, and a very kind brother, but otherwise weak and insignificant, and the empire of the Seleucidae under him fell into still greater decay. When he ascended the throne, he ransomed his brother from captivity, by sending his own son Demetrius as a hostage in his stead (Olymp. 151, 2). Seleucus died after a peaceful and insignificant reign of twelve years. In the East the Syrian empire became more and more contracted; Persistan proper and Media, at that time still belonged to it; and Antiochus

Epiphanes still had some possessions on the Caspian, but the whole of Chorassan, on the other side of the desert, was already lost. "But notwithstanding all this, the empire under Antiochus Epiphanes was still great and powerful."

Antiochus Epiphanes is known to us as a tyrant from the books of Maccabees, and we entertain a feeling of detestation of him from our earliest days. Polybius, who confirms this opinion, describes him as a complete madman. It often occurs in the case of eastern despots, that owing to their unlimited power and their licentiousness, combined with the absence of all moral principles, they become mad. Otherwise his reign is brilliant (*ἐπιφανής*) enough. "In the German translation of the Bible he is surnamed *the Noble*, but it ought to be translated *the Brilliant*, which is the real character he aimed at." The splendour of Antioch commenced in his reign, and it was not till his time that it became the permanent residence of the kings, and it was he who built the new town. According to the description of Libanius,¹⁰ it was a place of extraordinary magnificence: Rome never had anything more splendid. It was quite a distinct place, with two main streets leading through two porticoes of marble columns. "The palace of Antioch was of such splendour, that the description of Libanius makes our imagination giddy; and Antiochus celebrated his games in a manner as brilliant, as if he had been lord of all Asia. He lived according to the eastern fashion in immense splendour and extravagance; but he was at the same time warlike, and did not neglect any opportunity of extending his empire, when circumstances allowed it." In history he is known for his undertaking against Egypt.

Ptolemy Epiphanes, the son of Philopator (from Olymp. 143, 4 till 149, 3) had been stabbed when quite a young man, and had left behind him two sons under age, Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy Physcon (thus surnamed from his enormous corpulence) or Euergetes II. They were to reign together, and Physcon was to have the government of Cyrene. During the war of Perseus, Antiochus, believing that the Romans were

¹⁰ "Libanius is an ingenious writer, who deserves to be read at all times. He must be especially recommended to students of divinity, because he exercised an influence upon St. Basilus and St. Gregory of Nazianzen, who were acquainted with him. But it is only the first three volumes of Reiske's edition that deserve to be read; the fourth contains nothing but letters which have no substance."—1826.

fully occupied, made a expedition against the Egyptian princes. "He first demanded Coelesyria, and as the existing treaty of peace was appealed to, he invaded Coelesyria, conquered it, and then attacked Egypt itself, which was quite defenceless, and, under the rule of Jews, was beginning to be completely ruined. That country was in the most miserable condition that can be imagined. Jews occupied the highest places in the state, and those not heroes like the Maccabees, but the *despectissima pars servientium*. Egypt had sunk so low, that the parties of the Samaritans and Hierosolymitans engaged and divided the court of Alexandria. The king was a Samaritan, and the queen, strange to say, an Hierosolymitan. Men of this description had the whole government in their hands, and the Alexandrian state had thereby sunk so low, that it was unable to resist the shock of the Syrians. Antiochus entered Egypt, "Philometor fled with his mother to Alexandria," and Antiochus appeared at its gates. But Philometor had invoked the assistance of the Romans, who had in the meantime concluded the war with Perseus; and the Roman ambassador M. Popillius Laenas compelled Antiochus forthwith to quit Egypt.

LECTURE CXII.

"BUT Antiochus evacuated only Egypt, and in the peace he retained possession of Coelesyria, which henceforth remained an undisputed part of Syria, and was after all an important acquisition.

It was particularly after this campaign, that his tyranny in Judaea commenced: he attempted to force the Jews into Hellenism, as is related in the books of Maccabees, where you may read the account of the heroic insurrection of the Jews under Mattathias and his five immortal sons.

As regards the history of the Jews, I confine myself to those parts in which it comes in contact with general history. An abridgment of what may be read in the Old Testament would be useless; a minute course of lectures on Jewish history from the point of view of other nations forms no part of our

object; it is the special province of those who combine the study of theology with that of history, and it requires most extensive information to treat it in a satisfactory manner. The history of the Jews after their return from the Babylonian captivity, is a fragment of such a general and comprehensive history of that nation. There does not, as yet, exist any satisfactory work on the condition of the Jews from that period, although a complete knowledge of it is necessary for those who seriously occupy themselves with historical studies, as well as for those who are engaged in the exegesis of the Scriptures.

Even the carrying away of the ten tribes was not as general as we commonly imagine, on the authority of a definite expression in 2 Kings, chap. xvii. For if we compare the subsequent condition of the country with what it was previously, we find in Galilee a pure Jewish race, whence that country was, in fact, divided into Jewish Galilee and Galilee τῶν ἐθνῶν; and the Jewish portion was inhabited by a Jewish race as well as Judaea. On the other side of the Jordan also, Jews occur among the pagan population during the wars of the Maccabees. The origin of the Samaritans, moreover, shows that a Jewish population had maintained itself on mount Ephraim: if this had not been the case, the amalgamation of the Jewish with pagan nations, in which the Jewish element predominated, could not have taken place. It is, therefore, impossible that the greater part of the ten tribes should have been transplanted into Upper Asia. But those who were carried thither remained there for ever. These ἀνασπάστοι were very numerous, especially in Media and throughout the Assyrian empire; they are mentioned in Josephus. The tribe of Judah, on the other hand, and a part of that of Levy returned; and when they did return, they did not find the country without a Jewish population. Nebucadnezar himself had not left the country wholly without a population of Jews. The fact that a part of the Jews remained behind, is clear from the circumstance, that when the murderers of Gedaliah, the Babylonian governor, fled to Egypt, those who remained behind emigrated; it is less clear whether, after this emigration, a part remained behind in the territory of Judaea itself.

The small number of those who returned, about forty thousand, found Jerusalem and all the towns destroyed, for

the neighbouring nations had extended their dominions at the expense of the Jews, as we know from the prophets; this had been done especially by the Edomites, who had taken possession of the whole of Upper Judah up to the very walls of Jerusalem, being the most malicious and inveterate enemies of the Jews, although they were akin to them; they had assisted in the destruction of Jerusalem, and now greatly impeded the rebuilding of it. Hebron was an Edomite town as late as the time of the Maccabees, that is, about four hundred years after the return of the Jews from the Babylonian captivity. The Jews, as isolated pure Jews, were now confined to Jerusalem and Jericho; the whole mountainous country from Hebron as far as the frontiers of the Philistines, was in the hands of the Edomites. Those who had returned had only a very narrow tract of land, the territory of the tribe of Benjamin, and about the third part of that of Judah.

At Jerusalem, which was rebuilt with perseverance and skill, the Jews did not by any means live as a free people: it is unhistorical to believe, that for a time they were subject only to the high priest. These high priests were certainly not so important as is generally believed; they were only the first magistrates of their people, probably even under the Persians, and certainly under the Lagid kings: they seem to have levied the tribute, and were nominated and appointed by the Persian king to administer justice; and this privilege they, like the patriarchs at Constantinople, had to purchase with splendid presents. Our accounts of that period are very defective; the lists of the high priests are incomplete, most of their names being wanting, and it is a mere accident that it is stated by Josephus, that at the time when Ochus undertook his expedition against Phœnicia, the high priest who had murdered his brother and predecessor in that office, purchased his dignity of Bagoas.¹

During this period, Jerusalem slowly but steadily increased in prosperity and power. We here clearly see the operations of Providence preparing the way for Christianity, for it caused the ancient nations to become weary of their superstitions; some longed for one, and some for another mode of worship, but the belief in idolatry disappeared. The religions of the eastern nations were inaccessible to others, for the Magi

¹ There must be some mistake here; comp. Joseph. *Ant.* xi. 7.—Ed.

admitted no proselytes, and the nations who had previously corrupted the Jews with their idolatry, now turned their attention towards Jerusalem, and by the extended meaning attributed to a happy passage in the law, the Jews obtained the power of spreading their religious views. They were now not a nation, but a community, which by new acquisitions endeavoured to extend itself. The king of Persia was not their head, but the high priest, who was much interested in their extension. By means of a prudent interpretation of the law, they evaded it. The new proselytes, however, did not become Jews, but only metoeci. The Egyptians were regarded as akin to the Jews, and if one desired to become a member of a γένος, he might gain his end by being adopted. But the Jews did not stop short in admitting metoeci, but there were added to them what are called Proselytes of the Gate. For no one was allowed to live in a Jewish town, who indulged in idolatry; the superintendence of the laws was left to the priests, and they maintained them in such a way as to demand only the renunciation of idolatry—which gave rise to a kind of rationalism. Whoever, therefore, had renounced idolatry, was allowed to live in a Jewish town; they were not, indeed, permitted to enter the temple, but sacrifices might be offered up on their behalf. Marriages with foreigners, also, were prohibited rather than illegal; and from the connubium with the metoeci, there now arose a class of men, who stood in a kind of isopolity, as was the case among the Egyptians, if they submitted to all the Jewish ordinances of circumcision and of the law. This class of persons were real citizens.

Many thousands now adopted the Jewish religion, Jerusalem increased enormously, and the number of proselytes became so great, that a large majority of the people at Jerusalem were strangers who had settled there. This also accounts for the charges of the non-Jews against the Jews, and for the dispute between Josephus and Apion; for otherwise it would be perfectly ridiculous on the part of their opponents to say, that the Jews were not a nation, but a mass of people that had flocked together from all parts. Apion, it must be observed, overlooks the fact, that there existed a nucleus of the nation; but he is quite right in believing, that during the increase of the people persons had flocked to them from all quarters. The Jews in distant parts, especially those in

Egypt, undertook journeys to Jerusalem for the salvation of their souls.

In Egypt quite a new class of Jews had sprung up. I have no hesitation in assigning the first origin of the Jews in that country to the time when the murderers of Gedaliah, contrary to the command of the prophet Jeremiah, fled into Egypt. This command is justified by the influence which the flight of the Jews had upon the Jewish nation, although it is not directly intimated; Jeremiah foresaw it, and threatening the murderers, declared, that temporal misfortunes would be their lot even in Egypt. But this threat was only a means to induce them by fear to remain behind; for the Jews were in no way badly off in Egypt. This was the first settlement of the Jews in that country, and its site was in the neighbourhood of Heliopolis. From it we must carefully distinguish a larger and much later Jewish settlement at Alexandria, in the reign of Ptolemy Lagi, who wished to have a large and mixed population in that city; and this latter settlement increased very rapidly.² For Ptolemy Lagi, soon after the beginning of his war with Antigonus, surprised the Jews on a Sabbath, as they believed that on that day they were not even allowed to defend themselves; and thus he led away a colony to Alexandria. This colony was the germ of the Jews in that city who soon became so numerous, that out of the eight quarters of the place, they occupied two, enjoying their own rights, and to a certain extent, even privileges. The Jerusalemites also were Egyptian subjects until the time of Antiochus the Great.³

² "It is quite unpardonable that Josephus has written nothing at all upon this period, concerning which the books of the Old Testament are silent, for with the book of Ezra everything is at an end until the books of Maccabees. This gap has led some to believe that the golden age of the Hebrew language and literature entirely ceased with the return from captivity. But it can be proved, that the literature in its original purity and excellence continued to flourish for several centuries later, and down to the period of the Syrians. The book Tobiah, the Ecclesiastes, and Jesus Shirach, belong even to the sixth century of the city of Rome; it is clear from the concluding note of a Greek translation, that these books were composed 200 years before the Christian era."

³ On a separate leaf we find the following remark of Niebuhr respecting Alexander's visit to Jerusalem. "The story of Jaddus and Alexander is, according to Reland, related in the following rabbinical books, *Megilloth Taanith*, *Toma*, and the Comment. on Leviticus, but it seems that they have Simeon instead of Jaddus. Alexander's presence in the temple, 23 *Sivan*. The 21 Cislew (now November) is a holiday, because, owing to the favour of Alex-

During this period, they lived quietly and in great prosperity, for it gradually became the established opinion among the Jews in all parts of the world, although the law says nothing about it, that every one who could not come to Jerusalem at the Passover, must send a double shekel as a tribute to the temple, which the Levites levied on the distant Jews. As it was impossible for the latter to celebrate the Passover at Jerusalem, this money was prescribed as a dispensation. The Jews in the remotest countries sent this tribute to Jerusalem, and the descendants of the ten tribes also took this obligation upon themselves. This became a source of immense wealth, and owing to these double shekels which poured in from the Jews of all countries, from those of Italy as well as from those of the interior of the Parthian empire, the temple became so wealthy, that the Jews did not know what to do with their treasures, and in the end spent them upon useless objects: they made the golden vine, which covered the whole roof of the temple, and the golden beam, which was enclosed in a wooden one. In the time of Herod these treasures were employed in a more rational way, in building the magnificent temple and adorning the city, which was paved with white marble, because it was well known that if the Romans should find the useless gold, they would take it away at once.

In Egypt the number of Jews increased at such a rate, that they spread over Cyrene and all the principal towns of Egypt. It was there also that the commercial spirit sprang up among the Jews. In the commercial city of Alexandria, where they existed in such large numbers, nothing was so advantageous to them as commerce. There they also soon rose in favour with the court, and the highest offices of the state were given to them. At the time when the Jews at Jerusalem became subjects of Antiochus the Great, the same thing happened which took place under the kings of Israel, who, in order to reduce the number of visitors to the temple, established chapels. In like manner the kings of Egypt, after having lost Coelesyria, endeavoured to attach the Jews to Egypt, by encouraging the building of the temple at Heliopolis, at which even a descendant of the family of the high priests, was appointed high priest.

ander, they triumphed over the Samaritans. This festival after all seems to give some support to the story; and why should Alexander, who affected to be religious, not have honoured Jerusalem?"—ED.

This temple, situated beyond the boundaries of Palestine, was, according to the law, a thing not to be tolerated, but even the strictest and most inflexible laws had so much accommodated themselves to existing circumstances, that the Egyptian Jews took no offence at it. It was, however, not only the Jews that were so numerous in Egypt; the Samaritans also formed an important body there. Some points in Egyptian history are of such a nature as to prove that those who were called Samaritans, were Israelites who had adopted Samaritanism. They are also mentioned under the name of Caraites; for they rejected the traditional laws of the Rabbis. In this manner, the Egyptian Jews satisfied their own wants, after Coelesyria had been irrecoverably lost in the war of Antiochus Epiphanes against the two Egyptian princes.

The condition of the Jews now, was as follows: the Galileans, the remnants of the Jews of the ten tribes in Palestine, were despised, although they had preserved their religion in the greatest purity, and were least mixed with others. In Samaria, the smaller number of the inhabitants were real Jews;* the Samaritans, however, had spread over Egypt and as far as Cyrenaica, and these were distinguished from the others as Egyptian Samaritans. The population of Judaea consisted, for the most part, of foreigners; the Jews at Jerusalem were separated from the Galileans, and had their own proselytes especially in Asia; the Jews in Egypt also were distinct. The ten tribes were scattered over the most distant parts of the world, and it is quite a correct statement that at that time Jews existed even about Mount Caucasus. This was the state of affairs when Antiochus Epiphanes commenced his persecutions.

The undertaking of Antiochus Epiphanes, which at first sight appears sheer mad pagan fanaticism, was in reality not so much fanaticism as a system of policy; for his plan was to hellenise everything, as had in general been the aim of all the

* A separate slip contains the following remark of Niebuhr about the Samaritans. "There must have been a high priest connected with the temple at Gerizim, which was not completed until Alexander had subdued Syria. The Samaritans also observed the sabbatical year, and, therefore, no doubt the sabbath itself likewise; but they cannot have been as strict as the Jews in regard to unclean food, nor could they, being a mixed people, observe the same principles in regard to marriage. Hence they were joined by those Jews who looked upon their own laws as too severe and rigorous."—ED.

Macedonian kings, who hoped that thereby the government would become more autocratic. An additional reason for his wishing to hellenise the Jews was their attachment to Egypt, where men of their nation had obtained the highest distinctions, and, strange as it may seem to us, were appointed even to the command of armies. Under these circumstances the policy of the Syrians was correct; but the manner in which they carried it into effect, was not only cruel and faithless, but the most perverse that could have been devised. For the Jews were no longer as severe against idolatry as they had been during the first temple; and there can be no doubt that a kind of syncretism already existed in Palestine, so that it was possible to hellenise the Jews in the same manner as that which was successfully employed among the native tribes of Syria. In Palestine, however, a thousand interests and a thousand feelings were connected with one place, and the work of hellenisation ought to have been carried on with great caution and delicacy.

When the Greek high priest, appointed by Antiochus, endeavoured to hellenise them, his first measures met with no resistance, nor would any have been offered, if he had acted with moderation and without hellenic fanaticism. For there was no vehement opposition, no one thought of insurrection; and that feeling of self-respect which rose against the all-powerful dominion of Rome, when Caligula's statue was to be set up, did not show itself at all. Theatres (*gymnasia*?) had already been erected at Jerusalem, and there was no inclination whatever to rise against the high priest, although he was manifestly a pagan. But when the Greeks wanted to force upon the Jews their own sacrificial worship, and when the tyranny rose to its highest pitch, their wild persecution led some of its victims to acts, which afterwards ended in the national insurrection which lasted under Antiochus Epiphanes and his successor, until the time of Antiochus Sidetes.

At first it was a mere emeute, headed by Judas who was known to be an able man. The insurrection acquired more consistency, when the title of high priest was combined with that of commander of the forces.

In order that I may show you how it was the policy of the Romans, by their interference in the affairs of states which strove to gain power and become consolidated, to endeavour to create disorganisation, "I shall now return to the affairs of Syria."

As time is pressing, I can give you only a short sketch of the history of Syria. You may read on this subject Josephus, an author who ought to be studied much more than he is; in him you find the materials for a history of Syria, and the means of forming an idea of Syria from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes. His work is one of the most charming and interesting books, and highly deserves to be studied; at present it is read a great deal too little.

Antiochus Epiphanes, whose reign, in spite of all his crimes and cruelties, was extremely brilliant, was succeeded (Olymp. 154, 1) by Antiochus Eupator, a child under the guardianship of Lysias, who was regent. "The Romans, after having compelled Antiochus Epiphanes to give up his conquests in Egypt, had left him unmolested; although he did not observe the treaties, and exceeded the number of elephants and ships which he was allowed to keep; and as long as he lived they remained silent, for he also kept up a connection with Eumenes. But as soon as he died, and had been succeeded by the child Antiochus Eupator," the Romans sent ambassadors to Syria to demand the destruction of the ships and elephants which were kept contrary to the existing treaty. This command was obeyed: the elephants were killed and the ships burnt. But the measure excited general indignation, and an insurrection broke out at Laodicea, in which the chief of the Roman ambassadors, Cn. Octavius, was murdered by a Greek of the name of Leptines. Circumstances induced the Romans not to be very particular, and the occurrence was compromised. "It is strange to find the Romans at this time overlooking, from political motives, an act, which at an earlier period, would have roused the most bitter spirit of revenge; they did indeed threaten to punish this cruel murder, but undertook no war," leaving the Syrian empire to its fate, that is, to its steadily progressing decline, for this was an easier method of subduing it than war. Subsequently, Demetrius, the successor of Antiochus Eupator, sent the perpetrator of the murder to Rome to be punished; but the Romans ordered him to be taken back, that the Syrians might put him to death, though they neither condemned nor pardoned the Syrians.

Lysias, the regent, plays a prominent part in the book of Maccabees: he continued the war against Judaea. The in-

surrection was then confined to Judaea, Galilee taking no part in it at all. The war was carried on in a difficult country, but the power of the Jews was so paralysed that the Syrians were enabled to surround and blockade them.⁵

The Syrian people groaned under the regency of Lysias,

⁵ "Lysias is called, in the book of Maccabees, a *συγγενής* of the king, and this is translated by 'cousin' or 'relation,' although Lysias was not related to the royal family. Letronne has explained this by means of inscriptions, from which it is clear that *συγγενής* was a mere title in Syria, just as in Portugal and France every peer is called *mon cousin*. In the same sense the word occurs in Herodotus, Ctesias, and still oftener in Plutarch's life of Artaxerxes (*συγγενής τοῦ βασιλέως*). For *gentes* existed among the Persians as well as among the Greeks and Romans, and, in fact, among all the nations which were not divided into castes; hence we find among the Persians the *γένος* Ἀχαιμενιδῶν, etc. Individuals might be admitted into a gens, as was also the case among the German tribes; in my native country, *e.g.*, there existed a law to the following effect. 'If an honest man from another country wants to settle among us, he must apply to a gens (*Geschlecht*), and if he can prove that he is the son of honest parents, and of good conduct, the gens must adopt him as a cousin, and protect him as if he were a relation by blood.' Inscriptions further prove, that, in states thus constituted, a person might be admitted into a phratia. From the interesting *Theophilus ad Autolyceum* we clearly see, that Alexandria was divided into phylae, phratiae, and *γένη*, and that the kings also had their *γένος*. When, therefore, a king wished to show to a person the highest honour, he admitted him into his *γένος*, whereby the person became a *συγγενής* of the king; in the book of Maccabees this very act is mentioned as an act of royal grace, when a person is raised to the rank of *συγγενής*. This is not Letronne's explanation; he as a French archaeologist could not give it, because he did not know the inscriptions which we now have in Germany."—1826. [Compare *Nubian Inscriptions*, etc., Inscriptions of Philae, No. 5: "Respecting the offices and dignities of these Macedonian empires, as well as respecting the whole of their internal organisation and administration, we are still extremely ignorant; partly because the documents affording instruction are very scanty and defective, and partly because this part of ancient history has hitherto been very much neglected. Letronne, as far as I know, was the first to shew what we have to understand by the term *συγγενής*; I perfectly agree with the view he takes, and under the guidance of our inscriptions, in which not less than six individuals with this title occur, I have only to make the following additional remarks. It is a very plausible idea to trace the origin of this dignity to the Persian institutions. I imagine that in conferring this dignity, a person was either really or fictitiously admitted into the *γένος* of the Achaemenidae, to which the royal family of Persia belonged (Herod. i.). I only beg to remind the reader of what was said above (*Inscrift. von Gartass*, No. 22) from Theophilus (*ad Autolyce.*) about the phylae of Alexandria, and a similar registration in the *γένος* to which the family of the Lagidae belonged, must probably be conceived only in the case of those who were declared *συγγενεῖς*, until in the course of time this may have been neglected. The terms *pater* and *frater*, which were so commonly employed in the age of the Antonines, and of which we have lately been reminded by the letters of Fronto, as well as the expression *parens karissime* of the imperial rescripts, and the patrician title *pater Augusti* probably originated in those

but he was the favorite of the Romans. In the meantime, however, Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV., who had been sent to Rome as a hostage, had made his escape and returned to Syria, shortly before the outbreak of the last Punic war. "This young man had attached himself to Polybius and the exiled Achaeans; he had in vain asked permission to return, until at last he escaped with the assistance of Polybius. Now, although we know the violence of the Roman government, and may thank God that we live in happier times, yet there existed at Rome a liberty in writing, of which we can hardly form any idea. We become aware of this, when we see how frankly Polybius in his history owns that he aided Demetrius in his escape; according to our present notions any government would punish such an act. This is a proof that, in regard to moral relations, the most different ideas prevail at different times about offences against the state.

Demetrius, who was expected to be more energetic than he really was, found many followers in Syria; he was victorious everywhere, caused the child to be murdered, and made himself master of the whole Syrian monarchy as far as Babylon, where one Timarchus acted the part of a tyrant (Olymp. 154, 3). He delivered Babylon from the tyrant, and hence received the surname of Soter. Media and Persia, under these circumstances, seem to have fallen into the hands of the Parthians; it is highly probable that this loss occurred at this time, for Antiochus Epiphanes was still in possession of those countries." The Romans allowed Demetrius to act as he pleased, for their policy then was to shut their eyes, until an opportunity for revenge presented itself.

"But Demetrius did not answer the expectations formed of him, and the activity of his enemies made him sink in public opinion; and thus he was soon hated by the fickle Antiochians. The Antiochians, as we find them in the time of Julian and Theodosius, were witty, but without character, and in their friendship there was no object. There can be no doubt that Antioch was constituted as a Greek city. In the commentary of St. Jerome on Daniel, there occurs a passage, which shows that there was a government in the city, which was not without authority. The population consisted of all sorts of people,

oriental relations; and in the East, too, such titles re-appear in the Mahomedan empires."—ED.]

including Greeks and Macedonians; but the great body were Syrians, an excellent people, but good for nothing when governed in any other way than by kadis, according to the eastern fashion; under the dominion of the Greeks they had been admitted as free subjects. Hence this people was never in a good understanding with its king." Demetrius had concluded a treaty with the Jews, acknowledged their independence, and kept Jewish mercenaries in the mutinous city of Antioch. This attempt to keep the nation down by means of foreign troops, excited great exasperation against the king among the Antiochians; "and the irritation at length became so strong, that Demetrius ordered his body-guard to plunder the city.⁶ Thus an insurrection broke out in the country, and the Syrians looked for assistance to Egypt.

Ptolemy Philometor, who had arrived at the age of mature manhood, was still reigning there. After the war of Antiochus, he reigned in common with his brother, Ptolemy Euergetes II. (from Olymp. 152, 2, to 154, 1). A dispute then arose between the two brothers, in consequence of which and in order to restore peace, Ptolemy Euergetes received Cyrene as a separate state. Cyrene had become connected with Egypt through Berenice; in the reign of Philopator and Epiphanes it was again separated from it and governed as a republic, and now it became the principality of Ptolemy Euergetes. Ptolemy Philometor, who, after the first three, was one of the best among the Egyptian kings, was, nevertheless, a weak man: he was under the unworthy influence of the Jews, and of his wife Cleopatra, so that he was in perpetual disputes with the rabbis; but he was a mild ruler. His mother, Cleopatra, was a Syrian princess; and for this reason he now raised claims to the Syrian throne. But before he himself came forward, he urged on Balas, a young man, who gave himself out to be a natural son of Antiochus Epiphanes, of the name of Alexander, to claim the throne. Balas caused the people to rise, and the hatred of Demetrius was so strong, that the Syrians recognised Balas and proclaimed him king. He then married a daughter of Ptolemy Philometor, who came to his assistance against Demetrius. In a battle which ensued, the latter lost his kingdom and his life.

"Ptolemy Philometor, in his turn, now endeavoured to

⁶ This probably refers to Demetrius II., and not to Demetrius I.—Ed.

deprive Alexander of his kingdom; and his administration was in fact so bad, that" the Syrians gave the diadem to Ptolemy. Henceforth this history is very complicated. Demetrius had two sons, Demetrius and Antiochus, whom, in the time of his distress, he had sent to Cnidus. Demetrius II., the elder of the two, now returned to Syria. "As Balas perished, and Ptolemy Philometor fell in a pitched battle against Alexander, Demetrius prudently availing himself of these circumstances, made himself master of Syria, and became king (Olymp. 158, 3).

Demetrius II. was not wanting in ability, but his kingdom was in an unfortunate condition." Syria had at that time already lost all the satrapies in Upper Asia. Whether a portion of Cilicia still belonged to it is uncertain; Babylon formed a part of the empire as late as the beginning of Demetrius' reign. But this is the period at which the Parthian empire established itself.

The Parthians belong to Chorassan and Persistan; whether they belonged to the Iranian race, cannot be said with certainty. According to what the ancients say about the Parthians, they must be regarded as wandering tribes, like the Kurd, Turkish, and Turanian tribes in Persia; and it is probable that the Parthians, even before Alexander's time, wandered about in Chorassan in the same warlike manner as the tribes just mentioned, although the country is not one suited to nomades. Their subjugation was not difficult to Alexander; during the reign of the first Seleucidae, they were subject to them; but under Antiochus Theos, or Seleucus Callinicus, more probably under the former, they revolted. The dates do not agree with history; much has been conjectured about them, but the facts are well known, and certain it is, that they extended their dominions even before Seleucus Callinicus. Chorassan is separated by nature from western Iran in such a manner, that even in the ninth century, under the Thaherids, etc., it was quite independent from the Kaliphs. It is there that we find in the kingdom of Bactria and Balkh quite a mysterious Greek empire; it is possible, that in the course of time, many Greeks may have gone thither, but we do not know how it originated; all that is certain is, that it was an empire of great extent. Western India, as far as the Indus and the point where it is separated from eastern India by the great sandy desert, belonged

to it. By the side of it there existed the Parthian empire. The Bactrian empire was destroyed by the inroads of the Tartars and by the Parthians. The latter appear in history about 240 B.C., A.U.C. 510; but in 130 B.C., A.U.C. 620, they were already masters of the upper provinces. Media had already separated itself several times from the Syrian empire, and in the time of Demetrius it was an independent kingdom governed by one Antiochus. In the time of Balas, the Parthians under Mithridates the Great subdued Media, and Babylon was tributary to them. Demetrius waged war against them with great success, and acquired much renown; but fortune soon turned her back upon him, and owing to the tactics of the Parthians, he was defeated and taken prisoner (Olymp. 159, 4) "and for a series of years he was kept in captivity."

During this captivity several inter-reigns occurred, and henceforth quarrels and wars broke out between the two lines of Demetrius and his brother Antiochus. Until the latter came over, a native of Syria, Diodotus of Apamea, took possession of the throne. The connection among the several parts of the empire was so shaken, that the king could maintain himself only by force, and during these extortions and acts of violence, it required only a trifling occasion to bring about a change on the throne. Diodotus therefore set up against Demetrius one Antiochus, a son of Alexander Balas, who was yet a child, as the legitimate heir to the throne, and himself as regent or prince with the same rights. But when Demetrius was taken prisoner, and Diodotus found many followers, he got rid of the child Antiochus, changed his name into Tryphon, and then reigned himself, while Demetrius was kept as a prisoner among the Parthians. His undertaking against Judaea was insignificant. But his yoke was heavy to bear, and the Antiochians being accustomed to legitimate, hereditary kings, felt how beneficial a hereditary government was to the internal consolidation of the people. Hence it was to be expected, that as the usurper did not make himself popular by a better system of government, Antiochus Sidetes, the brother of Demetrius II., would find numerous followers. Moreover, the Egyptian princess, Cleopatra, the wife of Demetrius, who had been left behind (she had before been married to Balas) was ready to marry any king who offered himself, in order that she might be queen and regent; and she now invited Antiochus Sidetes to return.

When the latter came to Syria, Cleopatra used her influence in his favour, the gates were thrown open to him, and Tryphon lost his throne and his life (Olymp, 160, 2).

Antiochus now without difficulty took possession of the government. He commenced his career as an active and able prince, and restored Syria, which was then of the same extent as a modern European kingdom. "He consolidated what was falling to pieces; proofs of this are found in Josephus, though his history of this period is extremely meagre.⁷ We see from it how completely Coelesyria was disorganised; we find rulers until then unknown, tetrarchs and ethnarchs, who now occur for the first time, without its being known how they originated. The title tetrarch is difficult to explain. They were, probably, tax-gatherers, and were in the same relation as the farmers of the revenue, so that whatever they raised beyond a certain sum was for themselves. Besides this revenue they had also the civil and criminal jurisdiction in their districts. We now also find the Phœnician towns as independent states, as is clear from their coins." It must be mentioned in particular, that Antiochus Sidetes conquered Jerusalem, and compelled the high-priest, Hyrcanus, to submit and recognise him as his feudal lord.

"In Judæa, as we see from the history of Judas, the latter was not recognised by the Syrian king as high-priest; Jonathan, on the other hand, was recognised as high-priest, and as possessing the authority of that dignity, but without the title of prince, and Simon was the first that was formally and fully recognised by Alexander Balas as a prince; so that even official documents were dated according to the year of his accession, as for example, in the first year of Simon the high-priest and ethnarch of Judæa. And this was a recognition of his sovereignty, just as much as when the Orientals mention the name in their prayers(?). The immense number of coins with the date of Simon's reign are lasting monuments of his government.⁸ He greatly

⁷ "In an Italian library there existed a third book of Maccabees, as a continuation of the book of Maccabees from the time of John Hyrcanus. No part of it is now extant except a notice of the librarian; the book is burnt. This would be an irreparable loss, if it were not that we must suppose that the history was as incomplete as that in Josephus, as both had the same materials for the reign of Hyrcanus."—1826.

⁸ "These coins have often been described by numismatists, but the most interesting question connected with them has never been raised, I mean the

extended his country, and principality; but after a reign of four years he was murdered, and was succeeded by his son John Hyrcanus. But before the Jews had time to extend their dominion further, they were visited by a fresh calamity. Owing to the misfortune of the Syrians they had become strong; but when Antiochus Sidetes had ascended the throne he assembled his forces, and compelled Jerusalem to surrender (Olymp. 162, 1). Josephus, from a stupid national vanity, has disguised this fact; but the Syrian history of Porphyrius, and the Armenian translation of Eusebius, expressly state, that the city surrendered on account of want of provisions, and that the Syrians demolished its walls. Hyrcanus was reduced to a condition little above that of a dependent high-priest and ethnarch; he was, however, not tributary, and was only obliged to accompany Antiochus on his expedition against the Parthians."

For Antiochus, after having consolidated his empire, undertook an expedition into upper Asia to deliver his brother; "but, of course, at the same time hoping to recover the conquered provinces from the Parthians. He was at first successful, and the large cities which, owing to their hellenic organisation, were connected with the Seleucidae, and hated the Parthians as a nomadic and very oppressive people, prepared a welcome reception for Antiochus." He penetrated far into the Parthian territory, even to the mountains of Kurdistan. "He might now have concluded peace, but disdained it. The captive, Demetrius II., was now married to Rhodogune, a Parthian princess, and" the Parthian king, Arsaces, dismissed him from captivity, and sent him as a vassal prince of the Parthian empire, with an army into Syria to cause the country to revolt against Antiochus. Demetrius was base enough to do this, and the Syrian empire was thrown into the greatest confusion. The situation of Antiochus became very difficult, but even independently of this, the result would have been the same. He was surrounded in the mountains of Kurdistan,

question, how it happened that in his reign such a vast quantity of money was coined, and none in the reigns of his sons. There is only one coin of Hyrcanus extant, and his descendants had all Greek coins. This mystery must, I think, be solved by the supposition that the Jews after his reign continued to coin money with the sign and name of Simon, in remembrance of his delivering Zion."—1826.

and things then happened as they always do in the East, where the military power of a new nation is always superior to that of the old one: Antiochus perished with his whole army (Olymp. 162, 3).

The complete dissolution of the empire now commences. Demetrius again became master of Syria. Babylon was the *praemium belli* for the Parthians. But Demetrius did not reign long in Syria as a vassal prince of Parthia, for he was cruelly murdered by his wife Cleopatra, who was determined to rule herself (Olymp. 163. 1); for this reason she also killed her son, Seleucus V., who had succeeded Demetrius, and she then entered upon the government (Olymp. 163, 4). All these scenes of horror caused no sensation among the people, for they were accustomed to them; but Cleopatra was put to death by her other son, Antiochus.

Owing to this state of dissolution, Coelesyria and Judaea separated themselves from the Syrian empire. Coelesyria was a country surpassing all the kingdoms of Europe in fertility, but it seemed too small for its inhabitants, because they did not know how to make use of its resources. John Hyrcanus now ruled as ethnarch, quite unconcerned about the supremacy of Antiochus. So far as we can see from Josephus, it is clear, that he now conquered the Philistine towns, such as Gaza, Ascalon, and others. He also conquered Samaria, which was most offensive to the Jews, because its ancient Mosaic religion formed a strong contrast to the Jewish rabbinism. Samaria was completely destroyed by Hyrcanus, with the most inveterate national and religious hatred. He also extended his dominion in the direction of the Phoenician coast towns, and conquered the Idumaeans (Edomites). They then occupied the whole of the southern mountainous district of Judaea, and no longer occur in the country to which they are assigned in the Mosaic writings, that is, between the Dead Sea and Acabah; they now inhabited the country near the Nabathaeans, from the southern hills of the Dead Sea as far as the frontiers of Egypt. The Edomites or Idumaeans were subdued, and, contrary to the Mosaic law, according to which the Edomites were not to be admitted, they were compelled to become Jews. Many Greek places in Peraea still show by their ruins, how highly the country was civilised.

But although the family of Hyrcanus was outwardly

prosperous, it was not so internally: he was hated by the Pharisees. The first traces of Pharisaism occur in his time; but still we must not suppose, that Pharisees did not exist even as early as the building of the second temple, although their name may not be mentioned. Their character was developed only by degrees: when the life of the Jewish religion disappeared with its prophets, the class of learned interpreters of the Scriptures, commonly called scribes, began to come forward more prominently. Now the Pharisees, in the time of Hyrcanus, formed a strong opposition party, which was the more dangerous, as under the most frivolous pretexts they threatened to overthrow the family of the Maccabees; for according to the letter of the law the dignity of high-priest did not belong to that family; but it assuredly had a better title to it, than those who had evidently sold their religion and their country, and were the crouching slaves of tyrants. Rebellions and conspiracies occurred even in his reign. Hyrcanus punished them with cruel executions, and thus his last year was darkened by the recollection of the atrocity and cruelty into which he was drawn by the seditious party of the Pharisees.

He was succeeded by his son Judas, who assumed the name of Aristobulus. This latter, as Jewish high-priest, had a number of Hellenic subjects, whom he endeavoured to win over in the same way as the Parthian kings did, by adopting a Greek name. He also ruled with great toleration over the Greeks, and they were much esteemed by him; many Jewish kings ruled in the Greek towns according to the Greek usage, and received from them all marks of honor. But this often gave rise to a conflict between Judaism and Hellenism. His son imitating his father's example called himself Alexander Jannaeus. In the case of Aristobulus, the Jewish name still predominated, but in that of his son the Greek name is placed first, and even Jannaeus cannot be explained by means of the Hebrew. His principality was not insignificant, and his reign was not inglorious: it is reviled by Josephus, who was a thorough Pharisee, and therefore places the reign of Alexander in the most unfavourable light. The Pharisees were obstinate fanatics, and in their opposition and obstinacy they were ready to become martyrs, but without having any object: they were animated by the same fury with which the zealots raged, who, when masters of Jerusalem exercised such a tyranny that the people

looked upon the conquest of the Romans as a relief. Thus Alexander is described as a bloody tyrant. His dominion when compared with that of Herod is indeed not large, but still of considerable extent. It is said that he derived his wealth from excessive extortion, and that the public burdens under him were terrible. But if we look at his reign with impartial eyes, we find that it was a happy period, and the shedding of blood was the consequence of Pharisaic intrigues alone. Alexander left behind him two sons, Aristobulus and Hyrcanus; the latter obtained the dignity of high-priest, and the former the government of the country."

In the meantime, Syria was torn to pieces and ravaged by the constant wars between the two lines of Demetrius II. and Antiochus Sidetes, without these wars leading to any decisive result. The murdered Seleucus V. was succeeded by Antiochus Grypus, a son of Demetrius II., who for a time ruled over the ruins of the empire. But Antiochus Cyzicenus, a son of Antiochus Sidetes and Cleopatra, revolted against him, gained followers; and a long protracted war arose between Cyzicenus and Grypus, until they became reconciled. In the treaty, which they concluded in the end, the empire was divided, and on that occasion one part of Syria was entirely separated from it. At last, however, Antiochus Cyzicenus acquired the portion of Grypus also, and for a time ruled over the whole. "But after this a war broke out between Antiochus and the sons of Grypus." Cyzicenus left behind him five sons, who again carried on angry and protracted wars against the sons of Grypus, and among one another. The empire was completely broken up, each of the sons of Cyzicenus maintaining his share. The Phœnician towns were now completely separated from Syria, and existed as republics. The last survivor of the warring princes was Antiochus Eusebes, a grandson of Cyzicenus, whom most chronologers call Antiochus XIII. But he possessed only a small portion of Syria; all the rest of the empire, headed by Antioch, had surrendered to Tigranes of Armenia, although Antioch was a Greek city (Olymp. 174, 2): "such was the misery of the country. Tigranes united the separate parts of Syria and Antiochia, and retained possession of them for some time." Antiochus Eusebes sought the assistance of the Romans, and during the second Mithridatic war he went to Rome, and by means of his father's treasures endeavoured to purchase the

interest of the Romans, just as an Indian dynasty, after the breaking up of the Mongol dynasty, possessed influence only on account of the treasures of its ancestors. He was treated at Rome for a long time in a humiliating manner, but effected nothing. He accordingly returned, and when Pompey had taken Syria from Tigranes, Antiochus endeavoured to obtain it; but he received only the small principality of Commagene (Olymp. 179, 1), which continued to belong to the Seleucidae down to the time of Vespasian; "there they lived as a wealthy but politically insignificant family."

In this manner the Syrian empire was broken up: Asia again became completely Asiatic, and Babylonia, Hyrcania, Media, and Bactria were incorporated with the Parthian empire.

The Parthians were essentially different from the Persians, who had their national peculiarities and the peculiar Magian religion of Zoroaster. The Parthians had no such religion, did not regard themselves, like the Persians, as natural adversaries of the Greeks, but began to assimilate themselves to them, and their kings called themselves *φιλέλληνες*. They were much more uncivilised than the Persians, but had everything Greek, like the Thracians and Illyrians; all their coins bear Greek inscriptions, and there are no Parthian coins at all with Parthian characters, but we invariably find, *e. g.* : *βασιλεὺς Ἀρθάκης φιλέλλην*, and their chronology was the era of the Seleucidae, beginning with A. U. C. 442. The Parthians seem at all times to have been a barbarous people; as they did not reach the civilisation of the Orientals, they remained what they were; for Greek culture was too far above them, for them to reach it. The Greek inscriptions on their coins (probably struck at Seleucia) became more and more barbarous, until, in the end, they are so bad that we can only guess what they are. Their empire was a large feudal empire, and they are, therefore, called by the Orientals kings of nations and kings of countries. They had no satraps, but in every country, as in Persia and Media, they left a vassal prince, who was obliged to support them with troops. We see this at a later period in Armenia, which afterwards, likewise, became subject to them; for Armenia, under its own kings, continued to form a kingdom by itself. It is strange that the Parthian empire maintained itself so long, for it was a weak state, its defence consisting only in its vast extent and its inaccessible

frontiers; and it was owing to these circumstances that the Romans were unable to conquer it.

The state of Pergamus in Asia Minor, after having been small for a long time, became great after the war of Antiochus, by means of the provinces which the Romans gave to it. Its distance protected it against the indignation of the Romans, which was shown especially towards Eumenes. His brother Attalus intrigued against him, but Eumenes died at the right time, and the kingdom of Pergamus was saved for the present. In ancient times Pergamus is not mentioned. It was quite a small and insignificant place—a mountain fort, which became important only in the course of time; it had no *κτίστης*, and is not mentioned at all among the Aeolian places. Under its kings it became prosperous, large, and important, “not only on account of fine buildings and wealth, but on account of the cultivation of the arts and literature.” It was the seat of a school of literature, and there was a literary rivalry between Pergamus and Alexandria. The literature of Alexandria had been completely changed since the time of Ptolemy Euergetes. The mathematical school remained, being continued by a *διαδοχή*, though it was less and less distinguished for its great men, and flourished down to the third century of our era: mathematics, at least, did not go backward. But literature became quite extinct, and from the time of Ptolemy Philopator there is no trace of poets or any really good writers; there were, indeed, authors and historians, and even the monster, Ptolemy Physcon, was an author of talent (what is quoted from him by Athenaeus is interesting), but the noble Muse of literature had disappeared. There remained only grammar, which from the time of Eratosthenes was more and more developed. Eratosthenes was the first who was called *γραμματικός*; but the idea then connected with this word was that of an interpreter and connoisseur of literature. All that which had until then been pursued without method, *e.g.*, the criticism of poets and philology, now assumed a definite form, especially since the time of Aristarchus, at the beginning of the seventh century of Rome. At Pergamus, also, a grammatical school existed, the development of which was very great, and for a time even poetical literature flourished there; but it never was of any great importance, and never could be compared with that of Alexandria. Pergamus, moreover, contained the

second great library in the ancient world. The art of painting was encouraged particularly by the liberality of Attalus I. The course of Greek art runs parallel with that of the political history, and the history of the later period of Greek art is neglected as much as the later political history. The ornamental arts, which require more skill than genius, may indeed be encouraged by the liberality of a prince, but genius in painting, as well as in poetry, cannot.

Under Attalus, the successor of the last Eumenes, Pergamus reached the height of its prosperity. He left behind him one son, who was a peculiarly fearful specimen of humanity—a man, in whom absolute wickedness and malice settle into a deep-rooted madness—a satanic genius, who delights in evil and in destruction: such characters are not uncommon in eastern dynasties. He took a delight in frightening and destroying his own friends. He was not without knowledge, but his chief study was the botany of poisonous plants; he murdered his own mother, and was mad like Caligula. In order to end in bringing misery upon his country, he bequeathed it to the Romans (Olymp. 161, 4). The entrance upon this inheritance, however, was made difficult for them by Aristonicus, a bastard of the late Eumenes, an excellent and worthy man. Supported only by Asiatic troops, and under most unfavourable circumstances, he maintained himself for some years against the Roman armies, defeated them, and made Roman generals his prisoners; but he succumbed in the end to the military discipline and valour of the Romans in a glorious manner (Olymp. 162, 3). His death is no disgrace to him, although it was ignominious. After this the Romans divided western Asia, and gave away a part of it. There now remained only two principalities in Asia Minor—Bithynia and Pontus.

I have already spoken of Bithynia in my account of the war of Perseus, when Prusias, for a time, was hostile against the Romans. But after the peace he went to Rome, where he obtained pardon by the lowest humiliation. He gave his son Nicomedes as a hostage, and the Romans afterwards armed him against his father. When he returned, his father, suspecting him, aimed at his life; but the son, anticipating him, murdered his father. Nicomedes was recognised by the Romans; and he, together with Mithridates of Pontus, were

allies of the Romans against Aristonicus. After the defeat of the latter, both were rewarded with presents: Mithridates obtained Great Phrygia, and from the fragments of Caius Gracchus⁹ we can see that these concessions were made to them in the same way in which Talleyrand, in 1802, at Ratisbon and Paris, sold territories to the German princes.

Mithridates was descended from the ancient seven princes of the Persians, and this princely family had established itself in Cappadocia and Pontus. Cappadocia and Pontus were Aramaic countries, at least an Aramaic people ruled there ever since the time of the Assyrians; but it is probable that they existed in those countries even at an earlier period. In the time of Antigonus the one-eyed, a certain Mithridates was ruler in those parts. His family branched off in two lines, one of which received Cappadocia in a narrower sense, and the other the principality of Pontus. These principalities were very hostile to each other. The kingdom of Pontus was particularly extended under Pharnaces, at the time of the Hannibalian war; it subdued the Greek towns on the coast. Such things, in a barbarous state, always form the beginning of a new era. Pontus now became a wealthy country. Pharnaces' son was named Mithridates, and at his death he left behind him the great Mithridates as a mere child.

During the minority of the latter, the Romans treated him with unexampled injustice. They first took from him Phrygia, because their attention had been directed to the importance of that state. This he never forgot. But they also endeavoured to injure him otherwise in every possible way, and to limit his powers more and more. Under these circumstance he grew up thirsting for revenge. During the Cimbrian war, the Romans had no time to keep their eyes upon him. He was a man of a great mind, and having now grown up to the age of manhood, he formed a profound plan of revenge. He first tried to strengthen his kingdom, and that too in the most distant parts, where the Romans could not interfere. Thus he carried on wars in the Crimea, on the Bosphorus as far as the Borysthenes, and there subdued all the nations as far as the Dniestr. His general, Neoptolemus, built fortresses there. His whole plan was directed against Rome; and had he been a contemporary of Hannibal, it is very probable that Rome

⁹ Gellius, *N. A.*, xi. 10, 4.

would have been crushed. If he had only had another people than Asiatics, the destruction of Rome would have been possible. All his designs were excellent, but all failed in their execution on account of the miserable character of his subjects. His plan, even at an early period, was to throw the barbarous nations of the Bastarnae and Getae from Dacia upon Italy, while he himself was to attack the Romans in Asia and Greece, and expel them from those countries. On this subject I refer you to my Lectures on Roman history. The wars are extremely memorable. If we judge of him from the ill-success of his undertakings, we wrong him: the fault of the unsuccessful issue of the war of his generals, Archelaus and Taxilas, is not his. Whatever he himself did was excellent: it was he who devised the plans at that time, when being confined to himself alone, and quite repressed by the Romans, he rallied again, and was conquered only through exhaustion, the unfitness of his Asiatics, and the good fortune of Pompey.

Bithynia had been bequeathed to the Romans by the will of the last Nicomedes. A similar will of Ptolemy Alexander was spoken of at Rome, which he was said to have made at Tyre, when he was expelled from Alexandria; and upon the ground of this alleged will, the Romans claimed the sovereignty over his dominions.¹⁰

The fate of Alexandria had been very sad ever since the death of Ptolemy Epiphanes, when the two brothers Ptolemy Philometor and Physcon obtained the supreme power. Philometor was unquestionably the best of the later Ptolemies, and Physcon was the most talented, but thoroughly wicked. We have seen that the two brothers at first reigned conjointly, and then carried on war against each other, until Physcon or Euergetes II. withdrew to Cyrene, and that Philometor lost his life in Syria. After the death of Philometor, Euergetes, who had already acted at Cyrene as an infuriated tyrant, returned; this caused an insurrection, and hence his deadly hatred of Alexandria and its Graeco-Macedonian citizens. He ruled by

¹⁰ "In the short sketch of the history of Egypt which I am going to give you, I want to direct your attention particularly to two points, respecting which erroneous opinions are generally entertained. Peter Eckhel, an ornament of our country, who without being a philologist had a correct philological tact, has thrown much light upon this period in his work *Doctrina Nummorum*. But in a work of such magnitude it was impossible to avoid all errors, especially in regard to the later years."—1826.

means of mercenaries in the same manner in which Agathocles had ruled at Syracuse, and in a most horrible massacre he extirpated the whole of the old Greek and Macedonian population. Polybius who, together with the Roman ambassador Scipio or T. Mummius, saw Alexandria in his reign, states that the Graeco-Macedonian population was destroyed by him, and that the citizens of Alexandria consisted of a populace assembled there from all parts of the world. The city now completely assumed the character of an Egyptian town. It must be remarked, however, that Euergetes was not wanting either in knowledge or in ability. He even wrote memoirs, which, to judge from the passages quoted from it, must have been of considerable historical interest. The disgusting custom of marrying their sisters had been common in the family of the Ptolemies, ever since the time of Ptolemy II. Several physiologists maintain, that when near relations are married to each other, physical and moral deterioration, and crippled and scrofulous constitutions are, with very few exceptions, the necessary consequences. This is a general rule, and the laws forbidding such marriages are founded on sound principles. Nay, even in villages, where marriages are contracted among the villagers themselves, we often see crippled, idiotic, and wretched generations. According to this observation, we cannot wonder that there arose among the Ptolemies, who married their own sisters, such a degeneracy of both body and soul: a manifest curse hangs over the Ptolemies. Ptolemy Philometor was married to his sister Cleopatra, and had a daughter by her. When, after the death of his brother, Physcon undertook the government, he first married his brother's widow, and then her daughter who was likewise called Cleopatra, and acts a prominent part in Egyptian history. I do not intend to relate to you the horrors of Physcon, I will only mention that he caused the son of Cleopatra to be murdered, and ordered the corpse to be taken to her. His wife, the sister of the murdered child, showed no trace of revenge, and was as indifferent as if one of her courtiers had been killed. In Physcon's will, she was appointed his successor, and "his two sons, Ptolemy and Alexander, became her colleagues (Olymp. 166, 1).

"The mother favoured the younger son, while the people and the soldiers preferred Ptolemy, the elder, who is surnamed Soter; but the people called him by the Egyptian name Lathurus, the meaning of which is unknown. These two

names have been the cause of much confusion, and have led people to believe that there were two Ptolemies. Eckhel has corrected the mistake, and shown that both names belong to one individual, the one being an honourable surname, and the other a nickname. He obtained the government, and reigned conjointly with his mother for nine years: he must have been a good-natured man, and was as popular as his mother was hated. Alexander, the younger, reigned during this period as nominal king at Pelusium; but with the aid of his mother, he expelled his brother, and then reigned with Cleopatra alone. "One of the inscriptions of Philae shows that this Alexander was not called Ptolemy." Ptolemy Soter then went to Cyprus; but it is doubtful whether he remained there, or whether after meeting with an obstinate resistance he was obliged to quit the island. Between Cleopatra and her son there soon arose a hatred, such as was common among men at that period, and the son murdered his mother. She deserved no pity; but Alexander being now expelled by the Alexandrians, proceeded to Cilicia and Pamphylia. "Soter still continued to reign for some time. The condition of Egypt was truly deplorable. We do not find a trace of the beneficial institutions of the earlier Ptolemies; the monuments perished, the Greek character disappears more and more, and the Jewish population becomes hellenised; everything is of foreign origin, imperfect and bad." Egypt had lost all its possessions with the exception of Cyprus and Cyrene, and these latter countries were given as separate principalities, to princes of the royal family. Cyrene was now bequeathed by will to the Romans (Olymp. 171, 1), and Cyprus was soon after taken by them.

"Ptolemy Soter died (Olymp. 174, 4) without leaving any legitimate children. A daughter of Ptolemy Physcon now married Alexander III., a son of Alexander I. He thus ascended the throne, but in the spirit of that dynasty, he murdered the old princess on the nineteenth day after his accession. This act called forth an insurrection, in which the infuriated people slew him. His brother, Alexander III., now ascended the throne, but he too was expelled by the Alexandrians (Olymp. 178, 3). What was now to be done about the succession? for Ptolemy Soter's brother, Alexander I., had died at Tyre. He is the one who is said to

have bequeathed the kingdom to the Romans: one of the ordinary means by which at that time a king took vengeance on his own country. It was however perhaps a mere report; but the Romans made use of it as a pretext for seizing the country, and they would have done so, had they not been prevented by their own civil wars. The Egyptians were now left to choose for themselves, and those who had the power, elected an illegitimate son of Ptolemy Soter, called "Ptolemy νέος Διόνυσος, or by a nickname, Auletes, on account of his great vulgarity, and because it alluded to the only thing in which he showed any ability. "These two names have produced the same mistake as those of his father, who was surnamed Soter and Lathurus; but they *must* be assigned to one and the same person. The confusion in this case is the greater because his reign was of long duration; and even Eckhel here allowed himself to be deceived, for he speaks of two different persons.¹¹ Ptolemy Soter had two illegitimate sons; the younger, who was king of Cyprus, was deposed by the Romans, on the ground of the alleged will of Alexander; the elder was Ptolemy νέος Διόνυσος."

The latter, the father of Cleopatra, the most contemptible among the later Ptolemies, now undertook the government. "His kingdom was confined within its own boundaries, and the empire which once excited the envy of the world, was now deficient in agriculture. The government was wretched, and was in the hands of the basest and most abject persons. The Alexandrians, moreover, were a restless people, and" thus his reign became so insufferable to them that they expelled him. They then proclaimed a princess Berenice, "the eldest daughter of Auletes, regent; and besides her they appointed a council, in which again the administrators of the kingdom are called *συγγενεῖς*." Ptolemy Auletes went to Rome, wishing to draw the Romans into his interest. The intelligent among the Romans would not interfere, and as in bad times bad arguments also are used for a good object, they produced a forged Sibylline oracle which forbade the expedition to Egypt. But Ptolemy remained at Rome for a long time," borrowing incre-

¹¹ "There is still much confusion among the Alexanders. A passage of Porphyrius clearly shows, that Alexander II. was slain on the nineteenth day after his accession; but the one who in his will left the country to the Romans, was Alexander I., a brother of Ptolemy Soter, who wandered about in Cyprus."
—1826. (Comp. *Klein. Schrift*, vol. i. p. 302.)

dible sums, by means of which he bought over the leading men in the senate, without, however, gaining the object he desired. At a later period, however, he was put in possession of his kingdom by Gabinius, the governor of Syria, "the most inveterate enemy of Cicero, to whom the king promised a sum of upwards of two millions sterling, which the Roman was to extort from the Egyptians by commissioners" (Olymp. 181, 2). We may easily imagine what bloody vengeance he took; Gabinius did not indeed receive the promised sum, but Egypt was plunged into the deepest misery in order to raise the money which had been squandered at Rome.

After his death there followed the period of the Pharsalian war. "His daughter Cleopatra, yet a young girl, reigned conjointly with her still younger brothers, one of whom was surnamed *Διώνος*. Both were mere puppets, though the elder distinguished himself a little in the war against Julius Caesar." When after this Caesar came to Alexandria, "Cleopatra won his affections and became queen of Egypt, at first conjointly with her second brother, but afterwards alone, the younger brother also dying soon after. She then married Antony and lived with him, until the battle of Actium decided the fate of Egypt, and Cleopatra made away with herself." Respecting all these points I must refer you to my Lectures on Roman history.

THE END.

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* * The Roman numerals indicate the volumes, the Arabic figures the pages, and the letter *n* the notes.

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
- Page 91, line 17, *for* Allyattes, *read* Alyattes.
„ 123, „ 19, *for* sont, *read* son.
„ 201, „ 4, *for* Peloponnessus, *read* Peloponnesus.
„ 304, „ 13, *for* justly, *read* unjustly.
„ 324, last line, *for* Hellones, *read* Hellenes.
„ 355, line 2, *for* where, *read* were.

VOL. II.

- Page 58, line 4, *strike out the word* not.
„ 76, „ 11, *for* Cobbet, *read* Cobbett.
„ 104, „ 17, *for* Caathaginians, *read* Carthaginians
„ 142, „ 30, *for* he, *read* Pisander.
„ 166, „ 19, *for* loquunter, *read* loquuntur.
„ 191, „ 9 from bottom, *for* they, *read* the.
„ 341, „ 14, *for* ad, *read* had.

VOL. III.

- Page 16, line 29, *for* have might, *read* might have.
„ 140, „ 17, *for* enabled, *read* unable.
„ 270, last line, *for* Boetians, *read* Boeotians.



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